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ABSTRACT
This thesis offers a development of work on and with L. J. J. 
Wittgenstein by R. Bambrough (1969 etc), S. Cavell (1979 etc), J. C. 
Edwards (1982), P. Hacker (1986 etc), F. Kerr (1986), N. Lash (1988), N, 
Malcolm (1960 etc), D. Pears (1987 etc), D. Z. Phillips (1965 etc), R. 
White (1982), P. Winch (1972 etc) and others.
It is argued that all Wittgenstein’s philosophical work coheres with his 
inclusive spirituality, Jewish and Christian, in seeking to express the 
dialectics of the sublime in the pedestrian. The most important 
chapters (one, seven and eight) cannot be fully understood without the 
others.
Wittgenstein’s inclusive concern with transforming philosophy, himself 
and all friends within reach, expresses his sense of responsibility for 
the language that we use and have, share and actively are. This 
intensive and comprehensive responsibility, with eschatological and 
apocalyptic affinities, shows in his ethics of descriptive grammar. 
Since languages and concepts are ways and means for procedural 
knowledge, his ethics of description is also an ethics, aesthetics and 
theology of perceptive equilibration in understanding, interpretation 
and family-resemblances. Inclusive spirituality involves Anselmian 
transcendence.
Wittgenstein’s inclusive spirituality is maintained to be a revised and 
radicalised version of Augustine’s regulative dialectics of inclusive 
grammar, free from his exclusive theories of language-development and 
predestination. Wittgenstein’s simplest and potentially most powerful 
presentation of Augustine’s grammar is the third "great difficulty" in 
his ethics of 1929. This integrates Wittgenstein’s work as a vital open
system, akin to eastern trinitarianism. His dialectics of the sublime 
are related to William James, Tolstoy, Emerson, Pascal, Hamann, Kant, 
Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Kraus, Weininger, Dostoevsky, Barth and 
others. Convergences between Wittgenstein and Barth are considered, 
particularly with regard to the letter's lecture on ethics, published in 
1924 (1928 in English), and the beginning of Church Dogmatics (1932
onwards). Wittgenstein's theological and religious reticence is finally 
argued to be his way of leaving his gift before the place where 
sacrifice was once offered, as he works on his remembering of 
unreconciled others. (Matthew 5:23-24). His "third (greatest) 
difficulty" is the greatest difficulty.
15 August 1988
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
As formally declared above, the following thesis has not previously been 
presented for a higher degree. It has been composed as independently as 
possible of a thesis for which the University of Dundee awarded me an 
M.Ed. degree in 1980. That thesis has been made available to my St 
Andrews supervisors.
This is the appropriate point at which to explain something about the 
relationship between the Dundee thesis and the present one. The 1980 
thesis marched under the bold banner of "Reason, Religion and Revision: 
a discussion of some aspects of the metamorphosis of rationality, 
spirituality and education after Wittgenstein, L.J.J". The present 
thesis is intended to be read, as it has been written, without further 
cross-reference (after this introduction) to the Dundee thesis being 
made or required for comprehension. However, I hope that the present 
thesis succeeds in both correcting and developing the former one. If it 
were to succeed in this task, at once both negative and positive, it 
could be considered as a contribution to a programme related to the work 
of those mentioned in the Abstract.
It may now be useful to quote, and comment briefly on, the summary of 
the 1980 thesis.
"The influence of Wittgenstein on thinking about rationality, religion 
and education is investigated and evaluated, partly through certain 
writers who respond to his provocation. The thesis aims at a synoptic 
illumination of Wittgenstein's sometimes fluid, fragmentary and elusive 
thinking about reason, spirituality, morality and the development of 
understanding.
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Wittgenstein’s earlier and later work is not fully comprehensible when 
abstracted from his overriding ethical-religious concern. Superficial 
familiarity with Wittgensteinian jargon militates against deeper 
understanding of his work. Wittgenstein’s legacy points towards 
revision of certain notions of rationality, spirituality and morality. 
Vulgar Wittgensteinian poses of cultural relativism and linguistic 
idealism are shallow responses to, and partial evasions of, this
challenge.
Wittgenstein’s work, for all its new aspects, is increasingly
intelligible and enlightening when understood in its complex
relationship with certain ancient traditions. His stress on competence, 
always partly tacit, makes it possible to elucidate a deep structure or 
pattern in assumptions about meaning, rationality and knowledge, which 
is centrally of an ethical-religious character. Assimilation of, and 
accommodation to, the view of education implicit in Wittgenstein’s
thought and practice has, if offered arguments are sound, barely begun. 
It promises to provide a 'way between the philistine machismo of the 
old-fashioned educational scrum, dead alike to religious image and 
critical imagination, and the infinite ego therapy pushed by the soft 
Utopians.’ (David Martin in The Spectator, 15 September 1979.)’’
The 1980 thesis investigated sceptically notions of "religion as a form 
of knowledge", with special reference to writings of P H Hirst. He is 
best known as a philosopher of education, who has contributed 
influentually to discussions of the curriculum in secondary education. 
Also investigated sceptically were notions of "religion as a form of 
life", associated with work by D Z Phillips and N Malcolm, and an idea 
of religion as essentially related to "the theistic universe of 
discourse", a theme developed by W D Hudson, author of various works 
dealing with Wittgenstein and religious belief.
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In contrast to those attempts to assimilate and interpret Wittgenstein, 
vulnerable in varying degrees to complaints about Wittgensteinian 
fideism, cultural relativism or linguistic idealism, and to complaints 
about apparent collusion with Ideological distortions of particular 
religious traditions (whether sectarian, political or metaphysical 
distortions), the Dundee thesis attempted to interpret "religion" as 
"the grammar of radical precariousness". "Precariousness" was used so 
as to evoke two main clusters of association: the predicament of those 
who seek a middle way, whether as Buddhists, Aristotelians, Thomists, 
Anglican Episcopalians, Hegelians, Kierkegaardians, or Nagelians, and 
the notion of such predicaments as evoking a prayer-like acknowledgement 
of responsibility which in itself might constitute an inclusive form of 
direction for living.
With reference to Thomas Nagel’s work in Mortal Questions (1979), 
especially his paper entitled "Subjective and Objective" which is the 
seed of his View From Nowhere (1986), I identified what I called "a deep 
structure or pattern in assumptions about meaning, rationality and 
knowledge ,.. centrally of an ethical-religious character". Exploration 
of this pattern was underdeveloped in the 1980 thesis, even though it 
was "pictured" in terms of a polar opposition which, by a Gestalt shift 
of vision, could also be seen as a continuum or dimension of mediation 
between opposing poles. This abstract model was, moreover, linked with 
key thinkers and traditions of thinking.
By 1980 I believed I had recognised this pattern in Simone Weil’s 
dialectics of gravity and grace, in Kierkegaard’s existential dialectics 
of objectivity and subjectivity, in Kant’s dialectics of necessity and 
freedom, or of humanity between phenomenal and noumenal worlds, in the 
relationships between Pascal’s three orders (of body, mind and love), in 
Nicholas of Cusa’s coincidence of opposites and in Biblical dialectics
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of lord and servant, descent and ascent, death and life, as interpreted 
by Karl Barth, assisted by Hegel, himself assisted by neoplatonic 
thinkers within as well as without Eastern and Western Christianity. 
(See Hdlscher, (1978) on the influence of Heraclitus on Cusanus, Goethe, 
Hülderlin, Hegel and Nietzsche - to which we must add T S Eliot). I 
suggested then, too, that the grammar of such radical precariousness was 
recognised in his own way by John Donne:
... On a huge hill,
Cragged, and steep, Truth stands, and hee that will 
Reach her, about must, and about must goe;
And what the hills suddennes resists, winne so;"
(Satyre III: On Religion Donne 1955)
Alongside Donne, the other image or parable which I had identified 
comes, perhaps surprisingly, from Kant. It was singled out repeatedly 
by Simone Weil in her school philosophy classes. It is the symbol of 
the dove used by Immanuel Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason. (Weil 
1978, Kant 1968; A5/B9). In spite of all speculation to the contrary, 
the dove needs the resistance/support of the atmosphere for her free 
flight. Donne echoes this with his hill’s resistance, and reminds us of 
the problematic complexities of the logic of ’’must’’, in his line "... 
about must, and about must go",
"I have", wrote Wittgenstein, "one of those talents that constantly has 
to make a virtue out of necessity." (Culture and Value (CV) 76: "... 
das immer Wieder aus der Not eine Tugend machen muss": "Not" —
necessity, need, misery, want, trouble, distress). Wittgenstein here 
had in mind his own style of thinking but, it will be argued below, he 
was referring to this in relation to his central concerns as a thinker 
and human being. Style, like grammar in use, can show the heart of a
f 15human being as well as the essence of the matter, - at least for those 
with eyes and ears sufficiently responsive and sensitive. Wittgenstein, 
as Brian McGuinness shows throughout volume one of his biography (WL(i) 
1988), was involved in developing sensibility of this kind.
However, the above paragraph is on the brink of plunging into the 
present thesis, rather than summarising the previous one. When I wrote 
in 1980, I had not realised how deeply Wittgenstein had, in effect, 
assimilated Kant’s antinomy of freedom and necessity, and his resolution 
of this in the Critique of Judgement. Wittgenstein did this through his 
assimilation of Schopenhauer on the sublime. Nor had I realised that 
Wittgenstein has assimilated Kant’s resolution of his central antinomy 
also through assimilating something of the radical, Orphean or 
linguistic transcendentalism of Ralph Waldo Emerson, in part directly 
(McGuinness IfL(i) 1988, 224-225) at least as early as 1914, and in part 
indirectly, through William James. (Emerson himself was saturated in 
classical German literature, including those who spoke to Wittgenstein: 
Kant, Goethe and Schiller, partly as mediated by Coleridge and Carlyle).
Probably the one most obvious difference between this thesis and its 
predecessor concerns the availability of Wittgenstein’s collected 
notebook remarks now known in English as Culture and Value (1980). For
the 1980 thesis had to be written when I had access only to a minute
fraction of this material, scattered in other published sources. While 
I knew, by 1979, of the existence of the first German edition of this 
material (Vermischte Bemerkungen 1977), I was unable to obtain a copy
until a stage of my work when I had insufficient time to work at
translating it, even if I had the linguistic competence to do so 
reliably. Peter Winch’s translation (CV 1980), from which I shall 
depart only occasionally, was based on the amended second edition of the 
German work.
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Three disappointments of this work, in its present form, are first, its 
English title (suggestive more of a text-book or museum, but based on 
the last paragraph of CV 6; perhaps, "Developing responsibility for our 
conversation", or - better - "Notes towards responsibility" comes 
closer); secondly, its lack of references to its manuscript sources; and 
thirdly, its omission of similar manuscript material, not easily 
available, for example an important passage on theology and prayer in 
manuscript 219, 6 (probably 1932 or 1933) which at present is only
published in the thick of Garth Hallett's monumental Companion to 
Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' (1977) , page 427. (For 
Wittgenstein's manuscript reference numbers, see von Wright (1982). For 
the passage, see below, chapter eight). However, in spite of these 
disappointments, the book is arguably the single most important 
published primary source for understanding Wittgenstein's spirituality 
in the period between 1929 and 1951, even though this spirituality is 
such that it is implicit in his other work of this period and cannot be 
fully understood without this.
The Dundee thesis owed much to talks with Wittgenstein recorded by 
Maurice O'C Drury, first published by the Philosophical Society of 
Finland in 1976 under the title, "Some Notes on Conversations with 
Wittgenstein", and now available in R Rhees (Editor) Recollections of 
Wittgenstein (hereafter RW) 1984, pages 76-96. This should be compared 
with Drury's fuller draft essay, published posthumously in RW pp97-171. 
Drury's suggestive material, I did not always interpret precisely in 
Drury's way. Moreover, I was making my first attempts to assimilate 
Stanley Cavell*s close reading of the later Wittgenstein. (Cavell
(1969), in Must We Mean What We Say? and especially the paper therein on 
"The Availability of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy", and Cavell (1979) 
- The Claim of Reason, about half of which contains a reworked version 
of the doctoral thesis for which the "Availability" paper formed the 
original introduction).
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The 1980 thesis did note briefly a resemblance between traditional 
Jewish pragmatism and Kantian or American varieties of pragmatism. At 
the time it was a shot in the dark to draw attention to such 
resemblance(s). Only since then have I learnt increasingly from CV and 
WL(i) why it was so important to Wittgenstein to interpret his 
developing style of thinking as Jewish. One way of approaching the 
present thesis is to read it as a way of recording, explaining and
justifying the development of what I have learnt about this.
The development of Wittgenstein's understanding of these matters is 
related to his developing method(s) for clarification of philosophy and 
of essence(s) in grammar. (Cp. PI s371 and s373). His learning to see
the goal in the way and the way in the goal (Lecture on Ethics (LE) and
chapter seven below) means that we must and may learn to read his 
message in his style and his style in his message. This does not imply 
that to give an adequate account of, and to apply, his message one must 
slavishly imitate his style, even if that were possible. On the
contrary, one may and must learn to speak for oneself, with respect for 
the developmental character of understanding. Wittgenstein, like 
Kierkegaard, Hamann, Pascal and Augustine, has a deep regard for this 
developmental character. One implication of this is that it has seemed 
right and desirable to retain something of a developmental character in 
presenting the argument of this thesis.
This qualified developmental structure can be seen in that chapters two 
to six were written mainly in sequence over several years. However, 
chapter one, following this introduction, was written between chapter 
six and seven, as it was considered important at that time to provide 
better early indication of where and how the argument was to culminate. 
Finally, chapters seven and eight were written in the sequence one would 
naturally expect.
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The extensive use of quotation throughout the thesis has seemed 
defensible for two reasons. More extrinsically, it is a convenient way 
of producing the evidence for what may seem at times to be a surprising 
way of reading, and reading with, Wittgenstein. More intrinsically, it 
has often seemed required by that very coinherence of style and message, 
grammar and essence, way and goal, to which appeal has already been 
made. The explanatory sampling of this coinherence or equilibration 
comes to its climax in chapters seven and eight. Consequently some 
readers may find the opening summaries for those chapters are also 
useful maps of the wood for the trees in chapters two to six.
The concept of equilibration, just introduced together with that of 
coinherence, has many venerable roots including Aristotelian and Jewish 
ones. In the following passage, where Wittgenstein suggests the 
importance of equilibration for the religious character of his thinking, 
one should consider carefully the confident, authoritative tone in which 
he speaks of the precarious work of being or becoming "an honest 
religious thinker": "An honest religious thinker is like a tightrope
walker. He almost looks as though he were walking on nothing but air. 
His support is the slenderest imaginable. And yet it really is possible 
to walk on it." (CV 73, 1948. Cp PI s87 and CV 33, 63, 14: "... Don't 
act a tragedy ..."). For a Jewish parallel, consider: "The way in this 
world is like a knife-edge. There is an abyss on either side, and the 
way of life lies in between." (Rabbi Moshe Leib of Sasov, quoted by 
Friedman (1982) p.vii as the epigraph for his account of Martin Buber * s 
Life and Work. Wittgenstein uses a very similar image in CV 63, which 
relates to his discussions of predestination, freewill and the election 
of grace (Gnadenwahl) "... Denying responsibility is not holding people 
responsible." Op.cit).
For Wittgenstein, the Jewish equilibration which he seeks and finds is
19
also Augustinian equilibration, between the way and the goal, which is 
at the heart of his/their inclusive spirituality. "Inclusive
spirituality" is to be understood as spirituality which is at once both 
authentically Jewish and authentically Christian, in which love for God 
includes love for neighbour, and for all others and all else, 
represented by the neighbour who/which may and must be a goal of loving 
attention and so of any or all of our powers well used: "Hear, O Israel: 
The Lord our God is one Lord; and you shall love the Lord your God with 
all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your might."
(Deuteronomy 6:4-5 RSV), "Tell me how you are searching, and I will 
tell you what you are searching for." (PR s27, p67).
"You will seek me and find me; when you seek me with all your heart."
(Jeremiah 29:13 RSV), "The infinite does not rival the finite. The
infinite is that whose essence is to exclude nothing finite." (PR sl38, 
p 157). Therefore: "... if you are offering your gift at the altar, and 
there remember that your brother has something against you, leave your 
gift there before the altar and go; first be reconciled to your brother, 
and then come and make your gift." (Matthew 5:23-24 RSV). What some 
brothers and sisters have against others is to do with confusion between 
the infinite and that which rivals or excludes the finite. If, after 
all this, it should still seem odd that Wittgenstein's Jewish theology 
of the infinite can be embodied in remarks, for example, on the 
philosophy of mathematics, then we need to recall that: "There is no
religious denomination in which the misuse of metaphysical expressions 
has been responsible for so much sin as it has in mathematics." (CV 1, 
1929. Cp PI s254).
Equilibration between the sublime and the pedestrian can produce, or be 
produced by, some surprising applied concepts of the sublime or of the
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pedestrian (Kierkegaard (1983) p41 etc.). One gesture in this
direction, which may strike different readers as playful, or irritating, 
or even as helpful, is that in the presentation of this thesis material, 
often thought properly put down in footnotes, has been raised up into 
the main body of the text. If some readers prefer to see this as 
bringing the text from above down to the level of mere footnotes, that 
is their privilege or misfortune. It is hoped that this method of 
presenting details of the "supporting cast" or "extras" will not be
experienced as unduly disruptive, but accepted in the spirit in which it
is offered. In any case, it is another means of trying to achieve
Wittgenstein's end of (perhaps) slower, more patient reading, as 
required and encouraged by the equilibration which is central to his 
inclusive spirituality (CV 57 etc). If such reading is an unreasonable 
expectation for certain types of academic product and process, at least 
it is possible to remember or look forward to the reality of reading 
differently.
Pascal's Johannine, Ephesian and Augustinian dialectics of truth and 
love develop the Jewish and Christian, as well as Hellenistic, roots of 
Christian understanding of the beautiful as the sublime, in advance of 
the eighteenth century rediscovery of the sublime in relation to nature 
and mind. If the triad of truth, goodness and beauty can, after all, 
offer a responsible (not superficial) way of interpreting God as
Trinity, then it can also offer a way of understanding the objectivity 
of faith, love and hope. Compare the whole structure of Barth's Church 
Dogmatics, especially volume 4, on the doctrine of reconciliation as the 
threefold work of God in Christ, with Balthasar's The Glory of the Lord. 
(Barth 1932 ff; Balthasar 1961 ff).
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CHAPTER ONE
EXTENDED PRELIMINARY OVERVIEW:
EMERSON AND JEWISH RESPONSIBILITY
The Structure of Chapter One
1.1 Opening summary for chapter one
1.2 The sublime in Emerson and Kant
1.3 James, Emerson and responsibility
1.4 Trinitarian interpreting of interpretations
1.5 Jewish responsibility for language
1.6 Tragedy and beyond
1.7 "Bon sens precoce"
1.8 Jewish inclusiveness
1.9 Buber and friends
1.10 Kabbalah as dialectical interpretation of interpretations
1.11 Masking and revealing
1.12 Desert and deliverance I
1
1.13 Precariousness and balance I
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1.14 The shame and glory of interpretation
1.15 Rousseau, purity, danger and secrecy
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1.1 OPENING SUMMARY FOR CHAPTER ONE
For Emerson, the vision of the sublime present in the here and now 
transforms the world from a lumber-room into a matter of wonder and 
hope. For Kierkegaard, it is the "knight of faith" who is able 
"absolutely to express the sublime in the pedestrian". They, and other 
writers after Kant, have recognised how his concept of the sublime, in 
The Critique of Judgement, goes a considerable way towards making 
spiritual sense of his central antinomy of necessity and freedom, and so 
towards relating his first and second critiques.
Emerson, whose essay on "Fate" will be shown in chapter eight to make 
sense of the "two godheads" of Wittgenstein’s Notebooks of 1914-1916 
(when he also read Emerson) is a hermeneutic thinker. His essay on 
"Politics" anticipates James and Wittgenstein on family-resemblances. 
Emerson, in his essays, shows a Jewish sense of shared responsibility 
for the language which we use and have, share and enact. Hermeneutic 
understanding of God the Trinity as the model for interpretation, 
introduced in this chapter, is developed in chapter eight. Emerson 
shares with Wittgenstein the inclusive Jewish grammar of the true, the 
good and the beautiful.
Wittgenstein’s investigations of Jewish features in his developing style 
of thinking carry forward the concern for the sublime which he earlier 
found in Schopenhauer, and which Schopenhauer and Kant developed out of 
Jewish and Christian traditions, while tending to conflate these with 
Cartesian, gnostic or manichaean dualisms between mind and body, spirit 
and flesh, rule and application. The Jewish character of Wittgenstein’s 
thinking means, amongst much else, that he is concerned with 
understanding and active interpretation of the inclusive and more or 
less obvious Anselmian grammar of Deuteronomy 6:4-5 etc.
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1.2 THE SUBLIME IN EMERSON AND JAMES
Since the 1980 thesis I have benefited from the application, 
clarification and development of Cavell on Wittgenstein in Fergus Kerr’s 
Theology After Wittgenstein (1986) and from the development of this 
approach by Nicholas Lash in his Easter in Ordinary (1988). One reason 
for the importance of the latter work is its extensive, close 
Wittgensteinian reading of William James on The Varieties of Religious 
Experience, a book which, even more than James’ other psychological 
texts, was deeply significant for Wittgenstein. While Lash includes the 
best development I know of Wittgenstein’s approach to theology as 
grammar, he appears to have overlooked how William James was in part 
interpreting, and in part repressing, his Emersonian inheritance. This 
is particularly evident with regard to James’ theme that religion makes 
a felicitous virtue out of necessity, a theme that Lash strangely 
neglects, even though it seems close to his own wide interests. Here
any student of Emerson, such as James certainly had been under his
father's influence, can detect echoes of the poetry which Emerson
pervasively makes out of Kant’s antinomy of freedom and necessity. For
example, see Emerson’s essay on "Fate" in The Conduct of Life (Emerson 
1983). Here he almost ritually invokes freedom though worship of "the 
Beautiful Necessity". It is far from clear, however, that this makes 
Emerson simply a naive idealist, anymore than we can usefully label Kant 
or the later Wittgenstein in that way. What is clear from 
Wittgenstein’s earliest surviving Notebooks (1914-16, hereafter NB) from 
his Tractatus Logico Philosophicus (1921/22 etc, hereafter TLP) and from 
McGuinness WL(i), is that Wittgenstein’s early philosophizing had 
intimate links with Emerson, which he to some extent recognised.
Depending on how one thinks about the discontinuities and continuities 
in Wittgenstein’s life-work, it is possible that this Emersonian 
influence makes itself felt in more than the earlier work. I shall be
commenting on the later Wittgenstein's sense of affinity with certain 
types of poetry (including work of Blake, Cowper and Longfellow), his 
wonder regarding language, his sense of the non-finality of the tragic, 
his inclusive form of spirituality and his references in 1931 (CV 9) , 
when his new approach was developing fast, to the "lumber-room" world of 
his philosophical work, compared to the approach of an epic poet’s 
account of the "problems of intellectual world of the West", an account 
"written in the obscure language of prophecy” but akin to Beethoven and 
"perhaps" Goethe (reverenced by Emerson) and "perhaps" Nietzsche (a 
life-long admirer of Emerson).
Wittgenstein’s extraordinary 1931 references, in this context, to the 
"lumber-room" of his world are, I will argue, clear enough references to 
Emerson’s "The American Scholar", an early address which has been called 
an intellectual "Declaration of Independence" on behalf of "the new 
world". While the relevant pages of that address are too long to 
reproduce here, some of the key phrases are as follows:
"... show me the sublime presence of the highest spiritual cause 
lurking, as it always does lurk, in these suburbs and extremities of 
nature ... and the world lies no longer a dull miscellany and 
lumber-room ... This idea has inspired the genius of Goldsmith, Burns, 
Cowper, and, in a newer time, of Goethe, Wordsworth and Carlyle..." 
(Emerson 1983, p69).
While Wittgenstein has no time for the cult of "progress" in either 
European or American forms, Emerson - the epic poet and prophet -
foresees the end of the old high culture of Europe and, even in
Wittgenstein’s time, was rejected or repressed by the progressive
culture of America, on whose behalf Santayana caricatured him as
"genteel". So far as I can discover, Cavell - the first to detect the 
affinity between Emerson and Wittgenstein, has not pointed out
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Wittgenstein's "lumber-room" references to the Orphean poet of Concord.
While Emerson was not a relativist, his radical transcendentalism is 
often labelled dismissively as a form of idealism. However, I shall be 
arguing that what interested Wittgenstein in him was rather his 
unfreezing of language, his gift for seeing the extraordinary in the 
ordinary - the sublime in the everyday (and the converse), his lyrical 
or evangelical stoicism (compare Simone Weil's essay, in the tradition 
of Pascal and Corneille, on "The Iliad, Poem of Might" Weil 1987) , and 
his reconciliation of responsibility for language with freedom in 
language. (The New Testament offers a promising term for this 
reconciliation: "parrhesia" - the free, confident, open speech, in all
matters, of the citizen (of a polis) or of the child and heir, not to be 
confused with the linguistic intoxication of various kinds of babbler).
Like Emerson, in this respect, Kierkegaard thinks of "the knight of
faith" as able "absolutely to express the sublime in the pedestrian" 
(Kierkegaard 1983 - Fear and Trembling p 41 in the "Preliminary
Expectoration"). In the 1980 thesis I urged the relevance of
Kierkegaard on "the what" and "the how", objectivity and subjectivity, 
to Wittgenstein on essence and grammar, saying and showing.
Wittgenstein at times, also uses "what" with "how", for example (as we 
shall see) in the Lecture on Ethics (LE) and in Philosophical Remarks 
(PR) sIII-27 (p67 "... Tell me how you are searching, and I will tell 
you what you are searching for". What I had not recognised in 1980 is 
that Kierkegaard's grammatical investigations of communication, 
Christian and non-Christian included, in his Purity of Heart is to Will 
One Thing, are an exploration of the grammar of seeking and finding, 
which flows through the whole of Augustine's Confessiones, as well as 
his later work. Moreover, Kierkegaard links this with his existential
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interpretation of Kant’s antinomy of freedom and necessity in the same 
work. While it cannot be shown that Wittgenstein read Purity of Heart, 
this book relates intimately with his immersion in the Confessiones and 
in the overcoming of Kant’s antinomy.
The centrality of Kant’s most important antinomy, not just to James and 
Wittgenstein on making a happy virtue out of necessity, but to many 
varieties of post-Kantian spirituality can be strikingly illustrated 
with two examples, from Hans von Balthasar and Martin Buber. "... Every 
moment in our life teaches us with gentleness what the last moment must 
finally enforce with violence: that we ought to discover in the mystery 
of time’s duration the sweet core of our life - the offer made by a 
tireless love..." (Balthasar 1979, p26).
"... this free human being encounters fate as the counter-image of his 
freedom. It is not his limit but his completion; freedom and fate 
embrace each other to form meaning; and given meaning, fate - with its 
eyes, hitherto severe, suddenly full of light - looks like grace 
itself." (Buber 1970, pl02). Buber, like Kierkegaard against Hegel, 
explains that this antinomy has to be lived through, and not just 
reconciled in the thought that each side of it belongs to a separate 
"world", the phenomenal and the noumenal "worlds" or "sides of the 
world",
The fact that this family of attitudes and practices can be traced 
before as well as after Kant indicates that he gave powerful new 
expression to some form or forms of traditional metaphysical and 
theological dualism, involving the world as it appears to us (qua human 
and rational in the image of the God of Descartes and Newton) versus the 
world as it is in itself (in effect the world as if not yet finshed by 
the God of seventeenth and eighteenth century scientists, a God who must
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have reservations about his clockwork and sometimes change his mind). 
However this form of dualism was the rationalised, more respectable 
version of confused and perhaps more dangerous forms of dualism. A clue 
to these skeletons in the cupboard is given by the way in which Kant's 
"phenomenal world" is equivocal between world qua totality of created 
reality (both visible and invisible) and world qua totality of 
everything as it appears to us.
This underlying confused dualism has tended to conflate mind/body 
contrasts with God/world contrasts. Such conflation has two main 
tendencies which are significant for the present discussion. Firstly, 
the concept of God is regarded as if it were the concept of part of the 
world, in the sense that minds can be regarded as parts of the world. 
Secondly, mind is regarded as if divine or internally, essentially 
linked with the concept of God. Consequently, the concept of body comes 
to be regarded as alien to mind as world was held alien to God. This 
unstable pattern of exchange between forms of dualism seems to be one 
contributory factor in the development of such phenomena as gothic 
horror fiction, certain forms of science-fiction and the cinema of the 
occult, not to mention more banal or more psychotic forms of confusion, 
superstition and scepticism.
The difficulty with taking Kant's antinomy or paradox of freedom and 
necessity as paradigmatic for spirituality can be summed up as follows. 
The difficulty we should take more seriously is not the difficulty of 
accepting what we cannot and should not try to change, nor the 
difficulty of changing what we should and can change, but rather the 
difficulty of learning which is which. The price of underestimating the 
third-mentioned difficulty is either to be seduced into a quietistic 
(perhaps heroic) fatalism or to be summoned into an activistic (perhaps 
obedient) prometheanism. Such currents can be traced in varieties of
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Romanticism and other cultural movements, expressed aesthetically, 
ethically, politically and religiously, (Cp Cavell 1984).
1.3 JAMES, EMERSON AND RESPONSIBILITY
In the midst of the complexities of such unstable confusions and 
conflicts what seems to be needed is a direction, a movement or way in 
which "we" may actively interpret and interpret actively our histories, 
a way which regulates and transforms human practices and experience and 
which as such is selectively descriptive, expressive and constitutive, 
"We" would be all those potentially or actively engaged in learning to 
become persons together. At the heart of such learning would be the 
development of responsibility for our conversation and communication. 
We would need to learn to take increasing responsibility for ensuring 
that the contrasts which we discover, make and use in our discourse, 
thinking and other practices are not permitted or exploited to deform or 
destroy our communal and personal development.
It can be argued (most convincingly by Nicholas Lash 1988) that William 
James had only limited success in his efforts to escape from Cartesian 
dualism. However, it is striking that the point in his Varieties of 
Religious Experience where he comes closest to struggling free of an 
essentialist approach to explaining the meaning of religion, as he 
proposes his use or uses for the term, and closest to a Wittgensteinian 
family resemblance treatment of the protean term, is the point at the 
start of his second chapter where he uses a political analogy.
Here James points out that the meaning of "government" appears to shift 
according to context of usage. (Wittgenstein read the book avidly at 
least as early as June 1912 and thereafter recommended others to do so, 
in spite of his later deep criticism of James' philosophy of psychology.
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criticism developed throughout the 1930s and 1940s.) James writes, "The 
man who knows governments most completely is he who troubles himself 
least about a definition which shall give their essence... And why may 
not religion be a conception equally complex?" Earlier in the same 
opening paragraph for chapter two of Varieties he has written, "Let us 
not fall immediately into a one-sided view of our subject, but let us 
rather admit freely at the outset that we may very likely find no one 
essence, but many characters which may alternately be equally important 
to religion."
Though not "immediately", James does soon relapse into a version of 
Cartesian dualism with respect to the private self, with its essentially 
extra-linguistic, extra-social emotional resilience and vitality in the 
face of tragic necessity. Through the borderland of the unconscious, 
James speculates, this Cartesian severed-self particpates in what he 
describes as the higher side of the universe or of life which is divine. 
(This puzzling predeliction for a pantheistic relationship with a finite 
deity may be read more charitably as gesturing towards a hermeneutic 
approach. See chapter eight below).
Here James apparently falls victim to what was described above as 
confusion between mind/body dualism and God/world dualism. While for 
him, the body as such does not become demonic, experience does threaten 
to relapse into chaos. This chaos threatens to invade experience 
through clinical depression, through the unhealthy religion of the 
divided self, not least among the educationally under-developed relative 
to the genteel élite, ostensibly more priveleged by evolution.
Attention has been directed above to the way James came close to escape 
from his dualistic approach to language and humanity when he reminded
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himself of the varieties of government and politics, and so the 
potential importance of varieties of religious experience, which could 
well promise a richness and so a complex unity more vital, and more 
intellectually satisfying and stimulating, than forms of dualism 
allowed. It is significant, moreover, how Emerson went further in 
weaving what he saw as a Platonic longing for richness and harmony, 
regarded after the manner of the Hellenism of classical German writers, 
together with a distinctively American republicanism and emergent 
pragmatism. In case it should be supposed that the quest for such unity 
in diversity was Hellenistic in some exclusive sense, it is important to 
recall the weaving together of Biblical traditions of interpretation, 
which can be seen throughout both the Jewish and Christian scriptures, 
and throughout Jewish and Christian traditions of interpretation guided 
by those Scriptures.
1.4 TRINITARIAN INTEPRETING OF INTERPRETATIONS
The grammar of this unity in diversity of interpretation is arguably 
articulated in the trinitarian patterns for worshipping, living and 
thinking which have been developed - with significant differences - in 
Eastern and Western Christianity. (See chapters seven and eight below). 
Emerson’s lapsed Unitarianism may be read as a struggle with Augustinian 
or Calvinistic trinitarianism. Already in Augustine’s autobiographical 
account, as Wittgenstein insists in his later philosophy, the isolated 
self, pre-equipped with its own private inner language, is thereby 
estranged from its own past and present. Such a self is morbidly 
restless and vulnerable to epistemological crises as well as other forms 
of anxiety - not just Cartesian, but also Pascalian, Kierkegaardian etc.
What Emerson could not find clearly enough in his Augustinian 
background, and struggled to glimpse through other dark reflections,
31
was, I suggest, an Eastern type of trinitarian grammar in which God 
neither rivals nor excludes his creatures, in spite of their attempts to 
rival and exclude one another and him. The more charitable way of 
interpreting Hamann, Herder, Lessing (expert in Alexandrian theology) 
Kant, Goethe, Hegel, Schelling and Kierkegaard - in spite of how they
are compromised by or collude with forms of metaphysical dualism - is
that they anticipated Emerson's struggle. It was Wittgenstein - the 
intense reader of Hamann, Lessing, Goethe, Emerson and Kierkegaard - who 
identified what are arguably some of the most effective keys to the 
grammar of a neo-Augustinian, Eastern trinitarian pattern of thinking, 
practice and worship. The torrent of new similes (Gleichnisse CV 19) 
which he developed, from 1929 to his death in 1951, include not just
flies trapped in glass jars, and strings to be unknotted, and not just
strange or commonplace language-games related to semantics and 
psychology, but also - I believe - much of his work on philosophy of 
mathematics which has so puzzled his readers. Another thesis would be 
needed to examine this last hypothesis adequately. At this point 
I can only underline that the following grammatical remark comes in 
Wittgenstein’s writing on mathematics between 1929 and 1930 and is a key 
to both his earlier and later work and life (with their synoptic vision 
of "what" and "how", content and style, truth and way), as well as a key 
to so much else: "... the infinite doesn’t rival the finite. The
infinite is that whose essence is to exclude nothing finite." 
(Philosophical Remarks (PR) sl38, p 157).
The whole of Wittgenstein’s later philosophical work and life points to 
his philosophy of mathematics being readable in this way. Where 
Wittgenstein's discussions of the grammar of mathematics are not 
tracking the central grammar of PR sl38, they are, I consider, tracking 
ways in which certain distinctively mathematical features of our grammar 
may lead us astray in relation to Wittgenstein’s central grammar.
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Wittgenstein’s project here reads as a descendant of Pascal’s dialectics 
of 1’esprit de géométrie et l’esprit fin - the mathematical and 
intuitive styles of thinking. (Pensées s512). This is the main 
conclusion I have drawn from studying his so-called Remarks on the
Foundations of Mathematics (RFM) and then struggling with the 
commentaries of his apparently more charitable interpreters. See, for 
example, Crispin Wright (1980) and Cora Diamond (1981).
It is symptomatic, of what I believe to be the widely shared
limited comprehension of this area of Wittgenstein’s work, that the
third edition of RFM (1978) omits, by a significant mistake (see RFM 
1978, p29, for the editors’ assurance of completeness, and RFM’s second 
edition for the editorial note on p302) the following remark;
"If in life we are in the midst of death, so in wholeness of 
understanding we are in the midst of madness." (Revision of published 
translations of "Wenn wir in Leben von Todd umgeben sind, so auch in der 
Gesundheit des Verstands vom Wahn sinn.") (See also CV 44, 1944).
The "we" here is not the "we" of so-called "ordinary language
philosophy" or of "common sense". It is rather the "we" of an open and 
developing community aiming to follow the grammar of the infinite which 
neither rivals nor excludes the finite, in spite of the finite’s mad, 
fatally futile attempts at rivalry and exclusion. (Compare "Religion as 
madness is a madness springing from irreligiousness" (CV 13, 1931) - a 
dialectical transformation typical of Kierkegaard and Pascal.) This is 
an ecumenical "we". If we recall Wittgenstein’s veneration for 
Augustine in spite of his errors (see for example Wittgenstein’s motto 
for PR from Confessiones 1.9, to be discussed later), his veneration for 
Kierkegaard in spite of his being too complex ("... by far the most 
profound thinker of the last century ... a saint" - attributed by Drury,
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RVî 87), and his veneration of Dostoevsky, the friend of Soloviev, in 
spite of his Slavophile and anarchic leanings (Wittgenstein drank deeply 
and long from The Brothers Karamazov, as well as other works) , then it 
may be argued with some confidence that the normal, normative "we" of 
Wittgenstein's later work is indebted to both catholic and reformed 
(protestant) traditions, as well as indebted to orthodox, non-western 
traditions. However these family relations do not exclude, but are 
themselves indebted to, features bearing family resemblances with what 
Wittgenstein called Hebrew or Jewish thinking. These will be introduced 
shortly. If Wittgenstein's spirituality were neither Christian nor 
Jewish (the former denial being made with considerable weight by both 
von Wright and Malcolm in the earlier versions of their biographical 
accounts, but qualified by them in view of increasingly complex evidence 
(N Malcolm, (M), 1984) and the latter denial or its converse never even 
occurring to them as a possibility) , then such a conclusion would need 
to be considered carefully as an inditement of much of what has passed - 
and still passes - for both Christian and Jewish spirituality. Even in 
his early immersion in Schopenhauer and James, the young Wittgenstein, 
with his bitter estrangement from institutionalised and intellectualised 
forms of spirituality, was still - arguably - seeking for a Kantian or 
Augustinian alliance - between reason and will, or faith and 
understanding, or vitality and representation.
Before turning to features of Jewishness which mattered for 
Wittgenstein, it is worth noting that, like James, Emerson points to a 
relationship between political awareness and the overcoming of 
metaphysical dualism or monism. Emerson sees "the young citizen", in 
particular, as prone to illusions involving both underestimation and 
overestimation of responsibility for the republic and hence for the 
city-state of language inhabited by both young and old. On the one
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side, younger citizens underestimate the scope of shared responsibility 
for social and linguistic institutions. On the other side, younger 
citizens overestimate the influence of intellectualised, individualised 
responsibility. "Society is an illusion to the young citizen. It lies 
before him in rigid repose, with certain names, men and institutions, 
rooted like oak-trees to the centre, round which all arrange themselves 
the best they can. But the old statesman knows that society is fluid; 
there are no such roots and centres; but any particle may suddenly 
become the centre of the movement, and compel the system to gyrate round 
it, as every man of strong will, like Pisistratus, or Cromwell, does for 
a time, and as every man of truth, like Plato, or Paul, does forever. 
But ... We (Emerson means the young citizen in us) are superstitious, 
and esteem the statute somewhat: so much life as it has in the character 
of living men, is its force ... Our statute is a currency, which we 
stamp with our own portrait: it soon becomes unrecognisable, and in
process of time will return to the mint... Meanwhile, the education of 
the general mind never stops ..." (Emerson "Politics", Essay VII in 
Essays: Second Series in Emerson (1983) pp559-560).
From the second sentence of this passage, Wittgenstein seems to be 
looking over Emerson's shoulder. The effective illusion of alienated, 
divided society and the effective illusion of alienated dualistic 
language are of a piece. It does not seem unreasonably audacious to 
read the second sentence as revealing that it is on the tip of Emerson's 
tongue to take his argument in Wittgenstein's direction, with the 
younger and older Wittgenstein corresponding to Emerson's young citizen 
and old statesman. It is not being argued that Wittgenstein read this 
essay too, though it is not impossible. The point is in the overlapping 
patterns of thinking, shared by Emerson and Wittgenstein, as well as 
James to a degree.
35
1.5 JEWISH RESPONSIBILITY FOR LANGUAGE
It is now time to introduce those family features of what Wittgenstein
called his Jewish or Hebrew way of thinking. For the belated recovery
of these we are indebted mainly to the delayed publication of 
Wittgenstein's notebook material now in CV. As with the loss of 
Wittgenstein's reference to Heidegger and to Augustine in the first 
publication of Waismann's notes on Wittgenstein's conversation on 30 
December 1929 (Philosophical Review January 1965, ppl2-13), it is
somewhat difficult to rid oneself of the feeling that an element of 
unconcious repression may be involved in this belatedness of publication 
or avoidance of acknowledgement. It is as if such material were too 
personal, or private or eccentric to be philosophically relevant, 
regardless of its possible effects on the image of Wittgenstein; or as 
if some tabu were to require us to preserve a cordon sanitaire between 
the man and his philosophy. Such are among the factors likely to have 
contributed to the unavailability of Wittgenstein's later philosophical 
practices and style of thinking.
Wittgenstein was, of course, only too well aware of the dangers of 
thinking and feeling in stereotypes, including the dangers, scrdidness 
and stupidity of anti-semitism. It is not clear at what stage he
realised the extent to which his relatives - variously Roman Catholic, 
Protestant and secularised - had suppressed their strong family roots in 
Eastern European Judaism. (See McGuinness WL(i)). Wittgenstein's
philosophical development, especially in the axial period of 1929-1931, 
appears to have been intimately related to a desire to compensate or 
atone for such family and social suppression and repression, in which 
Wittgenstein had to some extent colluded. Wittgenstein recalled an 
incident of this kind when he was 10 or 11 (McGuinness WL(i) pp48-49) . 
Otto Weininger's writings, together with his suicide in 1903, constitute
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an apparent case of Jewish self-victimisation through assimilation of 
anti-semitism. Wittgenstein, growing-up in the same anti-semitic 
Vienna, was 14 at that time, when it was decided to begin his schooling 
by sending him away to Realschule in Linz.
While Wittgenstein can scarcely not have been aware of Weininger's 
complex notoriety in 1903, the fact that his name was listed among 
influences by Wittgenstein (in 1931, CV 19) after "... Schopenhauer, 
Frege, Russell, Kraus, Loos" and immediately before Spengler, suggests 
that Weininger did not become clearly significant for Wittgenstein's 
philosophical work until at least during the war, possibly through 
Wittgenstein's meeting with Paul Engelraann and friends in Olmutz. 
However, even in that Jewish circle, Jewishness seems not to have been 
discussed during the war. Wittgenstein's awareness of such issues may 
have been deepened by incidents during his post-war school-teaching 
career, by coming to grips with issues raised by Spengler and by 
conversations from 1929 with Piero Sraffa in Cambridge.
The intervening years had also seen a minor heterodox Jewish 
renaissance, which included the dissemination of Franz Rosenzweig's The 
Star of Redemption, written like the Tractatus during war-service, and 
Martin Buber's I and Thou (1923), as well as the development of Zionism. 
Probably sometime between 1926 and 1929 Wittgenstein and Engelmann 
discussed the controversial Buber and Rosenzweig translation of the 
Jewish scriptures into German. While Engelmann preferred the Luther 
translation, Wittgenstein "felt that in spite, or possibly because, of 
the liberties taken" with the German language, in order to convey 
features of Biblical Hebrew, Buber and Rosenzweig conveyed well - so far 
as he could tell (without Hebrew) - the exotic, "barbaric", ie., archaic 
character of the original. (Engelmann pplll-112; Buber and Rosenzweig 
Die Schrift from 1925. Cp Vermes (1980)). Compare "The Jew is a desert 
region, but underneath its thin layer of rock lies the molten lava of
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spirit and intellect." (Wittgenstein CV 13, 1931).
It is likely that Karl Kraus (who had a complex reltionship with his 
Jewish inheritance) and Adolf Loos contributed significantly to 
Wittgenstein's developing sense of Jewish features in his style of 
thinking. Such influence from Kraus began well before the war, while 
Wittgenstein met Loos on the eve of the war. Engelmann's interpretation 
of what Kraus, Loos and Wittgenstein shared, while not including 
explicit reference to Jewish features, appears sound as far as it goes, 
and will be developed later. Engelmann was a student and colleague of 
the architect Loos. Wittgenstein's design and management with Engelmann 
of the building of Wittgenstein sister's house in Vienna in 1926-28 
renewed these influences. Thereafter architectural and building 
Gleichnisse enter Wittgenstein's repertoire, partly in response to the 
building figures of speech used to express the scientific 
foundationalism of the Vienna Circle. (Cp Hilmy 1987).
The following features of what Wittgenstein regarded as Jewish thinking, 
or at least considered at sometime in this connection, are taken from 
CV. They are introduced, so far as possible, in the order in which they 
occur.
1.6 TRAGEDY AND BEYOND
"Ycu get tragedy where the tree, instead of bending, breaks. Tragedy is 
something un-Jewish. Mendelssohn is, I suppose, the most untragic of 
composers" (CV 1, 1929). In 1931 Wittgenstein appropriates this feature 
when he notes, "In this world (mine) there is no tragedy ..." (CV 9). 
The type of "tragic" story that suggests a chance event can decide one's 
whole life is to be regarded as "a one-sided view of tragedy" (CV 12, 
1931) . Tragedy is not only un-Jewish but un-Christian; "We might say 
that in Christianity God says to humanity; Don't act a
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tragedy, don’t enact heaven and hell on earth. Heaven and hell are 
business" (CV 14, 1931; translation revised). Using the theological
grammar of PR sl38, introduced above, we may say that humankind attempt 
to enact heaven and hell on earth when they attempt to rival and exclude 
both the infinite God and their finite neighbours. However, this 
attempted tragedy is only attempted. However terrible its consequences, 
it remains in vain, in so far as the infinite God neither rivals nor 
excludes finite humanity. Hence we may conclude that the theological 
grammar of PR sl38 is both Jewish and Christian. Moreover, "tragedy" 
here is used of the chaos which is excluded by the grammar of God. This 
does not mean that Jews or Christian have to ban other uses of the word, 
ie. other concepts of tragedy. Thus "if Mozart found no great tragedy 
in what he read, does that mean he did not encounter it in his life?" 
(CV 82, 1949). Such a remark, then, does not necessarily express an
abandonment of Jewish and Christian grammar. Thus Wittgenstein could 
write, "The Christian religion is only for the one who needs infinite 
help, solely, that is, for the one who experiences infinite torment" 
(CV 46, 1944; translation revised). The same passage adds that, "Anyone 
in such torment who has the gift of opening his heart, rather than 
contracting it, accepts the means of salvation in his heart." (hoc. 
cit.). Here again, we find confirmation that Wittgenstein, in 1944, 
still adheres to the theological grammar of PR sl38 (1929 - 1930).
1.7 BON SENS PRECOCE
"What Renan calls the ’bon sens précoce’ of the Semitic races (an idea 
which had occurred to me too a long time ago) is their impoetic 
(Undichterische) mentality, which heads straight for what is concrete. 
This is characteristic of my philosophy. Things are placed right in 
front of our eyes, not covered by any veil. - This is where religion and 
art part company" (CV 6, 1930).
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This passage comes at the end of a longer passage criticising Ernest 
Renan's piety towards science, as expressed in his History of the People 
of Israel (Vol 1, ch 3, etc). Wittgenstein's criticism is similar to 
that which he also directed over several years against the scientism or 
Comtean positivism of Sir James Frazer in The Golden Bough. However, 
the above quotation raises many issues for the way of reading 
Wittgenstein advocated in this thesis.
Some of these issues may be indicated briefly by the following 
questions. How far is Renan's notion of 'Semitic' 'bon sens précoce' 
influenced by positivism and how far by other older traditions? How far 
is Wittgenstein's appropriation of it influenced by positivism, how far 
by his own inner development, or by the new way of thinking about 
language being developed by Karl Kraus and others, including Ebner, 
Buber, Rosenzweig and Mauthner, who were drawing on ancient and 
relatively recent Jewish sources, as well as on Pascal, Hamann and 
Kierkegaard? Related questions concern what Wittgenstein meant by 
"religion" and "art" parting company, and how this parting is related to 
his philosophical development.
Renan was by no means just a positivist. The chapters of his work 
Wittgenstein probably read are both subtle and suggestive. They help to 
explain why Wittgenstein should have taken the trouble to criticise some 
of Renan's cruder thinking. When Wittgenstein writes, in the above 
quotation, of the "impoetic" and "concrete" Semitic mentality, doing 
without "any veil", and of religion and art parting company in these 
respects, part of what he means can be explained as follows. 
Wittgenstein is criticising bad poetry and art, ie., bad by the standard 
of his "Jewish" style of thinking.
40
1.8 JEWISH INCLUSIVENESS
It is necessary, in such Jewish thinking, to understanding religion 
inclusively, not exclusively. This is implied by the voice which guides 
and unifies Jewish thinking and living: "Hear, 0 Israel: The Lord our
God is one Lord; and you shall love the Lord your God with all your 
heart, and with all your soul and with all your might." (Deuteronomy 
6:4 RSV). The reasons why religion and art become differentiated, and 
why philosophy and art, philosophy and religion, also become
differentiated, and why they may rightly "part company" or rightly 
return together, are of course complex. But for Jewish thinking these 
complexities are to be understood in the light of the all-inclusive 
guidance given by the voice of Deuteronomy.
Wittgenstein, for all the assimilation to non-Jewish living and thinking 
evident in his family and in his own development, nevertheless seems to 
have heard that voice, and to have discovered his own voice in response 
to it. Even in the Tractatus and in the work preparing for it, this can 
be recognised. There is both the unity of the logical, the ethical and 
the aesthetic, and there is the inclusion of the world within this 
logical space. This logical space both guides and unifies the world 
which it transcends. "My book (ie,, the Tractatus) draws limits to the 
sphere of the ethical from the inside as it were." (Letter to Picker in 
September or October 1919: LLW 143-144). Similarly, it will be
argued, the absolute experience (or absolute way of using language), in 
the Lecture on Ethics of 1929, is the experience of the absolute which 
is present and active in the way of including all other relative 
absolutes and relativities. (Chapter 7 below). "The infinite doesn’t
rival the finite. The infinite is that whose essence is to exclude 
nothing finite" (PR sl38, February 1929-April 1930). If Wittgenstein’s 
earlier language seems at times to spin between a version of negative
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theology and of pantheism, or between an idealist monism and a realist 
dualism or pluralism, this is because he is engaged in developing, with 
gradually increasing self-understanding, a Jewish form of dialectical 
description or interpretation.
Renan’s ’’semitic" "bon sens precoce" does relate to Wittgenstein’s 
deeper personal development as can be seen from the already mentioned 
theological grammar concerning not enacting heaven and hell on earth. 
In that remark, it would be entirely proper to replace "Christianity" by 
"Judaism", so that it read: within Judaism it’s as though God says to 
men: Don’t act tragedy, don’t enact heaven and hell on earth. Heaven 
and hell are my business, (Cp CV 14). It is this "earth" - so 
liberated from the bad poetry, bad religion and bad philosophy which try 
to make this earth the theatre of their heaven and/or hell-enacting - 
which is the earth of Wittgenstein’s Semitic love of "bon sens", of 
"what is concrete", "unpoetic" and "not covered by any veil".
The last phrase links literally with the notion of the apocalyptic or of
revelation. It may be recalled that the new heaven and earth of the 
Apocalypse of John or Book of Revelation contains the new city which has 
no temple in it, ie. distinctions between the cultic and the secular or 
the artistic etc. are only provisional, and to be overcome by the Lord
who is both Lamb and Lion, victim and victor. The grammar of this
Jewish-Christian dialectic was not unknown to William Blake, whom 
Wittgenstein revered (RW 150-151). Jewish dialectical thinking, in a 
style at the opposite end of the spectrum from that of the Apocalypse, 
can be seen clearly at work in the wisdom-book of Ecclesiastes. The 
apparent contradictions, in the "secular" guidance given by the wise 
speaker or true king of Jerusalem, are resolved both by the famous 
overview of contrasting times for contrasting activities (Ecclesiastes
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3:1-8) and by a closing methodological passage which, if the impressive 
NEB translation is followed (ie. is not merely reflecting scholarly 
bias), continues the dialectical guidance with respect to the use of 
books and study, ie., the interpretation of proverbs and tradition, law 
and wisdom: "So the speaker, in his wisdom, continued to teach the
people what he knew. He turned over many maxims in his mind and sought 
how best to set them out. He chose his words to give pleasure, but what 
he wrote was the honest truth. The sayings of the wise are sharp as 
goads, like nails driven home; they lead the assembled people, for they 
come from one shepherd. One further warning, my son: the use of books 
is endless, and much study is wearisome." (Ecclesiastes 12:9-12),
On this translation, the passage is not a weary farewell to writing and 
study, except for the unwise who can only read it that way, but a 
balanced recognition of the importance of interpretation, of proverbs 
and law, for the sake of a human life on earth which can become whole, 
in response to the voice of Deuteronomy at work even among those who say 
in their wisdom "Emptiness, emptiness ... all is empty".
Compare Deuteronomy* s key text on "semitic" "bon sens": "For this
commandment which I command you this day is not too hard for you, 
neither is it far off. It is not in heaven that you should say, ’Who 
will go up for us to heaven, and bring it to us, that we may hear and do 
it?’ Neither is it beyond the sea, that you should say, ’Who will go 
over the sea for us, and bring it to us, that we may hear it and do it?’ 
But the word is very near you; it is in your mouth and in your heart, so 
that you can do it." (Deuteronomy 30:11-14). Compare CV 14 on "Don’t 
act a tragedy ..." For the way this connects with Christian as well as 
Jewish grammar, see Paul’s use of Deuteronomy 30:11-14 (and use of 
Jewish interpretation of this text?) in Romans 10:5-13. It should not
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be forgotten that Wittgenstein and G E Moore planned to study Romans 
together, and apparently embarked on this project (RW 90),
It will be argued during the thesis that this Jewish and Christian 
dialectical thinking was partially retrieved by Pascal’s insight into 
the need to hold together, in a new style of thinking, both a principled 
and a practical style of thinking - what he called ”1’esprit de 
géométrie et l’esprit de finesse" (Pensées s512, and throughout). This 
Jewish - and Augustinian - insight is transposed by Wittgenstein into 
his pervasive fragments of dialogue on the interdependence of 
rule-understanding and rule-following. This is, for example, a key to 
his work on the philosophy of mathematics. Wittgenstein’s "semitic" 
"bon sens précoce" is not a matter of an abstracted and deformed esprit 
de finesse, or just of thinking in similes as if they were either 
dispensable visual aids or else the substance of his thinking.
1.9 BUBER AND FRIENDS
While Wittgenstein’s friends and family appear not to have been in 
direct contact with Martin Buber’s Vienna circle, with its enthusiastic 
Zionism and mysticism of language, there were certainly indirect 
contacts, for example, Mauthner and Engelmann. Kraus, too, practices a 
Jewish mysticism of language. More important, however, is the way in 
which, at various points, and for all their differences, Buber and 
Wittgenstein do overlap in their approach. Once one has begun to 
appreciate their sharing of the dialectical grammar of Jewish thinking 
(Rosenzweig, too, used such terminology) it is hard to avoid being 
constantly reminded, when reading Wittgenstein on "the philosophy of 
mathematics" - and on much else - of the spirit and guidance shown in 
the following Hassidic story reported by Buber:
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"On one of the days of the Hanukkah feast. Rabbi Nahum, the son of the 
rabbi of Rishyn, entered the House of Study at a time when he was not 
expected and found his disciples playing checkers, as was the custom on 
those days. When they saw the zaddik they were embarrassed and stopped 
playing. But he gave them a kindly nod and asked: "Do you know the
rules of the game of checkers?" And when they did not reply for shyness 
he himself gave the answer: "I shall tell you the rules of the game of 
checkers. This first is that one must not make two moves at once. The 
second is that one may only move forward and not backward. And the third 
is that when one has reached the last row, one may move wherever one 
likes." (Buber’s The Way of Man According to the Teachings of Hasidism 
in Kaufmann 1964),
Buber lets the story look after itself, without explicit comment. 
However, on the maxim that attempts at paraphrase can reliably enrich 
our understanding of an "unparaphrasable" text, Buber’s Hassidic 
draughts-story may be interpreted as a parable, a metonym or a sign 
which participates in the presence of that which it remembers or 
anticipates, ie. a linguistic sacrament. Understanding of the rules of 
the small-scale "secular" game and the use of these rules, which should 
go together, have not been fully brought together by the Hassidic 
apprentices in Jewish interpretation. For they neither understand rules 
and application together with fluency, nor understand this dynamic 
equilibrium as parable and sign of the all-inclusive, holy game of the 
voice of Deuteronomy. The situation is in fact the reverse of that 
imagined by, perhaps mythological, "Wittgenstein fideists" for whom 
religion (or religions) is (are) exclusive game(s), as presumably are 
also poems or poetry, art(s) and philosophy or philosophies. Three 
rules are mentioned.
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The first rule is, ’’One must not make two moves at once”. Two mutually 
compatible interpretations may be intended and are certainly fitting, 
(a) One must take turns to make moves in draughts. One must take turns 
in conversation, the heart of living language. One must take turns in 
loving one’s neighbour as oneself and in applying the negative rule 
(Hillel) or positive rule (Jesus) which is said to sum up the law and 
the prophets. One must take turns in interpretation, not just to listen 
to others and to respond to them, but also to learn the dialectic of 
rule and application, study and action, forms of logic and forms of 
life. (b) "One must not make two moves at once" also by not confusing 
a move in draughts with a move in some other game. If draughts is, in 
the present context, the parable of the all-inclusive game, then any
other game is a parable of some non-inclusive game. This does not
exclude other games from also being parables of the all-inclusive game, 
but one cannot take this for granted, any more than one can take the
opposite for granted. Instead one must patiently search, look and see,
being prepared for surprises. Rational argument about how to compare 
games is possible. Turn-taking can apply also between people playing 
some other game, and between them and people playing draughts. 
Moreover, turn-taking which takes seriously the interdependence of 
rule-understanding and rule-following is grammatically and practically 
connected with overcoming both the divided self and divisions between 
people and groups of people. Turn-taking is deeply internal to the 
grammar of the all-inclusive voice of Deuteronomy.
The second rule is, "One may only move forward and not backward." The 
dialectic to be learnt is not a dialectic between the way of life and 
the way of death, or between love and hatred, or love and fear, or 
(seeing draughts are played with black and white) between light and 
darkness. Even if at times it may appear to be such a dialectic, in the
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eyes of the confused and even in the eyes of the apprentices, it is not 
and cannot be. The exodus from the land of slavery to the land of 
promise, from the city of Babel to the city of Peace, may involve many 
detours and side-tracks, but the only legitimate turnings along the way 
are tactical, not strategic. The discipline of "one may only move 
forward and not backward" is a discipline in which one can be and must 
be trained, by apprenticeship to reliable masters.
The third rules is, "When one has reached the last row, one may move 
wherever one likes." Through the discipline of apprenticeship to 
reliable masters, one may finally achieve the freedom which is skill in 
using the rules, skill in conversation, ethics, interpretation, - and 
skill in limit-situations, where one’s training and traditions 
apparently offer no explicit guidance, but where one can discover that 
one has learnt from them how to continue and how to find one's way about 
in surprising situations, for example even with players of other games, 
but also with those who for one reason or another are flagging and 
floundering in the training in which they can only move forward, 
including those who are confusing draughts with other games.
Gershom Scholem's worries about Martin Buber's interpretation of 
Hasidism can be plotted on this draughts’ matrix. If we accept that 
Scholem may well be the more historical, scholarly, scribal interpreter, 
and Buber the more prophetic interpreter, and that sometimes they may 
misunderstand each other, we find that Scholem's most serious complaint 
against Buber is that he, after presumably reaching the last row, too 
often gives the impression that he (and his readers, who may not have 
reached the last row) must only move back to the first row, ie., must 
accept and affirm the here-and-now, regardless of its (and their) 
transformation. If the Holy One both transcends and unites (and so
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fulfils) the present world or age, this does not mean that the present 
is not to be transformed. It is very far from clear that Buber is 
guilty of these gently made criticisms, but certainly he has been read 
in that way by some. It seems, so far as I can judge, that Scholem and 
Buber are both far from being as consistently clear about the dynamic 
equilibrium between rule-understanding and rule-following as is the 
apparently more "secular", apparently more exiled Wittgenstein. (For 
introductions to the debate between Scholem and Buber, see Scholem 1971, 
and Buber in Schilpp 1967.) Above-mentioned misunderstanding of Buber 
parallels misunderstanding of Wittgenstein.
1.10 KABBALAH AS DIALECTICAL INTERPRETATION OF INTERPRETATIONS 
"Turn it and turn it again, for everything is in it." This is an 
ancient rabbinic maxim for interpreting a scriptural text. It could
well be a contemporary maxim for interpreting secular scriptures. It
also corresponds to Wittgenstein's various remarks about his style of 
thinking, which made it so hard for him to give the Investigations a 
conventional or easy structure, - not because his thinking was 
fragmented, as the use of many short remarks suggests, but because of 
its inclusive, open, analogical, Jewish character. Here the style is 
the man and his grammar, the essence of his Jewishness. Those who fail
to take turns, both when they can only move forward and after they have
reached the last row, are those who try to "enact heaven and hell on 
earth" (CV 14) , those who search high and low, and far across the sea, 
for the word which is already on their lips and in their hearts, as 
draughts players and conversation partners in earth's here-and-now. 
Such players at heaven and hell act and think as if they can move 
backwards when they can only move forwards, and sometimes - even after 
apparently turning at the back row - as if they can move only forwards, 
or only backwards, when they can move either way.
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The rule for transcending interpretations is also the rule for
reconciling, enriching and transforming interpretations. The rule for 
transcending abstractly religious or metaphysical transcendence 
(negative theology and platonism) and for transcending religious or 
metaphysical immanence (positive theology, naturalism) is also the rule 
for transforming, enriching and reconciling these modes of life and 
interpretation. Rules isolated from applications generate (and are 
generated by) religious and metaphysical transcendentalism. The
regulative dialectic which aims to put everything in its place and to 
make and/or discover places for everything (and things for every place) 
can only be explained, understood and practised by means of offering 
and finding appropriate samples.
The fullest account and exemplification of such Wittgensteinian 
dialectic known to me, after Wittgenstein, is that of Nicholas Lash in 
his Easter in Ordinary (1988). He does not develop his dialectical 
grammar in relation to Wittgenstein on rules, or in relation to Buber’s 
Hasidic parable of the rules of draughts. Nevertheless, Lash's approach 
is much more deeply Wittgensteinian than might appear from his minimal 
explicit references. Of course, no book - and no thesis - can do 
everything, and these limits of Lash's latest wide-ranging work are
mentioned mainly out of regard for what is expected of a thesis.
Lash appears not to take Scholem's work into account, especially 
Scholem's importantly relevant essay on "Revelation and Tradition as 
Religious Categories in Judaism", in The Messianic Idea in Judaism and 
Other Essays in Jewish Spirituality (1971). In this essay, Scholem 
considers the Talmudic saying, "The Holy One, blessed be he, speaks 
Torah out of the mouths of all rabbis" and the discussions of this by 
Jewish Kabbalistic scholars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries-
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"The great, continuing voice contains all these diverse ways of 
interpreting, for in that voice there can be nothing missing" (Avodat 
ha-Kodesh by Meir ben Gabbai (1531), in op.cit. 300).
Lash makes no connection with either Pascal or Emerson. I have not been 
able to investigate whether Pascal's Jewish contacts, inevitably a
matter for some finesse, included contact with Kabbalistic traditions 
(not quite a pleonasm) of dialectical thinking. H F Stewart, 
contemporary with Wittgenstein at Trinity, mentions as Pascal's contacts 
with Judaism and Kabbalah the thirteenth century Catalonian Dominican 
Ramon Martini and J de Voisin of Bordeaux (Stewart 1947, xiii). One way 
in which Lash is less than fully perspicuous about William James, or 
about Wittgenstein, is in not relating James to Emerson. The linguistic 
aspects of Emerson’s radicalised transcendentalism, to which Cave11 has 
drawn attention for many years, may owe something to Emerson's knowledge 
of Kabbalah traditions. It is possible that Emerson's strange 
fascination with Swedenborg may owe something to their common interest 
in the type of hermeneutics they found in Kabbalah. James' father was 
immersed in both Emerson and Swedenborg. James' various attempts at
taxonomy of personality traits and styles of thinking are arguably
endebted to Emerson's style of dialectics and so may represent a
psychological, Cartesian secularisation of a pattern of thinking 
influenced by Kabbalah. This would be a factor in understanding both 
the vigour and the complex fluidity of James' style of thinking.
Clearly further research is needed in these directions, research once 
strongly inhibited by complexities of Christian guilt towards Jews and 
now inhibited further, perhaps, by ineptitudes in Christian desire to 
atone, ineptitudes which relate to a fear of ridicule for playing too 
enthusiastically the game of "Hunt the Kabbalah". Doubtless we shall
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never know how far Wittgenstein was aware of these affinities in his 
style of thinking. However, it is already clear enough that he was at 
least partially aware of these affinities and that his later finding his 
way about the turnings of the city of language, - finding how to go on, 
as a philosopher, as religious seeker and as a human being, - was closer 
to Judaism than he either advertised or perhaps understood.
Regardless of the uncertainties which attend these matters, 
Wittgenstein's great legacy as a Jewish-Christian religious thinker can 
be envisaged as his opening up of a way of testing Jewish and Christian 
traditions, so as to sort out roots of gnostic dualism from roots of 
reliable traditions of language and interpretation, with their 
dialectical grammar which is both distinctive and of universal 
significance. Wittgenstein's transformation makes possible the 
development of such linguistic responsibility. This can be seen by 
reading Wittgenstein on his Jewish style of thinking, together with work 
of Stanley Cavell, Fergus Kerr (1986 - not exploring Wittgenstein on his 
Jewishness to the degree called for by his fine reading of 
Wittgenstein's anti-gnosticism and of Cavell,- see pp33-34 of Kerr), 
Nicholas Lash (1988), Buber and Scholem. (Op.cit.).
1.11 MASKING AND REVEALING
To conclude this introductory chapter, comment will be made on the rest 
of Wittgenstein's references to "Jewish" features as he noted them in 
CV. Commenting on a certain abstractness in Kraus' prolific theatrical 
writings, Wittgenstein suggests they could, or should be, performed in 
masks. "And as I see it, masked theatre is anyway the expression of an 
intellectualistic character. And for the same reason perhaps it is a 
theatrical form which will attract only Jews." (CV 12, 1931), This
might appear to contradict the previous feature of Jewishness, the
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concrete bon sens mentioned by Renan. Against such a reading of it, the 
following points should be considered. If Wittgenstein was in effect 
trying to develop a style of thinking which held together 1’esprit de 
géométrie (logical space or logical grammar) and 1’esprit de finesse 
(practical application and competence, "intuition", concreteness, tacit 
procedural knowledge), then he, following Kraus, saw the theatrical work 
of other contemporaries as out of equilibrium. Too much weight was 
being put on actors' personality, on dramatic effects and elaborate, but 
peripheral, production techniques (Janik and Toulmin (1973), chapter 3). 
Against this half-truth of theatre, Kraus put forward his 
"one-and-a-half-truths", by concentrating severely on the text and its 
interpretation, so letting the language look after itself. Of course, 
facial expressions and the rest of body-language all belong to the 
fullness of human dialogue in life. However, against one type of 
imbalance, an opposite type can be justified in a provisional way. 
Moreover, even in theatre without masks, language and its 
interpretations should be central. In any case, why should classical 
Greek drama and its revivals, or the theatres of carnival and opera, 
monopolise the use of masks? There is also a link with reflections 
about the alleged "secretiveness" of Jewish character, to be commented 
on at several points below.
1.12 DESERT AND DELIVERANCE
"The Jew is a desert region, but underneath its thin layer of rock lies 
the molten lava of spirit and intellect" (CV 13, 1931). This may be 
read, not just as an image of individual self-repression, and of social 
suppression and repression, but also as an image of Wittgenstein's 
philosophical work. Prima facie it applies most easily to the Tractates 
and the Lecture on Ethics. However, it can be seen to apply also to the 
later work, if this is read (with, as well as against, the Tractates) as
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typically Jewish. For exclusive, non-Jewish styles of thinking, most of 
Wittgenstein's philosophical landscapes look like precipitations which 
are the boulders and dust of his "atomism" and of the "disintegrated 
modernism" of his fragmentory remarks. Any connection with Pascal may 
look fanciful or superficial, merely a matter of a style for anyone in a 
hurry, or too dependent on notebooks, or over-impressed by aphorisms. 
Anyone may have the misfortune to get stuck in such a style of writing. 
Why should a style of writing be a style of thinking or of being?
However, given a Jewish, inclusive, way of seeing Wittgenstein’s 
landscapes, "the molten lava of spirit and intellect" is/are integrated 
with description and concepts. For the latter are always instrumental 
and goal-oriented. An inclusive Jewish style of thinking enables and 
requires (as well as specialisation and division of labour, - beyond 
simple economies, and in spite of alienation) a passion for inward and 
outward reconciliation. For only when the all-inclusive Holy One is 
sought "with your whole heart" ie., sought by the whole person, is he 
found as the One whose name cannot (grammatically) be misused: "You will 
seek me, and find me, when you seek me with all your heart" (Jeremiah 
29:13. See also Matthew 7:7-8, Luke 11:9-10 and the whole of 
Augustine's Confessiones, etc. See also Charles Hartshorne's The Logic 
of Perfection (1962) , especially pp40-41).
The reasons of the heart (understood in the Hebrew sense of personal 
centre, organ of intention and thought, will and belief) which Reason 
(ie., the reason of Platonic realism or Romantic idealism) does not know 
(partly because it fails to read Hebrew seriously), are the reasons and 
arguments which are at home with the grammar and dialectics of 
Deuteronomy and Ecclesiastes, of prophetic and wisdom traditions. 
Wittgenstein's "desert region", the apparently barren sand where he
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aimed to blow away metaphysical houses of cards, is in the region of 
Sinai, but is also a royal, processional road from metaphysical slavery 
to promise, from metaphysical exile to peace. (Compare PI sll8 and s426 
with Isaiah chapters 40-55.)
1.13 PRECARIOUSNESS AND BALANCE
"In western civilisation, the Jew is always measured on scales which do 
not fit him. Many people can see clearly enough that the Creek thinkers 
were neither philosophers in the western sense nor scientists in the 
western sense, that the participants in the Olympic Games were not 
sportsmen and do not fit into any western occupation. But is is the 
same with the Jews. And by taking the words of our (language? - 
Editor's conjecture) as the only possible standards we constantly fail 
to do them justice. So at one time they are overestimated, at another 
underestimated. Spengler is right in this connection not to classify 
Weininger with the philosophers (thinkers) of the west." (CV 16, 1931).
Wittgenstein is continuously concerned about the standards or scales 
which we use to measure others and ourselves. This is expressed in his 
repeated use of the phrase, "until we meet again at the last judgement" 
(LLW 75-78), in his asking, 'Why shouldn't one form of life culminate in 
an utterance of belief in a last judgement?' (LC p58), in his own 1951 
utterance of such a culminating remark, and in his repeated practice of 
confession with certain friends or acquaintances (RW throughout). 
Furthermore the logic or grammar of measurement is a pervasive theme. 
Even the motto of the Investigations, inexplicably omitted from the 
widely used English third edition, raises questions of how progress is 
and should be measured: "It is in the nature of all progress that it 
looks much greater than it really is". (Nestroy - admired by 
Kierkegaard and revived by Kraus).
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Wittgenstein's general remedy for the overestimating and underestimating 
of Jews when they are measured by "our" "western" standards is given as 
follows; "For we can avoid ineptness or emptiness in our assertions only 
by presenting the model as what it is, as an object of comparison - as, 
so to speak, a measuring rod; not as a preconceived idea to which 
reality must correspond. (The dogmatism into which we fall so easily in 
doing philosophy)." (PI sl31. Cp CV 14 (1931) related to discussion of 
Spengler and notion of family resemblances and CV 26-27, 1937).
The Jews, or their canonical scriptures, or canonical persons, as it 
were, are overestimated when their grammar is viewed in isolation from 
its use, ie. , when their rules are taken in abstraction from the 
following of these rules, so that their grammar is absolutised in 
unbalanced, false types of transcendence and immanence. Conversely, the 
Jews, their literature and history, are underestimated when their 
rule-following, their use of their grammar, is regarded as dispensable, 
an inessential illustration of independent principles. The same 
problematic precariousness and the same need for balance apply to other 
communities and traditions. However, it is arguable that the Jews have 
shown the way with regard to this dialectic, which requires balanced 
respect for both differences and similarities between peoples. It is 
not a matter of measuring Judaism by standards merely internal to 
Judaism. Such an interpretation may be a recurrent temptation, 
especially in cases of obsession with abstractions of the Torah, but to 
surrender to it is a betrayal of the identity and vocation of Judaism. 
Here again, one of Buber's Hassidic stories makes a key point; on the 
day of judgement the devout Jew is confronted, not by the question, "Why 
were you not Moses?" but, "Why were you not yourself?" (Op.cit). The 
thought here is that, for Moses, the matter of learning, and living in 
responsibility for, the Torah was a matter of becoming himself.
55
Likewise for others. Any other attempted way of following in the way of 
Moses is an illegitimate short-cut which, far from "using the law 
lawfully" (Cp 1 Timothy 1:8 and Augustine’s Confessiones chapter 12 
throughout), deforms it in gnostic or manichaean directions.
Weininger is a complex example for Wittgenstein to invoke here. When 
Wittgenstein refers to him, he is referring to the author of the 
notorious best-seller Sex and Character (1903), even though other work 
of Weininger's was published, and read by Wittgenstein. (On Weininger 
and Wittgenstein, see Rhees (in RW) , Janik (1985), McGuinness (WLi) and 
Haller (1988)). The first point to be made here is made most clearly in 
Wittgenstein's own words. Wittgenstein had apparently urged Moore to 
read Sex and Character. Moore was puzzled and Wittgenstein replies: "I
can quite imagine that you don't admire Weininger very much, what with 
that beastly translation and the fact that he must feel very foreign to 
you. It is true that he is fantastic but he is great and fantastic. It 
isn't necessary or rather not possible to agree with him but the 
greatness lies in that with which we disagree. It is his enormous
mistake which is great. Ie., roughly speaking if you just add a "-" 
(negation sign) to the whole book it says an important truth."
(Wittgenstein: Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore (LRKM) pl59, 1931) .
Weininger comes closest to the inclusive grammar of Judaism in his 
understanding of ethics as the logic of life and logic as the ethics of 
thought; also in his quest for a vision which would hold together truth, 
goodness and beauty. This is recognisable as a strand in the
interpretation of Kant, which also runs through the various
'pragmatisms' of C S Pierce, William James and John Dewey. This strand 
appears to belong to what Wittgenstein accepted as Weininger's greatness 
and authentic Jewishness. However, it is in danger of being grotesquely 
deformed by conflation with Weininger's Schopenhauerean misogyny and 
anti-semitism.
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Weininger, however, is not merely influenced by Schopenhauer’s 
prejudices or philosophical shallowness in these respects, nor merely by 
his own cultural and social milieu, nor merely by his own apparent 
somatic and psychological problems. For, together with these factors, 
Weininger brings to eschatological and apocalyptic expression (in his 
book and closely related "life-world-ending" suicide), the anti-Jewish 
gnostic or manichaean dualism pervading so much western and "Christian" 
tradition. For Weininger, the Jewish, the female, the anti-logical and 
anti-ethical together form the opposite pole to the un-Jewish, the male, 
the logical and ethical - as darkness contrasted with light, or death 
with life. The process of salvation involves suffering and passing 
through the former in order to achieve the latter. For elements of 
both, in different proportions, are present in everyone. Thus the 
creation of the natural world and the spread of Judaism together 
constitute a prolonged Fall, and deliverance constitutes a Marcionite 
reversal. One is reminded of the gnostic dualism in the Kabbalah 
tradition associated with Isaac Luria. (See G G Scholem’s Major Trends 
in Jewish Mysticism 1946.)
Regardless of speculations about Wittgenstein’s own psycho-somatic 
constitution, which divert attention from the central points here, 
Wittgenstein has several philosophically and spiritually important 
reasons for finding Weininger fascinating. Weininger’s notion of 
degrees of sexual differentiation and similarity, regardless of the 
polarised stereotypes he used in his metaphysics and ethics, is 
presented by Weininger as an empirical hypothesis. Not only is it an 
empirical version of Wittgenstein’s family-resemblances method of 
analysis, but it offers Weininger an exodus from his apparently tragic 
dualism - a way out he seems not to have seen or wanted to use.
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For Wittgenstein, by 1931, the family-resemblances method of analysis
and reconciliation (which he had already met in other guises in James 
and in Spengler) was fast becoming a powerful way of overcoming 
un-Jewish dualisms and so of developing his own Jewish style of 
thinking. Wittgenstein's consequent critique of stereotyped or dogmatic 
ways of measuring and of understanding measurement amounts to a Jewish
critique of idols and idolatry. At the heart of his critique is his
insight into equilibration between rules and rule-following, principles 
and practice, haggadah and halakhah. Weininger appears to be a 
tormented epitomisation of traditional blindness to this
interdependence. Those who don’t see this consequently overestimate or 
underestimate him, but also overestimate and underestimate Judaism, the 
Judaism whose self-alienation Weininger expresses with tormented 
greatness.
1.14 THE SHAME AND GLORY OF INTERPRETATION
The long passage in CV 18-19 (1931), from which the famous list of
people who have influenced Wittgenstein's thinking is so often
abstracted, begins and ends in (or rather expands indefinitely into) 
Wittgenstein's meditation on the Jewish character of his thinking.
Jewish thinking typically involves interpreting the work of others: "It 
is typical for a Jewish mind to understand someone else's work better 
than he understands it himself". This can be read as presumptuous, or 
ironic, or even as true. However, when it is true, it is least
implausible when the person who has been understood, better than he
understood himself, acknowledges that this is indeed the case. When the 
person being interpreted is no longer able to speak for himself in 
person, it is least implausible when a genuine friend or advocate of his 
makes such an acknowledgement on his behalf. However, most of the time
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an interpreter of other's work, a typically Jewish thinker, may have to 
live with the risk that his interpretation may appear presumptuous and 
so shameful.
The situation is made more difficult for the interpreter when others, 
not least those whom he interprets, are blind to the extent to which 
their work, also, is interpretation of interpretations. In such a 
situation, the self-conscious - Jewish - interpreter, is made to feel 
that his work cannot be real work, when measured by the standards of 
others. Others appear, not least to themselves, as approximating to 
pure achievement, pure discovery, or pure expression. Thus, for 
example, the Kantian and Romantic notions of the autonomous, creative, 
genius, or the notion of science as progressive naive reading of the 
book of nature, are at odds with a Jewish style of thinking. (Cp 
CV 18-19, 6-8, etc). Compared with ways of measuring progress which 
were dominant around him, Wittgenstein's passion for clarification, 
interpretation and better understanding appear static, poor and even 
shameful - relative to those criteria (CV 18-20 etc). In such a 
situation it is easy to overlook how a careful and honest account of 
Kant's work or of the history of science, or of Descartes' 
self-certainty, would expose caricatures of the kind that obscure the 
centrality of interpretation - and so of language, community and 
tradition - in all human work.
It is only when 1’esprit de finesse and 1’esprit de géométrie have 
parted company that the invention of "new similes" (CV 19) can be looked 
down on as in essence merely a secondary or derivative aspect of 
intellectual work. Since Wittgenstein wrote of these matters in 1931, 
and partly because of his influence, there has been a wide awakening to 
the importance of models and metaphors in all areas of understanding.
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not least in the natural sciences. Norwood Hanson, Stephen Toulmin, Max 
Black, Ian Ramsey and Paul Feyerabend - all influenced by Wittgenstein - 
have played parts in this development.
It belongs to the meaning of interpretation that interpreters find 
themselves or put themselves in between those who misunderstand one 
another, or that interpreters keep company with those who fail to 
understand themselves as well or as fully as they should. This is one 
reason why Wittgenstein is correct in writing that his Jewish 
clarification needs "COURAGE" (sic), without which "it becomes just a 
clever game" (CV 19). For in these situations one risks being 
misunderstood by both sides. One can also be at risk from others 
projecting, and from oneself assimilating from others, their too 
limited or confused interpretations - as well as being at risk, of 
course, from one’s own limitations and confusions.
The glory of interpretation is connected with working through these 
risks with courage, in the hope that others may become more fully and 
richly themselves and that one may become so with them. It cannot be 
merely a facile error to see a resemblance between Wittgenstein’s 
therapeutic method(s) and Freudian psychoanalysis or related forms of 
psychotherapy, provided that these proposed psychological therapies are 
also understood as forms of interpretation, at least in effect if not 
always in intention. Moreover, the tradition (of Schopenhauer, 
Nietzsche, Freud) becomes better understood when it is recognised that 
the critique of "sublimation" involves the genuinely sublime showing 
itself in the interpretative practice of the analyst. Likewise with 
Wittgenstein's critique. It is not unusual for Jewish thinkers in 
general, as well as would-be psychotherapists in particular, to have to 
reflect on the possibility that, "I ought to be no more than a mirror.
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in which my reader can see his own thinking with all its deformities so 
that, helped in this way, he can put it right" (CV 18, 1931). The
courage which this calls for may be as great as the terrors of twentieth 
century European history; or as great as the torments of the mysterious 
servant of the Lord of Isaiah chapters 40-55.
Wittgenstein believes that it is the vocation of Jewish thinking to put 
others' work "into a comprehensive picture". This clearly relates to 
his remarks about the aim of philosophy as the sharing of a perspicuous, 
selectively descriptive, account of our grammatical practices. This 
contrasts with but, just for this reason, is not opposed to the 
specialised use of theories and hypotheses in varieties of scientific 
work. So strongly does Wittgenstein feel about this that he speaks of 
confusion between these two approaches as "tricking" or "cheating", of 
oneself as well as others.
The prevalence of such confusion seems to be at least part of what 
prevents him from describing his work of clarification with courage (cp. 
1'esprit de géométrie et l'esprit de finesse) in the way that he feels 
would be appropriate. "I would like to say 'This book is written to the 
glory of God', but nowadays that would be the trick of a cheat, that it, 
it would not be rightly understood. It means the book is written in 
good will, and in so far as it is not so written, but out of vanity, 
etc, the author would wish to see it condemned. He cannot free it of 
these impurities further than he himself is free of them." (Foreword to 
PR, 1930. Cp draft materials for alternative versions of this foreword 
in CV pp6-8).
That this is no passing bout of nostalgia is shown by Wittgenstein's 
stronger repetition of the idea in 1949. If this is seen as evidence of
61
a persistent religious nostalgia, then it is a nostalgia which is 
arguably at work throughout his philosophical clarifications, and 
therefore more of a passion than a nostalgia: "Bach wrote on the title 
page of his Orgelbuchlein, "To the glory of the most high God, and that 
my neighbour may be benefited thereby". That is what I would have liked 
to say about my work" (RW 168, as reported by Drury).
In both of these theological passages Wittgenstein is clearly appealing 
to the Jewish grammar which he formulated in 1929-1930 as follows: "The
infinite doesn't rival the finite. The infinite is that whose essence 
is to exclude nothing finite" (PR sl38). This is the same Jewish 
grammar which Irenaeus shares: "For the glory of God is the living human 
being, while the life of the human being is seeing God" ("Gloria enira 
Dei vivens homo, vita autem hominis visio Dei." Adversus Haereses 4, 
20). The confusion, which can amount to trickery or cheating of oneself 
as well as of others, and which contributes to Wittgenstein's reluctance 
to be explicitly theological, consists of confusing inclusive Jewish 
grammar with some form of exclusive grammar of religion or theology.
For the latter, religion belongs to one area of life amongst others and 
God is one possible or probable being amongst other beings, as in 
deistic use of t-heistic hypotheses in science, for example by Descartes 
or Newton, but also in much of the science-oriented religious 
apologetics of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Such apologetic 
work was, however, within a broad and venerable tradition, which 
regarded the human mind as somehow already correlated with the mind of 
God, according to an interpretation of the creation and preservation of 
mankind "in the image and likeness of God". (Cp. Genesis 1: 26-28, 
Psalm 8 and Hebrews 1: 1-2:9. See also E Craig's important (1987) study 
- The Mind of God and the Works of Man) . Thus traditional grammar of
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mind, knowledge, etc., had built into it theological assumptions of one 
kind or another. The two main kinds, which are alternatives, are 
Jewish-Christian and Gnostic-Christian. The latter may be characterised 
as dualistxc and the former as anti—dualistic.
The fact that Wittgenstein, especially in his later work, is not more 
explicitly theological may be interpreted, either as a form of failure 
or as a relatively successful "one-and-a-half-truth" (Kraus). According 
to the latter interpretation, Wittgenstein is aiming to restore balance 
to a tradition which has all too often forgotten that "How words are 
understood is not told by words alone. (Theology)" (Z sl44. See also 
CV 85, the passage beginning, "If someone who believes in God ..." and 
ending. Practice gives the words their sense,")
According to this reading of Wittgenstein's theological reticence, there 
IS no reason why theological remarks in Z and CV (etc) should not 
eventually have been included in part two, or perhaps in an eventual 
part three of the Investigations, once part one (with Augustine at its 
head) had begun to work a transformation of sensibility, so as to find 
more readers who recognise that, "Practice gives the words their sense" 
(loc.cit). This would be in keeping with the wisdom of the Jewish 
dialectic in Içnlesiastes, according to which there is, "a time to keep 
silence, and a time to speak". (Ecclesiastes 3:7b). Wittgenstein’s 
times to speak appear often to have been in personal conversations, 
either with a friend or when there was an opportunity to try to correct 
misunderstandings as one went along, in a way that not even a text like 
the Investigations can be sure of attaining.
If, on the other hand, the later Wittgenstein’s relative theological 
reticence should be interpreted as a failure, it is not clear what form
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of failure it would be. However, it is arguable that it should be read 
primarily as a hypothetical failure of historical understanding rather 
than as a failure of courage or integrity. While Wittgenstein had a 
keen nose for differences between his Jewish style of thinking and 
antithetical styles of thinking, and so was generally aware of the 
issues as pervading more than twenty centuries, and while his Jewish 
style of thinking opens a way for historical understanding to be taken 
more seriously, he was not at home in the Biblical and post-Biblical 
scholarship he would perhaps have needed to assess his situation more 
perceptively.
On the other hand, it must be said that much of the available 
scholarship was deficient or confused in precisely those ways which 
Wittgenstein and other like-minded contemporaries of his have enabled us 
to recognise in retrospect. Even Wittgenstein could not jump out of 
history. One suspects that, just as he tended to be like his 
contemporaries in being over-impressed by the dominant account of 
science in terms of an uncritical empiricism and naively progressive 
inductivism, at least to the extent that he knew of no well-developed 
alternative account, so he tended to be over-impressed - in spite of 
himself - by the deistic religious apologetics related to this account 
of science, to the extent that he knew of no well-developed alternative.
These are live issues, in that one finds Nicholas Lash (1988) arguing 
that work in philosophy of religion by Richard Swinburne, for example, 
takes as the essence of Jewish, Christian and Islamic thinking what Lash 
argues is the essentially unJewish and unChristian deistic dualism of 
the religious apologetics developed in seventeenth and eighteenth 
century Europe. It is not possible to pursue many of the relevant 
arguments, or to pursue them very far, in this thesis, apart - that is -
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from the spiral argument of the thesis itself. Accordingly, it will 
have to suffice at this point to indicate that the arguments of Lash 
(1988) are, I consider, more persuasive than the relevant arguments of 
Swinburne, and that, if Wittgenstein had known the arguments that Lash 
and allied thinkers have marshalled, he might have been less reluctant 
to make explicit his Jewish and Christian theological grammar.
It is also important not to forget that, until the development of the 
experimental sciences in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and 
the development of more perspicuous accounts of these developments in 
the twentieth century - after Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, as well as after 
Wittgenstein - it was not possible to differentiate as clearly as is 
needed today, between the grammar of religion and the grammar of the 
sciences. A similar problem faces interpreters of Heidegger, whose 
dialectical thinking of the anxiety of Nothing (and) the wonder of Being 
was not only of interest to Wittgenstein, at least at the time of his 
Lecture on Ethics, (WVC p68) but also related to Christian and Jewish 
mysticism, (See, for example, the discussion of Heidegger in John 
Macquarrie’s (1984) essay in "dialectical theism"), Heidegger digs 
himself into an apparently unhistorical and one-sided insistence on only 
the difference between his mystical dialectics and Christian traditions 
which he presents as almost hopelessly dominated by the "onto-theology" 
or deistic metaphysics which he rejects.
In view of the above-mentioned historical considerations, more 
suspicious interpretations of the apparent distance Heidegger and 
Wittgenstein kept between themselves and Christian or Jewish theology 
may not be needed. In Wittgenstein’s case it should be remembered that 
when he tried, as anonymously as possible, to find an opportunity of 
testing a possible vocation as a Franciscan or a Brother of Charity, no
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encouragement was given (McGuinness 1988, 279) - perhaps rightly.
Moreover the versions of Christianity which Wittgenstein knew best 
appeared predominantly triumphalist, both intellectually and 
institutionally. Conspicuous in this triuinphalist or Constantinian 
self-image was a marked degree of alienation from and conflict with the 
Jewishness of Christianity, antipathies expressed most notoriously in 
anti-semitism.
Such weighty considerations should be put in the balance against 
suspicions that, as a self-confessed "lay" theologian, Wittgenstein 
would have jeopardised his perceived precarious position as a 
philosophical Fellow, or member of a philosophical faculty, without 
apparently any certainty of meeting better understanding in a 
theological faculty. It should be noted, however, that until a few 
months before his death, Wittgenstein's will named as principal 
executor, together with Rush Rhees, the Reverend John Burnaby, Chaplain 
and Fellow of Trinity, and later Regius Professor of Divinity, as well 
as author of a classic study of Augustine entitled Amor Dei (1938). 
(See LRKM, pl90.) Although Wittgenstein could only' tolerate Cambridge 
in small doses, these doses mattered to him until his energies began to 
decline with ill-health. By then, he was committed to refining his 
Cambridge style of Jewish thinking rather than radically transposing it. 
(Compare Stephen Hilmy (1987) ppl5-24 on the "conspiracy theory" and
"mystical" view of Wittgenstein's style of writing).
1.15 ROUSSEAU, PURITY, DANGER AND SECRECY
"Rousseau's character has something Jewish about it." (CV 20, 1931).
While this note may be tentative, it would be rash to dismiss it just 
because one cannot decide how best to interpret it. (See Kerr (1987) 
p35 and note 14). Several related interpretations would seem to fit.
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For a reader of Renan on the history of Israel and on semitic-nomadic 
characteristics, Rousseau's temperament and preferred similes (CV 20 "It 
is sometimes said may be focussed on his slogan, "Man is born free
and is everywhere in chains." Jewish thinkers have sometimes kept alive 
the ancient nomadic picture of civilisation as a veil of separation, not 
just from the virtuous solidarity of nomadic life, without kings and 
temples, etc, but also from everything "eternal and important". See the 
discussion above of CV 80 ("veil") and CV 50 ("cellophane") . 
Wittgenstein's regular retreats to more desolate workplaces than Vienna 
and Cambridge suggest, not that he was a prisoner of Rousseau's nomadic 
picture, but that he was no stranger to that restlessness with the 
"hot-house" atmosphere of "civilisation". (Cp "... primordial life, 
wild life striving to erupt into the open - that is lacking 
(Hot-house plant)" CV 38, 1940).
A second, related, plausible line of interpretation is that Rousseau had 
his own version of Renan's "Semitic" "bon sens". This was expressed, 
for example, when in Emile Rousseau made his Savoyard priest illustrate 
the pragmatic tolerance of Nathan in Lessing's drama Nathan the Wise 
(1779). Nathan was intended by Lessing as a tribute to his enlightened 
friend Mendelssohn, whose pragmatism in religious matters was akin to 
that of Spinoza. However, while Renan was sometimes happy to hint, like 
a nineteenth century version of Lessing, that all religions are true for 
believers, false for unbelievers and useful for men of "bon sens", that 
relativistic pragmatism is alien to Wittgenstein's sensibility, in spite 
of what might be unjustly suspected by some who have read of allegations 
about "Wittgensteinian fideism". Wittgenstein was, of course, familiar 
with Lessing from his intellectual nursery-training onwards: "Yesterday 
I looked at a passage in Nathan the Wise : I find it superb."
(Wittgenstein to Engelmann, LW p39, 1920).
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The "original” of Lessing’s Nathan, the prophet who led king David to 
judge himself out of his own mouth ("... You are the man" 2 Samuel 12: 
1-7, etc. Compare CV 87: "God may say to me: "I am judging you out of 
your own mouth..."), might well be called the patron prophet of Karl 
Kraus’ esoteric Jewish mysticism of language. For Kraus persistently 
took on the role of Nathan in relation to what he saw as his 
contemporaries’ double-mindedness and disloyalties. Many of 
Wittgenstein’s anonymous interlocutors in the Investigations in effect 
function similarly, though Wittgenstein responds to these alter-egos 
with irony or with a gentler humour. Like Nathan, Rousseau aspired to 
prophetic criticism of the powers that be, though in the name of a 
natural covenant dependent on a general will.
Rousseau, rightly or wrongly, felt himself to be in danger and 
persecuted, a bird free to be shot, because sense could not be made of 
his life and thinking within the purity of conventional, bourgeois, 
eighteenth century categories. He was accordingly perceived as 
"unclean", and had to struggle inwardly against this image. (See Cavell 
1979 on Rousseau).
Similarly, Wittgenstein suggests, in a note made only a little later 
than the one on Rousseau’s character, the peoples of Europe in a sense 
cannot help but regard the history of the Jews as a "tumour", a 
"disease" or an "anomaly" (CV 20-21, 1931. Compare Mary Douglas’ Purity 
and Danger (1970) on anomalies and the sense of the unclean or dangerous 
in Judaism and beyond.) This is not to say one should adopt a 
fatalistic attitude towards anti-semitism, or not hold people in some 
sense responsible for anti-semitism. Rather, overcoming anti-semitism 
is not a matter of discrete attitudes, but requires a widely shared 
transformation as deep as a conversion. "We may say: people can only
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regard this tumour as a natural part of the body if their whole feeling 
for the body changes (if the whole national feeling for the body 
changes). Otherwise the best they can do is put up with it." (CV 20). 
Here Wittgenstein comes close to a further developed insight of Mary 
Douglas (1973) on the symbolic relationship between the individual body 
and the body of the community.
In a continuation of the same passage (CV 21) Wittgenstein recalls 
further anti-semitic cliches, so as to relate them to his own Jewish 
style of interpretative thinking. When Jews "are said not to have any 
sense of property this was already taken to apply to matters 
intellectual and spiritual, as well as material, by anti-semitic 
Europeans, even by Jews, who at best were making the mistake of 
over-generalising from Jewish (forced and unforced) assimilation to 
Christendom , and at worst were helping, yet again, to legitimise the 
seizure of Jewish property. In the context of a tormented history that 
goes back to the seizure of Canaan by the ancient Hebrews or later 
Israelites, Wittgenstein reminds himself that, "Power and possession 
aren t the same thing (Loc.cit). Here political and material history 
can become a parable of intellectual and spiritual history, or - rather 
- the two types of history can be understood in their interdependence. 
In particular, the renunciation of a theological or metaphysical grammar 
of exclusiveness, which can feel and look like mere poverty, can be the 
inheritance of the freedom and power of the grammar of inclusiveness. 
Learning to live with the 'anomalies" of Jewishness may be the way to a 
renewal and healing of the whole body.
"It has sometimes been said that the Jews' secretive and cunning nature 
is a result of their long persecution. That is certainly untrue; on the 
other hand it is certain that they continue to exist despite this
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persecution only because they have an inclination towards such 
secretiveness. As we may say that this or that animal has escaped 
extinction only because of its capacity or ability to conceal itself. 
Of course, I do not mean that as a reason for commending such a 
capacity, not by any means." (CV 22, 1931).
Here it is as if Wittgenstein is wrestling against his own "conspiracy 
theory" concerning his Jewish style of thinking (Cp. Hilmy Op.cit). If 
there is a "mystical" view of his style of thinking at work here, then 
it is an inclusive, Jewish mysticism, as opposed to the exclusive, 
anti-Jewish mysticism of Gnostic dualism. Wittgenstein accepts "an 
inclination towards" secretiveness, "a capacity or ability to conceal". 
However, he neither wants to commend this, nor to excuse it as a result 
of "long persecution".
Soon after his remarks on measuring Jews on the wrong scales and on 
Weininger as a non-western thinker (CV 16, discussed above),
Wittgenstein notes, "Perhaps what is inexpressible (what I find
mysterious and am not able to express) is the background against which 
whatever I could express has its meaning." (CV 16, 1931). Between this 
remark and the one on Weininger, Wittgenstein remarks, "Nothing we do 
can be defended absolutely and finally. But only by reference to
something else that is not questioned. Ie., no reason can be given why
you should act (or should have acted) like this, except that by doing so
you bring about such and such a situation, which again has to be an aim
you accept." (Loc.cit). Immediately after the passage on the
"inexpressible" and "mysterious", Wittgenstein noted, "Working in 
philosophy - like work in architecture in many respects - is really more 
a working on oneself. On one’s own interpretation. On one’s way of 
seeing things. (And what one expects of them)." (Loc.cit).
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Here Wittgenstein is referring to the Jewish style of thinking he shares 
with the architectural workers Loos and Engelmann, and with the literary 
and social criticism of Kraus. (LLW throughout). Amongst all these 
Jewish thinkers, the inexpressible and mysterious is encountered and 
experienced in and through the ordinariness of the ordinary, in one’s 
everyday relations with one’s neighbour and with all the neighbours whom 
he or she represents. This dialectic, of seeing and acknowledging the 
mysterious in the ordinary and the ordinary in the mysterious, is a way 
of acting and of bringing about a situation which, as a Jewish thinker, 
one accepts. A better interpretation of one's action and situation will 
always be possible but also always mysterious. One can always look 
towards this by way of better investigation and interpretation of the 
interpretations in which one is already involved with others. In this 
sense, everything one needs to know is already given and nothing is 
hidden, once one has accepted that one’s life is hidden with one’s 
neighbour in the all-inclusive grammar which neither rivals nor excludes 
the finite. One can share samples of this dialectic of interpretation, 
to the best of one’s abilities, with others and they may still mistake 
the sample, or a part of the sample, for the dialectical whole, 
insisting that some other, exclusive mystery must be held back 
possessively, as if one could understand grammatical guidance (1’esprit 
de géométrie) without grammatical description (1’esprit de finesse), or 
the converse form of one-sidedness (ie., haggadah without halachah).
On at least three occasions, which will be discussed and interpreted in 
chapter eight, Wittgenstein pointed to the grammar of the doctrine of 
God as Trinity as important for understanding our ways of making sense 
of ourselves and our world. It is not going as far beyond
Wittgenstein's explicit position as may initially be supposed to suggest 
that his Jewish dialectical grammar coincides with an understanding of
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the doctrine of God as Trinity, when this is followed as the model of 
interpretation. For interpreting, paradigmatically the work of the Holy 
Spirit, means the active interdependence of the interpreter and the 
interpreted, for which the relationship between the Father and the Son 
is paradigmatic. God is his own interpreter and actively shares this 
open secret with his people in his world. Traditions concerning God's 
self-naming, and the making holy or glorifying which constitute his 
self-naming, point in this direction. Thus the search for always better 
interpreting, through the dialogue of interpretations or rather of 
Interpreters, is already the way of Jewish and Christian grammar. This 
way of discernment involves dynamic equilibration between living truth 
and true living at the heart of these traditions. In a more secular or 
contemporary idiom, this means bringing ethics and literature more 
perceptively together. (Compare M C Nussbaum 1987) .
Moreover, "essence is expressed by grammar ... Grammar tells what kind 
of object anything is. (Theology as grammar)" (PI s371 - s373). 
Consequently, Wittgenstein's transformation of language, and 
responsibility for language, is not reductive for genuine, well-used 
theology or metaphysics. Compare the following aphorism of Karl Kraus: 
"A Weltanschauung is a good horse. But there is a difference between a 
fine rider and a horse dealer." (Kraus 1986, 60). Arguments about 
whether metaphysics or theology can be more than shadows thrown by 
grammar, and - if so - how, will be drawn together for consideration in 
the final chapter. However, it is already possible to point out that 
here, as so often elsewhere, bad uses do not show the impossibility of 
better use.
Chapter Two:
Communication and structure
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2.1 OPENING SUMMARY FOR CHAPTER TWO
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and his Lecture on Ethics of 1929 are 
paradoxical works in a precise sense. They are structured in such a way 
that they call themselves in question. Calling themselves in question, 
they call for an extraordinary response from their readers (or hearers) 
who are called in question as readers and contributors to discussion.
It is probable that in the most finished version of his later work, the 
Philosophical Investigations (the version now known as Part One) , 
Wittgenstein still pursues these objectives, although by somewhat 
different means. In and through the Investigations we are encouraged to 
apply its message or methods in our own life. We are asked to apply 
this work’s own complex communication in our reading and appropriation 
of the apparently open-ended text. We are reminded that the sense of 
language, which we may seek and find, depends on the situations of human 
life in which the language is embedded. In the light of this 
’platitude’, the strange structure and style of the Investigations 
invite, perhaps even demand, a particular way of re-reading the work.
The structuring of these three works makes sense as contributing to, and 
as reflecting, their author’s concern with the whole range of human 
communication, Kierkegaard’s investigations of the dialectics of 
communication provide an illuminating object of comparison. It is,
however, the ambiguous figure of Augustine who, in spite of his
questionable theory and metaphors, best brings into focus the pattern of
seeking and finding which permeates Wittgenstein’s struggles to map, 
using language, the grammar of language.
The religious or quasi-religious similes and metaphors which pervade
Wittgenstein’s philosophical writings and discussions are best
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understood in relation to his central model for his methods of 
clarifying and resolving problems of both philosophical and religious 
thinkers. This model suggests the dissolving or reconciliation of 
conflicting or estranged elements, Augustine, Kierkegaard and 
Wittgenstein can be read as tragically flawed figures. However, for 
Wittgenstein, his whole style of thinking was religious in that it had 
no place for a concept of tragedy as ultimate conflict. For the younger 
Wittgenstein, arguments belong within the form of logical, prepositional 
communication. Similarly, for the older Wittgenstein, arguments belong 
within forms of life which also include traditions of reading, 
interpretation and spirituality.
2.2 SOME PRELIMINARIES
For the greater part of this century, the gradual publication of 
Wittgenstein’s writings and the writings of his closest students, 
friends and others, has invited or compelled many to wrestle with 
problems of how he should be read. The seriousness of these problems 
can be assessed by the extent to which they also require struggle with 
problems of how anyone and anything should be read, including not least 
problems concerning our own competence and performance as readers. This 
is a marked feature of many of Kierkegaard’s writings, as well as 
Wittgenstein’s.
The implications of Wittgenstein’s life-work for the fields of 
philosophy of religion, theistic and non-theistic religious thinking, 
and religious studies are regarded by many philosophers and scholars 
specialising in Wittgenstein as marginal or obscure. Yet even the 
extent of the literature obviously salient to discussion of these 
allegedly peripheral Wittgensteinian fields, let alone the far greater 
proliferation of studies in what is often called his philosophy of
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logic, language, meaning, mathematics and psychology, shows how 
inappropriate it would be for an essay of the present kind to spend 
opening chapters on sampling the preceding discussion, let alone to aim 
at a conventional literature-survey or history of interpretation. The 
selectiveness and comment which would be needed could only assume or 
anticipate the fuller arguments so as to frustrate both readers and 
writer. Acquaintance with an appropriate proportion of the primary 
texts, by and about Wittgenstein, and with the secondary texts which 
discuss this primary material - treated with similar selectivity, should 
be shown in the course of developing the full argument of this thesis. 
The impression that the kind of approach to Wittgenstein which is being 
developed is somewhat atypical, an impression which has survived testing 
by extensive reading, would do little of course to reinforce confidence 
in its soundness, if one were to assume the disjunction between novelty 
and truth which so appeals to a certain frame of mind.
Novelty, however, is a relative notion in many contexts. It is a marked 
feature of Plato's dialogues, of Augustine’s autobiographical writing 
and sermons, and of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous and other works, that 
arguments are made more or less explicit in the context of an invitation 
to a dialectical development of understanding which is at times akin to 
conversation or to prayer. The unavoidable risks of interpreting the 
arguments being presented open out to include the unavoidable risks of 
interpreting the forms of one’s own life, activities and language.
2.3 ARGUMENT AND BEAUTY
One aspect of the predicament which Wittgenstein sets for his readers 
was sensed early by Bertrand Russell, On 27th May, 1912, Russell wrote, 
with reference to his prodigious student, "I told him he ought not 
simply to state what he thinks true, but to give arguments for it, but
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he said arguments spoil its beauty, and that he would feel as if he was 
dirtying a flower with muddy hands. He does appeal to me - the artist 
in intellect is so very rare. I told him I hadn’t the heart to say 
anything against that, and that he had better acquire a slave to state 
the arguments." (K Blackwell 1981, page 8). An inordinate number of 
slaves might wonder whether they have reason to be grateful for 
Russell’s leniency. However, Russell’s estranged responses to the 
’mystical’ utterances typical of the Tractatus and, more sharply, to 
Wittgenstein’s later work, attempted to compensate for this leniency.
This sense of incompatibility between argument and beauty, seen in 
something thought true, might be the same as the incompatibility which 
many inexperienced and anxious students sense between an analytical, 
critical, academic or discursive approach and that to which it may be 
applied, well or badly, in fields such as painting, poetry, music or 
texts held authoritative because sacred for a religious community and 
tradition. No matter how often some unfortunate people may find that 
such an approach is applied badly in a field for which they care, it 
does not follow that it cannot be applied well, so as to preserve or 
enhance the beauty of the subject-matter, as well as perhaps revealing 
or developing forms of beauty which belong to the methods and the manner 
of the approach. The contrary assumption of necessary incompatibility 
may be seen as an unsatisfactory expression of Romanticism.
Certainly a weak or inappropriate argument may be experienced as 
spoiling the beauty of something thought true. However, perhaps 
Wittgenstein’s point was that there could be a beauty of something 
thought true such that we would experience any ad hoc or extrinsically 
related argument as too weak or inappropriate for it, if it were a 
matter of trying to demonstrate, or trying to share, the rightness or
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the rationality of belief in its truth or its beauty, or both. There 
may be ways, on the other hand, of expressing beauty or of prescribing 
for goodness which are not reducible to subjective, know-nothing taste, 
but in which there is demonstration, and so a preserving and sharing of 
truth. This would be rational in a way other than those ways advocated 
by champions of varieties of dogmatism and scepticism in epistemology, 
logic and ethics. Why should not beliefs be purified and knowledge 
liberated and fulfilled by a tradition of discipline, skills and wisdom 
which is at home with the features of knowledge and learning that are 
personal and social, aesthetic, ethical and religious? Why should not a 
well-developed sense of beauty show itself in someone who shudders at 
(inappropriate) attempts to secure epistemological foundations? Can one 
not "almost say that these foundation-walls are carried by the whole 
house"? (OC s248b; cp "At the foundation of well-founded belief lies 
belief that is not founded." OC s253),
The pressure of such questions provides a rationale for Wittgenstein’s 
interest in both Kierkegaard and the Augustine of the Confessiones. 
(The Latin title is used as a reminder that this autobiography and 
theological manifesto has a name which relates not just to guilty 
admissions but also to the sharing and showing of praises, 
acknowledgements, avowals, expressions, witnessing and revelations, all 
in public language). After all, there is sufficient of a residual 
Hegelian in Kierkegaard, and sufficient of a residual neo-platonic 
Christian in Hegel, for the following summative judgement to have wider 
applications:
"Augustine’s path, which we call his conversion and which comprises many 
stages, is, less than all the other exemplary ’turnings’, one from 
’aesthetics' to ’religion’; rather, in its crucial articulation, it is
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one from a lower to a higher aesthetics." (Von Balthasar "Augustine"
1984, p 85).
This passage itself suggests its applicability to Kierkegaard. It is, I 
shall maintain, somewhat differently suggestive for Wittgenstein.
For Wittgenstein was in certain respects a belated heir of the Romantic 
interpretation of Plato. In Plato and Platonic traditions, a developing 
sense of beauty both heralds and crowns the developing understanding of 
truth and goodness. In Romanticism and Kantianism the apprehension of 
increasingly painful differences between the natural sciences and other 
forms of human culture means that the traditional Platonic sense of 
beauty is transformed. Beauty becomes an increasingly important
mediator between natural truth and human goodness, even when these wear 
the masks of a non-moral nature and a human obsession with human
falseness and evil.
This transformation of the traditional Platonic sense of beauty is
marked by the introduction of ways of distinguishing between ’ the
beautiful’ and 'the sublime'. The modern sense of the sublime, as it
will be developed in later chapters, has typically looked for expression
in enduring and overcoming human alienation of truth and goodness,
alienation which is expressed in human disorientation among multifarious 
truths and values. As this suggests, the Romantic and Kantian
transformation of Platonic beauty into the sublime and the beautiful 
owes something to traditions of Christian theology for which the glory 
of divine love is fulfilled and revealed, not apart from striving,
tormented humanity, but in and through the particularities of flesh and
blood. Augustinian tradition has been distinguished by its programmatic
aims of better understanding of forms of language and forms of argument
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within the context of well-formed life, and better understanding of the 
inclusive form of forms of life as given to those who seek in the true 
and right way. (Compare Chapter Seven).
See for example, Pascal’s programme for his Pensées, involving a 
dialectical relationship between his three orders, however formulated. 
If Wittgenstein’s remarks prove to lend themselves to a similar 
Augustinian or Kierkegaardian programme, this will give a deeper 
justification for von Wright’s comment on ’a trenchant parallelism' 
between Wittgenstein and Pascal (Malcolm 1984, pl9). For Pascal is a 
key interpreter of Augustinian tradition in relation to Kierkegaard.
Wittgenstein’s empathy for features of Augustine and Kierkegaard makes 
better sense when it is realised how Augustine’s relationship to 
neo-platonism and gnosticism is in certain aspects retrieved by Pascal’s 
relationship with Descartes, by Kierkegaard’s relationship with 
Hegelianism and by Wittgenstein in relation to elements of Cartesian and 
post-cartesian traditions in philosophy. The relationships claimed and 
implied here will be explored in subsequent chapters.
Wittgenstein’s earlier and ’lower’ aesthetics (to use von Balthasar’s 
term) look and sound like those of early nineteenth century Romanticism, 
become by a century later an almost "conventional" Romanticism, except 
in so far as it was an intensely personal appropriation of what was 
mediated to him through the contemporary Viennese and European cultured 
circles centred on his family home. The tone of his youthful 
Romanticism is well expressed in his giving Russell the biographies of 
certain ’great’ composers, followed, after Russell had read the books, 
by a letter calling the composers "... the actual sons of God" (16 
August 1912. Wright 1974. The remark could be understood as a
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conflation of the beatitude of the peace-iaakers in Matthew 5:9 with the 
aesthetics of Schopenhauer and the music of Schubert. McGuinness (WLi, 
pll2, note 73) detects a reference here to "die echten Gottersohne" in 
Goethe's Faust (Prologue in heaven): "But ye, true sons of Heaven, it is 
your duty/To take your joy in the living wealth of beauty". Trans. 
Louis Macneice and E L Stahl).
Wittgenstein, after his aesthetic-ethical-religious assimilation of 
aspects of Tolstoy, during the war of 1914-18, seems never again to have 
expressed himself in quite that way. (Cp. CV 71 on J S Bach). However, 
Wittgenstein's subsequent life-long struggle to change his own and 
others' style of thinking shows his own higher aesthetics and ethics. 
As with Kierkegaard and Augustine, so - I shall argue - with
Wittgenstein, earlier or lower stages of aesthetic and ethical
development, far from being abandoned or suppressed, are retrieved in 
purified versions as significant movements. What may properly be 
described as Wittgenstein's spirituality is shown by the manner of his 
pilgrimage through realms of aesthetics and ethics as well as of
philosophy and religion: "It is impossible for me to say in my book
(the Investigations) one word about all that music has meant in my life. 
How then can I hope to be understood?" (Rhees 1984 (RW) p79, as quoted 
by M Drury. Wittgenstein answers his question in CV, eg. p52, where he 
writes about Schubert's music "that what is ordinary is here filled with 
significance").
2.4 DIALECTICAL ASPECTS
Dialectical aspects of Wittgenstein’s thinking, though not
self-evidently of his spirituality, are shown in various ways. Most 
obviously there is the style of the Investigations, as of much of his 
later work, with its recurrent snatches of dialogue either with himself
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or with almost entirely unnamed partners in conversation. In fact the 
originals of these more or less internalised partners range from student 
classes, such as the group involved in the production of the Blue Book, 
through Moore, Bussell, Frege and W James, and through other, more 
typically European figures of the eighteenth century enlightenment and 
its aftermath, to Augustine, in whom so many currents of Greek, Jewish 
and Roman thinking run together in both conflict and reconciliation.
Less obvious, but more striking evidence, which makes the use of
"dialectical" slightly less open-textured, comes from Wittgenstein's 
occasional references to levels within his thinking. His idiomatic use 
of "deep" is no merely superficial adaptation from contemporary
depth-psychology. Moreover, Wittgenstein spoke to Drury, with reference 
to his own work, of how he could not help seeing everything from a 
religious point of view (Rhees 1984) . He wrote in 1937 of levels of 
spirituality (Religiositat) going with levels of understanding (CV 32) . 
We also have the following parable about his philosophical work, spoken 
off-duty and relatively unguardedly - it could be supposed. F Pascal 
has written, "He said, as far as I can remember: 'Suppose you were 
trying to draw a chart of the progress of a hospital sister walking 
round her ward, then of another doing likewise on another floor, and 
finally, to produce one chart which would combine and illustrate their 
joint progress...?’" (Rhees 1984, pl3).
Here it is also worth recalling a passage which will be discussed later, 
on philosophy as poetic composition. "I think I summed up my attitude 
to philosophy when I said: philosophy ought really to be written only as 
a poetic composition (dichten). It must, as it seems to me, be possible 
to gather from this how far my thinking belongs to the present, future
or past. For I was thereby revealing myself as someone who cannot quite
do what he would like to be able to do." (CV 24)
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This was written in 1933 or 34, It is not known when Wittgenstein had 
said what he is here discussing. The interweaving of different levels
of meaning is central to the way in which many poets make intense use of
metaphor and simile. Such uses of language are also frequent in 
religious speech and writing. In both poetry and religion, performers' 
knowledge of older and more recent elements of tradition (including 
practical knowledge or skills) is arguably vital for good practice and 
creativeness.
Wittgenstein linked his enthusiastic creation of new similes
(Gleichnisse; also "parables") with what he thought of as his Jewish
style of thinking (CV 19) . \-Jhat he meant by such a style of thinking is 
examined in other parts of this thesis. At this point it is sufficient 
to suggest, on the basis of the 1931 passage just mentioned, that the 
new similes involve or require courage ("MUT" loc. cit) to clarify 
differences and similarities in order to understand work by others, 
better than they understand it themselves. The courageous search for 
better understanding through the clarification of differences and 
similarities, carried through in solidarity with those who are belittled 
or maligned as Jewish thinkers: this could be paraphrased as dialectical 
spirituality. Here it is relevant to borrow from a paragraph of 
Wittgenstein on "soul" and/or "body": "Show me how you use the word
'spiritual (seelisch) ' and I shall see whether the soul is 
'incorporeal', and what you understand by 'spirit (Geist)’". (Z sl27, 
translated by F Kerr 1986, pl79) .
A major contribution to the dialectical character of Wittgenstein's 
thinking is made by the interaction of saying and showing in his earlier 
work. This will be explored in the following chapters. At this point 
it is, however, worth recalling the too little noticed evidence of
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Wittgenstein’s translator, critic and friend, F P Ramsey. Writing from 
Austria on 20 September 1923, Ramsey says "Some of his (Wittgenstein’s) 
sentences are intentionally ambiguous having an ordinary meaning and a 
more difficult meaning which he also believes." (Letters to Ogden, (LG) 
p78.) This reference to a hidden or esoteric meaning in parts of the 
Tractatus must be interpreted together with similar explanations to 
Ficker and Engelmann. (See chapter three). Its special significance is 
that, in his discussions with Ramsey, Wittgenstein was concerned mainly 
with the more technical aspects of the Tractatus. With the other two, 
his emphasis and context were very different. This reference by Ramsey 
is not sufficient to answer P M S Hacker’s abrupt rejection of what 
Wittgenstein claimed about the ethical point of the Tractatus as "either 
self-deluding or disingenuous" (Hacker 1972, p 83). Ramsey’s evidence 
does, however, stengthen the need for Hacker and those taking his 
approach to provide a strong argument for dismissing Wittgenstein’s own 
claims about how his earlier work should be understood. Hacker’s 
defence of his interpretation will be examined in the following chapter. 
Here it is sufficient to note that his impression may be due to a lack 
of appreciation of the Viennese and European context of Wittgenstein's 
work, and more specifically due to overlooking the Kierkegaardian 
background which links ethics with communication and logic.
2.5 PARADOXICALLY STRUCTURED WRITINGS
The final among these considerations, intended to render my initial 
application of "dialectical" less imprecise, arises from what might be 
called the oxymoronic structure of Wittgenstein's more finished 
writings, a structure recalling the notion in Kierkegaard that objective 
uncertainty, or the paradoxical, may rightly function so as to liberate 
or intensify a genuine subjectivity. The Tractatus is the most finished 
of the longer writings, the Lecture on Ethics the most finished shorter
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writing - apart from much shorter remarks, and the Investigations - Part 
One is the most finished of the later writings.
The Tractatus and the Lecture clearly share the same structural feature. 
It is said there is something which sentences cannot say but only show. 
Yet it is unclear whether the sentences of these works are showing 
successfully, or whether they are trying to say unsuccessfully, what 
they say they cannot say- This self-questioning is called structural in 
that, while it emerges towards the end of each work, it raises, 
belatedly, the question of how the work should be read from its 
beginning. Readers are shown that they should consider whether their 
reading of the whole work is to be revised or reversed, in the light of 
this surprising end.
The outcome of the self-questioning might be a resolution to live with 
the paradox as marking the transitional frontier, the ladder, between 
what we can say well or clearly in linguistic communication, when this 
is grasped as being in essence prepositional communication, and what we 
can only communicate differently, perhaps in the wordless music of the 
"great composers", or in other forms of wordless music or of the will. 
These varieties of communication can be either in restless conflict or 
in ultimate peace with each other. The will to communicate communicates 
itself, both propositionally and non-propositionally, within and beyond 
the world of representations. Here, of course, I am going further than 
the author of the Tractatus or even of the Notebooks 1914-16 in 
borrowing and adapting the idiom of Schopenhauer, to suggest 
Wittgenstein's early background of thought. However, as we shall see, 
the influence of Schopenhauer was probably never as pure as the above 
passage suggests, even when some allowance is made for the more 
ambiguous or manichaean character of the will in Schopenhauer.
85
Alternatively the self-questioning structure may be perceived as 
threatening to reduce the works to absurdity, for if this is the outcome 
of these arguments, then the arguments must somehow be wrong somewhere. 
Even those who can live with clarity and purity on the border between 
"linguistic" ie., prepositional, communication and other forms of 
communication must live with the threat of being dismissed as absurd or 
non-sensical by those less perceptive than themselves. Kierkegaard's 
works are pervaded by similar forms of "Either-Or", designed as 
exercises in self-examination, self-resolution and self-development, 
though capable of being read or re-read, so Kierkegaard suggests, in the 
light of that which makes the self transparent to its ground and goal 
through self-forgetfulness.
The problem of the structure, or lack of structure, or different type of 
structure in the Investigations shows up strongly in the context of the 
previous paragraph. G.E.M. Anscombe, in her essay "On The Form of 
Wittgenstein’s Writing" has put it as follows:
, from the Tractatus as it were a face looks out very clearly. With 
Philosophical Investigations I at least have the impression of a veiled 
face, or of one which does not appear strongly. . . . The Investigations 
insists that it is an error to think that there in something that can’t 
be said, and yet it seems often to be nearly revealing something which 
yet does not come into view: a picture, not supposed to be constructed
out of its elements, the Bemerkungen in assemblage - but in a substance 
from which they cleanse the encrustations and engrained deposits". 
(Klibansky 1969, pages 377-78). Anscombe’s comments on these 
contrasting faces should be compared with what Baker and Hacker have 
written in summary about the actual and candidate mottos for the 
Investigations. "It is striking how the Nestroy motto (the actual one)
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and (il) - (v) (the candidate mottos discussed in the authors'
commentary) display a kind of family resemblance. The image of husk and 
core, appearance and reality, the revealed and the concealed run through 
them, even though they alternate in evaluation". (Baker and Hacker 
1983b, p6). The suggestion here, to be developed throughout this
thesis, is that to understand the Investigations would be to understand 
these contrasting aspects together, perhaps in the way Pascal held 
together the darkness and light of an understanding on the way towards 
unity through diversity.
Anscombe concentrates, in her essay, on problems about how the 
Individually numbered remarks of Wittgenstein's later writing are 
assembled. She approaches our present problem through the 
microstructure of the later work, saying little about the macrostructure 
of the Tractatus and the Lecture on Ethics, and nothing on the lines of 
the present account of the Kierkegaardian family-likeness and rationale 
of the face of the Tractatus. She does not mention the Lecture on 
Ethics in her essay. The present approach aims to complement her’s, by 
approaching the microstructure of the later work through the problem set 
by the issue of the macrostructure of the Investigations.
Given the later Wittgenstein's criticisms of his earlier work and the 
general development of his thinking, it was no longer possible for him 
to use for the Investigations the general structure of the Tractatus and 
Lecture, even if he had wanted this. The distinction between 
prepositional saying and non-propositional showing is central to the 
structure of the Tractatus, and is not far from the surface of the 
argument in the Lecture on Ethics, as one would expect in view of the 
identity of macrostructure in the two works. The Investigations has an 
even less conventional ending, or endings - if one considers the history 
of Parts One and Two of the work, than do the Tractatus and Lecture. 
(Von Wright 1982).
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What has been described above, in an introductory manner, as the 
structure of the Tractatus was important to Wittgenstein. This is 
confirmed by his explicit personal commitment, in 1929 - over ten years 
after concluding the writing of the Tractatus, at the end of the 
similarly structured Lecture on Ethics. However, readers generally 
failed to recognise the significance of the Tractatus' structure. Given 
the qualities of character with which he responded to this failure, as 
well as to the related failure of his primitive distinction between 
saying and showing, it seems unlikely that Wittgenstein easily gave up 
the idea of building some other, more appropriate type of paradoxical 
structure into the Investigations. Such a structure, in spite of its 
differences from the earlier work, would still serve much the same sort 
of functions, of self-questioning and self-development, which he had 
envisaged in a Kierkegaardian spirit for his earlier work. There is 
certainly adequate evidence to show that he repeatedly tried in the 
1930s and earlier 1940s to find the right way or organising his 
projected major work. What is not clear is whether, or to what extent, 
he failed to find and apply what he had sought. It is far from clear 
that the preface to the Investigations is lacking in a certain tone of 
irony, not unlike Kierkegaard’s more elaborate uses of irony.
Perhaps the tensions of the preface to the Investigations, touched on by 
Anscombe in the aforementioned essay, do point to an unwilling but 
actual surrender of the project of using a structure, whether of a 
paradoxical or non-paradoxical kind. On the other hand, it would seem 
rash to rule out, in advance of any adequate exploration of the 
hypothesis, that Wittgenstein has in fact produced an even less 
conventional structure, serving the purposes of his spirituality, for 
the book which sums up so much of his later thinking, in attempting to 
correct and fulfil his whole life's work. It is the contention of the
present thesis that this hypothesis does, or should if adequately 
argued, enable the presentation of a far more coherent account of 
Wittgenstein’s whole philosophical vocation. A distinctive feature of 
this more coherent account, which should also be more comprehensive if 
the coherence is not to be too cheaply bought, should be the integration 
within it of Wittgenstein’s aesthetic, ethical and religious concern(s), 
as well as of associated traits of character and way of life.
2.6 INTRODUCING AUGUSTINE
Aurelius Augustinus, to be referred to hereafter by the Anglicized 
version of his name, was one of Wittgenstein’s most admired and 
respected authors, even though there is no clear evidence that he knew 
well at first-hand any work except the Confessiones. Both R Rhees and M 
Drury support the view that he knew well and almost always used the 
Latin text. When Wittgenstein died, the few books he possessed included 
both Teubner’s Latin edition (1898) and 0 F Lachmann’s German 
translation (1888). Augustine is one of the few writers repeatedly 
identified by Wittgenstein, for example in at least eight sections of 
the Investigations. Wittgenstein read (reread?) and began to appreciate 
Augustine while he was a prisoner of the Italians in 1918-19. He was 
encouraged by his fellow prisoner, Ludwig Hâ’nsel, to learn Latin for 
this purpose. (Hânsel 1957, pp315-322; Spiegelberg 1979; McGuinness
WLi) .
It would be wrong to suppose that when Wittgenstein criticises 
Augustine’s theory of language, as he does from the first section of the 
Investigations, and previously in PG si9-20, pp56-57 and BB p77 (ie. the 
start of the "Brown Book"), he has randomly picked on Augustine as a 
convenient example of error. Wittgenstein was serious when he said to 
Norman Malcolm that, "he decided to begin his Investigations with a
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quotation from the latter’s Confessions, not because he could not find 
the conception expressed in that quotation stated as well by other 
philosophers, but because the conception must be important if so great a 
mind held it." (Malcolm 1958/1984, p 59-60). Drury writes that 
Wittgenstein considered St. Augustine’s Confessions possibly "the most 
serious book ever written". (Rhees 1984, p 90). Examination of these 
claims would be out of place in this chapter, but they will be 
considered later.
If it is a more Kierkegaardian face which look out from the structure of 
the Tractatus and the Lecture on Ethics, it is a more Augustinian face 
which looks out from the Investigations. It is not just that 
Augustine’s practice is better than his theory with respect to the 
topics of language and time. The multiplicity of language-games which 
Augustine practices and discusses have their literary context and 
setting-in-life in the language-game(s) of his "Asking, thanking, 
cursing, greeting, praying". (PI s23). The Augustine of the 
Confessiones makes most sense in this context and situation. The whole 
book is perhaps best read as an expression and investigation of the 
grammar of its final Gospel text(s) which it has shown pervasively in 
use:
"Ask, and it will be given you; 
seek, and you will find; 
knock, and it will be opened to you.
For everyone who asks receives, 
and he who seeks finds,
and to him who knocks it will be opened".
Matthew 7:7-9 and Luke 11:9-10 RSV) .
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Moreover, in the Confessiones and throughout Augustine's work the
grammar of seeking and finding runs parallel to the grammar of faith and
understanding, at least at important points in Augustine's work and
experience. Just as faith already includes an outline of understanding, 
while still lacking any fuller understanding, so all other modes of 
seeking for the God of Jesus Christ, of the prophets and apostles, 
already include a certain finding which may also be understood as being 
found. In a similar way, understanding (which Augustine tends to
conflate with perspicuous vision) and other modes of finding still 
include certain modes of seeking which may also be understood as 
experiences being sought or summoned.
The identification of this pattern, rhythm or form should not be thought 
of as dependent upon a Platonic doctrine of learning as remembering. 
For the Platonic doctrine can be seen justifiably as a theoretical 
constricting of relevant phenomena throughout experience. 
Wittgenstein's technique of assembling reminders of how our concepts and 
language are at home in the flow of life amounts to demythologizing the 
Platonic doctrine while still exploring phenomena analogous to those 
which spoke to Augustine.
Better understanding of language, which Augustine was seeking (sometimes 
in the wrong direction - as Wittgenstein shows so extensively) was 
already given, not just in Augustine's more skilful practices, but even 
in the very passage which Wittgenstein sets at the beginning of his 
Investigations. For here Augustine already mentions the very phenomena 
in which Wittgenstein sees signs of the right direction for 
understanding language: ". . .(my elders). . .bodily movements, as it
were the natural language of all peoples: the expression of the face,
the play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of the body, and tone
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of voice. . . seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something . . .
words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences . . . "  
(PI si, Confessiones 1.8)
The same passage, partially quoted by Wittgenstein, also mentions an 
expressive function of language, as well as a naming or descriptive 
function: ". . . I used them (ie these signs) to express my own
desires". However this expressive function may be dependent on the 
naming function. If naming or description has first been made the 
essence of language, any subsequent account of expressive functions will 
be distorted by- this, as can be seen from the history of attempts to 
understand language from the seventeenth century onwards. Much of the 
Investigations lends support to this claim and the related reading of 
history.
It is not easy to believe that Wittgenstein overlooked Augustine's 
references to, "the natural language of all peoples". While some 
body-language is relative to a particular culture, it would be clearly 
false to claim that all body-language is relative to linguistic 
communities, these latter being allegedly exclusive of one another. I 
know of no evidence that Wittgenstein ever took up this position. Nor 
is it easy to believe that he supposed all his readers would overlook 
Augustine on "the natural language of all peoples". Certainly 
Wittgenstein was doubtful about the effects of his book so far as the 
enlightenment of most of his readers was at stake. The Preface warns 
that he should not like his writing "to spare other people the trouble 
of thinking", rather than "to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own".
Also towards the end of the same Preface Wittgenstein wrote, "- If my 
remarks do not bear a stamp which marks them as mine, - I do not wish to
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lay any further claim to them as my property". What he is doing here 
includes confession of anxiety about how readers will think of his 
originality in relation to various acquaintances and students. But it 
is not just a matter of stung vanity (Preface) , or of an ironic, bequest 
of his life-work to the free market of intellectual property 
speculators. What is only hinted at in some suggestions of the printed 
preface is made explicit in remarks two years later, which belong with 
various materials looking like revised or alternative prefatory remarks. 
Even the printed Preface went through innumerable earlier revisions. 
There is no reason to believe that revision ceased in "January 1945".
"Is what I am doing really worth the effort? Yes, but only if a light 
shines on it from above. And if that happens - why should I concern 
myself that the fruits of my labours should not be stolen? If what I am 
writing really has some value, how could anyone steal the value from me? 
And if the light from above is lacking, I can't in any case be more than 
clever". (CV 57-58, 1947).
The light from above is the light which shows that such laborious 
efforts (with their asking, seeking and knocking) are not in vain. It 
is the light of the value that cannot be stolen, and not just not stolen 
by others. It is the light of the perspicuous over-view for which 
Augustine struggled. And if people try to steal the value that cannot 
be stolen, then their seeking and having ("in petendis, habendis") will 
be hidden in the darkness of their rejecting or evading ("rejiciendis, 
fugiendisve" Confessiones 1.8) (Compare chapter one, last section, of 
Kierkegaard's/Climacus' Philosophical Fragments).
One of Wittgenstein's clearest allusions to Augustine's grammar of 
seeking and finding, of longing and delight, is at the start of his
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Lecture on Ethics of 1929. This will be discussed in detail in chapter 
seven. While Augustine is not mentioned here, Wittgenstein uses 
Augustine’s imagery in Augustine's manner. Wittgenstein says that the 
difficulty of this address is a difficulty which is characteristic of 
philosophical work. There is, one may add, no reason to regard this 
difficulty as exclusively philosophical. It is the difficulty of 
understanding the special relationship between the goal and the way of 
the work in hand. The goal and way have to be seen or understood
together. When we fail to share this vision, then we join the "many
(who) leading this life before us, made tortuous ways, which we were
forced to traverse, with multiplied travail and anguish imposed on 
Adam's offspring". Wittgenstein selected this passage (Confessiones
1.9) as a motto for the material of 1929-30 now known as the
Philosophical Remarks. (R White, one of the two translators, has stated 
in private correspondence, that R Rhees confirmed by letter 
Wittgenstein's selection of this motto.) (Translated above by I 
McPherson: "Et multi ante nos vitam istam agentes, praestruxerant
aerumnosas vias, per quas transire cogebamur multiplicato labore et 
dolore filiis Adam.") Compare the Preface to PI on " . . . the very 
nature of the investigation (which) compels us to travel over a wide 
field of thought criss-cross in every direction (kreuz und quer)". On 
any other account, the downright assertion of ontological and 
methodological necessity at this point in the Preface remains 
arbitrarily paradoxical.
When Wittgenstein writes of seeing the way and the goal together, he is 
thinking of how philosophy as an activity belongs with philosophy as a 
synoptic overview, in which restless Augustinian hearts may find an
abiding peace (Confessiones 1.1, 13.38,et passim). What he is doing is 
in effect to use the already-mentioned key text of the Confessiones 
(Matthew 7: 7-9 = Luke 11: 9-10) to give an interpretation of
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Confessiones 7.20ff, in which he understands Augustine better than 
Augustine understands himself at that point. (Cp CV 19 on Wittgenstein's 
"Jewish" way of understanding someone else's work better than he 
understands it himself). The relevant part of Confessiones 7.20ff 
begins, " . . .  to see and understand the difference between presumption 
and confession, between those who see the goal that they must reach, but 
cannot see the road to that blessed country which is meant to be no mere 
vision but our home . . .  It is one thing to descry the land of peace 
from a wooded hilltop and, unable to find the way to it, struggle on 
through trackless wastes where traitors and runaways . . .lie in wait to 
attack. It is another thing to follow the high road to that land of 
peace . . . "
The absence from the Investigations of anything like a conventional 
ending, or even an unconventional ending like the Lecture on Ethics and 
the Tractatus, and thus the lack of what has been called above a final 
structural self-questioning and final stimulus to reversal, itself 
suggests that readers should work back to the beginning of the 
Investigations where they may find what they were seeking. 
Wittgenstein, in beginning his book with Augustine, was concealing yeast 
within dough. For readers of the Investigations who know the Augustine 
of the Confessiones, the workings of that yeast can be detected 
throughout Wittgenstein's text and life-work.
For example, the list of language-games in Investigations s23 can be 
read as just a list, containing apparently arbitrary samples in an 
apparently arbitrary sequence, ie lacking any teleological order or 
order of kinds. However a reader who has already been alerted by the 
initial ambiguous presentation of Augustine, and who is familiar with 
the Confessiones, may find it hard to think away the culmination 
constituted by and given in the final line in the list:
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"Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying".
These language-games are central to that comprehensive and intensive 
family of language-games which is the life and work of the author of the 
Confessiones. Augustine's text is one all-embracing act of prayer. 
Within it he includes his philosophical arguments and all their 
subject-matter- This unity in diversity of the Confessiones at least 
suggests the possibility of a similar unity in the diversity of the 
Investigations. Wittgenstein's list no longer appears arbitrary if it 
is recognised as containing the language-games which are discussed or 
alluded to in the Investigations. One might even come to see that whole 
list in s23 as including the language-games which are practised in the 
Investigations. The work may be no less of an ambiguous object than 
some of the ambiguous figures presented within it, including the 
ambiguous figure of Augustine. However, if a figure is recognised as 
having been constructed or portrayed so as to be intentionally 
ambiguous, then its ambiguity should not in the final analysis be 
experienced as confusing. One reason for inbuilt ambiguity, or - more 
positively - for richness of allusion, may be to drive home the point 
that, "How words are understood is not told by words alone. (Theology)" 
(Z sl44). Living and suffering, longing and delight, action and passion 
provide the context within which words begin, and begin to make better 
sense.
2.7 SINS AND LOGIC
The Augustinian tradition, with its insistence on appropriate holding 
together of faith and understanding, sin and logic, the order of love 
and the order of truth, - as may be seen also in Anselm and in Pascal - 
provides a setting in which Wittgenstein's long insistence on thinking 
of both (his) sins and logic together appears less eccentric. Three
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initial examples may be sufficient reminder of the strength of this 
characteristic. In 1914 he compared his inability to discern the 
humanity in a human being with the inability of someone who does not 
understand Chinese language to hear anything but inarticulate gurgling 
from a Chinese speaker. (CV 1: see the context given in McGuinness
WL(i) p215). In 1929 he wrote, "There is no religious denomination in 
which the misuse of metaphysical expressions has been responsible for so 
much sin as it has in mathematics". (CV 1). In 1948 he notes, "Ambition 
is the death of thought". (CV 77).
Even in some of his earliest encounters with Russell, Wittgenstein 
insisted on thinking about both his sins and logic. To Russell’s 
surprise, he expressed admiration for the text, "For what shall it 
profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?" 
(Mark 8: 36 KJV). Russell was surprised because of what he had seen of 
Wittgenstein’s apparently ferocious attitude towards conventional piety, 
or what passed for this. The Gospel saying, taken in isolation, sounds 
like a folk-proverb, on the meaninglessness of an acquisitive life when 
face-to-face with death. It was close to the heart of Tolstoy when he 
wrote "How Much Land Does a Man Need?" This was one of Tolstoy's short 
stories for which Wittgenstein expressed life-long admiration.
Russell tells us that Wittgenstein thought not losing one’s own soul 
depended "on suffering and the power to endure it." (Blackwell 1981, 
p9: May 1912). For a sympathetic explanation of similar statements see 
the "Postcript" by Rush Rhees in Rhees, 1984, pp 172ff.
Wittgenstein may have had in mind the courage that endures in situations 
where one’s pretensions, self-deception and other forms of deficient 
self-knowledge are exposed. This courage is related to what he writes
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about in terms of opening one’s heart to others, in a love which 
acknowledges kinship such that one loses personal prestige, official 
position, dignity or disparity from others. (CV 46). This is what 
Wittgenstein thinks of as the sort of experience, suffering or living
that "can force the concept of God on us". (CV 86). Confession before
God and between neighbours go together, "but not (feeling) ashamed of 
yourself before your fellow-men". (CV 46). Wittgenstein also writes of 
suffering and the strength to endure it in terms of the language of 
humanity or of human greatness: "Bach said that all his achievements
were simply the fruit of industry. But industry like that requires 
humility and an enormous capacity for suffering, hence strength. And 
someone who, with all this, can also express himself perfectly, simply 
speaks to us in the language of a great man." (CV 71)
Such a capacity for suffering need not issue in musical work, let alone
in such a musical work-ethic as that of J S Bach. In a less exalted 
tone Wittgenstein wrote, "My life consists in my being content to accept 
many things." (OC s344). We can add: ’our’ form of life consists in 
’our’ being content to accept many things. What links such acceptance, 
culminating in a capacity for suffering sometimes as outstanding as that 
of Bach (as Wittgenstein understood him) with the themes of logic and of 
sin/salvation is Wittgenstein’s central theme, which came to him early 
and stayed with him.
In the Tractatus this central theme is most obvious in his understanding 
of philosophical logic. Philosophy is the activity of one who is 
concerned with clarifying away confusions let loose by transgression 
against the laws or rules of logical syntax. The philosophical activity 
exorcises the scepticism that haunted earlier philosophers. Their 
doubts are to be not refuted but dissolved. Their doubts do not make 
sense when we gain the perspective of pure logical syntax:
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"Scepticism is not irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical, when it tries 
to raise doubts where no questions can be asked. For doubt can exist 
only where a question exists, a question only exists where an answer 
exists, and an answer only where something can be said." (Tractatus 
6.51, Pears and McGuinness).
The continuity of this master-theme, and its salience to the 
Investigations is well represented by what was the motto for the 
Investigations until the present quotation from Nestroy (a favourite 
author of both Kierkegaard and Kraus) replaced it sometime after 
25.4.1947. This penultimate motto was from H Hertz, whom Wittgenstein 
acknowledged amongst the earliest important influences on his thinking 
(Cp. CV 19).
"When these painful contradictions are removed, the question as to the 
nature (of force) will not have been answered; but our minds, no longer 
vexed, will cease to ask illegitimate questions." (Principles of 
Mechanics 1910, p9.)
Now it is this central theme which also guides Wittgenstein’s attitude 
to what he describes as the problematic character of life. One of the 
clearest expressions of this comes from 1937;
"The way to solve the problem you see in life is to live in a way that 
will make what is problematic disappear. The fact that life is 
problematic shows that the shape of your life does not fit into life’s 
mould. So you must change the way you live and, once your life does fit 
into the mould, what is problematic will disappear..." (CV 27). The 
passage from which this extract is taken will be considered in detail* 
later. However, it is relevant at this stage to note that the
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imagery of life’s mould (die Form des Lebens) is also taken up in 
connection with the issue of doctrine and life in Christianity;
’’It (Christianity) says that wisdom is all cold; and that you can no 
more use it for setting your life to rights that you can forge iron when 
it is cold. ’’ (CV 53). Wittgenstein uses related imagery when 
discussing Augustine on the question "What is time?" (Confessiones
11.14 etc.) "Someone who is engaged in measuring time will not be 
bothered by this problem. He will use language and not notice the 
problem at all. In his hand, we might say, language is soft and 
pliable; in the hands of others - philosophers - it suddenly becomes 
hard and stiff and begins to display difficulties. Philosophers, as it 
were, freeze language and make it rigid." (MS 219, 24 in Kenny 1982, 
pl7).
These three passages show a family resemblance to Augustine in 
Confessiones 11.29-30:
"My thoughts, the intimate life of my soul, are torn this way and that 
in the havoc of change. And so it will be until I am purified and 
melted by the fire of your love and fused into one with you. Then I 
shall be cast and set firm in the mould of your truth. I shall no 
longer suffer the questions of men who, for their punishment, are sick 
of a disease which makes them thirst for more than they can drink, so 
that they ask ’What was God doing before he made heaven and earth?' or 
’How did it occur to God to create something, when he had never created 
anything before?',.. Let them have done with this nonsense."
2.8 "CULTURE AND VALUE"
Wittgenstein’s most explicit written remarks about religion, 
Christianity, theology and spirituality, and what look like his most
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personal written expressions of his religious point of view, have been 
collected, with other kinds of remarks, as Vermischte Bemerkungen. The 
expanded second edition of these "miscellaneous remarks" is known as 
Culture and Value in its English version.
In the period of preparation for the Tractatus, Wittgenstein’s Notebooks 
1914-16 (2nd Edition) remains the principal primary source for his
religious remarks. In Culture and Value only one remark comes from this 
period, though it is a deeply seminal one. The collection in effect 
begins in 1929, the year of his return to Cambridge and to philosophical 
writing on a large scale, and continues until 1951, the year of his 
death.
Explicitly religious subject-matter is found throughout the whole of the 
main collection, from 1929-51. Moreover, the way in which this and
other material is written often suggests a point of view or conviction 
which can intelligibly be described as religious. Explicit remarks on 
religious themes cluster most strikingly in the years 1937, circa 1944 
and 1949 - 1950,
The sixteen years, 1929-1945, when Wittgenstein was working on the 
method(s) and materials culminating in Part One of the Investigations 
are represented by 46 pages. The remaining five years of his life
(1946-51) are represented by the other 40 pages of Culture and Value, 
thus including almost half of these collected remarks. Like the 
Confessiones Wittgenstein's notebooks and manuscripts are open to the 
whole of human life. This life-long tendency becomes markedly more
pronounced with the completion of Part One of the Investigations.
Such catholicity of mind and writing presents editorial difficulties, 
especially for those inclined to greater respect for conventions of
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academic specialisation. G H von Wright who, with assistance, selected 
the miscellaneous remarks largely from Wittgenstein's still unpublished 
manuscripts, or from parts of published material previously edited out - 
though there are exceptions to this, concludes his editorial discussion 
in the 1977 preface of Culture and Value as follows. In spite of 
various difficulties for the chief editor in making the selection, and 
in spite of difficulties, or perhaps benefits, for readers otherwise 
unfamiliar with Wittgenstein’s life, reading and philosophical work, "I 
am all the same convinced that these notes can be properly understood 
and appreciated only against the background of Wittgenstein's philosophy 
and, furthermore, that they make a contribution to our understanding of 
that philosophy." What he might also have brought out into his preface 
is that Wittgenstein's way of working at philosophy was always to 
rework, sometimes through innumerable revisions, such notes or remarks, 
often without any clear view of where they might be fitted into any 
large-scale work. This uncertainty was often because they might be 
helpful at so many different points. Moreover, "If I am thinking about 
a topic just for myself and not with a view to writing a book, I jump 
about all round it; that is the only way of thinking that comes 
naturally to me. Forcing my thoughts into an ordered sequence is a 
torment for me..." (CV 28, 1937).
The way in which von Wright sees the remarks of Culture and Value 
contributing to our understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophical work 
is illustrated by his essay on "Wittgenstein in Relation to his Times" 
(McGuinness 1982). Here von Wright gives some support for his claim 
that, "trying to understand Wittgenstein in relation to his times is a 
task in its own right, not to be dismissed as either idle or irrelevant. 
It may not be relevant to the philosophy of others; but it is certainly 
relevant to understanding the philosophy of Wittgenstein." (Op.cit.
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110). What von Wright says here about Wittgenstein's times needs also 
to be said about his life, and this in spite of all that may be said by 
way of doubt or warning by philosophical advocates of the merits of 
timeless arguments, or by literary advocates of "the New Criticism" 
concerned with the integrity and authority of texts rather than with 
speculation about an author’s intentions or psychological processes.
Without Culture and Value we would, for example, find it harder to trace 
convincingly the way in which what was called above "Wittgenstein's 
central theme" brings together his thinking in logic, ethics and 
religion, so as to make more intelligible his constant use of religious 
metaphors and similes in the course of philosophical writings and
discussions. We now ]cnow better how deeply Wittgenstein cared that his 
life-time was one in which so many no longer (or not yet) worked and 
lived "in the spirit of the whole" which was or would be at large when 
the best human beings struggled, not for purely private ends, but in 
"the light from above" of a teleology of absolute value. (Compare CV6 
and 57-58 with the Lecture on Ethics.) Without Culture and Value it
would be far from clear how Wittgenstein understood his periodic
confessions to various acquaintances and friends. For details of these 
confessions see R Rhees' Postscript in Rhees (1984), pl72ff. For
Wittgenstein, "A confession has to be a part of your new life." (CV 18: 
1931) .
While a prisoner of war in 1918-19, Wittgenstein quoted 2 Corinthians 
5:17 and said this has been his own experience, according to F Parak, a 
fellow prisoner. (Parak 1978; "Therefore, if anyone is in Christ, he is 
a new creation (or: creature) , the old has passed away, behold, the new 
has come". RSV) . It was in September 1914 that Wittgenstein read 
Tolstoy's edited version of the Gospels which, he said to Ficker, had
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saved his life. Fellow soldiers consequently referred to him as 'the 
one with the Gospel': Luckhardt 1979 and Rhees 1984, p3.
More weightily still, it is from a longer passage in Culture and Value 
(45-46) written in 1944 that we know how for Wittgenstein "the gift of 
opening (one's) heart" in penitent confession to God, and for other 
people too, meant accepting "the means of salvation" in one's heart. 
The intensity of this passage makes it hard to believe that Wittgenstein 
is not also speaking for himself here, and hard to believe that he no
longer understood his own confessions as part of a new religious life,
provided that "religious" is read here with some degree of freedom, 
rather than in terms of partisan institutionalisation. Indeed, it is
scarcely going beyond the letter of what he wrote here, about "the means
of salvation: das Heilmittel", to say that such confessional openness of 
heart between "neighbours" or fellow human beings (den Mitmenschen) is a 
sacrament or paradigmatic ritual enactment for Wittgenstein's 
spirituality. Philosophical argument for the incoherence of the notion 
or fantasy of a private language here joins hands with acknowledgement 
of the torment of the isolated individual whose contracted heart is in 
infinite or ultimate torment, needing ultimate, infinite help. 
Wittgenstein's language here is richly Augustinian, in a way enhanced by 
its Lutheran and Kierkegaardian undertones. To claim, in such contexts, 
that Culture and Value adds nothing of importance to our philosophical 
understanding of Wittgenstein would be to parade a constricted 
understanding of philosophy as well as of Wittgenstein. Here also, it 
is a matter of learning to see the way and the goal together. (Compare 
LE p3 and chapter 7).
2.9 KIERKEGAARD
A determination to think about sin and logic together, in the context of 
the German literary culture of 1910-14, is a sufficient reminder of
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Kierkegaard's existential transformation of Hegelian dialectic which was 
already being assimilated by circles around Ficker, T Hacker and Kraus. 
Russell's letter of 20.12.1919 says that Wittgenstein "reads people like 
Kierkegaard... It all started from William James's Varieties of 
Religious Experience (Note: Wittgenstein wrote to Russell about
Varieties on 22.6.12), and grew (not unnaturally) during the winter he 
spent alone in Norway before the war..." (Von Wright 1974, p82 and 10). 
Ficker's periodical Per Brenner (ie., the pass opening a way between 
Northern and Southern cultures) was read by Wittgenstein before and 
during his Norwegian retreat of 1913-14. As well as frequent 
discussions of Dostoevsky, Per Brenner during its first four years 
(1910-14) included the first easily available German translations of 
Kierkegaard. Ficker also admired Kraus. Wittgenstein's financial 
benefactions of 1914, made through Ficker, gave largely anonymous 
support to Per Brenner and to significant members of its circle of 
writers. (See especially the research of Allan Janik listed in the 
bibliography; also Carl Dallago's (1916) Karl Kraus, Augustin, Pascal 
und Kierkegaard. Dallago was a regular contributor to Per Brenner. F. 
Ebner also contributed).
Wittgenstein's attitude to Kierkegaard was, unsurprisingly, complex, but 
seems to have ranged from an earlier intense respect to a later more 
discriminating response. Culture and Value includes evidence of a 
serious and explicit attempt to do justice to something like the spirit 
of Kierkegaard as late as 1937 (pp31-32) and another sympathetic
reference in 1946 (p53). The theme of sin and logic is sounded again in 
Wittgenstein's introductory comment on Kierkegaard to Drury as an 
undergraduate in the years 1929-32: "Kierkegaard was by far the most
profound thinker of the last century. Kierkegaard was a saint" (Rhees 
1984, p87). This is recognisably related to N Malcolm's report from not
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earlier than October 1938, that Wittgenstein esteemed Kierkegaard. "He 
referred to him, with something of awe in his expression, as a ’really 
religious’ man. He had read the Concluding Unscientific Postscript - 
but found it ’too deep’ for him". (Malcolm 1958, p71). Given the irony 
and humour (Kierkegaard distinguishes between these categories 
precisely) of "Johannes Climacus" and given the deliberate uncertainty 
propagated in "his" Postscript over how far he conceals or reveals the 
position of Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein's comment seems precisely true to 
the spirit of Kierkegaard, and helpful, given the context of 
Wittgenstein's conversation with Malcolm (1984). In a letter to Malcolm 
(5.2.48: Malcolm (1984), pl06-107) Wittgenstein wrote, "Kierkegaard is 
far too deep for me, anyhow. He bewilders me without working the good 
effects which he would in deeper souls." This is a comment more 
appropriate to the pseudonymous works than to the openly acknowledged 
edifying works. However, it would probably be too ingenious to claim 
that here Wittgenstein intentionally expresses himself in the spirit of 
Kierkegaard, even when one recalls the remarks of Climacus/Kierkegaard 
in the Postscript that "To be outstanding in the religious sphere 
constitutes a step backward... It is rather remarkable that one may 
precisely by talking about something, prove that one does not talk about 
that thing..." (Quoted by Drury in Rhees 1984, p89).
2.10 THE GRAMMAR OP LOVE
We also owe to Malcolm a report that, at least up to 5.2.1948, 
Wittgenstein had not read Kierkegaard's The Works of Love. (Malcolm 
1984, pl06-107) . It is not known whether Wittgenstein read that work 
after this date. Yet here again one may reflect that Wittgenstein 
appears to have become in key respects a natural Kierkegaardian, for 
much of the thrust of The Works of Love is condensed into a drop of 
(theological) grammar by Wittgenstein in a 1942 remark. This seems to
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echo the prayer with which Kierkegaard prefaced his 'non-sermonic’ 
"discourse" on Luke 22:15, now included in Christian Discourses (Trans W 
Lowrie 1939, p259). Certainly Kierkegaard's pseudonymous authors can be 
long-winded, and even his edifying discourses can be too long by some 
twentieth century standards. However, sometimes Kierkegaard can be 
almost as terse as Wittgenstein. The latter wrote "If you already have 
a person's love, no sacrifice can be too much to give for it; but any 
sacrifice is too great to buy it for you." (CV 42: 1942).
Kierkegaard wrote, with a more Augustinian reference to longing, "Father 
in heaven, longing is Thy gift; no one can bestow it upon himself, when 
it is not given no one can buy it though he were willing to sell all - 
but when Thou givest it, then one can sell all to buy it." (Op cit.) Of 
course, it is not necessary to appeal to direct influence in order to 
explain such congruence. Direct influence is not to be ruled out, and 
even if it were not the case, the congruence would still count for 
something, possibly for even more.
Concerning the content of Wittgenstein's remark on the grammar of love, 
it is evident that this concept of love involves the sort of intensity 
and comprehensiveness which are marks of theological concepts of love, 
grace and longing. Wittgenstein's remark crystallises the way in which 
Kierkegaard aimed to correct Lutheran tradition, as he understood it. 
No sacrifice can buy this love. Why not say that any sacrifice is too 
small to buy it? That unparadoxical attempt to articulate the grammar 
might still deal too gently with the idea that an infinite love could do 
the trick if somehow it could be attributed to us. Hence the
appropriateness of "any sacrifice is too great to buy it for you".
Why, then, does Kierkegaard pray, "... then one can sell all to buy it"? 
He has already stated that no one can buy it or give it to himself.
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Consequently the final reference to buying is probably ironic. Inverted 
commas could be used to mark this. There is also the possible influence 
of the pair of Gospel parables about buried treasure and the pearl of 
great price. These are bought in the sense of being personally 
appropriated, but only after they have been found. There is a 
suggestion that their value transcends all that we can do to appropriate 
them. It follows that Kierkegaard is neither contradicting himself in 
the above passage, nor being contradicted by Wittgenstein.
Kierkegaard’s correction to Lutheran tradition, as he perceived it, was 
to stress that unconditioned and unconditional love, or free grace, or 
the gospel could only be appropriated through individual obedience to 
its claim, authority or law. Otherwise the 'cradle-Christians’ of 
Christendom were merely pandering to their own laziness and deceiving 
one another with consoling fantasies of cheap 'grace' and 'wisdom' 
which, being without passion, does not "move you and turn you in a new 
direction." (CV 53, with a reference to Kierkegaard). Amongst 
Wittgenstein's contemporaries, this theme of Kierkegaard was also taken 
up by Karl Barth and Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Wittgenstein is at one with 
his two more explicitly theological contemporaries in the way he relates 
love and response - provided that the context admits of a theological 
interpretation: "If you already have a person's love, no sacrifice can 
be too much to give for it; ..." (CV 42).
Is this theological proviso so strong as to weaken the parallels just 
drawn? To begin to answer this question adequately it is necessary to 
consider the form of Wittgenstein's remark on the grammar of love. 
Wittgenstein casts it in the form of the German second person singular 
pronoun, "Du". This is the form for intimate address between human 
beings, and for prayer. Wittgenstein's remark fits perhaps unhappily
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into a context of prayer, unless as part of a prayer of complaint or 
accusation, modelled perhaps on Job or a type of ancient Hebrew psalm, 
one of George Herbert's engines "against th' Almighty." (Prayer 1).
The other possible theological model for the form of Wittgenstein's 
remark is that of personal address by a prophet who speaks out on behalf 
of the Holy One who sends him. Compare "You can’t hear God speak to 
someone else, you can hear him only if you are being addressed. - That 
is a grammatical remark." (Z s717). Here Wittgenstein hints that
Kierkegaard’s phrase "indirect communication" should perhaps be taken in 
a spirit of Kierkegaardian irony. We are inclined to take divine 
communication as merely "indirect", but what could be more direct than 
the communication which seeks and finds the "Du" in lonely crowds of 
fragmented subjectivists or tormented solipsists? (Cp CV 45-46). It 
would be wrong to run together what Kierkegaard meant by indirect
communication with what we normally mean by indirect speech. The same 
applies to direct speech and direct communication. What was for
Kierkegaard the primacy of indirect communication is approached by 
Wittgenstein's remark that, "How words are understood is not told by
words alone. (Theology)" (Z sl44). Wittgenstein’s remark on the
grammar of love is about a love which freely communicates itself in a 
whole life and death. ("...no sacrifice can be too much..." Cp John 
15:13).
For Kierkegaard the forms of communication in the different stages of
life prefigure the forms of divine-human love. Kierkegaard suggests
this pre-figurement becomes clear to those practised in the right kind 
of humour and irony, such as is present in the Gospel of John. 
Similarly, for Wittgenstein the primacy of communicative practice
pre-figures what he writes of as the openness of heart, between human
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beings in the presence of God, which constitutes the gift of salvation. 
(CV 45-46). Such a gift saves, not by frustrating or destroying nature, 
but by perfecting it.
If we may say that Luther wrote theology (as grammar) and that 
Kierkegaard wrote both theology (as grammar) and grammar (as theology) 
in his two main types of writing, then we may describe Wittgenstein's 
writing - at least in the one place discussed above - in terms of
grammar (as theology) aimed at clarifying Kierkegaard.
2.11 INDIRECT COMMUNICATION AND PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE
As Wittgenstein became free, in his later work, from what he looked back 
on as the mistakes of the Tractatus, his theology often remained 
implicit. It is likely to be rewarding to explore to what extent the
reasons for this are analogous to the reasons Kierkegaard tried to
co-ordinate around the phrase, "indirect communication."
The strand in Kierkegaard’s use of "indirect communication" which 
appears closest to Wittgenstein is that in which Kierkegaard connects 
indirect communication with practical, as opposed to propositional, 
knowledge. Indirect communication is constituted by the ways we
communicate our knowing how to x, while direct communication consists of 
our communicating our knowledge that x. The drawing of this familiar 
distinction seems the best way of interpreting statements by Kierkegaard 
such as the following. "All communication for knowledge (ie., 
propositional: I McP) is direct communication. All communication of
capability is more or less indirect communication." (Underlined by 
Kierkegaard who added a marginal note, "Here again it is naturally the 
error of the modern period that all communication is direct, that it has 
forgotten that there is such a thing as indirect communication". 
Journals VIII^ B89, 1847, Hong s.657, p308.^)
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Four further comments on this quotation are needed. It should be noted 
how Kierkegaard in effect corrects his initial conflation of knowledge 
with direct communication by his marginal note on the modern error of 
forgetting indirect communication. It does not matter whether he fully 
recognised his own slip here, as other passages are clearer though less 
interesting. It might be objected here that both propositional 
knowledge and the communication which is of its essence as a matter of 
publicly shared language involve practical knowledge, skills or 
"communication of capability" at least as much as non-propositional 
forms of communication. However, the correctness of this criticism can 
be allowed for by elaborating what Kierkegaard wrote here, recalling 
that in his Journals he was writing more for himself and often with the 
compression of notes which struggle to keep up with speed of insight.
Similar considerations attend the ambiguity of "communication of 
capability", which may be understood either in a weaker sense of: 
expression of capability, or in a stronger sense of: transmission, or
sharing by one person with another, of capability - as when A 
successfully teaches B how to x. In the weaker sense, B knows that A 
can do X. In the stronger sense, B comes to know how to do x as a 
result of the way in which A shares his doing of x with him, 
Kierkegaard, I believe, thinks of indirect communication in both of 
these senses, though often in a given context one of them is
predominant.
Thirdly, there is Kierkegaard's qualification "more or less" between his 
phrases "communication of capability" and "indirect communication". It 
is difficult to be sure about the reason or reasons for this 
qualification. One explanation may be that Kierkegaard, by means of
this qualifying phrase, is inserting a reminder that his use of
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"indirect communication" is loosely textured and not to be constrained 
by any Socratic definition. An assiduous reader of Kierkegaard might be 
forgiven for suspecting that "indirect communication" is a 
family-resemblance term of art bordering on the elusive. Grounds for 
this will be summarised below. Another explanation, which may be 
complementary rather than alternative, is that Kierkegaard came to think 
of pure or absolute indirect communication as the work of God alone. 
Consequently for a human being to aspire to realise such purity in his 
own work would point to a project of demonic usurpation. The insertion 
of the qualifying "more or less" may be an acknowledgement of this.
Fourthly, the quotation on direct and indirect communication can be used 
as a key to open up much of Kierkegaard's most distinctive and difficult 
thinking, including his varied use of "subjectivity" and "objectivity", 
with related terms, and his equally varied use of the pair of terms 
"What" and "How" to write about essence and use, content and style, 
message and medium, sense and force, propositional knowledge and 
practical knowledge, truth and method, goal and way, etc. In all of 
this, theological and Christian contexts and applications are never far 
from the surface. Kierkegaard's concern with the individual 
appropriation of Christianity means that he wishes to be, and perhaps 
does become, a theologian of the Holy Spirit. It does not follow from 
this, and it is far from clear to any careful reader of Kierkegaard, 
that he is a subjectivist, irrationalist or fideist in any intelligibly 
pejorative sense. Even in the labyrinth of "Johannes Climacus’" magnum 
opus, the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, we may read, "An orthodox 
champion fights in defence of Christianity with the most frightful 
passion . ,. and he has no inkling of the little ironical secret that a 
man merely by describing the "how" of his inwardness can show indirectly 
that he is a Christian without mentioning God's name. (Kierkegaard's
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footnote continues at this point: "... But with respect to believing
(sensu strictissimo) it holds good that this "how" is appropriate only 
to one as its object ... the content of the assertion must constantly be 
reduplicated in the form of expression .... ...All ironical 
observations depend upon paying attention to "how", whereas the 
gentleman with whom the ironist has the honour to converse is attentive 
only to the "what"." (Op.cit. "Conclusion"; "Subjective Christianity", 
p542-43). Kierkegaard confirms that this represents his own position in 
his Journals. Kierkegaard, it can be said, aims at bringing together 
and holding together both "the what" and "the how", both ’direct' and 
'indirect' communication. This, however, is no easy task, given 
opposition from distorted communication. For Kierkegaard, the measure 
of this difficulty is the difficulty of following the way of the 
crucified Christ. "Good news" that does not seriously try to be 
faithful to the way of the crucified one cannot be faithful to the risen 
one, and so cannot be authentically Christian good news.
2.12 WITTGENSTEIN ON COMMUNICATION
Wittgenstein's own strong interest in varieties of non-propositional 
communication can be seen in Culture and Value. There his remarks 
include the topics of human gestures and expressiveness, drama, music, 
poetry, building, styles of writing and thinking, and other samples from 
across the whole range of human skills and techniques.
Wittgenstein writes that "language is not merely a matter of 
communication" (Z s329) . Here he does not mean by "communication" 
propositional communication. Rather his point is that one uses language 
(to make a plan, for example, not just to make oneself understood by 
others, but also) "to get clear about the matter myself." (Loc. cit.). 
Here Wittgenstein's point is that individual coherence and identity
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should not he taken as prior to our being with others. For 
individuality develops through interaction with others. There can be no 
"Ich" where there is no "Du": so Weininger put it in Sex and Character 
(Geschlecht (1903) p225 - 226). Moreover, Wittgenstein makes it clear 
that speaking and writing are forms of thinking and not merely stage 
props or masks. Here Wittgenstein is close to Kierkegaard as well as to 
Feuerbach, Weininger, Ebner and Buber. For Kierkegaard, in spite of all 
his hostility to systematic demythologizing of Christianity by Hegel and 
and Hegelians, was indebted to Hegel - amongst others - for an 
anti-Cartesian and anti-Kantian approach to language, as he admitted in 
an unusually generous reference; "Whereas the philosophy of the recent 
past had almost exemplified the idea that language exists to conceal 
thought (since thought simply cannot express das Ding an sich at all) , 
Hegel in any case deserves credit for showing that language has thought 
immanent in itself and that thought is developed in language. The 
other thinking was a constant fumbling with the matter." (Journals III 
A 37, 1840, Hong and Hong, vol. 2, sl590, page 214). Compare
Wittgenstein on "fumbling with words" in CV 85. See also Goethe; "Look 
for nothing behind phenomena; they themselves are what is to be 
learned."
As Wittgenstein's own work makes clear, it is another matter whether 
Hegel or Kierkegaard followed through with the necessary thoroughness 
the many ramifications of this insight pioneered in German Romanticism 
with its expressivist approach to language.
Wittgenstein is also close to Kierkegaard when in the Investigations, he 
writes: "I should like to say: you regard it much too much as a matter
of course that one can tell anything to anyone. That is to say: we are 
so much accustomed to communication through language, in conversation.
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that it looks to us as if the whole point of communication lay in this: 
someone else grasps the sense of my words - which is something mental: 
he as it were takes it into his own mind. If he then does something 
further with it as well, that is no part of the immediate purpose of 
language". (PI s363 Cp. PG 140). Wittgenstein’s critical reference to 
"the immediate purpose of language", and his reference in the previous 
section to the impression of an instructor imparting meaning to a pupil, 
"without telling him it directly" (Pi s362), look like allusions to 
"direct" and "indirect" communication. The implicit criticism of 
Kierkegaard needs to be weighed together with the complexity of 
Kierkegaard's usage and with the tone of irony which he may intend to 
communicate concerning the application and relative importance of these 
terms in certain contexts. If Wittgenstein is, amongst other things, 
intentionally alluding to Kierkegaard in PI s363 it should be noted that 
his criticism is by no means merely dismissive.
There is further evidence that Wittgenstein was suspicious of certain 
ways of using the terms "direct communication" and "indirect 
communication", at least for the purposes of communication with his 
immediate contemporaries. At the end of The Blue Book, discussing 
pain-1anguage, he says, "....One expression is no more direct than the 
other. The meaning of the expression depends entirely on how we go on 
using it. Let's not imagine the meaning as an occult connection the 
mind makes between a word and a thing, and that this connection contains 
the whole usage of a word as the seed might be said to contain the
tree". (Pp 73 - 74), Similarly at the end of The Brown Book, Part One,
he concludes, "It was not the function of our examples to show us the 
essence of "deriving", "reading" and so forth through a veil of
inessential features; the examples were not descriptions of an outside
letting us guess at an inside which for some reason or other could not
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be shown in its nakedness. We are tempted to think that our examples 
are indirect means for producing a certain image or idea in a person's 
mind, - that they hint at something which they cannot show...." (p 125). 
Again, at the end of Part Two of The Brown Book we find, "There is the 
idea that the feeling, say, of pastness, is an an amorphous something in 
a place, the mind, and that this something is the cause or effect of 
what we call the expression of feeling. The expression of feeling then 
is an indirect way of transmitting the feeling. And people have often 
talked of a direct transmission of feeling which would obviate the
external medium of communication...........Now can we say that the
communication of feelings by gestures is in this sense indirect? Does 
it make sense to talk of a direct communication as opposed to that 
indirect one? " (p 185).
It should be noted that Wittgenstein’s projected book, towards which he 
was working in various ways in the preparatory writings cited in the 
previous paragraph, seems from this evidence to have been taking shape 
with a structure which required a final discussion of the contrast(s) 
between direct and indirect communication, with a view to questioning 
and overcoming the dissonance between them. This need for such a final 
discussion recalls the structure shared by the Tractatus and the Lecture 
on Ethics, a structure which requires a culminating paradox to express 
the self-questioning character of a work. In those, ■ earlier works the 
dissonance in the communication is to be overcome, not by a final 
discussion, but by a final act of will. The disappearance from the 
ending(s) of the Investigations of any such feature is one reason for 
being alert to the possibility of some such feature (s) perhaps at or 
near the beginning of that work, or perhaps dispersed throughout it.
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2.13 VARIETIES OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION
It is now time to note, however briefly, other ways in which Kierkegaard 
employs a distinction between "direct" and "indirect" communication. 
This is necessary here, not for the sake of a less incomplete picture of 
Kierkegaard, but in order to appreciate a striking section of Culture 
and Value where Wittgenstein enters into discussion with Kierkegaard 
regarding communication in the Jewish-Christian scriptures and in 
Christian existence. Sometimes Kierkegaard does apply the 
direct/indirect contrast to the non-pseudonymous/pseudonymous difference 
between his works (Journals IX A222), but this is not central to his 
usage. For the "witness" of the edifying discourses (IX A222) "strikes 
the truest mean between direct and indirect communication" (X' A 235). 
Thus even those edifying discourses published in his own name are to be 
characterised as to some extent indirect. They too are parts of a 
larger activity. These partial language-activities and the larger 
communication-activity to which they belong are on the way between 
indirect and direct communication.
The notion of distorted communication and its overcoming is sometimes 
central to Kierkegaard’s contrasts between direct and indirect 
communication. For "direct communication pre-supposes that the 
receiver’s ability to receive is undisturbed". (Point of View, Part 
Two, Ch. 1, A5, page 40). Indirect communication pre-supposes disturbed 
reception, or perception or communication. The indirect communicator 
puts himself in the place of those whose disturbed condition is 
presupposed. He "must first of all take pains to find" those who are 
presupposed to be in need of help "and begin there". (Loc cit, A2, 
p27). Thus "all true effort to help begins with self-humiliation: the 
helper must first humble himself under him he would help, and therewith 
must understand that to help does not mean to be a sovereign but to be a
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servant, that to help does not mean to be ambitious but to be patient, 
that to help means to endure for the time being the imputation that one 
is in the wrong and does not understand what the other understands". 
(Loc. cit., page 27 -28). Kierkegaard’s insight is close to Paul's 
ironic preaching of the "foolish" wisdom and the "weak" power of God in 
Christ crucified and risen. ( 1 Corinthians, chs. 1 - 3 ) .  Thus, what 
might be called a religious understanding of the ethics of 
communication, or an ethical understanding of the complex of doctrines 
labelled as the incarnation, the atonement, the resurrection and the 
communion of the Holy Spirit, is expressed in Kierkegaard’s otherwise 
rather more opaque claim that, "an illusion can never be destroyed 
directly, and only by indirect means can it be radically removed. If it 
is an illusion that all are Christians - and if there is anything to be 
done about it, it must be done indirectly, not by one who vociferously 
proclaims himself an extraordinary Christian, but by one who, better 
instructed, is ready to declare that he is not a Christian at all." 
(Loc. cit. Al, p 24 - 25).
If indirect communication is, objectively, the method of Christology, 
understood as inclusive of the incarnation and atonement, in which God 
through Christ seeks and already finds his still alienated creation, 
then, subjectively, indirect communication is appropriately the method 
of appropriating this truth, the method of the Holy Spirit. (Compare 
the role of the Spirit as "another advocate" in John chs. 14 - 16. See 
also Paul on the "not.... .boastful" patient endurance of love as the 
greatest gift of the Spirit, in 1 Corinthians ch 13).
This interpretation of the varieties of communication in Kierkegaard's 
thinking, culminating in his identification of the "what" of 
Christianity with the subject-matter of Christology and the "how" of
TTF
Christianity with the functions and subject-matter of Pneumatology, 
receives considerable support from a Journal entry of 1850: "Christ
continued with the indirect method until the last, for the fact that he 
was incognito, in the guise of a servant, makes all his direct
communication nevertheless indirect  But then his life has a phase
which is otherwise denied - the Resurrection from the dead, the 
Ascension - here is really his first direct communication". (X^ A 367, 
Hong and Hong, vol 1, s 677, page 316).
It would be possible to discuss this passage at much greater length than
is fitting for this context. However, it is important to note that in 
the above passage of Kierkegaard what makes the communication finally 
direct is not the defeat or abandonment of the body and the bodily world 
but the overcoming of their abuse. Moreover various New Testament 
passages trace intimate connections between accounts or concepts of 
resurrection/ascension and accounts or concepts of the giving or coming 
of the Holy Spirit. Wittgenstein’s criticisms of "direct" and
"indirect" communication seem to be aimed more at a Docetic, Manichaean 
or Gnostic reading of Kierkegaard (or, it would be better to say, of 
Climacus) than at what Kierkegaard himself intended. This is not to 
deny that Kierkegaard himself had to struggle with Docetic, Gnostic or 
Manichaean elements which had infiltrated so-called "orthodoxy".
2,14 IN THE SPIRIT OF KIERKEGAARD?
I would not want to suggest that the above pages exhaust the rich
confusion of Kierkegaard on varieties of communication. However, enough 
has perhaps been sketched to provide a setting for Wittgenstein’s own 
remarks explicitly but tentatively "in the spirit of Kierkegaard". (CV 
32-32). This 1937 passage shows that Wittgenstein's 'later' philosophy, 
ie. since about 1929,has not had the effect of distancing Kierkegaard as
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a "significant other". The passage could be set out as a dialogue 
between Kierkegaard, as Wittgenstein understands him, and Wittgenstein 
speaking for himself, but also for Kierkegaard. It should also be noted 
that themes in this passage are to be found elsewhere in Culture and 
Value, and are not confined to explicit discussion of “ or with - 
Kierkegaard.
In this passage (CV 31 - 32) what Winch translates as "communicate" is 
"vermittelm", which could also be used to translate "mediate", as well 
as "negotiate". Wittgenstein does use the adjective "direct" ("....a 
more direct warning...."), but not "indirect". What Wittgenstein is 
writing about could be described, on the basis of these pages of Culture 
and Value and their neighbouring pages, even by someone ignorant of 
Kierkegaard, as historical ("historische") communication compared with 
communication as spirit ("Geist", p31 - 33) or communication as love 
("liebend", p32; "Liebe", p33) or communication as deed ("Tat"; p31) . 
It could also be described, again on the basis of these passages, as 
averagely plausible communication, as contrasted with communication 
essential for your life. (Compare Kierkegaard on the non-paradoxical 
and the paradoxical as marks of direct and indirect communication.)
Wittgenstein begins by attributing to Kierkegaard a question which 
sounds typical of Kierkegaard’s work, but which, so far as I know, no 
one has located in Kierkegaard as a precise quotation. It seems to be 
an impression reconstructed from various memories. This may be one 
reason, at least, why the passage ends, "(I an not sure how far all this 
is exactly in the spirit of Kierkegaard.)" (CV 32). In the passage, as 
often elsewhere in Wittgenstein, a dash, ie. is used to indicate a
change of perspective or of speaker. The passage begins:
"Kierkegaard writes:
Tier
If Christianity were so easy and cosy, why should God in his Scriptures 
have set heaven and earth (changing Winch’s "Heaven and Earth”) in 
motion and threatened eternal punishments?" Of the many eschatological 
passages in the Jewish and Christian Scriptures, which have so moved 
twentieth century people for both academic and existential reasons, 
perhaps the most salient to recall here is the end of Hebrews 12. 
Wittgenstein continues with a "- Question:
But in that case (he replies to his Kierkegaardian other self) why is 
this Scripture so unclear? If we want to warn someone of a terrible 
danger, do we go about it by telling him a riddle (Ratsel) whose 
solution will be the warning?"
The Kierkegaardian voice continues, "- But who is to say that the 
Scripture really is unclear? Isn’t it possible that it was essential in 
this case to ’tell a riddle’? And that, on the other hand, giving a 
more direct warning (eine direktere Warnung) would necessarily have had 
the wrong effect? God has four people recount the life of his incarnate 
Son, in each case differently and with inconsistencies". Here we have a 
shift from Kierkegaard’s more obvious interests to something which, 
while it concerned him, was of more obvious concern to Wittgenstein’s 
contemporaries, ie. the riddle of how to understand the relationships 
between the four New Testament Gospels and, more generally, the riddle 
of how to relate critical scholarship, with its "historical" search for 
Jesus behind the Gospels, and a contemporary spirituality still 
engaged in significant critical discussion and partnership with more 
traditional forms of spirituality, symbolised by the so-called "Christ 
of faith".
Such problems have an historical descent which can be traced through 
Lessing and Kierkegaard/Climacus’ discussion of Lessing in the
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Postscript. (Wittgenstein's awareness of Lessing is shown by various 
evidence including CV 8 and 32). That Wittgenstein’s twentieth century 
dialogue is still in the spirit of Kierkegaard is supported by a similar 
line of thinking about Gospel differences and spirituality in the 
Journals (VIII A 565, 1848, Hong vol. 1, s318, p 133 - 134).
Wittgenstein’s suggestion is that the riddling character of the four 
Gospels, read as "direct" communication, functions to warn readers of 
the need for, and the presence of, "indirect" communication. With 
regard to direct communication, Wittgenstein tends, in this passage, to 
assimilate the Gospel writers to historians, perhaps under the influence 
of apologetic fashion. It seems unlikely he would wish to deny there 
are important differences between the ’evangelists’ (whether these are 
understood as individuals or as community traditions in which 
distinctive individuals merge into anonymity) and ’historians’ (whether 
these are understood in a more modern or ancient sense.) Here, however, 
he is interested in the similarities. With regard to indirect 
communication, Wittgenstein is interested (in this passage) only in 
applying the notion to the Gospels or to the Jewish-Christian 
scriptures, but not to the work of (other) historians.
Whether the Scriptures in general, or the Gospels in particular, are 
unclear depends on assumptions about why and how they were written, and 
about why and how they should be read. What we need in this context may # 
be a revision or reversal (Greek: metanoia - change of mind, turning, 
repentance) in our understanding and practice of communication. The 
difficulty and danger of judgements concerning the unclarity of the 
Gospels, etc. are appreciated by Wittgenstein. He shows this in an 
earlier passage, also written in 1937. Here he is trying to compare 
Paul’s letters with the Gospels. He writes, "Perhaps it just my own 
impurity which reads turbidness into it (ie. the stream flowing in
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Paul’s letters); for why shouldn't this impurity be able to pollute what
is limpid?  In your present state you are quite incapable of
understanding what may be the truth here". (CV 30). Later in 1937 he 
writes similarly, about Paul's teaching on divine election by grace (Die 
Lehre von der Gnadenwahl bei Paulus: not, pace Winch, "the Pauline
doctrine of predestination"): "If it is a good and godly picture, then
it is so for someone at a quite different level, who must use it in his 
life in way completely different from anything that would be possible 
for me." (CV 32.) One wonders how Wittgenstein knows this. Certainly 
he is aware that the Christian grammar of salvation, freedom and grace, 
uses modal syntax not altogether unlike his own in this passage. How he 
knows this is developed in CV 33, which is discussed at length in 
chapter eight.
Before the growth of critical historical study in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, the sixteenth century reformers had rejected in 
principle and to varying extents in practice the traditional Alexandrian 
or platonic hermeneutics which saw in the Scriptures four main levels or 
stages of meaning, corresponding to stages in the development of 
understanding and spirituality. One price paid for this rejection was 
the highlighting of textual and historical riddles which allegorical 
types of interpretation could often apparently take in their stride. 
Another price paid was the increased difficulty in relating the texts, 
both of the Scriptures and of their scholarly students, to Christian 
growth, "sanctification" or "edification". This is necessary background 
for appreciating the significance of Kierkegaard’s re-introduction of 
three or four revised stages of existence in the context of his major 
question concerning what it is to become a Christian. Levels of 
spirituality or existence, correlated with levels of understanding, 
having been thrown out of the front door of Biblical exposition, creep
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in again, somewhat chastened, through the back-door of Kierkegaard’s 
pseudonymous caricature of the complexity of the Scriptures. (This 
development in Kierkegaard was anticipated to a certain extent by
Pascal's Augustinian dialectic of the three orders, culminating in the
order of love, relative to which all else (in the scriptures) is
figurative. (Pensées s270 (Lafuma and Krailsheimer), s670
(Brunschvicg), s364 (Stewart) et passim).
Wittgenstein's appreciation of levels of life and understanding was 
probably influenced by Kierkegaard, as well as by Augustine.
Kierkegaard found the initial outline of his stages of life in
Augustine, rather than in Hegel. Kierkegaard noted that Hegel's system
represented Pelagian optimism concerning human self-help, in contrast 
with what he saw as the realism of Augustine (Journals lA 101, note of 
14.1. 1837 on entries of 1835, cited by Malantschuk 1974, P 143 - 144). 
Wittgenstein’s position on levels of life and understanding is most 
clearly expressed in CV 32 (1937), immediately following his interior 
dialogue with Kierkegaard on Biblical hermeneutics: "In religion every 
level of devoutness must have its appropriate form of expression which 
has no sense at a lower level. This doctrine, which means something at 
a higher level, is null and void for someone who is still at the lower 
level; he can only understand it wrongly and so these words are not
valid for such a person." By "this doctrine" Wittgenstein means, not
the general view he is in process of expounding, but a particular topic 
of teaching, such as Paul's doctrine of Gnadenwahl. This interpretation 
of "this doctrine" is required by the continuation of the passage, which 
has already been quoted.
Wittgenstein’s Kierkegaardian dialogue continues,"-
but might we not say (ie. trying to restate Kierkegaard’s way of using
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varieties of "direct" and "indirect" communication: I. McP.); It is
important that this narrative should not be more than quite averagely 
historically plausible just so that this should not be taken as the 
essential, decisive thing? So that the letter should not be believed 
more strongly than is proper and the spirit may receive its due. I.e. 
what you are supposed to see cannot be communicated even by the best and 
most accurate historian; and therefore a mediocre account suffices, is 
even to be preferred. For that too can tell you what you are supposed 
to be told. (Roughly in the way a mediocre stage set can be better than 
a sophisticated one, painted trees better than real ones - because these 
might distract attention from what matters.)" (Loc.cit.).
Here Wittgenstein’s thinking circles around three pairs of contrasting 
terms, pairs which may be regarded as, not equivalents, but related. 
These are set out below, beginning with the pair most evident in the 
text and finishing with the least evident:
Letter/Spirit
Direct communication/indirect communication
Flesh/Spirit
The third pair comes to the fore in a passage later in 1937, in which 
Wittgenstein meditates on Paul’s text, "No man can say that Jesus is 
(the) Lord but by the Holy Ghost." (1 Corinthians 12:3 - CV 33. This 
rich meditation, intimately related to Wittgenstein's whole programme 
for philosophical work, is interpreted in chapter eight.
Enough has already been written to show that care is needed in 
interpreting the pair: direct/indirect communication. The same is true 
of the other two pairs. Paul’s writing, one source for them, is as free
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of deductive system and as open to semantic famlly-resemblances as that 
of Kierkegaard. The situation is complicated by tendencies to 
assimilate these pairs to Lutheran contrastive treatment of law and 
gospel, as well as to outwardness/inwardness as understood variously in 
Cartesian and Romantic texts. Kierkegaard's understanding and practice 
of communication probably owe something to Paul, not just as mediated by 
Lutheranism and Augustinianism, but also as studied by Kierkegaard. 
(This is not to suggest that the supposed epistemological privilege of 
an historically innocent eye should be attributed to Kierkegaard).
What Wittgenstein is wanting to say in this text seems relatively clear 
in spite of all the noise of tradition. If the narratives in the 
Gospels, or the narrative(s) which can perhaps be constructed from the 
Gospels, were more plausible from the point of view of historians (- but 
which and when?) this would not be sufficient for the communication 
which matters most to take place through such narrative(s). Such 
increased historical plausibility in not necessary for the purpose(s) 
for which the Gospels were written and for which they are used by 
Christians. The same applies, Wittgenstein suggests, to the scriptures 
in general, or rather to the narrative threads in them. His point seems 
not unlike the saying in John 20:29 b, "Blessed are those who have not 
seen and yet believe". The effect of the related pairs of contrasting 
terms could be to increase suspicion agains those taking the contrary 
position. That, at least, could be part of Wittgenstein's intention.
Notice that Wittgenstein's references to "historically plausible" and 
"the best and most accurate historian" have been qualified and weakened 
in the above interpretation. This interpretation applies to 
Wittgenstein advice which he frequently gave to himself as well as to 
others. See, for example: "For we can avoid ineptness or emptiness in
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our assertions only by presenting the model as what it is, as an object 
of comparison - as, so to speak, a measuring-rod; not as a preconceived 
idea to which reality must correspond. (The dogmatism into which we 
fall so easily in doing philosophy.)*’ (PI sl31 Cp. CV 26 and 28). This 
point is doubly apt if what Wittgenstein is trying to develop, in his 
dialogue with Kierkegaard, is that this very point applies to Christian 
acknowledgement of Jesus as Lord, but is not adequately grasped by those 
who attempt to write harmonies of the Gospels or reconstructed lives of 
the historical Jesus.
Kierkegaard can be read as making the same point in more extreme form 
when he suggests (or his pseudonyms suggest) that Christian claims about 
history can be reduced to a claim that the incarnation happened, or that 
the crucifixion/atonement is the most implausible/absurd of all claims 
made by Christians. Such claims of Kierkegaard’s writings and their 
contribution to his tactics and strategy need far more extensive 
discussion than is appropriate in this context.
Wittgenstein occasionally adopts what looks like the more provocative 
approach of Kierkegaard to these matters. See, for example, "Queer as 
it sounds : The historical accounts in the Gospels might, historically 
speaking, be demonstrably false and yet belief would lose nothing by 
this: .... because historical proof (the historical proof-game) is
irrelevant to belief. This message (the Gospels) is seized on by men 
believingly (i.e. lovingly). That is the certainty characterising this 
particular acceptance - as - true, not something else., . (CV 32, 
1937) .
Here, Wittgenstein's initial claim is unclear. The Gospels certainly do 
contain some historical error. John differs from the Synoptic Gospels
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on the date of the Last Supper and they cannot both be correct, though 
they can both be wrong. Such differences may have theological 
significance, or show differences in spirituality between different
groups and traditions in early Christianity, though sometimes it is hard 
to be sure about such claims. On the other hand, if it could be proved, 
or argued with high probability, that the Gospels were, en bloc, a 
forgery, or that Jesus was an "agent provocateur" in the pay of Rome, 
this would be a quite different situation. Where then is the 
dividing-line between relatively unimportant falsity and important 
falsity? When people worry or argue about how to answer this question, 
then - it would seem reasonable to argue - whatever "is seized on by men 
believingly (ie. lovingly)" has a contribution to make. It is not
evident that this position is intellectually irresponsible. When 
Wittgenstein writes, "It is love that believes the resurrection" (CV 33, 
1937), he is not contributing to arguments about the history of Gospel 
accounts of Jesus’ tomb and post-mortem body. He is, however, quietly 
suggesting something about the importance of such accounts and 
arguments. His suggestions could be elaborated as arguments, but would 
the priorities communicated by that any longer be Wittgenstein’s 
priorities?
The whole drift of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy appears to go against 
the notion that the essence of Christianity is encapsulated in
I Corinthians 13, with Jesus as an optional example. Such a reductive
position makes sense within the philosophy of Kant and various branches 
of Kantianism. In the case of the later Wittgenstein, however, there is 
a renewed regard for the importance of historical concreteness, 
particularly with specific reference to inter-personal and social 
aspects of human life, including the variety of things we do in and 
through language. Wittgenstein’s discussion of the Gospels did not have
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the benefit of later investigations of linguistic forms, traditions and 
social influences in the early Christianity which the Gospels 
communicate. Knowledge of these investigations enriches appreciation of 
how Wittgenstein continues his dialogue with Kierkegaard. For these 
investigations can be read as confirming the content of New Testament 
theologies, Christologies and pneumatologies through their twentieth 
century accounts of how, from the earliest days of Christianity, "The 
Spirit puts what is essential, essential for your life, into these 
words... .*' (CV 32) .
The notion with which Wittgenstein is struggling here is very different 
from the deus ex machina of a doctrine of literal inspiration of the 
words of the scriptures. That Wittgenstein is struggling here is 
evident from his gesturing use of two different kinds of emphasis in the 
following sentence, ie. both upper-case and underlining. What he points 
towards in this way is a notion of revelation in which prepositional 
communication is often used without being either sufficient or 
necessary, a notion of revelation as clarification of the mystery of 
God, without any attempts at reductive, non-theological explanation. 
Wittgenstein writes, "The point is precisely that you (Du) are only 
SUPPOSED to see clearly what appears clearly even in this 
representation. (I am not sure how far all this is exactly in the 
spirit of Kierkegaard.)" (CV 32). True and full clarity of vision is an 
eschatological promise or hope. This includes better understanding of 
the coherence of the content (the What) and the form (the How) of divine 
revelation. Even the partial and fragmentary understanding of this 
coherence which "you" may have at present, is not something possessed 
just as one possesses the words which constitute "this representation". 
(CV 32). Without self-involvement in seeking and finding better 
understanding of the coherence in question, the signs that are given 
seem opaque and useless: "Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it
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life? - In use it is alive. Is life breathed into it here? - Or is the 
use its life?" (PI s432). If the use is its life, we are still left to 
learn better about how our uses may be related to the use.
For Wittgenstein, as for Kierkegaard, what counts as being clear and 
unclear in the scriptures, and what counts as mystery and revelation in 
relation to God, differ in accordance with differences in spirituality, 
ie. differences in ways of living and understanding which may already be 
responses to the divine word and spirit. In the context of CV pp 31 - 
33, the work of the Holy Spirit may be described as, not the heteronomy 
of some magical force taking the place of human responsibility, but the 
gift of freedom to make a "place in your life" for the message of Paul 
and the Gospels, quite different from the place given to other messages, 
including different species of what we call history as well as 
"different species of what we call fiction" (CV 32) . If to write of 
this message being "used" in a good sense is intolerably insensitive, 
then an alternative is to write of making an appropriate "place" for it 
"in your life". (CV 32). The trouble with "use" is, amongst other 
things, that it suggests the freedom to live in this way is something 
that can be controlled, earned or even taken for granted. The 
inappropriateness of this is made clear by Wittgenstein in his long 
meditation on "No one can say, "Jesus is Lord, except by the Holy 
Spirit". (I Corinthians 12:3 in CV 33): "....first you must be redeemed 
and hold on to your redemption (keep hold of your redemption) - then you 
will see that you are holding fast to this belief...." Both Paul and 
the Gospels give examples, paradigmatic for Christians, of people 
involved in radical revision of what counts as being clear or unclear in 
the scriptures and what counts as mystery and revelation in relation to 
God.
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Augustine in his Confessiones can be read as engaged with these matters, 
with specific reference to the meaning of "seeking" and "finding", as 
can his near contemporary in the more eastward realm of Greek-speaking 
Christianity, Gregory of Nyssa. In the twentieth century another writer 
who has retrieved these themes, also in dialogue with Kierkegaard and in 
reaction against Cartesian mental privacy, is Karl Barth. In the 1932 
German edition of volume one, part one of Church Dogmatics it is 
claimed, not only that "....expressions acquire their meaning from the 
associations and contexts in which they are used....", but also that 
"....from our thoughts and words about this How (ie. the integrated 
form/content of the Word of God for those whose faith, love and hope are 
in Christ as the mystery/revelation of God in this world: I. McP.) there 
can never, never issue the private system of a What" (op. cit. ET 1st 
ed. pp 86 and 187).
2.15 CLOSING SUMMARY FOR CHAPTER TWO
"Would it be correct to say our concepts reflect our life? They stand 
in the middle of it". (RC III, s302). "Words have meaning only in the 
stream of life" (RPP (2) s687) . In such late remarks Wittgenstein was 
not writing autobiography, not even spiritual or cultural autobiography. 
However, these remarks epitomise what may be called his later semantics 
and epistemology so well as to show how inappropriate it would be to try 
to exclude the possibility of a better understanding of his life and 
times in the search for a better understanding of his philosophical 
work. For this work and understanding can be said to culminate in 
appreciation of how the sense of human language interacts with the forms 
of life (both cultural and organic) in which language is at work, or 
sick, or on holiday. This has proliferating consequences. Hence it is 
not surprising that in Wittgenstein’s written work, published and 
unpublished, there are many remarks which, on the one hand, apparently
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"do not belong directly" with his current philosophical discussion yet, 
on the other hand, cannot always show tidier philosophers (with a less 
holistic understanding of meaning, evidence and justification) how "to 
separate them sharply from the philosophical text." (Von Wright, op. 
cit.).
There are not, it seems, any a priori reasons why the miscellaneous 
remarks of Culture and Value should not both illuminate and be 
illuminated by the larger and more finished works with their ostensibly 
stronger claims to philosophical canonicity. It still remains for 
individual remarks from Culture and Value, or from biographical
fragments, to prove themselves as they are put through their paces in 
some forum or arena of discussion. The same is true of the more
aphoristic remarks which Wittgenstein’s editors have allowed to survive 
within the more finished, larger-scale works.
The remarks of Culture and Value can make a rich contribution towards 
putting Wittgenstein back into his proper element. The right
atmosphere, within which he functions well, may become accessible to his 
readers through this primary source material, assisted by relevant
biographical sources. "Put a man in the wrong atmosphere and nothing 
will function as it should. He will seem unhealthy in every part. Put 
him back into his proper element and everything will blossom and look 
healthy. But if he is not in his right element, what then? Well, then 
he just has to make the best of appearing before the world as a cripple" 
(CV 42). Intellectual portraits of the earlier Wittgenstein, by many 
writers involved with logical positivism, and of the later Wittgenstein, 
by many involved with linguistic idealism or cultural fideism, arguably 
suffer from special problems of this contextual kind.
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Kierkegaard's dialectics of communication provide a way of reading 
together both the form and content of Wittgenstein's more finished, 
larger-scale works. This will be developed in the following chapters, 
Augustine's more informal dialectics, within his Confessiones, as 
exemplified by the tension between his linguistic theory and his 
linguistic practices, as well as by his own references to levels or 
stages of life, are identified, even when not discussed, by 
Wittgenstein. Augustine’s central model, within the Confessiones, of 
the interdependence of finding and seeking, of rest and restlessness, 
has important family-resemblances not only to Kierkegaard on love as 
gift and task, or as delight and longing, within different stages of 
life, but also to Wittgenstein’s central model for philosophy and for 
practical understanding of life, ie. the dissolving or reconciling of 
conflicting or estranged elements within human practices, practices 
which enable and fulfil rather than thwart natural and cultural 
communicative competence. Wittgenstein's central model not only has 
this religious genealogy but also functions religiously to guide his 
comprehensive and intensive attempts to make sense of his life, as can 
be seen from the way the central model gives coherence to the more or 
less religious metaphors and similes which permeate what Wittgenstein 
called his Jewish style of thinking, especially from 1929 onwards.
As a concluding illustration of these points for the purposes of this 
chapter, it is useful to recall Wittgenstein’s remarks on tragedy. In 
considering these remarks, "tragedy" may be connected not just with 
literary categorisation , but also with - for example - references to 
twentieth century European history, and the suicide of Wittgenstein's 
three brothers. On another level, there is also the "tragic" face of 
experiences of being unable to overcome or evade the conflicts of 
metaphysical dogmatists with one another and with metaphysical sceptics,
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conflicts complexly related to institutional and personal conflicts such 
as those just mentioned.
In 1929, Wittgenstein wrote, "You get tragedy where the tree, instead of 
bending, breaks. Tragedy is something in Jewish..." (CV 1). In 1931,
he wrote, "In this world (mine) there is not tragedy, It is as
though everything were soluble in the aether of the world;.... conflict 
is dissipated in much the same way as is the tension of a spring when 
you melt the mechanism (or dissolve it in nitric acid) . This 
dissolution eliminates all tension" (CV 9). The context, especially of 
the later remark, suggests that Wittgenstein was not without some 
misgivings or reservations about perceived aspects of his style of 
thinking. His first remark can be read as appealing to a distinctive, 
if not idiosyncratic, version of Jewishness, which is seen more as a 
matter of (discerning) a way or style of living and thinking that it is 
to do with metaphysical articulation or theological dogma. If this is a 
matter of orthopraxy rather than orthodoxy, it is not clear how far the 
standard of correctness overlaps with a concern to survive or with 
concern for the excellence of what does or should survive. However his 
open-textured Jewishness is open to a kindred version of Christianity: 
"We might say that in Christianity God says to human beings: Don't act a 
tragedy, don't act out heaven and hell on earth. Heaven and hell are m%^  
affair." (CV 14, 1931, translation adapted from Rhees 1981, p 185). In 
line with this, M. Drury remembers Wittgenstein as saying to him in 
1930, "For a truly religious man nothing is tragic." (Rhees 1984, 
p.107). Such remarks raise problems, some of which Wittgenstein 
discussed in other contexts. In the present context his remarks on 
tragedy are sufficient to shed some light on how he could, much later, 
say to Drury with reference to his continuing work for the 
Investigations, "I am not a religious man but I cannot help seeing every
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problem from a religious point of view." (Rhees 1984, p.79, apparently 
from 1949, but compare Drury op. cit. p. 159 - 160 where this remark has 
been omitted from an apparently parallel account.) It is not evident 
why either Augustine or Wittgenstein should be read as enacting tragedy.
Chapter Three:
Wittgenstein and William James
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CHAPTER THREE
WITTGENSTEIN AND WILLIAM JAMES
Structure of Chapter Three
3.1 Opening summary for chapter three
3.2 The ants and the centre
3.3 Starting from The Varieties
3.4 Boltzmann and Hertz in the light of James
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3.6 Longfellow, Wittgenstein and James
3.7 Questioning the Jamesian vision
3.8 The Sentiment of Rationality
3.9 Distancing from James
3.10 Variation and selection
3.11 The desire and pursuit of the whole
3.12 Against resentment
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3.1 OPENING SUMMARY FOR CHAPTER THREE
James recommends attempting to put oneself as an interpreter at the 
centre of another person’s vision. Otherwise it may seem that no centre 
exists, James’ Varieties of Religious Experience was important to
Wittgenstein from 1912 and Russell believed the book was the start of 
Wittgenstein’s mysticism. The early influence on him of the
philosophical physicists Boltzmann and Hertz can be understood as
subsumed by the influence of James.
Through the recognition of painful contradictions and necessities we can 
overcome the urge to ask and answer questions which make no sense, and 
so learn to review and redescribe our knowledge. This is close to
James’ understanding of religion as diagnosis of and remedy for the 
human predicament, especially when due prominence is given to James’ own 
central insight, ie., that ’’Religion ... makes ... felicitous what in 
any case is necessary.” A similar understanding of religion found in 
Longfellow appealed to Wittgenstein.
Wittgenstein's Jamesian vision is discussed by him with a measure of 
self-questioning in a 1937 passage. % a t  is seen as problematic in life 
will, given deep enough self-transformation by the individual, 
"disappear", or rather be transformed from a matter for sorrow to a 
matter for joy. This can be distinguished from a loss of problems 
experienced or described by shallow thinkers. James’ 1879 essay 
entitled The Sentiment of Rationality covers parts of the same area in 
arguing for "a strong feeling of ... peace" as typical of success in the 
struggle for greater rationality, as for example through equilibrating
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acceptance of both "passion for simplification" and "passion for 
distinguishing",
However, unlike James, Wittgenstein is not concerned for theism as an 
"empirical" hypothesis, but is concerned for the more distinctive 
grammar of Christianity, as well as for overcoming the Cartesian 
tradition in psychology which still heavily influenced James in spite of 
himself even in Varieties. James’ understanding of religion and other 
rational passions coheres well with evolutionary concepts of variation 
and selection, while his model of human wholeness involves a balance of 
both faculties and virtues. Consequently James’ understanding of 
religion, as making easy and felicitous what in any case is necessary, 
has a strong family likeness to Wittgenstein’s talent for constantly 
making a virtue out of necessity. A widely suggestive 1947 passage by 
Wittgenstein offers a way of relating James and Augustine within an 
overriding concern for acknowledging and overcoming resentment. In 
these ways, James (like Emerson) offers pointers to the centre of 
Wittgenstein’s vision.
3.2 THE ANTS AND THE CENTRE
"Place yourself", advises William James, "....at the centre of a man’s 
philosophic vision and you understand at once all the different things 
it makes him write or say. But keep outside, use your post-mortem 
method, try to build the philosophy up out of the single phrases, taking 
first one and then another and seeking to make them fit ’logicallyand 
of course you fail. You crawl over the thing like a myopic ant over a 
building, tumbling into every microscopic crack or fissure, finding 
nothing but inconsistencies, and never suspecting that a centre exists." 
(James (1977/1909) A Pluralistic Universe, lecture 6 on "Bergson and his 
critique of intellectualism", p 117, Compare CV 62 on PI as an
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"ant-heap"). This advice would be helpful if it could be applied, not 
just to Wittgenstein's later work, but also to the earlier work 
culminating in the final version of his Logisch - Philosophische 
Abhandlung, now known by the title Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP).
Reasons for appreciating the relevance of James' advice are not hard to 
find. Much of the Tractatus consists of condensed, aphoristic comments, 
suggestions, criticisms and declarations, offered apparently as 
contributions to a conversation with G Frege and B Russell, but not 
excluding H Hertz and A Schopenhauer, and open to many others. In spite 
of the gesture, made by the book's numbering system for its remarks, 
towards the tradition of Euclid's and Spinoza's "geometrical" style of 
argument, the book's content has been described as "splintered, 
kaleidoscopic, and ambiguous at almost every point". (Wedberg, A., vol 
3, 161.) Even Russell, who should have been best placed, had
difficulties in understanding the Tractatus, although his difficulties 
were not, or not merely, because of its technical innovations and 
compression, but also probably because of the Kantian European-Viennese 
background, the aesthetic, moral and religious differences between 
himself and Wittgenstein, and Russell's view of philosophy as a kind of 
science distinguished only by its generality.
3.3 STARTING FROM "THE VARIETIES"
Before looking at the better known clues which Wittgenstein gave to the 
point and coherence of the Tractatus, justification for the present use 
of James is needed. James is mentioned by Wittgenstein, not in the 
Tractatus or in the Notebooks of 1914-1916 (NB) but in correspondence 
belonging to the period under consideration at present. The first 
reference by Wittgenstein which has survived is in a letter to Russell 
dated 22 June 1912: "Whenever I have time I now read James's 'Varieties
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of Religious Experience'. This book does me a lot of good. I don't 
mean to say that I will be a saint soon, but I am not sure that it does
not improve me a little in a way in which I would like to improve very
much; namely I think that it helps me to get rid of the Gorge (in the 
sense in which Goethe used the work in the 2nd part of Faust)."
(LRKM 10).
An important secondary source is in Russell's letter of 20 December 1919 
to Lady Ottoline Morrell, describing Russell's first post-war meeting 
with Wittgenstein in the Hague during mid December: "I had felt in his 
book (the Tractatus) a flavour of mysticism, but was astonished when I 
found that he has become a complete mystic. He reads people like 
Kierkegaard and Angelus Silesius, and he seriously contemplates becoming 
a monk. It all started from William James's Varieties of Religious 
Experience, and grew (not unnaturally) during the winter he spent alone 
in Norway before the war, when he was nearly mad ... ." (LRKM 82),
In addition to the biographical importance of these references, and
their testimony to Wittgenstein's early concern with spirituality as
well as logic, there is a link between James' arguments in Varieties and 
Wittgenstein’s vision of philosophy. The character of this link has not 
only been overlooked, to the best of my knowledge, in all other accounts 
of Wittgenstein and his philosophy, but is of central importance for 
Wittgenstein from this period onwards. This link provides one further 
interpretation for Wittgenstein’s remark, in the autumn of 1948, that 
his fundamental ideas came to him very early in life. Drury, reporting 
this, believes that Wittgenstein did not mean Schopenhauer. (RW 158).
Now the conventional interpretation of Wittgenstein’s fundamental and 
enduring ideas is that they are essentially philosophical, or perhaps
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ethical and philosophical, and that the best information comes from the 
paragraph of 1931, now in Culture and Value (CV 18-19): "I think there 
is some truth in my idea that I really only think reproductively. I 
don’t believe I have ever invented a line of thinking. I have always 
taken one over from someone else. I have simple straightaway seized on 
it with enthusiasm for my work of clarification. That is how Boltzmann, 
Hertz, Schopenhauer, Frege, Russell, Kraus, Loos, Weininger, Spengler 
and Sraffa have influenced me. Can one take the case of Breuer and 
Freud as an example of Jewish reproductiveness? - What I invent are new 
Gleichnisse." (Winch translates this as "similes". The context, 
discussing "the Jewish mind", or a style of thinking which Wittgenstein, 
with others, had come to call ’Jewish’, suggests that "parables" might 
be an alternative translation). The conventional interpretation, then, 
points to the priority and importance of the pair of philosophical 
physicists who head this apparently chronologically sequenced list, 
Ludwig Boltzmann (1844 - 1906) and Heinrich Hertz (1857 - 1894). Von 
Wright, in his Biographical Sketch (1982 etc.) writes that Wittgenstein 
seems to have wished to study physics with Boltzmann in Vienna. (This 
wish was frustrated, as Boltzmann took his own life in intellectual 
despair, just when his atomic doctrine was about to triumph, going to a 
grave marked with his formula "S = K log W" in 1906 - the year
Wittgenstein left school in Linz). Von Wright also reports 
Wittgenstein’s high regard for Hertz’s Principles of Mechanics (op. cit. 
3 and 7, note 3). However, the conventional interpretation is not 
excluded but subsumed by the Jamesian interpretation I am developing 
here.
3.4 BOLTZMANN AND HERTZ IN THE LIGHT OF JAMES
In order to see how this happens, we need to mention what two 
influential interpreters of Wittgenstein see as his most probable and
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most important borrowing from the two physicists. Baker and Hacker, in 
their essay XIV on "Hbersicht" (survey/bird’s-eye-view/overview, etc) in 
Wittgenstein, Meaning and Understanding (pp. 295-309) refer to the two 
physicists as significant precursors who influenced Wittgenstein’s 
characteristic use of this term. Hertz's introduction to his Principles 
of Mechanics expresses his insight that some kinds of vexing problems in 
mechanics and physics have to be, not solved but dissolved: "We have
accumulated around the terms "force" and "electricity" more relations 
than can be completely reconciled amongst themselves. We have an 
obscure feeling of this and want to have things cleared up. Our 
confused wish finds expression in the confused question as to the nature 
of force and electricity. But the answer which we want is not really an 
answer to this question. It is not by finding out more and fresh 
relations and connections that it can be answered; but by removing the 
contradictions existing between those already known, and thus perhaps by 
reducing their number. When these painful contradictions are removed, 
the question as to the nature of force will not have been answered; but 
our minds, no longer vexed, will cease to ask illegitimate questions." 
(Hertz, quoted by Hacker, PMS, Insight and Illusion (1972 and 1986) 
p. 4). Boltzmann, in addition to stressing the importance of 
surveyability, model-building, analogical understanding and the dangers 
of unrecognised extensions of concepts between domains, also parallels 
Hertz in claiming that the simplest preconditions of experience or laws 
of thought require description which will dissolve apparent 
contradictions, typical of philosophical perplexity, by showing that the 
questions fail to make sense. Endorsing the importance of an holistic 
overview both for new discovery and for new syntheses of old ideas, in 
spite of inherent dangers, he refers to Goethe: "Only half of our
experience is even experience, as Goethe says. The more general the 
overview one can win, the more surprising the facts one can discover but
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the more easily too one can fall into error." (Boltzmann, On the 
Development of the Methods of Theoretical Physics in Recent Times 77, 
quoted in Baker and Hacker, WMU (1983) 298). (This theme, in Goethe, is 
found, for example, in the introduction to his Theory of Colours).
Two further paragraphs from Boltzmann, but this time from his work On 
Statistical Mechanics (English translation, p 167) , provide further
evidence of relevant similarities with aspects of Wittgenstein's 
thinking, both in earlier and later stages of his development.
"My present theory," writes Boltzmann, "is totally different from the 
view that certain questions fall outside the boundaries of human 
cognition. For, according to that latter theory that is a defect or
imperfection of man's cognitive capacity, whereas I regard the existence
of these questions and problems themselves as an illusion. On 
superficial reflection it may of course be surprising that after
recognition of the illusion the drive towards answering these questions 
does not cease . . . Only very slowly and gradually will all these 
illusions recede and I regard it as the central task of philosophy to 
give a clear account of the inappropriateness of this overshooting the 
mark on the part of our thinking habits..."
Backer and Hacker write (op.cit. 299) that this paragraph could be seen
as representing part of the task of Wittgenstein's Investigations. 
Certainly the emphasis on gradual recession of illusions about
boundaries and cognition is more reminiscent of the Investigation than
of the Tractatus. The second (following) paragraph, however, seems 
closer to the Tractatus, in spite of its use of "gradually" in keeping 
with the first paragraph.
"If, therefore, philosophy were to succeed in creating a system such 
that in all cases mentioned it stood out clearly when a question is not 
justified so that the drive towards asking it would gradually die away, 
we should at one stroke have resolved the most obscure riddles and 
philosophy would become worthy of the name of queen of the sciences." 
(Boltzmann, loc.cit).
3.5 JAMES' RELIGIOUS CENTRE
The crucial anology between Hertz, Boltzmann and James, and a central 
piece missing from many attempts to give a synoptic account of 
Wittgenstein, is brought out most sharply in what James finally writes, 
after displaying all the varieties of his religious phenomenology, about 
the structure of religion, in the "Conclusions" of his twentieth Gifford 
lecture. In spite of the possible family-resemblances between religious 
features, which James so seminally pointed out in lecture two, there is, 
he maintains, "a common nucleus", "a certain uniform deliverance in 
which religions all appear to meet", ie., "1. an uneasiness; and 2. Its 
solution"; or "a sense that there is something wrong about us as we 
naturally stand" and "a sense that we are saved from the wrongness by 
making proper connection with the higher powers." Moreover, "In those 
more developed minds which alone we are studying, the wrongness takes a 
moral character, and the salvation takes a mystical tinge," (Loc. cit.).
However, this climatic passage must be read together with what James has 
already suggested proleptically towards the end of his second lecture, 
entitled "Circumscription of the Topic". Starting the lecture with a 
Wittgensteinian permissiveness, James steadily narrows dowm possible 
definitions of religion, so as to end the lecture by pointing 
circumspectly to his overview in his ultimate conclusions. Religious 
emotions, he says in effect in his earlier sections of lecture two, are
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necessarily connected with some intentional object, they are essentially 
developed as responses (as if?) to x, where x may be a power or powers. 
Men have feelings, experiences, etc., of a religious kind or kinds "so 
far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they 
may consider the divine". Tempting as it may seem, "It would strain the
ordinary use of language too much to call" religious, or a religion,
"any total reaction upon life", even though "religion, whatever it is,
is a man's total reaction upon life".
In other words, religion is better thought of as a certain kind of total 
reaction upon life, one in which "the individual feels impelled to 
respond” to some primal reality "solemnly and gravely, and neither by a 
curse or a jest". "Things are more or less divine, states of mind are 
more or less religious, reactions are more or less total, but the 
boundaries are always misty, and it is everywhere a question of amount 
and degree. Nevertheless, at their extreme of development, there can 
never be any question as to what experiences are religious 
Hesitation as to whether a state of mind is "religious", or 
"irreligious", or "moral", or "philosophical", is only likely to arise 
when the state of mind is weakly characterised,..."
Now the strong and clear characterisation of the religious state of 
mind, given in the penultimate paragraph of James' second lecture, is: 
"... we are in the end absolutely dependent on the universe; and into 
sacrifices and surrenders of some sort, deliberately looked at and 
accepted, we are drawn and pressed as into our only permanent positions 
of repose. Now in those states of mind which fall short of religion, 
the surrender is submitted to as an imposition of necessity, and the 
sacrifice is undergone at the very best without complaint. (James 
illustrates this from Stoic literature). In the religious life, on the
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contrary, surrender and sacrifice are positively espoused: ... Religion 
thus makes easy and felicitous what in any case is necessary;".
Thus, in a typically religious state of mind, according to one of James* 
earlier paragraphs, "the will to assert ourselves and hold our own has 
been displaced by a willingness to close our mouths and be as nothing in 
the floods and watersprouts of God. In this state of mind, what we most 
dreaded (cp. Wittgenstein's reference to "Sorge"; see also Varieties on 
Sorgen in the sick soul or divided-self as exemplified by Goethe, 
Luther, mere positivism and Tolstoy: lectures VI - VII, pp 146-163,
Fontana edition) has become the habitation of our safety, and the hour 
of our moral death has turned into our spiritual birthday. The time for 
tension in our soul is over, and that of happy relaxation, of calm deep 
breathing, of an eternal present, with no discordant future to be 
anxious about, has arrived. Fear is not held in abeyance as it is by 
mere morality, it is positively expunged and washed away."
For James, then, the strong model of a religious solution to the problem 
of the meaning of life is the total or comprehensive response which 
solves the ultimate or supreme problem by dissolving it, embracing what 
is ultimately inevitable (according to one's best understanding of the 
human predicament) in what he describes as a solemn joy or a 
bitter-sweet reaction. Thus the religious form of life can be seen as 
the most comprehensive pattern, or form of forms of life. Other forms 
of life, including those of the philosophical physicists Hertz and 
Boltzmann, may be seen as approximating towards, or participating in, 
this pattern to some degree. Being seen as supremely coherent and 
supremely comprehensive, this pattern has a beauty of its own, which may 
illuminate even minute particulars.
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3.6 LONGFELLOW, WITTGENSTEIN AND JAMES
Concerning "minute particulars", Wittgenstein, as well as appreciating 
William Blake, thought in 1938 of using verse 5 of H Longfellow’s poem 
The Builders as a motto. (CV 34.) It is not clear whether Wittgenstein 
was thinking here, in the first instance, of his work on the book to 
become known as the Investigations, or of his life-work. However, if 
the prospective Investigations was seen by Wittgenstein at that time as 
the culmination of his life-work, then Wittgenstein may have had both 
these applications in mind. The following quotations show Wittgenstein 
apparently misquoting the last line of Longfellow’s fifth verse. If 
this is a slip of memory or attention it may still be a significant 
slip, and this not merely because of the irony that here Wittgenstein 
himself may fail to see a minute part, "wrought with greatest care". 
Wittgenstein’s apparent slip in effect assimilates the last line of 
Longfellow’s fifth verse to the sense of the third line of his sixth 
verse.
For the last line of verse five, Wittgenstein wrote, in English, "For 
the Gods are everywhere." Longfellow had written here, "For the Gods see 
everywhere".
The interest for Wittgenstein of Longfellow’s poem may be confirmed by 
Wittgenstein’s 1931 remark that, "Working in philosophy - like work in 
architecture in many respects - is really more a working on oneself. On 
one’s own interpretation. On one’s way of seeing things. (And what one 
expects of them.)" (CV 16.) Moreover, Longfellow’s poem appears to be 
a meditation on Emerson’s essay on "Fate". In chapter one of this 
thesis, the relevance of Emerson’s essays for Wittgenstein’s early 
thinking has already been discussed. This discussion will be developed 
in the final chapter. Wittgenstein’s interest in Longfellow is not so
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surprising, given the Emerson connection, and the architectural imagery, 
and the Augustinian concern with making sense of human being in time.
"THE BUILDERS 
All are architects of Fate,
Working in these walls of Time;
Some with massive deed and great,
Some with ornaments of rhyme.
Nothing useless is, or low;
Each thing in its place is best;
And what seems but idle show
Strengthens and supports the rest.
For the structure that we raise.
Time is with materials filled;
Our to-days and yesterdays
Are the blocks with which we build.
Truly shape and fashion these;
Leave no yawning gaps between;
Think not, because no man sees.
Such things will remain unseen.
In the elder days of Art,
Builders wrought with greatest care 
Each minute and unseen part;
For the Gods see everywhere.
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Let us do our work as well,
Both the unseen and the seen;
Make the house, where Gods may dwell.
Beautiful, entire and clean.
Else our lives are incomplete.
Standing in these walls of Time,
Broken stairways, where the feet 
Stumble as they seek to climb.
Build to-day, then, strong and sure.
With a firm and ample base;
And ascending and secure
Shall to-morrow find its place.
Thus alone can we attain
To those turrets, where the eye
Sees the world as one vast plain,
And one boundless reach of sky."
The world to which the poet (and all for whom he aims to speak) believes 
he belongs, with its constraints of "Fate", and "Time" as well as 
"minute parts", becomes through the poem the world which is believed to 
belong to the poet, with his final longing for and vision of coherence 
and comprehensiveness.
Such a Jamesian religious vision of the world in the all-seeing 
perspective of eternity, "Sub specie aeternitatis" - to use with 
Wittgenstein Spinoza’s phrase, is arguably at the centre of 
Wittgenstein’s struggles, early and late, to show through and beyond his 
arguments that in logic or grammar, in ethics and in aesthetics we may
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see the all-inclusive shape (the "logical space") of possibilities 
within which the world of facts is present and more or less 
significantly "lives, moves and has its being".
3.7 QUESTIONING THE JAMESIAN VISION
Later we can find Wittgenstein questioning himself about the 
acceptability of this understanding of religion, with its incorporation 
of Boltzmann and Hertz into James’ approach. Relatively explicit 
examples of such self-questioning provide evidence of how the Jamesian 
vision continued to matter for Wittgenstein. Two examples will be given 
here,
A passage from 1937, the beginning of which has already been used in the 
previous chapter, shows Wittgenstein questioning himself about this and 
providing an answer. In order to assist appreciation of the 
continuation of this passage, I now provide it entire.
"The way to solve the problem you (Du) see in life is to live in a way 
that will make what is problematic disappear.
The fact that life is problematic shows that the shape of your life does 
not fit into life’s mould. So you must change the way you live and, 
once your life does fit into the mould, what is problematic will 
disappear.
But don’t we have the feeling that someone who sees no problem in life 
is blind to something important, even to the most important thing of 
all? Don’t I feel like saying that a man like that is just living 
aimlessly - blindly, like a mole, and that if only he could see, he 
would see the problem? Or shouldn’t I say rather: a man who lives
rightly won’t experience the problem as sorrow (Traurigkeit), so for him
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it will not be a problem, but a joy (Freude) rather; in other words for 
him it will be a bright halo (Ather) around his life, not a dubious 
background." (CV 27.)
It is relevant to note here that although the two questions of the 
second paragraph are countered, in the final paragraph, by what looks 
like a question, neither the English translation of Winch nor the German 
original as printed by him contains a question-mark for this final 
"question"! Compare Augustine on finding in seeking.
A superficial response to this passage would be that a problem, by being 
experienced as a joy instead of a sorrow, does not cease to be a 
problem. For example, consider the problem for a sports-team, or 
individual competitor in some sport, of how to overcome the opposition. 
However, Wittgenstein isn’t thinking of this sort of problem. He is 
thinking perhaps of the basic "Jamesian" problem of everyman, wanting to 
live and not being able to live, or perhaps of a closely related 
problem, of how to live with some moral, metaphysical, epistemological 
or religious tension or conflict which can be neither evaded nor 
overcome so far as a particular person is concerned. Here the 
existential problem of wanting to live and not being able to do so, is 
rediscovered in a specific context, perhaps as an apparently theoretical 
or metaphysical problem such as how to satisfy both our need for what 
James called "simplification" (coherence, overview, generalisation) and 
for what he called "distinguishing” (clarity, analysis, openness to 
concrete detail). Another example of the kind of problem for 
understanding which is closely related to the problematic character of 
life is the cluster of problems about apparently endless regress in 
explanation or justification and about where attempts at justification
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and explanation can or should begin or end. While in specific contexts 
specific solutions can be worked out, what exacerbates such problems and 
the difficulties of giving and accepting such solutions is the way the 
problems of theoretical or metaphysical survival, defence or attack are 
so readily assimilated to, or seen as expressions of, group or 
individual struggles for survival.
Wittgenstein may have feared that he, or his work in the hands of 
others, could become vulnerable to the critical questions of his second 
paragraph above. These fears are suggested by the following paragraph, 
which provides the second example of Wittgenstein's self-questioning 
about his Jamesian vision.
"Some philosophers (or whatever you like to call them) suffer from what 
may be called 'loss of problems'. Then everything seems quite simple to 
them, no deep problems seem to exist anymore, the world becomes broad 
and flat and loses all depth, and what they write becomes immeasurably 
shallow and trivial. Russell and H G Wells suffer from this." (Z s 
456.)
Wittgenstein is suggesting that such writing is shallow because it fails 
to make significant connections between the problems at hand and the 
problematic character of life as this is suffered and endured through 
struggle for personal change. Of the writers whom Wittgenstein admired 
most, two less obviously experienced the problematic character of life 
as "a joy" (Kierkegaard and Tolstoy) compared with two who are for many 
readers paradigmatic in this respect, ie., Augustine and Dostoevsky.
3.8 "THE SENTIMENT OF RATIONALITY"
What Wittgenstein writes of the transformation of the problematic 
character of life, if one transforms one's life in the right way.
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corresponds to what James described as "the sentiment of rationality". 
"A strong feeling of ease, peace, rest" is typical of success in the 
struggle for greater rationality. "The transition from a state of 
puzzle and perplexity to rational comprehension is full of lively relief 
and pleasure This feeling of the sufficiency of the present moment,
of its absoluteness - this absence of all need to explain it, account 
for it or justify it - is what I call the sentiment of Rationality. As 
soon, in short, as we are enabled from any cause whatever to think of a 
thing with perfect fluency, that thing seems to us rational." (James 
(1920) The Sentiment of Rationality. First published 1879).
What distinguish such a condition from that of a careless, stupid or 
trivial person ("like a mole") are the context of struggle, and the 
means or manner of the struggle, in which the condition is attained or 
maintained, and which are internal to its meaning. A salutary warning 
of the alternative to be avoided is provided by the case of Benjamin P 
Blood who claimed in 1874 that, "The disease of Metaphysics vanishes in 
the fading of the question and not in the coming of an answer." This 
condition is to be attained, however, through regular administration of 
laughing-gas, the cult drug of the 1870s. (A case mentioned by James in 
a footnote to "The Sentiment of Rationality"). "... to conscience the 
means are without exception as important as the end ..." (S Kierkegaard, 
Purity of Heart 207-208).
3.9 DISTANCING FROM JAMES
Wittgenstein only let James influence him selectively and critically. 
Wittgenstein’s later writings often use James' writings on psychology as 
targets for criticism, even while regarding James highly for being so 
"human" a writer. However, it is now time to refer to two specific 
respects in which Wittgenstein parts company from James with regard to 
religious understanding and understanding of religion.
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Firstly, James, in the Varieties, The Will to Believe and other 
writings, shows a degree of tender-mindedness towards an empiricist 
approach to theism as essentially hypothetical. Wittgenstein does not 
share this tender-mindedness, and his approach is arguably the more 
coherent in this respect.
Secondly, James, within the context of the basic religious vision
described in this essay, does not do enough to articulate differences 
between, on the one hand, a neo-Stoicism or Schopenhauerean Buddhism, 
and, on the other hand, mainstream versions of Christianity. In spite 
of James’ concern with pluralism, varieties and anti-essentialism, he 
does at times convey the impression of being content with a
psychological syncretism in place of concrete religious traditions. 
Even though James does include a pointer towards theology as the
"grammar" of religion, in the sense that theology is related to religion 
as grammar is to language in use, he does not develop this apparent 
anticipation of Investigations s373. Wittgenstein rightly associated 
"(Theology as grammar)" with Luther rather than with the Varieties or 
with James’ source. (Varieties Lecture XVIII on "Philosophy", p 419, 
note 1, refers to H Fielding The Hearts of Men, London, 1902. Ambrose 
(1979) Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Part 1, s28, p32, 1932-33, reports
Wittgenstein attributing to Luther a claim that theology is the grammar 
of the word "God".) By contrast with James, Wittgenstein increasingly 
experienced a need to attempt descriptive accounts of areas of Christian 
grammar, eg., love (CV 42 and 43), confession (CV 18 and 45-46), 
crucifixion and resurrection (CV 45-46 and 33), election by 
grace/predestination (CV 30, 32, 33, 77 etc).
Thirdly, while it is intriguing (and perhaps currently fashionable in 
circles influenced by R Rorty's version of "neo-pragmatism") to dwell
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upon similarities between James* pragmatism and Wittgenstein's growing 
stress on human practices and life, there are important differences. 
For all James* localised frustrations with the Cartesian ‘tradition in 
psychology, and for all his revisionary efforts, he remains within the 
confines of a highly individualistic and private notion of selfhood, 
with apparently little place for a deeper appreciation of social, ritual 
or historical features of human activity, understanding and life. Hence 
the extent and intensity of Wittgenstein’s friendly arguments with 
James, and Wittgenstein’s own counter-efforts in the philosophy of 
psychology throughout his later philosophy.
However, not all that looks like a development away from James is really 
this. One must not be misled by Wittgenstein’s way of going beyond his 
early dialectic of saying and showing. This dialectic had to be 
abandoned. One of its attractions was the way it lent itself to a 
Jamesian understanding of the human predicament and its overcoming. 
Nevertheless it can be regarded as an immature or preliminary attempt to 
apply a Jamesian approach, as will be argued in the following chapters.
3.10 VARIATION AND SELECTION
It may be helpful at this point to trace a further connection between 
the two main aspects of what is being characterised as a Jamesian 
understanding or approach. Under the aspect of theoretical 
understanding, much has been made of the need to reconcile what James 
calls the passion for simplification with what he calls the passion for 
distinguishing. Under the aspect of practical understanding, much has 
been made of the notion of comprehensive religious response through 
which the human predicament of wanting to live but having to die is 
transformed from a matter of tragedy into a matter of joy. A bridge 
between these two aspects can be discerned through using concepts at 
home in evolutionary theory. This is not a vague claim that theoretical
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understanding "evolves" as a specialisation of practical understanding. 
Instead, it involves analogical use of the terms "variation" and 
"selection". For just as proliferating forms of desire for life can be 
seen as expressive of evolutionary variation, and human mortality can be 
seen as expressive of evolutionary selection, so proliferating forms of 
linguistic and conceptual differentiation can be seen as vital for 
cultural variation, and forms of linguistic and conceptual 
simplification or generalisation can be seen as vital for cultural 
selectivity in this stage of evolution. Accommodation to and 
assimilation from the human environment are vital for more than one 
level or type of adaptation, even if the principles of selection and the 
methods of variation are markedly different, though overlapping in 
application. (For development of a similar approach, though without 
application to James or Wittgenstein, see G Theissen's Biblische Glaube 
in Evolutionarer Sicht, 1984, ET 1985).
3.11 THE DESIRE AND PURSUIT OF THE WHOLE
On account of this evolutionary connection it is not arbitrary to see a 
strong similarity between the considered response of theoretical 
understanding, according to James, ie., a passion for reconciling the 
passion for simplification with the passion for distinguishing, and the 
considered response of practical understanding, ie., the passion of joy 
that is strong enough to sorrow with those who sorrow, without enacting 
a tragedy. Compare what James writes, in Lectures XIV and XV of the 
Varieties, on the "Value of Saintliness". Wittgenstein's 1912 letter to 
Russell on the value of reading the Varieties implies that Wittgenstein 
is also recalling this section of the lectures. ("... I don’t mean to 
say that I will be a saint soon, but..." LRKM, plO). James praises 
what he variously calls balance, all-round character, equilibrium or 
equanimity in the following terms:
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"Strong affections need a strong will; strong active powers need a 
strong intellect; strong intellect needs strong sympathies, to keep life 
steady. If the balance exist, no one faculty can possibly be too strong 
- we only get the strong all-round character. In the life of saints, 
technically so-called, the spiritual faculties are strong, but what 
gives the impression of extravagance proves usually on examination to be 
a relative deficiency of intellect." (Loc. cit.).
This passage points to James' model of the whole, healthy human being 
who "makes easy and felicitous what in any case is necessary", ie., 
within the constraints of a given understanding of the human 
predicament, and in this way becomes a paradigm for or judge of true 
religion. A given understanding is not necessarily a static one. One 
would hope that understanding of a predicament could develop constantly 
in step with understanding of an appropriately liberating, or 
therapeutic, or wise response to it.
In 1948 Wittgenstein wrote: "I have one of those talents that constantly 
has to make a virtue out of necessity." (CV 76). Here James' 
compendious use of "necessity" may be interpreted not just in terms of 
natural necessities of ability, character, family and history but also 
in terms of all the other varieties of necessity that play their parts 
in ethics and in religions as well as providing occasions for the 
exercise of philosophical acumen.
3.12 AGAINST RESENTMENT
The following passage from Wittgenstein, written in 1947, may be read as 
bringing together necessity or "fate", which constitutes the human 
predicament according to James, Longfellow and Emerson, with a cluster 
of Augustinian concerns, ie,, temporality (Confessiones chapter 11)
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responsibility, predestination and/or grace, theology and ethics, grace 
and law, and - above all - Augustine's alertness to the evangelical (ie. 
Biblical) grammar of "seeking/finding" or "asking/receiving". (See 
especially Matthew 7:7-8 = Luke 11:9-10 and Confessions 13:38 and
throughout.) In the following extraordinary passage from his workbooks, 
Wittgenstein not only embraces all this but also shows how James' 
religious vision can be taken beyond the dangers or superficial 
attractions of a bland syncretism with Stoicism, or with Schopenhaurean 
Buddhism, or pragmatic Pelagianism and into the surveyable land of 
detailed, descriptive, grammatical cartography of practices and 
teachings in particular communities and traditions.
"The use of the word 'fate'. Our attitude to the future and the past. 
To what extent do we hold ourselves responsible for the future? How 
much do we speculate about the future? How do we think about the past 
and the future? If something unwelcome happens:- do we ask "Whose fault 
is it?", do we say "It must be somebody's fault," - or do we say "It was 
God's will", "It was fate"? In the sense in which asking a question and 
insisting on an answer is expressive of a different attitude, a 
different mode of life, from not asking it, the same can be said of 
utterances like "It is God's will" or "We are not masters of our fate". 
The work done by this sentence, or at any rate something like it, could 
also be done by a command! Including one which you give yourself. And 
conversely the utterance of a command, such as "Don't be resentful", may 
be like the affirmation of a truth." (CV 61).
As Nietzsche appreciated, resentment can take moral, metaphysical and 
religious forms, as well as more atavistic inter-personal varieties. 
The aesthetic, ethical, religious and intellectual sensibility evident 
in James and in Wittgenstein may be understood as concerned with
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acknowledging and overcoming such ramified resentment. Even if one is 
wary of according resentment and counter-resentment such a pivotal place 
in one's interpretation of Wittgenstein or James, it remains true that 
salient cases of making felicitous virtue out of hard necessity are 
provided by transcendance of resentment in recognising it and through 
acknowledging it. The psycho-analytical model of therapy, for all its 
contested aspects, provides a related kind of example. (Compare R. 
Girard (1987) etc.).
This chapter began with James' advice that we should place ourselves at 
the centre of a person's philosophic vision in the hope of understanding 
at once all the different things it makes a person write or say. The 
alternative, external way, James warns, is a post-mortem method. For 
then we must try to build the philosophy up from single phrases, seeking 
to make them fit by taking first one and then another, but attempting a 
hopeless task, given the following experience: "You crawl over the thing 
like a myopic ant over a building, finding nothing but inconsistencies, 
and never suspecting that a centre exists." This is how myopic ants 
experience the way of dialectical, regulative equilibration followed by 
Augustine, Pascal, Kierkegaard, Emerson, James and Wittgenstein.
Thinking of how his own work would be experienced by such readers, 
Wittgenstein wrote in 1947, "The book is full of life - not like a man, 
but like an ant-heap." (CV 62.)
However, it does not follow from this that Wittgenstein's vision had 
lost, or never had, a life-giving centre. Further pointers to this 
centre will be considered. Reasons why Wittgenstein's written pointers 
are so often understated or ironical are not far to seek. He aimed at a
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centre for whole, human lives, and "Anything your reader can do for 
himself, leave to him." (CV 77).
However, Wittgestein's vision, through his experiences during 1914-1919, 
becomes much more deeply Augustinian than is James’ over-psychological, 
secularised variation on the tradition. This can be illustrated by 
looking again at the phrase: theology as grammar. For Henry Fielding 
(1901, ch.31 p.313), while, "the creeds are the grammar of religion,
they are to religion what grammar is to speech", it is also the case
that "grammar is the theory formed afterwards". (Loc. cit.). Fielding 
appears without insight into the interdependence of rule-understanding 
and rule-following, which this thesis describes as the dialectical or 
equilibrating character of grammar. It is tempting to see Fielding's 
book (though earlier than James') as a reduction to banality of James'
Varieties. However, a fairer perspective takes into view the
sophistication and learning with which James rises above the banalities 
of the anti-intellectualism of the period, and not just in America. 
Opposition to what James later called "vicious intellectualism" does not 
entail vicious or banal anti-intellectualism.
It is striking that Paul Holmer, in The Grammar of Faith (1978, p.ix, 
etc.) associates his use of grammar, not just with Wittgenstein in PI 
but also with Graham Wallas (1858-1932) who spoke of the "grammar of 
politics", with Karl Pearson's Grammar of Science (1892: mainly a
variation on the philosophy of science of Ernst Mach) and John Henry 
Newman’s Grammar of Assent (1870). What is striking is the omission. 
Holmer, apparently having a Lutheran background, forgets, or is not 
aware of, Luther and Hamann. Luther, in turn, draws on Augustine and 
the New Testament, as well as renaissance humanism, for his thinking of 
theology as grammar, as is shown elsewhere in this thesis. For only
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where the law Is fulfilled in love can one fully and clearly learn how 
understanding of the law and following of the law, through its 
fulfilment in love, are interdependent,
Fergus Kerr (1986, p. 146, note 1) points out that Fritz Mauthner, in a 
work Wittgenstein read (see TLP s4.0031), quotes for his motto Hamann's 
claim that he "like Luther, turned the whole of philosophy (sic) into a 
(sic) grammar". (See Weiler 1958). However, Wittgenstein read Hamann 
for himself (RW 107) and in effect encouraged others to do so (RW 84, 
note), Moreover Hamann has much to say on theology and philosophy as 
grammar. For Hamann the Lutheran, grammar is not a metaphor for the law 
of God, but rather a central aspect of it, with regard to both its 
negative and positive functions. Earlier, the eminent Lutheran
theologian John Gerhard had written "  our theology is altogether
grammatical : tota est grammatics" (Loci Communes Theologici, Jena, ed.
E. Preuss, vol.l, Berlin 1863, ch.6.20, s249. I am endebted for this 
Gerhard reference to Wilfried Flach and Ingolf Dalferth).
Luther's commentary on Psalm 1 (1519, in Pelican, J. (1958) pp.287-311) 
is a principle source of this Lutheran tradition. See especially 
pp.287, 290 and 294. Here, contrary to Ebeling's book on Luther,
Luther at first contrasts grammar and theology, but then (p.294) brings 
them together as a heading for his interpretation of verse 2 of Psalm 1: 
"But his delight is in the Law of the Lord, and on his Law he meditates 
day and night". Luther is, characteristically, drawing heavily on Paul, 
but he would also have been well aware of Augustine's references to
grammar and law, and to "using the law lawfully (1 Timothy 1:8) in the
Confessiones. These are aspects of theology as grammar, and of grammar
as theology, which Wittgenstein could not learn (not, at least.
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directly) from William James. (For what Wittgenstein could have learnt 
from Clement of Alexandria's book entitled Patchwork (Stromateis), see 
Hans von Campenhausen's (1963) Fathers of the Greek Church ch. 3, 
especially pp. 31-35).
Chapter Four:
Schopenhauer and Kraus
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CHAPTER FOUR
SCHOPENHAUER AND KRAUS
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163
4.1 OPENING SUMMARY FOR CHAPTER FOUR
There are reasons for treating with caution Wittgenstein’s 1931 
acknowledgement of influences. Wittgenstein’s ambivalence towards 
religious influences and towards the religious style of his own thinking 
reflects different responses towards "Jewish" and "non-Jewish" 
tendencies. He sees his task as clarifying influences with courage. 
Kierkegaard and James, though unacknowledged in the 1931 list, make 
their presence known, in spite of anxieties about influence. 
Schopenhauer's vision of will and its representations is clarified 
through Frege and Russell, but in a direction indicated by both Purity 
of Heart and Pragmatism. Schopenhauer's gnosticism is related to the 
model of the essence of language as naming and representation, as well 
as to both Wittgenstein and James on metaphysics as a kind of magic.
The Tractatus in effect seeks to mediate between tough-minded pluralism 
and tender-minded monism by way of the practice of a method owing more 
to Frege's new logic than to James. Wittgenstein’s concern with the 
"Jewishness" of his style of thinking is related to his sense of 
responsibility in the face of an ultimate judgement, but also to his 
anxieties over being influenced and influencing, ie anxieties about his 
dependence and independence in the face of strong influences upon his 
thinking. His patient clarifications and redescriptions show a courage 
which Kierkegaard also recognises, in a voluntary acceptance of 
unavoidable suffering, in the tasks of better understanding and 
interpretation. These tasks may be undertaken in forgetfulness or in 
remembrance of the "golden rule" as a key to hermeneutics and to 
conversation, as well as to morality and "the Law and the prophets". 
Wittgenstein's last available written remark on meeting again at the 
last judgement is explored in the light of Kraus' linguistic 
eschatology. The remark of 1951 is a culminating expression of the form
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of life which Wittgenstein struggled to embody as a dweller within 
apparent "preliminaries".
4.2 ACKNOWLEDGED INFLUENCES IN 1931
Anyone making a list of those who have influenced his thinking is 
selective, unless his thinking is exceptionally impoverished or his list 
contains expressions so general as to be uninformative, expressions such 
as, "My contemporaries and their predecessors". Normally one selects 
influences which are believed to be important. However, one's 
understanding of such importance may be rightly modified by different 
occasions or contexts. Selection is subject not just to limitations of 
recall and working-memory but also to the needs and purposes of the 
selector in his setting-in-life. A writer listing influences may be 
constructing or confirming a particular picture or story of himself and 
his life.
The above considerations are deepened by recognition of the complexities 
of anxiety involved in mutualities of influence, i.e. in being 
influenced and in influencing, in ways for which we may or may not be 
responsible, or responsible to an uncertain extent. In such matters we 
are not transparent either to ourselves or to one another. Publicly and 
privately, our recognitions and evasions, acknowledgements and pretences 
may have roots in the relationships of our earliest years. If we recall 
such issues, even this briefly, we can better appreciate the depth of 
the courage which may be needed to clarify our dependence and 
independence in relation to influences on our thinking. How such 
matters may make a difference to interpretation of traditions of writing 
has been opened up by Harold Bloom in a series of works which includes 
The Anxiety of Influence.
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Wittgenstein’s 1931 list of influences is, "...Boltzmann, Hertz, 
Schopenhauer, Frege, Russell, Kraus, Loos, Weininger, Spengler, Sraffa 
..." (CV19). However this list is often cited or reproduced without 
reference either to its context in Wittgenstein’s notes or to its 
setting in his life.
The context in Wittgenstein's notes is given by his ruminations on the 
issue of the ways in which his distinctive style of thinking may be 
called Jewish, i.e. may be expressive of a Jewish style of thinking or 
a "judischen Geiste" (CV19. NB however that the passage begins on 
p.18). This theme appears in Wittgenstein's notebooks in 1929, at the 
time of his return to Cambridge, and is conspicuous in the years 
1929-31. However, even in 1949 Wittgenstein told Drury, "... my 
thoughts are one hundred per cent Hebraic" (RW p.161).
F. Kerr's suggestion that this remark "may in any case have been a joke" 
(Kerr 1986, p.35) seems to be grounded in little more than Kerr's 
difficulty in knowing how to interpret the remark. However, the 
context, in Drury's account, counts strongly against the "joke" 
interpretation, while giving a positive interpretation. For 
Wittgenstein had just said, in criticism of Drury and Origen of 
Alexandria, that Origen's eschatology was rightly rejected by the 
church, as it "would make nonsense of everything else. If what we do 
now is to make no difference in the end, then all the seriousness of 
life is done away with". Wittgenstein then said that Drury's religious 
ideas had always seemed to him (Wittgenstein) "more Greek than 
biblical". This scarcely sounds like the lead-up to a joke.
This conversation is especially significant for the way in which 
Wittgenstein links grammar ("It would make nonsense of everything else") 
with theology. Compare, "Grammar tells u§""what kind of object anything
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is. (Theology as grammar.)" (PI s.373) Compare also, from 1929-30, 
"... philosophy as custodian of grammar can in fact grasp the essence of 
the world, only not in the propositions of language, but in rules for 
this language which exclude nonsensical combinations of signs" (PR page 
85, s.V.54) . While we must not rest too much on a report of a
conversation, this conversation coheres with important themes in 
Wittgenstein’s written remarks. It is also striking that the grammar/ 
theology of the conversation is not concerned to distinguish, for the 
purposes of this conversation at least, between "Hebraic", "biblical" 
and "Christian".
On the basis of this conversation, near the end of his life, it seems 
reasonable to conjecture that Wittgenstein's enduring sense of his style 
of thinking as Jewish, whatever else it may involve, includes a sense of 
personal accountability as an interpreter of grammar. Moreover, while 
Wittgenstein was dismissive of the universality of final reconciliation 
in Origen's doctrine of apocatastasis, at least as he (Wittgenstein) 
received it from modern interpreters (including perhaps by implication, 
W, James in the final paragraph of Varieties), Wittgenstein also 
regarded "tragedy" as un-Jewish. Consequently a fuller condensation of 
Wittgenstein's Jewish style of thinking could be in terms of his hope of 
thinking with shared responsibility as a non-tragic interpreter of 
grammar. [Compare, "... Don't act a tragedy ..." (CV14) and "... I am 
judging you out of your own mouth ...". (CV87)].
It is one of the strange features of the history of research on 
Wittgenstein’s development that, either no one could persuade his friend 
Piero Sraffa to speak about his influential conversations with 
Wittgenstein, or no one appreciated the potential importance of this 
source before Sraffa's death. Our evidence is frustratingly brief. 
Sraffa gave up his first university career in Naples, when the fascist
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party gained power. He began his second career, which would lead to 
distinction as an economist, wit and man of practical good-sense, at 
Trinity in 1927, supported by Maynard Keynes, two years before 
Wittgenstein returned.
Wittgenstein, in the Preface to the Investigations, makes it clear that 
Sraffa’s influence on his development was greater than that of Frank 
Ramsey (who died on 19.1.1930). Wittgenstein is indebted to Sraffa for 
the criticism which he "for many years unceasingly practised on my 
thoughts. I am indebted to this stimulus for the most consequential 
ideas of this book". (Von Wright, in his Biographical Sketch (1984, 
p.14) appears to misinterpret this passage of the Preface where it is - 
perhaps surprisingly - Ramsey, not Sraffa, who is described as "always 
certain and forcible").
Von Wright has reported how Wittgenstein, after discussions with Sraffa, 
felt like a tree from which all its branches had been cut (op. cit. 15). 
Both von Wright and Malcolm have reported, in slightly different terms, 
Sraffa’s use of a Neapolitan gesture, expressive of disgust or contempt, 
to criticise Wittgenstein’s current explanation of propositions! 
meaning, whether this was in terms of "logical form" (Malcolm) or of 
"grammar" (von Wright: op. cit. 57-58). Malcolm concludes that this 
incident "... broke the hold on him (Wittgenstein) of the conception 
that a proposition must literally be a ’picture’ of the reality it 
describes" (Loc. cit.).
A first draft by Wittgenstein of material underlying Investigations 
s. 102 includes a reference to Sraffa which connects with von Wright's 
and Malcolm’s recollections: "... I had to recognize this and that as 
signs (Sraffa) and yet couldn’t provide a grammar for them ..." (Hilmy 
1987, p.64, quoting MS 157b pp.10-12). The rest of this passage points
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to a transition from an earlier notion of grammar, as literal rules 
hidden in the understanding, to a later notion of grammar as the 
description of usage. However this description is not an aimless 
meandering. It selects examples from the forms of presentation in the 
family of language, in order to illuminate important misunderstandings 
and so liberate us from grammatical illusions or from logical trickery. 
The notion of language as a family of activities, forms of life or 
games, appears to have become important for Wittgenstein while reading 
Oswald Spengler's comparisons between cultures (CV14, in 1931) though 
the notion is hinted at by Otto Weininger and by William James.
Wittgenstein’s reported comment that Sraffa’s criticism left him like a 
tree without branches may connect with Wittgenstein’s notes in 
paragraphs immediately following the list of influences. For here 
Wittgenstein notes that for a Jewish style of thinking one has "to 
accept poverty willingly", i.e. to accept that one "does not have the 
power to produce even the tiniest flower or blade of grass" (CV19). In 
view of Sraffa’s contributions to Wittgenstein’s self-clarification, it 
could be said of Sraffa, too, that, "It is typical of Jewish Geiste to 
understand someone else’s work better than he understands it himself", 
(Loc. cit.)
It is generally agreed, following von Wright, that the 1951 list of 
influences noted by Wittgenstein is in chronological order of influence 
on him. There is much to be said for this, provided one also recognises 
overlapping periods of influence. For example, Karl Kraus or Otto 
Weininger may well have influenced Wittgenstein during the period he was 
Russell's student and partner, even though Wittgenstein only became 
clearer about how to interpret them at a later stage. Certainly 
Spengler and Sraffa are the latest influences. However neither Sraffa
nor Spengler can be counted as obvious influences on Wittgenstein’s 
religious thinking in the sense that the following were; William James, 
Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard, Augustine and Biblical sources. This 
is not to say that Spengler and Sraffa do not contribute to the 
religious character of Wittgenstein's thinking. Wittgenstein’s concern 
with his Jewish style of thinking, evident from 1929 onwards, may have 
been evoked by many factors, including especially interaction between 
recurrent anti-semitism, and discovery of his Jewish ancestors 
(McGuinness 1988). Also significant is his critical reading in 1930 of 
Ernest Renan’s History of the people of Israel. Within this context 
Wittgenstein may well have discussed with Sraffa how, even in relation 
to the more obviously philosophical, or less obviously religious 
influences on him, he nevertheless thinks in a Jewish way.
Wittgenstein's passage (CV 18-19) also echoes (unwittingly) the 
Varieties model of religion in the following paragraph. "The Jew must 
see to it that, in a literal sense, 'all things are as nothing to him'. 
But this is particularly hard for him, since in a sense he has nothing 
that is peculiarly his. It is much harder to accept poverty willingly 
when you have to be poor than when you might also be rich." The pairing 
of poverty with willing acceptance in this metaphorical paragraph 
parallels the pairing of "clarification with COURAGE" in the previous 
paragraph. James, unnamed, for whom courage is a cardinal virtue, is 
at work in the fermentation of 1931. (Also from 1931, compare "... 
there is no tragedy ... This dissolution eliminates all tensions"). 
(CV9).
4.3 SCHOPENHAUER
As the first two influences named in Wittgenstein's list have already 
been discussed, it is now appropriate to turn to the third. According 
to Anscombe, Wittgenstein as a boy of sixteen had read Schopenhauer's 
Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (Anscombe 1959, p. 11. See also
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von Wright [1984, p.6]). He had been impressed by "the world as 
idea/representation (Vorstellung), but less by "the world as will". 
However, Anscombe recalls, he thought then that, given a few adjustments 
and clarifications, Schopenhauer was basically correct (Loc.cit.). 
Anscombe indicates that in her view Wittgenstein’s "solipsism", his 
notion of "the limit" and his ethical thinking will be better understood 
in the light of Schopenhauer than of any other philosopher. (Op. cit. 
p. 12)
Other resemblances which have been taken up include Wittgenstein's 
apparent "pessimism", his youthful "hostility to Christianity” (before 
1914), his pejorative use of "metaphysics" and his opposition to 
features of philosophy. However, analogous tendencies are evident in 
Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and Tolstoy, though their grounds, where given 
or reconstructable, are various. Moreover, such tendencies were 
sufficiently widespread in the period 1850-1914 to remove any necessity 
to attribute them to the influence of such singular critics.
Von Wright, in his Biographical Sketch, believes he can recall having 
been told by Wittgenstein that his earlier Schopenhauerian 
epistemological idealism had been surrendered under the influence of 
Frege's conceptual realism (Von Wright 1984, p.6). To avoid 
misunderstanding of von Wright's reference to "conceptual realism" (ie. 
conceptual platonism), it is also important to add the following. For 
Frege, true propositions of logic describe eternal (or timeless) 
relations between abstract entities, concepts and relations. However, 
according to Wittgenstein, all propositions of logic are tautologies 
expressive of logical operations. For his fundamental thought in the 
Tractatus is, he claims, that the logical constants of the new, Fregean 
logic are not representational (TLP 4.0312). In this respect 
Wittgenstein is already anti-platonic in one specific sense, i.e. the 
platonic essentialism, which sees the essence of all language and
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thought in representation, has already begun to retreat in his 
philosophy of logic.
4.4 RATIONALITY AS PROPOSITIONAL REPRESENTATION?
For this reason J. C. Edwards in his book on Wittgenstein and the moral 
life, tendentiously entitled Ethics Without Philosophy (EWP 1982), is 
open to misunderstanding in presenting the Tractatus as the epitome of 
the tradition which he calls "rationality-as-representation". However, 
Edwards may be excused in that Wittgenstein’s early approach to 
tautologies, and their role and status in the Tractatus, appears, 
initially at least, ambiguous. He paradoxically both asserts and denies 
the existence of tautological propositions. This paradox marks 
Wittgenstein’s own transition from a Fregean platonic view of the matter 
to his own distinctive approach. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein invites 
the reader to travel with him the way of discovery through which logic 
made its exodus from "the world as representation" and moved nearer to 
"the world as will".
The problems are illustrated by the opening sentences of an important 
section of the Tractatus, where the two best-known translations are at 
odds. C. K. Ogden’s version (TLP 1955/1922) of 6.124 begins, "The 
logical propositions describe the scaffolding of the world, or rather 
they present it". ("... sie stellen es dar.") However, the 
Pears-McGuinness version (TLP(PM)) reads, "The propositions of logic 
describe the scaffolding of the world, or rather they represent it". 
Here "represent" looks like a synonym for "describe" rather than a 
radical alternative.
A later sentence in 6.124 seems to support the Ogden translation; "It is 
clear that something about the world must be indicated by the fact that
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certain combinations of symbols - whose essence involves the possession 
of a determinate character - are tautologies. This contains the 
decisive point." (TLP(PM)) Tautologies are clearly not propositions
standardly about the Tractatus world and, in this sense, are not genuine 
Tractatus propositions. However, they are called "propositions of
logic". They indicate or show what they cannot say as standard
Tractatus propositions.
4.5 THE DISPENSABLE LADDER
In defence of the PM translation it can be argued that if tautologies 
are seen as propositions of logic, then they must be seen as
representing something, according to the Tractatus. An alternative or 
complementary point can be made if the "ladder" of TLP 6.54, which must 
be thrown away after being climbed, consists of "logical propositions" 
or, more specifically, of tautological "propositions". If the decisive 
acknowledgement that this ladder must be thro^m away is deliberately 
placed as late as 6.54, then there is a structural or dramatic argument 
for not stressing this earlier.
There is no reason why this logical interpretation of the ladder should 
exclude a religious interpretation; provided that the latter does not 
conflict with the former. If the logical interpretation fits well into 
the context, then the ladder use of "logical propositions" no more 
belongs to Wittgenstein’s developed understanding than the arguments of 
the pseudonymous author John the Ladder-Climber (Johannes Climacus) 
belong to the developed understanding of Kierkegaard. (For a ladder as 
an image of a rejected way of thinking, see CV7, written in 1930).
The considered case of the Tractatus against meaningful logical 
propositions depends on the contradiction between the contingency
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claimed as essential to genuine propositions and the necessity claimed 
as essential to logical analysis. Tautologies or contradictions cannot 
sensibly be negated or asserted, or called false or true, so as to 
picture some contingent state of affairs. Consequently, references to 
logical propositions have to be reinterpreted as an indirect way of 
referring to logical characteristics of genuine propositions. Thus 
logic leads the way in showing what the earlier Wittgenstein believed to 
be the right method also in aesthetics, ethics and religion: the
conceptual scaffolding should be shown and seen at work in the world of 
contingencies; or rather, to use his preferred metaphor, the world of 
contingencies should be seen and shown within logical space. This 
spatial metaphor may then be elaborated in terms of aesthetic, ethical 
and religious realms of logical space. In Wittgenstein’s later work, 
logical space becomes the grammar of a form or forms of life.
4.6 CRITICISING SCHOPENHAUER
Consideration of two questions about Schopenhauer's central vision may 
cast some light, not just on its more problematic aspects, but also on 
how Wittgenstein's explicit criticisms of Schopenhauer can be 
interpreted. The two questions are:
(1) Why does Schopenhauer identify the will with the thing-in- 
itself?
(2) Why does Schopenhauer assume that whatever is not thing-in-itself 
is representation?
Wittgenstein in 1948 is reported as finding Schopenhauer shallow by 
contrast with Kant and Berkeley. (Rhees (1984) RW 158) On its own this 
remark might be taken to mean that Schopenhauer as a simplifier of Kant 
is in danger of complacency or of suffering a loss of philosophical 
problems similar to that which Wittgenstein detected in Russell and
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Wells (Z s 456). It is indeed possible to detect in Schopenhauer tones 
of Voltaire, for whom the philosopher’s father, H. S. Schopenhauer, had 
a lasting enthusiasm. In his son, however, this current of influence is 
not just filtered through Kant but flows together with currents more 
akin to varieties of gnosticism flourishing between Paul and Augustine. 
Schopenhauer himself takes some pleasure in drawing attention to this. 
(WWI 3 pp.441-444).
However, Wittgenstein’s 1948 remark on Schopenhauer is complemented by 
comments from 1939-40; "Schopenhauer is quite a crude (roher) mind, one 
might say. I.e. though he has refinement (Verfeinerung), this suddenly 
becomes exhausted at a certain level and then he is as crude as the 
crudest. Where real depth starts, his comes to an end. One could say 
of Schopenhauer: he never searches his conscience." (:er geht nie in 
sich - literally, never goes into himself) (CV36).
4.7 KIERKEGAARD AGAINST SCHOPENHAUER
The obvious figure for comparison here is not Nietzsche but that other 
singular critic of Hegelianism whom Wittgenstein called the greatest 
philosopher of the nineteenth century and a saint. One non-pseudonymous 
work by Kierkegaard which shows "real depth", with minimal display of 
playful or ironic complications, is Purity of Heart is to Will One 
Thing. This is not the place to attempt a paraphrase of the arguments 
of that work. It must suffice here to make two points. Firstly, there 
is the depth of the work's investigation of various forms of divided 
conscience or double-mindedness, an investigation which belongs to the 
grammar of Christian confession and repentance; but which also alludes 
to Kant’s problematic relating of phenomenal necessity and noumenal
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freedom. (Cp CV 45-46, on opening the heart in confession, with Purity 
of Heart pp.173-175 and 201-204, for example). Secondly, there is in 
this work a settling of accounts with the grammar of gnosticism, 
characterised as "double-mindedness" in its many forms. This settling 
of accounts, which is as relevant to Schopenhauer as to Hegelianism, is 
epitomised by a prayer with which Kierkegaard, in an authentically 
Augustinian way, opens and closes his book or address.
Kierkegaard's prayer, in keeping with his address, is anti-gnostic in at 
least the following respects. The human predicament is marked by sin 
rather than by any superficial ignorance. Saving knowledge of God 
involves neither speculation nor just specialised "wisdom" but single- 
mindedness, patience and courage in repentance. Repentance is 
interruption which reverses the interruption by sin, both interruptions 
including the whole life of a whole person. The unity of the Good is 
interpreted in relation to the unity in God of beginning and end, 
creation and salvation, as symbolised by the unity of the book's 
beginning and ending. If Kierkegaard’s polemic against the crowd and on 
behalf of the one authentic individual, with his individualised 
consciousness and conscience, sounds at times like a late Cartesian form 
of gnostic elitism, this impression is mitigated, for example, by his 
explanations of how he is attacking false forms of socialisation, e.g. 
exclusive clannishness, in the interests of a genuinely inclusive, open 
or universal humanity.
4.8 SCHOPENHAUER'S COHERENCE IN QUESTION
If Schopenhauer’s shallowness, in Wittgenstein’s later view, is 
symptomatic of double-mindedness such as Kierkegaard investigates in 
Purity of Heart is to Will One Thing, it is possible to give an account 
of Schopenhauer’s problems and of their repercussions for the younger 
Wittgenstein at the time of the earliest Notebooks and of the Tractatus.
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It is basic to Schopenhauer that the will is identical with Kant’s 
thing-in-itself or noumenal reality. However, Schopenhauer also intends 
to share with Kant the doctrine that the thing-in-itself is beyond space 
and time. Now, the meaning of the language of "willing" and "wills" 
appears inseparable from the language of personal activity, and this in 
turn inseparable from bodies and from temporal and spatial features of 
language. Consequently, to try to think away all temporal and spatial 
features amounts to trying to think away the notion of willing, so that 
attempting to think of the will as the thing-in-itself seems to be 
equivalent to attempting to make sense of a "square circle". A theory 
of the meaning of words which already requires one to think away many of 
the temporal and spatial occasions of their use by corporeal and 
socially corporate agents, for the sake of timeless essences which 
language must mirror, plays an important part in hiding the strangeness 
of Schopenhauer's project.
Schopenhauer’s position seems stranger still, for two reasons. Firstly, 
he does elsewhere take the position that what applies in the realm of 
phenomena cannot apply in the noumenal realm. Unlike Kant, Schopenhauer 
refuses to speak of things-in-themselves, in the plural. For 
Schopenhauer, the will as thing-in-itself is not contingently but 
necessarily free from all multiplicity, i.e. it "lies outside time and 
space, the principium individuationis, i.e. the possibility of 
multiplicity" (WWI, 1 p.146). Secondly Schopenhauer comes close to Ryle 
and the later Wittgenstein in making an anti-Cartesian point, that acts 
of will and bodily actions are not related as phenomenal cause and 
effect, but are one reality perceived in two ways. "We certainly do not 
recognise the really immediate act of will as something different from 
the action of the body, and the two as connected by the bond of 
causality; but both are one and indivisible. Between them there is no 
succession; they are simultaneous. They are one and the same thing.
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apprehended in a double manner," (WWI, II, p.206) If Schopenhauer had 
taken neither this position, nor the position that the will is a natural 
cause, but something mysteriously other, then his doctrine of the will 
as thing-in-itself would be less surprising, being even less closely 
associated with bodily actions of people in space and time. And yet, in 
spite of all such doubts about coherence, Schopenhauer's vision could 
still speak with power to people as acute as Tolstoy, Thomas Hardy and 
Thomas Mann.
If the above criticism of Schopenhauer, in terms of the incompatibility 
of the key notions of will and thing-in-itself, can stand, i.e. if we 
ignore the relevant complexities of thinking in Kant and his 
predecessors, Schopenhauer is in this respect not obviously in a worse 
position than theologians facing questions about the coherence of a 
negative, neoplatonic theology with an affirmative anthropomorphic or 
pantheistic theology. Indeed, their position and Schopenhauer's are 
family variants to this extent. The main difference, at least in the 
case of Christian theologians, is that their doctrines of divine 
transcendence and immanence, and doctrines of analogy, tend to be 
modified, and self-confessedly should be modified, by doctrines of 
divine incarnation and reconciliation in Christ, within the context of a 
doctrine of creation as neither divine nor demonic but related in some 
other way, more or less Jewish and Christian, to the paradigmatic case 
of divine activity and revelation.
However it was not just such background influence which perhaps 
distracted Schopenhauer from seeing the strangeness of his position in 
attempting to identify the will and the thing-in-itself. The complexity 
or confusion of Kant's presentations of related matters probably added
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to Schopenhauer’s difficulties in getting clear about the implications 
of his position. For example, in Kant's first Critique, chapter three 
of the Analytic of Principles, "On the Ground of the Distinction of all 
Objects in general into Phenomena and Noumena", appears even to 
sympathetic interpreters as a "highly vacillating piece of writing" 
(Findlay 1981, pp.185-190). The point of that chapter can perhaps be 
best understood as making explicit the limited scope and importance of 
experience or empirical knowledge, or rather of certain historically 
conditioned ways of using this language, in the light of its being 
pervaded by and dependent on theoretical and normative considerations, 
through which our intellectual practices may be reconnected with our 
moral and religious practices. In this connection it is important for 
understanding the earlier Wittgenstein’s struggles with the notion of 
will that Kant himself seems to vacillate between teaching that the 
trancendental self is a noumenal reality, in a sense defined by its 
transcendence of the phenomenal self, and that it is a noumenal reality 
in the sense that it is a kind of perspective, a devolved god's-eye- 
view, a view from nowhere in particular,
4.9 THE WORLD SHORT-CIRCUITED
The conceptual difficulty or impossibility of making sense of 
Schopenhauer’s position on the will as the thing-in-itself has an 
interesting consequence. As Schopenhauer presents his whole gnostic 
melodrama of the will, it is only at the apocalyptic end that we learn 
from him how we may "freely acknowledge that what remains after the 
entire abolition of the will is for all those who are still full of will 
certainly nothing; but conversely, to those in whom the will has turned 
and denied itself, this our world, which is so real, with all its suns 
and milky-ways - is nothing". (\#I, 1 p.532) However, what
Schopenhauer presents by this stage as a moral, psychological and 
epistemological dilemma was arguably from the start a conceptual
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dilemma. For to attempt to reconcile his notion of the thing-in-itself 
with his notion of the will seems either to nullify the notion of the 
thing-in-itself (cp. Schopenhauer’s vision of the world as cosmic fall 
or self-alienation of the numinous noumenon) or to nullify the notion of 
the will. (Cp. his vision of salvation as the quieting of the will, 
through which the worldly self-alienation of the noumenon is in effect 
reversed).
D. W. Hamlyn (1980, ch. 5, pp.80-102) makes much of the absence from 
Schopenhauer's argument, as he aims to reconstruct it, of a required 
premise that ’’anything that is not a representation is a thing-in- 
itself". However, given that thing-in-itself, noumenal will and 
transcendental subject are intended to be largely overlapping terms, it 
can easily be seen that the so-called missing premise is identical with 
an axiom or rule which Schopenhauer does express and discussion as basic 
or central to his transcendental idealist vision. In The World as Will 
and Idea Schopenhauer gives this in the compressed formula, "No object 
without a subject". This formula is a condensation of his earlier 
extended discussion of the root of the matter in The Fourfold Root of 
the Principle of Sufficient Reason. This discussion is crystallised in 
the statement of the earlier work that, "Our knowing consciousness, 
manifesting itself as outer and inner sensibility (receptivity), 
understanding and reason, divides into subject and object, and contains 
nothing else. To be object for the subject, and to be our 
representation, are the same thing. All our representations are objects 
of the subject, and all objects of the subject are our representations". 
Schopenhauer's vision or programme is precisely to see the consciousness 
which is conscious of nothing but itself as the child fathered by the 
will which wills nothing but itself, whether in ignorant self-denial as
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scattered in space and time, or as awoken in denial of its self-denial, 
this higher-order self-denial being rehearsed in the arts and religions, 
and consummated in ethics and genuine philosophy.
Now, given that for Schopenhauer, as for Kant, there is an intimate 
relationship between ethics and metaphysics, it is possible to recognise 
an attraction for Schopenhauer, beyond that of relevance to the
intellectual fashions of his day, in the rule of "No object without a 
subject" or "anything that is not a representation is a
thing-in-itself". For this rule, axiom or premise and the related 
metaphysical programme are well matched to a picture of love as either a 
self-seeking which masters and uses, or a self-denial which lets itself : 
be mastered and used. Schopenhauer himself comes close to claiming, at 
the end of his work, that the contrast, "Eros is selfishness, agape is 
sympathy", is necessary to the completeness of his thinking. (WWI Vol.l, 
bk.iv, 8.66-67, pp.484-485). However, he does not make explicit how his 
gnostic metaphysics ties in with his manichaean ethics of love. 
Selfishness, he would say, creates the world of rival individualities 
and scattered representations; but unselfishness saves this world by 
decreating it. For plurality is experienced as a state of fallenness,
from which the many must return into an undivided unity. (Compare 
Wittgenstein's fondness for Schopenhauer’s parable of the porcupines 
(McGuinness , 46-47, etc) and how McGuinness relates this to
Wittgenstein’s character. Compare also Hegel and post-Freudians on the 
pathologies of relationships of dominance and submission; also Barth's 4 
critique of Nygren's dualism of agape and eros: Church Dogmatics 4.2).
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4,10 A GNOSTIC MODEL OF THE ESSENCE OF LANGUAGE
Such is an important dimension of the background to Wittgenstein's 
thinking in the early Notebooks and Tractatus, and even as late as 
1929-30. During this period a major philosophical aim is to use Frege's 
work to clarify, interpret or demythologise Schopenhauer, much as 
Schopenhauer had used a version of Kantian transcendental idealism to 
interpret religions and rival philosophies. However Frege and 
Schopenhauer, for all their differences, both accept or tolerate what 
Wittgenstein came to reject as a misleading "Bild", picture or model, of 
the essence of human language. In the words of the first section of the 
Investigations it is the Bild for which "the individual words in 
language name objects - sentences are combinations of such names. - In 
this Bild of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every 
word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is 
the object for which the word stands." Both Schopenhauer's metaphysics 
and Wittgenstein's Tractatus are in varying degrees expressions of this 
model of language which show its temptations and its dangers. 
Wittgenstein's work from about 1930 explores these temptations and 
dangers (not in the hope of finding or constructing a new model of 
language or theory of meaning, but so as to exemplify a way or family of 
ways in which argument and spirituality, understanding and faith, wisdom 
and practice could be set free from the domination of a model which 
appears to be an important source of gnostic tendencies. (This is not 
to deny that there are other important sources).
The significance of the naming of names, in gnostic space-odysseys of 
saving knowledge, lost and regained, is such a commonplace as to be in 
danger of uncomprehending neglect. Admittedly, the powers and dangers 
of names used and abused, in magic, public relations, libels and
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blasphemies, are no monopoly of gnosticism. However, in gnosticism we 
see relatively late, literary, intellectualised versions of 
preoccupation with the numinosity of naming.
It was probably in 1931 that Wittgenstein wrote, as a preliminary to his 
first set of remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough (RFGB),
"I think now that the right thing would be to begin my book with remarks
about metaphysics as a kind of magic. But in doing this I must neither
speak in..,defence of magic nor ridicule it. What it is that is deep
about magic would be kept. - In this context, in fact, keeping magic
out has itself the character of magic. For when I began in my earlier 
book to talk about the 'world' (and not about this tree or table), was I 
trying to do anything except conjure up something of a higher order by 
my words?" (RFGB v-vi. It is worth noting that the last two sentences 
are omitted by Baker and Hacker. See WMU 1983, p.273-274, where their 
discussion on p.274 of how metaphysical thinking differs from myths and 
rituals is undermined by the contrary direction of the sentences they 
have omitted or not recalled). In a related context, Wittgenstein 
comments that Frazer, disdainful towards "primitive" peoples, overlooks 
that we too have Plato and Schopenhauer.
4.11 JAMES AGAINST GNOSTICISM
Wittgenstein's remarks on magic in the immediately preceding paragraph, 
and his other similar remarks, are close relatives of an equally central 
current of thought in William James. One of James' most powerful 
passages repays being recalled in some detail at this point. 
"Metaphysics has usually followed a very primitive kind of quest. You 
know how men have always hankered after unlawful magic, and you know 
what a great part in magic words have always played. If you have his
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name, or the formula of incantation that binds him, you can control the 
spirit, genie, afrite, or whatever the power may be. Solomon knew the 
names of all the spirits, and having their names, he held them subject 
to his will. So the universe has always appeared to the natural mind as 
a kind of enigma, of which the key must be sought in the shape of some 
illuminating or power-bringing word or name. That word names the 
universe’s principle, and to possess it is after a fashion to possess 
the universe itself, "God", "Matter", "Reason", "the Absolute", 
"Energy" are so many solving names. You can rest when you have them. 
You are at the end of your metaphysical quest.
But if you follow the pragmatic method, you cannot look on any such word 
as closing your quest. You must bring out of each word its practical 
cash value, set it at work within the stream of your experience. It 
appears less as a solution, then, than as a program for more work, and 
more particularly as an indication of the ways in which existing 
realities may be changed.
Theories thus become instruments, not answers to enigmas, in which we 
can rest. We don't lie back upon them, we move forward, and, on 
occasion, make nature over again by their aid. Pragmatism unstiffens 
all our theories, limbers them up and sets each one at work. Being 
nothing essentially new, it harmonizes with many ancient philosophic 
tendencies. It agrees with nominalism, for instance, in always 
appealing to particulars; with utilitarianism in emphasizing practical 
aspects; with positivism in its distain for verbal solutions, useless 
questions and metaphysical abstractions.
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All these, you see, are anti-intellectual tendencies. Against 
rationalism as a pretension and a method pragmatism is fully armed and 
militant. But, at the outset, at least, it stands for no particular 
results. It has no dogmas, and no doctrines save its method." 
(Pragmatism pp.52-54).
4.12 METHOD IN PLACE OF MAGIC
Here Schopenhauer’s world as will and idea is transformed into James' 
universe as will and words. However this will is the old and yet new 
will to mediate between tough-minded pluraliste and tender-minded 
monists. Their perceived enigma of the meaning of things, or riddle of 
the meaning of the universe, is dissolved into James' magical 
counter-magic of making the passage between their separated rooms, by 
way of a wisdom which is practical, human, open and dynamic. This 
wisdom is like a physiotherapist on her rounds between different wards 
and floors of a hospital caring for stiffened, frustrated, listless 
children, who have to be encouraged to join in her games. (Compare (1) 
William James’ continuation of the quotation given above as he uses 
enthusiastically "the young Italian pragmatist" Papini’s simile of a 
passage in a hotel; (2) the Fourth Gospel’s image of the Father's house 
embracing many resting-places (John 14:2); (3) Wittgenstein’s allegory
of the nurse on her rounds; (4) Matthew 11:16-19 on the games of the 
children of wisdom, and (5) Matthew 13:51-52 on the new and old treasure 
of the well-trained scribe).
The younger Wittgenstein also declares (in apparent self-refutation) 
that the riddle does not exist. But for him the magic against magic is 
primarily the practice of the method of Frege’s new logic, together with 
its apparent philosophical implications. However TLP 3326, 3328 and
especially 6211 already show the powerful attractiveness of elements of 
pragmatism. Yet, it was Frege’s practice at its best that was to
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provide Wittgenstein’s mediating passage between the tough-minded 
logical atomism of Russell’s tribe and the tender-minded transcendental 
idealism of the tribe for whom Schopenhauer became a totemic animal. 
Frege, with Russell and Moore, helped Wittgenstein to prepare for the 
longer-term task of clarifying James. This included attention to the 
reverberations of Emerson in James, as can be heard in the above 
passages.
To those who are institutionalised or imprisoned within sects of 
rationalism, the later Wittgenstein appears as a new type of fideist, 
dressed in the clothes of a socio-linguistic version of transcendental 
idealism, and surrendering all too often to a willful or whimsical 
predilection for gnomic or hermetic utterances. However to those who 
have learnt with Wittgenstein, Emerson and James to play the games of 
their magical counter-magic, the "program for more work" and directions 
for change may well appear as a matter of provisionally sorting the 
chaff and the wheat in the varieties of gnosticism with which Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam have had long and ambivalent relationships.
With reference to Islam, it is worth recalling Schopenhauer’s affinity 
for Sufi mysticism (\WI, Vol III 423 and 432) and the enigmatic presence 
of a prayer-mat in both of the key dreams attributed to Wittgenstein in 
W. W. Bartley's speculative and controversial psycho-biography (1986, 
pp.25 and 29). Both dreams are in the style of a Jungian gnosticism, 
which Wittgenstein found prefigured in Otto Weininger’s bestseller. Sex 
and Character. For Sufism, genuinely Islamic Islam involves 
transcendence which mediates between Judaism and Christianity. For 
family as well as cultural reasons, Wittgenstein inherited a particular 
ambivalence towards Judaism and Christianity.
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4.13 SENSES OF "JEWISHNESS" AGAIN
The passage from William James provides a further point of entry into 
Wittgenstein's preoccupation, from at least as early as 1929, with the 
characterisation of his style of thinking in terms of Jewishness. Part 
of the context which renders this intelligible is his family history and 
part is the wider history of ambivalence between Christians and Jews, 
especially as this came to crisis points in the 1930s and 40s. But much 
more is needed in order to appreciate why he found it appropriate to 
describe his style of thinking as Jewish, and to continue thinking of it 
in this way.
It may be helpful at this point to recall how in 1949 Wittgenstein said 
to Drury words to the effect that, "... If what we do now is to make no 
difference in the end, then all the seriousness of life is done away 
with. Your ideas (Eg. Drury's sympathy for Origan's eschatology) have 
always seemed to me more Greek than biblical. Whereas my thoughts are 
one hundred per cent Hebraic," (RW 161),
Now, the drawing of such a contrast could be mistaken, or confused, or 
superficial or perhaps sometimes even right to the point of profoundity. 
It depends on the grounds that can be given or the situation in which 
the move is made. Wittgenstein may have had a variety of reasons for 
resorting to this contrast, reasons which may have changed over the 
years, or become more or less important to him. One closely related 
theme, which continued throughout his life, has just been touched on: 
"If what we do now is to make no difference in the end, then all the 
seriousness of life is done away with". This theme will be taken up 
again more directly at the end of this chapter. However, anxiety over 
whether "what we do now" makes "no difference"; or over how it can or
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may make a difference, is acknowledged both in James’ passage on magical 
names or words in metaphysics ("... Pragmatism ... Being nothing 
essentially new ...") and in Wittgenstein’s 1931 passage which names 
influences and wrestles with his Jewish style of thinking. 
Responsibility to, and for, one's sources is best understood as a shared 
responsibility, which includes one's sources.
4.14 AS HAVING NOTHING YET POSSESSING EVERYTHING
In CV 18-19 Wittgenstein links his Jewish style of thinking with his 
idea that he really only thinks reproductively (CV18), taking over lines 
of thinking from others and inventing (only) "new similes 
(Gleichnisse)". He sees his work or task as enthusiastic or courageous 
clarification of others’ work. Without "COURAGE", his work would become 
just a clever game. The Jewish thinker has to accept this poverty 
willingly, which is harder to do because he has no choice about being 
poor in this way, but only about his attitude towards such a life-world. 
(At the back of Wittgenstein’s reflection there is a vicious stereotype 
according to which, "Jews are said not to have any sense of property" 
(CV21), this being traceable, with due caution and horror, as far back 
as the original struggle for Canaan).
The paragraph paraphrased in the last sentence but one (CV, p.19, third 
paragraph) includes a difficult quotation. Wittgenstein writes, "The 
Jew must see to it that, in a literal sense, ’all things are as nothing 
to him’". Winch notes that this could be intended as a free echo of the 
first line of Goethe’s poem, "Vanitas! Vanitatum vanitas", but he thinks 
Wittgenstein is probably attending to Max Stirner who uses Goethe for 
Chapter one of his Per Einzige und sein Eigentum. Without excluding
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such echoes, one wonders whether other obvious echoes should not be
acknowledged, i.e. (1) the end of Vol, I of the World as Will and Idea,
(2) the pervasive sense of belatedness which afflicts the "Preacher" of 
Ecclesiastes, and (3) Paul’s dialectics concerning "the weapons of 
righteousness for the right hand and for the left" in 2 Corinthians 
6:7-10, where Paul ends with "(We are) as poor, yet making many rich; as 
having nothing, and yet possessing everything". The echoes of the two 
Jewish sources seem particularly apt in view of the passage’s concern 
with the character of Jewish work and thinking.
The last sentence of Wittgenstein's paragraph reads, "It is much harder 
to accept poverty willingly when you have to be poor than when you might 
also be rich." Here Wittgenstein's life, i.e. his (attempted) rejection 
of his inheritance from his father's fortune (without rejecting his 
family, also) is made into a simile. The same line of thought, or a 
similar one, may be read in Kierkegaard: "ETien a person of means
voluntarily chooses the hard way, then he is called strange .... And 
when the victim of unavoidable suffering bears it patiently, one says of 
him, "to his shame, he is coerced, and he is making a virtue out of a
necessity ... that is just his secret ....  He makes a virtue out of
necessity. He brings a determination of freedom out of that which is 
determined as necessity". (Purity of Heart p.174. Compare the children 
who refuse to play either at the game of "Weddings" ojc of "Funerals", 
and the different "children" or "deeds" by whom/which Wisdom is 
justified, in Mathhew 11:16-19). "Is patience not precisely that 
courage which voluntarily accepts unavoidable suffering?" (Op. cit. 173; 
"Patience": Danish "Taalmod"; "courage": Danish "Mod"). Here, once
again, Kant's sublime struggle, to match freedom and action in the 
noumenal world with necessity and causality in the phenomenal world, 
makes itself felt.
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4.15 UNDERSTANDING OTHERS BETTER THAN THEY UNDERSTAND THEMSELVES 
Wittgenstein's 1931 passage comes to one ending with, "It is typical for 
a Jewish mind to understand someone else's work better than he 
understands it himself". The one example, other than himself, which he 
makes explicit in this passage (CV19) and later (CV36, 1939-40) is
Freud's relationship with Breuer. He might also have mentioned the 
controversy about Freud's relationship with Otto Weininger, as well as 
those arch-interpreters' relationships with Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and 
Hartmann, let alone with all Freud's other clients. Paul, too, in 
building up to the words quoted above from 2 Corinthians 6:10, includes 
among the many shared afflictions and labours, "honour and dishonour", 
"ill repute and good repute", and being "treated as imposters, and yet 
true". Paul and Freud, for all that stands between them, both show 
typically Jewish anxiety and courage in the face of staggering 
hermeneutic tasks. For these tasks involve living with outer and inner 
voices insistent on their being poor and having nothing, yet making many 
rich and possessing everything.
It is in the nature of the struggle for understanding, with its 
suggestions of more or less loving war of all against all, that each 
will often hope to understand others' work better than they understand 
it themselves. That in itself cannot plausibly be presented as an 
exclusively Jewish trait. However the extent of the history of Jewish 
literature combined with the importance in Judaism of remembering and 
reminding, and the consequent importance of relating this living past so 
as to make coherent sense together with present existence and future 
prospects, all conspire to place a higher premium on interpretation. In 
virtue of this higher premium, a Jewish thinker may understand himself
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and his tradition as representative of all other traditions and 
communities, given this archetypal and costly vocation to interpret 
better. This is a vocation or election by grace to inclusive 
representation and inclusive interpretation.
Complicating factors, in European history of the eighteenth, nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, include effects of Jewish emancipation, for 
some, in the wake of seventeenth century England and the Enlightenment; 
also continuing pressures towards assimilation and legitimation, as well 
as continuing anti-semitism. It was not only Paul (as Luke depicts him 
in Acts 17:22 ff) who was moved, on behalf of Jews as well as Christians 
under the pressures of Hellénisation and counter-Hellenisation, to 
proclaim to the Athenians, "... What therefore you worship as unknown, 
this I proclaim to you".
A possible further complication is humour. It would be typical of a 
certain tradition of Jewish humour, to which Wittgenstein seems to 
relate through the satire of Nestroy and Kraus (different in some 
respect from Lewis Carrol and Lawrence Sterne who evoked a delight in 
Wittgenstein for once more characteristic of a certain type of Oxbridge 
don) to read the following as a Jewish joke, in the tradition of the 
Abraham who haggled with fraught irony before "the Judge of all the 
earth", on behalf of the city ripe for destruction (Genesis 18:22-23). 
"It is so typical of a Jewish mind to understand someone else's work 
better than he understands it himself" (CV19). In spite of the way this 
remark, read as irony, fits the triple Biblical irony of Abraham 
pleading before the strange Judge (Abraham acts as if he understands God 
better than God. God acts as if he understands this better than 
Abraham. The editor(s) of the tradition(s) act(s) as if he/they also 
understand better), it might be objected that this interpretation does 
not fit the Wittgenstein who, with his scrupulous sensitivity, rejects
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Wittgenstein who, with his scrupulous sensitivity, rejects what sounds 
blasphemous (eg. in CV30: and may this be no blasphemy -"). This
thought is, however, outweighed by the aspect of the joke which is at 
Schopenhauer's expense. For Schopenhauer, the will which estranges 
itself from itself, in the scattered forms of its emanation as a fallen 
creation, is a will which does not understand itself until it becomes 
artist, musician, ascetic, Schopenhauer or impersonal agape among the 
theosophically religious. Now Schopenhauer characterises his Gnosis in 
opposition to Judaism. What he sees as sound in Christianity comes, he 
claims, from Indian sources, perhaps via Egyptian and Hellenistic 
sources, or is at least of this type. As a latter-day Marcion, 
Schopenhauer berates the New Testament and the early Christian fathers 
for all they retain of "Jewish superstition". There is a trace of 
Marcion, too, in Tolstoy as he rewrites the Gospels in the version which 
became strangely life-saving for Wittgenstein in 1915. Thus, as 
Schopenhauer understands the Will better than it understands itself, so 
Wittgenstein seeks to understand the anti-semitic Schopenhauer better 
than he understands himself. Irony recognises such matters, but often 
with typical immaturity. Jewish and Christian humour responds to the 
divine-human comedy (not tragedy, but) with its tragic side. Both 
playfulness and joy are essential to these aspirations to understand 
others better.
4.16 UNDERSTANDING GNOSTICS
To achieve this understanding is to develop a Jewish style of thinking, 
as opposed to a gnostic style. However, to be a Jewish style of 
thinking, it must not get locked into mere or crude antitheses, if it is 
to understand gnostics better than they understand themselves. This 
requires, for example, deep investigations of the idolatry or
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enslavement inherent in obsession by the model of language as 
essentially naming and picturing. From this flow varieties of
theoretical dualism and practical alienation, between language (speaker) 
and world, between mind and language, mind and world, minds and bodies, 
speaking and thinking, speaking and acting, speakers and speakers, 
speaking and world, etc. Moreover, from these dualisms there may
perhaps spring equally deformed attempts at reconciliation, in the shape 
of monisms, mysticisms and institutionalised dogmatisms, both 
ecclesiastical and counter-ecclesiastical. Here is a vision which, in 
seeking to go beyond gnosticism, begins to make more intelligible the 
gnostic visions of hierarchies and circles of emanation, estrangement 
and overcoming, with their conflicting or co-operating powers and ages, 
all needing to be named, if only under pressures of having to evoke such 
complexities with both synoptic mastery and respect for the (biological, 
historical, social) persons who constitute the vital cast of these 
dramas.
To seek "to understand someone else’s work better than he understands it 
himself", could be symptomatic of arrogance, complacency or stupidity, 
but to refuse to aim at this could deserve the same criticism, if the
other person appears to need or invite or demand such attempts. An
important characteristic, not just technique, of a certain kind of 
teacher, is to invite such a better understanding. To read Wittgenstein 
is to find oneself invited, and to seem to recognise both a requirement 
and a need responded to, in accepting the invitation with fear and 
trembling.
The "new similes" which Wittgenstein invents in such profusion are 
personal as well as impersonal. "Invent", Winch’s translation of 
"erfinde", is just right, as the English (Latin) word conveys the German 
word’s echo of "finden", to find. Wittgenstein’s work makes/finds
193
similes/parables (Gleicbnisse), as well as differences, between the 
apparently heterogeneous influences whom he does name in 1931, but also 
between them and those whom he does not name in this context. Two of 
the unnamed are Kierkegaard and James. Kierkegaard, with his (Hegelian) 
anti-gnosticism, and James, with his (Emersonian) pragmatism, are 
nevertheless present. Jewishness is the new simile invented for them. 
One may see them (both being elusive children of Kant's tortuous homage 
to practical reason) as parables of Jewishness. Through the
acknowledgements and omissions (or evasions?) of the 1931 passage, 
Wittgenstein is struggling to come to terms with his own unique 
metabolism as well as with the world of significant others.
Thus even distasteful stereotypes or caricatures of Jewishness can 
become for Wittgenstein "new similes", as in the following passage: "It
has sometimes been said that the Jews’ secretive and cunning nature is a
result of their long persecution. That is certainly untrue; on the 
other hand it is certain that they continue to exist despite this
persecution only because they have an inclination towards such 
secretiveness. As we may say that this or that animal has escaped
extinction only because of a capacity or ability to conceal itself. Of
course I do not mean that as a reason for commending such a capacity,
not by any means" (CV22) . "A capacity or ability to conceal" can be
vital to provide opportunities for distinctively individual development, 
especially when the influence of others is experienced as overwhelming 
in any of many ways. Secrecy, like privacy and inwardness, need not be 
dishonest or anti-social. Too strong a suspicion in these matters 
betrays a family, society or culture with anxieties bordering on 
paranoid projections. Wittgenstein’s philosophical efforts against the 
privacy of the mental, or against solipsism, have a context and 
atmosphere markedly different from varieties of behaviourism with which 
some have confused them. Wittgenstein's gnomic style, which conceals as
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well as shows, and lures as well as gives, can be seen, and rightly (I 
have been urging), not as an unfortunate affectation, or a reprehensible 
anti-social (anti-intellectual) tendency but as making a personal virtue 
out of the necessity of struggling so hard to find a voice of one's own 
in the face of influences provoking strong admiration, or deep anxiety, 
or both.
4.17 THE CULMINATION OF 1951
Wittgenstein's Israelite wrestling with the angels of influence, to find 
his own way of walking the one necessary way, is crowned by a remark 
from the last year of his life;
"God may say to me: I am judging you out of your own mouth. Your own 
actions have made you shudder with disgust when you have seen other 
people do them." (CV87)
This recapitulates much. There is the strange question reported in 
students' notes about 1938: "Why shouldn't one form of life culminate in 
an utterance of belief in a Last Judgement?" (LG p.58. The notes 
continue, "But I couldn't either say 'Yes' or 'No' to the statement that 
there will be such a thing. Nor 'Perhaps', nor 'I'm not sure' ..."). 
There is also the strange phrase which Paul Engelmann reports was used 
repeatedly by Wittgenstein earlier in his life (c. 1916-1929): "... when 
we meet again at the last judgement". (Engelmann 1967, pp.77-78). 
According to Engelmann's not entirely clear account, Wittgenstein "would 
pronounce the words with an indescribably inward-gazing look in his 
eyes, his head bowed, the picture of a man stirred to his depths". (Loc. 
cit.)
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It would be inadequate just to connect these remarks with Wittgenstein’s 
response to Engelmann's poem on the last judgement (LLW 75-76). For all 
we know, the influence here was perhaps equally in the other direction. 
Nor is it sufficient or necessary to think of a regulative image of 
Judgement, on the lines of R. Braithwaite's action-guiding stories or 
myths, or on the neo-Kantian lines of H. Vaihinger’s "Philosophy of As 
If". Rather, we should seek guidance here by means of Karl Kraus' 
acknowledged influence (CV19). The decisive aspect of Kraus' influence 
is his practice of what may be called linguistic apocalyptic or 
linguistic eschatology. However, before enlarging on this it is salient 
to recall other voices which add to the pathos and power of 
Wittgenstein's saying.
Otto Weininger’s contribution comes through a passage discussing the 
desirability of a complete autobiography, in which really faithful 
memory would grow from a sense of "PietMt" ("Filial faithfulness" would 
be better than the debased "piety" here) that a man of real character 
has towards his life or his roots. Weininger continues, "And although 
someone of true distinction in Goethe's words may be very strict and 
severe towards errors of which he has only just freed himself when he 
sees others still holding to them - still, he will never smile at his 
past deeds and omissions, never ridicule his earlier way of thinking and 
living". (RW 182-183. Compare Wittgenstein's Lecture or Ethics, 1929). 
Of course, if projection or its converse, and the recognition of such 
phenomena, are taken as ontologically significant then one is in the 
territory of Schopenhauer, with his mystical "Thou art That". However, 
in Wittgenstein's saying the echoes of Biblical dialogue are stronger 
than the echo of the Upanishads. (Engelmann also testifies to 
Wittgenstein's regard for the translation of the Hebrew Bible by Martin 
Buber and Franz Rosenzweig, Op. cit. 111-112).
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The prophet Nathan, using a parable as a mirror, tricks King David into 
judging himself out of his own mouth. (2 Samuel 12:1-7), According to 
Matthew 12:36-37, Jesus declares, "X tell you this; there is not a 
thoughtless word that comes from men’s lips but they will have to 
account for it on the day of judgement. For out of your own mouth you 
will be acquitted; out of your own mouth you will be condemned." (NEB).
4.18 LINGUISTIC ESCHATOLOGY IN KARL KRAUS
Engelmann, who helped Kraus to collect newspaper cuttings such as Kraus 
used for his epic collage on the war, entitled, "The Last Days of 
Mankind", is one of those who stresses how, "In his polemics Kraus 
resorts time and again to the technique of taking his victim "at his 
word", that is, of driving home his accusation and exposing threadbare 
intentions by the simple means of citing the accused’s own words and 
phrases". As Kraus in his literary polemic takes an individual 
adversary at his word, and through him indirectly a whole era, so 
Wittgenstein in his philosophical polemic takes ’language’ itself (ie. 
the language of philosophy) at its word". (Op. cit. pp.124-125). The 
same point is made by Elias Canetti in his essay, "Karl Kraus: The
School of Resistance" (Canetti 1987, pp.28-38), "The quotation, as he 
employed it, testified against the quoted man ... Karl Kraus had a gift 
for condemning people out of their own mouths, as it were." (Op. cit. 
p. 31) Canetti does not mention Wittgenstein, but his whole essay 
illuminates Wittgenstein’s naming of Kraus as an influence.
Canetti, even more than E. Heller, who was a pioneer in drawing 
attention to the closeness of Kraus and Wittgenstein (Heller 1961 
etc.), portrays Kraus as a prophet in the tradition of Nathan, without 
mentioning Nathan or prophecy. For Canetti, Kraus’ apocalyptic and
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eschatology of language (not explicitly designated as such by Canetti)
show themselves in many ways. Canetti writes of Kraus' gift, "... the
origin of this mastery - and I don't know if the context has already 
been seen clearly - lay in something that I should like to call the 
"acoustic quotation". Kraus was haunted by voices ... the voices
pursuing him did exist, in the Viennese reality .. . this man let 
everyone speak. He was incapable of sacrificing even the least, the 
lowliest, the emptiest voice ..." (Op. cit. p.31). This man who lets 
everyone speak is also presented by Canetti as "the speaker. There has 
never existed such a speaker in my lifetime - not in any European
language that I know". This speaking meant that "we need years to 
gather enough strength and stand up against him" (Op. cit. p.32). The 
law which he spoke "glowed: it radiated, it scorched and destroyed" (Op. 
cit. p.30). This is the Kraus whom Trakl described as a "wrathful 
magician". Canetti, referring to Kraus’ juxtapositions of victims and 
victimisers (in the war and in the city), calls Kraus "the master of 
horror", and connects this with "his truly Biblical quality".
Then there is the conviction of "absolute responsibility" which Kraus 
imparted, being "a hundred degrees harder" than banal "commitment", "for 
it is sovereign and self-determining". Canetti also writes about Kraus’ 
showing how "each individual has a linguistic shape distinguishing him 
from all others", how language says the opposite of what was intended, 
how the structure or form of his prose, absent on the larger scale, is 
present in every sentence, and how Kraus, even though at worst the 
obsessive master of a hunting-pack of followers, can be a school for 
strong resistance or resilience in the task of entering into one’s 
inheritance. Recall how, according to Martin Buber, an Hassidic 
teaching has the Holy One, in the day of judgement, ask, not "T-Jhy were 
you not Moses?", but, "Why were you not yourself?". It seems that for 
the young Canetti this question was heard with Kraus standing in for 
Moses.
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Wittgenstein, at the end of his life, recapitulates on behalf of Kraus 
also: "God may say to me: ’I am judging you out of your own mouth. Your 
own actions have made you shudder with disgust when you have seen other 
people do them'". (CV87).
Wittgenstein, too, was disturbed by how some imitated him. The history 
of the quotation and misquotation of the Tractatus and the 
Investigations to legitimize sundry fashions and cults would doubtless 
prolong his shudder of disgust. The saying of CV87, in which "his" form 
of life culminates, has wider application, however, than to the moral 
paradoxes of his two-stage "intellectual career" or perhaps of his 
unknown "private life". The saying needs consideration in a light such 
as Stanley Cavell has suggested: "Skepticism about our knowledge of
others is typically accompanied by complacency about our knowledge of 
ourselves ... those capable of the deepest personal confession 
(Augustine, Luther, Rousseau, Thoreau, Kierkegaard, Tolstoy, Freud) were 
most convinced they were speaking from the most hidden knowledge of 
others. Perhaps that is the sense which makes confession possible ... 
we are thinking of convention ... (as) ... those exigencies of conduct 
and feeling which all humans share. Wittgenstein’s discovery, or 
rediscovery, is of the depth of convention in human life (Cavell
1979, p.109-111). We may add, to Cavell's "exigencies of conduct" and 
"depth of convention", Wittgenstein's (re)discovery of the depth and 
height, length and breadth of shared responsibility.
4.19 DWELLING WITHIN "THE PRELIMINARY"
One other passage of Wittgenstein’s guidance is relevant before drawing 
the threads of this chapter together. The way in which a person’s life
culminates may matter deeply for interpreting that life as a whole, just
as the end of a story can transform all that leads up to it. Similarly
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the way in which a philosophical discussion or investigation comes to an 
end may make an important difference to our understanding of its course. 
Consequently what Wittgenstein describes as coming "up against a 
remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in philosophical investigation" 
can also be a coming up against a phenomenon which is wider and deeper 
than allowed for in many accounts of what constitutes philosophy. This 
phenomenon, "the difficulty - I might say - is not that of finding the 
solution but rather that of recognising as the solution something that 
looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. 'We have already said 
everying. - Not anything that follows from this, no, this itself is the 
solution!' This is connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an 
explanation, whereas the solution of the difficulty is a description, if 
we give it the right place in our considerations. If we dwell upon it, 
and do not try to get beyond it. The difficulty here is: to stop".
(Z s314. Cp. D. Z. Phillips' essay on "Wittgenstein's Full Stop" in
Block (1981)). This passage concerns, not just philosophy in some 
exclusive sense, but also religion, aesthetics, ethics and theology.
See chapters five, seven and eight below.
Having now completed the preliminaries, the threads of this chapter will 
be drawn together, first in a shorter and more abstract way, and then in 
a more concrete and expanded form. The point of this drawing together 
is to show how, in Wittgenstein’s culminating remark of 1951, Kraus' 
linguistic eschatology gives a Jewish response to the gnosticism 
epitomised by Schopenhauer and the model of the essence of language with 
which he, like the ex-Manichaean Augustine, had to struggle. This is 
done in hope of both avoiding the kind of explanation which Wittgenstein 
rightly rejected and offering the kind of explanation which is not
thereby ruled out, but which Wittgenstein often did not (would not? 
could not?) provide.
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The efforts of others (x) to understand those other than themselves (y)
better than they (y) understand themselves can, but need not, give one
reason to shudder with disgust at one’s own efforts to understand others 
(x) better than they understand themselves.
To bring out the points in a less abstract way:
1. if "it is typical for a Jewish mind to understand (for better or for
worse) someone else’s work better than he understands it himself" 
(CV19),
2. and if the so-called "golden rule" may be understood as, "Do to and
for others as you would have others do to you and on your behalf”,
3. and if this rule remains fundamental to the grammar of Judaism, as a 
perspicuous summary of the Law and the prophets, and as fulfilling the 
turn-taking which is vital to both conversation and morality (and so is 
at the heart of the grammar of Christian doctrines of incarnation and 
atonement, of creation, spirituality and God the Trinity), then
4. one may live an inclusive form of life which culminates in 
expressing how one hopes for many Jewish minds, or Jewish Geiste, or 
both, to understand one’s own work better than one understands it 
oneself, and
5. one may thereby be ready, able and willing to let oneself be told, 
in a way which could mean "ultimate torment" because it does mean 
"infinite help" (cp CV 45-46) that "Jesus is Lord", that this judged
judge "will come to judge me" (cp CV 33), or
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6. put conversely, to say with one’s whole life, "God may say to me; I 
am judging you out of your own mouth. Your own actions have made you 
shudder with disgust when you have seen other people do them". 
Consequently,
7. "there and then", what may seem "here and now" to need to be 
explained, by being grounded upon the earth, will show itself, in and 
for that form of forms of life, to be the action in which explanation 
and justification can come to an end, as if for one hanging from above. 
(Cp. On Certainty throughout, with CV 33, Z s3I4 and Z s273. See the 
exegesis of CV33 in chapter eight).
Chapter Five:
The aesthetics, ethics and mysticism
of the sublime
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5.1 OPENING SUMMARY FOR CHAPTER FIVE
RTiat previous chapters have touched on, as at least apparent if not 
obviously deep affinities, and in some cases as probable or possible 
courses of influence, between Wittgenstein and James, Kierkegaard, Kraus 
and Schopenhauer, are clarified through being understood as diverse 
expressions of a deeper concern with a concept or concepts of the 
sublime, as retrieved and developed by Kant and his successors. The 
coherence of Wittgenstein’s earlier philosophy, including within the 
empire of logic the provinces of the aesthetic, ethical and mystical, is 
illuminated by the ’’ineffable experience" of "the sublime" in these 
ways. Wittgenstein's later work is clarified when seen as a Kraus-like 
attempt to clear the ground which has been cluttered up by distortions 
of, and cheap substitutes for, the genuinely sublime, including certain 
aspects of his own earlier work.
Thus a concept of the sublime, together with families of closely related 
concepts, helps to show the coherence of Wittgenstein’s life-work, with 
a deeper continuity against which the discontinuities can be better 
grasped. It also explains, when related to key religious writers, for 
example Kierkegaard, Pascal, Weil and Barth, the religious character, 
salience and promise of Wittgenstein’s work. The ups and downs in 
interpretation of the sublime since Kant make profound sense of 
Wittgenstein’s life-work, including his remarks that he would have liked 
to be able to dedicate his work to the glory of God and that he’d had a 
wonderful life.
Wittgenstein’s gestures towards trinitarian thinking cohere with an 
interpretation of Pascal’s three orders as vestiges of the Trinity and 
as a dialectics of the sublime. Analogies of the sublime abound in
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Wittgenstein's work, both in attempts to bridge opposing extremes of 
importance and in small explorations of difference and similarity, 
variety and unity. If such a style of thinking, skill or sensibility, 
can be regarded as at the heart of rationality, and not merely at some 
point on its periphery, then Wittgenstein opens a way to major 
reassessments of "anti-intellectualism" as well as of gnosticism, 
agnosticism and mysticism.
5.2 HACKER'S SCEPTICAL CHALLENGE
All those who at present struggle to understand Wittgenstein, and 
especially the Investigations, are indebted to the monumental labours of 
Peter Hacker and his collaborator Gordon Baker. In the revised second 
edition of Insight and Illusion, Hacker's own book surveying 
Wittgenstein's work, Hacker has tried to edit out of his interpretation 
the traces of what he alludes to as an Oxford (1960s) neo-Kantian 
approach to Wittgenstein. Hacker's preface to his revised edition 
(1986) describes the first edition (1972) as, in partial respects, a 
result of reading Wittgenstein "through the spectacles of Oxford 
philosophy and its preoccupations in the 1960s".
Lens-grinding for such spectacles was perhaps at its most distinguished 
in Peter Strawson's The Bounds of Sense (1966) which interpreted Kant's 
Critique of Pure Reason as a "metaphysic of experience" and tried to 
keep the baby of Kant's conceptual analysis of "limiting or necessary 
general features of experience" while throwing away the bath-water of 
Kant’s transcendental psychology and transcendental idealism. For, as 
Strawson saw the problem, Kant "seeks to draw the bounds of sense from a 
point outside them, a point which, if they are rightly drawn, cannot 
exist" (Strawson 1966, pl2. Cp CV pplO, 15).
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Hacker, in his first edition took up the invitation to read the 
Tractatus in a similar way. Hacker subtitled his first edition of 
Insight and Illusion as "Wittgenstein on Philosophy and the Metaphysics 
of Experience", pointing in this way to Strawson's version of Kant. 
Strawson, in turn, can be read as applying, and so clarifying, the then 
current reading of Wittgenstein to Kant's first Critique. Circular 
reinforcement takes place between such readings.
5.3 HACKER REVISED
It is clear that Hacker’s revised edition of Insight and Illusion does 
more justice to some of Wittgenstein’s main themes. However, there is a 
sense in which Hacker’s purge has not gone far enough and a sense in 
which it has gone too far. The purge of 1960s Oxford neo-Kantianism has 
not gone far enough in that Wittgenstein’s work in logic and in grammar 
is not seen clearly enough in its closeness to his ethical, aesthetic 
and religious concerns. This is epitomised in Hacker’s later edition 
merely omitting his earlier criticism of Wittgenstein as "either 
self-deluding, or disingenuous" (Hacker 1972 p83) in his claims for the 
ethical importance of the Tractatus, in his letter to Ludwig von Picker 
(October 1919).
Hacker adds nothing to his second edition to improve our understanding 
of either how Wittgenstein could have thought as he did about the 
ethical importance of his earlier work, or how he might have justified 
his thinking in this way, let alone how he might have been right to do 
so. Hacker’s justification for such omission might be that to attempt 
such explanation and justification would be against the spirit of 
Wittgenstein's later, as well as his earlier, philosophy. Such an 
excuse would be more plausible for Wittgenstein’s earlier than for his
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later philosophy, on account of his later criticism of his earlier work 
for its dogmatism about the ineffable. Part of the problem here is to 
try to assess the apparent discontinuities and continuities between the 
later and earlier work. This, in turn, connects with the viability of 
an attempt to reassess the coherence of Wittgenstein's life-work as a 
whole.
However, the purge of 1960s Oxford neo-Kantianism may be said to have
gone too far in the sense that what is needed, to grasp the coherence of
Wittgenstein's work at an appropriately deep level, is more of Kant 
rather than less, ie. a deeper appreciation of the inheritance
bequeathed by Kant to his successors. While it is likely that
Wittgenstein read little of Kant for himself, Schopenhauer was saturated 
in Kant, just as Wittgenstein had saturated himself in Schopenhauer. 
The Kant who so influenced Schopenhauer, and who matters for 
understanding Wittgenstein, is a much fuller figure than the version 
fashionable in the Oxford of the 1960s.
Strawson interprets Kant, as Hacker interprets Wittgenstein, 
Schopenhauer and Kant, without noticing the importance of the notion of 
the sublime. Perhaps the distance of D.W. Hamlyn's Schopenhauer (1980) 
from Hacker's Oxford of the 1960s could be measured by the fact that 
Hamlyn devotes two paragraphs to Schopenhauer on the sublime (op.cit. 
112-113), but without any suggestion that it could be important to 
evaluate Schopenhauer on the sublime as a key to the central vision of 
either Schopenhauer or Wittgenstein. Even Patrick Gardiner's wider study, 
Schopenhauer (1963) only hints in passing at the significance of the 
sublime for Schopenhauer, although in other respects he, following the 
lead of Geach (1957) and Anscombe (1959), has tried to alert readers of 
Wittgenstein to the importance of Schopenhauer, in a relatively
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piecemeal manner. Bryan Magee’s Schopenhauer (1983), while sensitive to 
the importance of the sublime for Schopenhauer, does not make 
connections with Wittgenstein at this point.
Hacker does not want to be taken as implying "any belittling" of 
Wittgenstein’s transcendental doctrines, in the Tractatus, in so far as 
they are significant for Wittgenstein (Op.cit. 105). To concede this 
is, however, not to salvage very much, unless one also has some reason 
for thinking Wittgenstein could have given a sufficiently acceptable 
justification of his position. Thus we find that Hacker still goes out 
of his way to refer to these doctrines as "transcendental twaddle" (104 
note 23). The only apparent partial confirmation or justification for 
Wittgenstein’s position which Hacker mentions in the relevant passage 
(1986 pp 105-106) is that the asserted ineffability of the ethical (etc) 
appears to dovetail or interweave with the argued ineffability of the 
logical. This, however, does not impress Hacker. He asserts that 
Wittgenstein's argument for the ineffability of ethics is "tenuous to 
say the least".
"It hangs on nothing more than the non-contingency of the ethical, a 
point asserted rather than argued." (loc cit). Hacker gives no 
reference, but probably has in mind Tractatus 6.4 - 6.43. Here
Wittgenstein argues briefly that value must lie outside the world of the 
accidental and prepositional, and that this applies to ethics, 
aesthetics and the non-phenomenal will. Wittgenstein’s Lecture on 
Ethics of 1929 brings together logical necessity and ethical necessity 
in a more direct way. His main point, in both the lecture and the 
Tractatus, is that such discourse cannot be essentially a matter of 
contingent prepositional truth within the world of contingencies as he 
has expounded it. Consequently it must be non-sense, to be
distinguished from meaningless rubbish. The difficulty to which Hacker 
draws attention is that of seeing the importance of the non-sense within 
the unimportance of the sense. What is genuinely important is how the 
sense and the nonsense are used and not used. This is where it is vital 
to understand Schopenhauer, Kant and others on the sublime in the
mundane.
At the bottom of Hacker's complaint about Wittgenstein's conviction of 
the ethical importance of the Tractatus there seem to be two roots. 
Firstly, it is hard to see the ethical importance or the value of the 
work, given the lack of ethical argument or explanation within the work. 
This difficulty is very understandable, but hardly a sufficient reason 
for dismissing Wittgenstein's own account of his work, unless one is
content to assimilate ethical value to exclusive philosophical value, an 
assimilation at odds with his life-long attitude. Secondly, and 
relatedly, it is hard for Hacker to see the inclusive ethical value of 
the work, and allied with this its aesthetic and religious value, given 
the lack of an appropriate model for understanding these provinces of 
the autonomous empire of inclusive logic, a model alternative to the
model or models presupposed in the types of ethical argument which 
Hacker takes as paramount for understanding ethical value.
Hacker is reported by Holiday (1985 plA2, note 5) as believing (in 1984) 
that the main point of the Tractatus is not an ethical one, on the
following grounds. Wittgenstein in the Tractatus is preoccupied with 
logic. The remarks on ethics (roughly from 6.41 to 7) fail to connect 
Wittgenstein's understanding of ethics with what is said elsewhere in 
the Tractatus about that which shows itself. For example Wittgenstein 
does not consider the question, "What would stand to the concept of
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ethical value as red stands to the concept of colour?" This last point 
is developed as follows in the second edition of Insight and Illusion 
(loc cit). If ethical predicates were formal concepts, "they would 
incorporate (not "represent" as in the first edition) variables taking a 
range of objects of a given category as their values". As formal 
concepts they would correlate with material concepts, ie. the 
substitution instances of these variables. However, Wittgenstein gives 
no clue as to what the substitution instances might be.
Reading between Hacker's lines, his lack of clues seems to indicate 
either that Wittgenstein was not interested in giving any substitution 
instances, and so not interested in philosophical ethics, or that he 
thought they were obvious, which they are not, or that he did not 
understand ethical predicates as formal concepts, in which case "ethical 
propositions" cannot be pseudo-propositions for Wittgenstein by virtue 
of an interpretation of ethical predicates as formal concepts. However, 
this seems to leave only one alternative, that apparent ethical 
propositions are pseudo-propositions in virtue of their being 
essentially tautologies or contradictions. In spite of the fact that 
Plato’s Euthyphro dilemma, or an extreme theological voluntarism, has 
sometimes been used to push a few theological innocents into this 
corner, any such claim for the essence of ethical discourse would be 
absurd. Moreover, inspite of Wittgenstein's apparent interest in 
dilemmas of the Euthyphro family and in theological voluntarism, there 
is no evidence that he held any such crude or confused doctrine of 
ethics. Here the evidence of Wittgenstein's 1929 Lecture on Ethics 
seems decisive, even through the evidence of his conversations may seem 
less clear. (See chapter eight for details and discussion). If the 
lecturer on ethics of 1929 had merely wanted to utter ethical 
contradictions or tautologies, then the struggle of his lecture would be
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incomprehensible. It would have been at best radically confused to 
struggle to present such a logico-ethical doctrine as compatible with 
ordinary moral and religious certainties, and at worst foolish or 
dishonest. While such disasters are not impossible, even for 
Wittgenstein, an interpretation which does not push one towards them, if 
such is available, is to be preferred. If other people were pushed into 
seeing him in such mistaken ways, then this was something for which he 
had only a limited responsibility. Who is in a position to judge with 
confidence whether another person has been sufficiently committed, or 
sufficiently able, to limit sufficiently others’ misunderstandings of 
him?
Hacker does allow that Wittgenstein’s early ethics received support, 
however slender, from his metaphysical as well as his logical doctrines 
(op cit 106). However, this concession is so heavily qualified as to be 
virtually withdrawn. For Hacker claims that in the Lecture on Ethics 
the same ethical doctrines "appear to be completely free-floating", at a 
time when Wittgenstein's earlier views on meaning, representation, etc. 
were either just rejected or in the process of collapsing and being 
rejected. Here it must be pointed out that the lecture still clings to
important elements of the earlier views on meaning and representation.
The lecture, being given in November 1929, was perhaps earlier than 
Hacker could have known when he wrote his first edition. His failure to 
revise this passage for his second edition perhaps owes something to his 
estrangement from Wittgenstein's earlier thinking in these areas.
Moreover the lecture of 1929, read in the context of Wittgenstein's 
possible crisis of development at this time, suggests that his views on 
meaning and representation were not obviously the foundation for his 
metaphysical, ethical and religious thinking. It seems equally possible 
that the latter thinking gave support to his thinking on sense and
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representation. This point can only be suggested tentatively here, not 
just because an interpretation alternative to Hacker's has not yet been 
sufficiently developed, but also because it is not impossible that the 
pressures of having to prepare a lecture for a set date can nudge one 
into slightly less critical treatment of one's own more comfortable 
habits of thinking. (My alternative interpretation is given in chapter 
seven).
Hacker ends his consideration of Wittgenstein's early ethics with a 
quotation from Kant's first Critique. Kant has just completed his 
"Critique of all theology" with his seminal remark that "while for the 
merely speculative employment of reason the supreme being remains a mere 
ideal, it is yet an ideal without a flaw, a concept which completes and 
crowns the whole of human knowledge". Then, in his immediately 
following appendix to the transcendental dialectic, Kant begins a 
discussion of "the regulative employment of the ideas of pure reason". 
In the opening paragraph of this he summarises "what we have already 
proved in the Transcendental Analytic", and it is this summary which 
Hacker quotes as illuminating Wittgenstein. "... all those conclusions 
of ours which profess to lead us beyond the field of possible experience 
are deceptive and without foundation; it likewise teaches us this 
further lesson, that human reason has a natural tendency to transgress 
these limits, and that transcendental ideas are just as natural to it as 
the categories are to (the) misunderstanding ..." (Kant Critique of 
Pure Reason A642, B670).
This passage from Kant, unlike the previous quotation from Kant in the 
above paragraph, reflects the Oxford neo-Kantianism of the 1960s from 
which Hacker seeks to distance himself in 1986. Hacker's concluding 
sentence points unwittingly in a promising direction, even though the
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difference between Konigsberg and Oxford is not altogether clear. "The 
Kantian idea echoes in Wittgenstein but what in eighteenth century 
Konigsberg led to an a priori critical rationalist ethics, produced in 
the twentieth century a romantic ethics of the ineffable" (Op.cit. 107). 
The city of language in which Wittgenstein seeks to be a guide, who 
tries either to keep silent about the ineffable, or to talk about the 
ineffable, or to talk about the ef fable works and children of the 
ineffable, is not any exclusively romantic, or medieval or modern city, 
but a more open one, in which to find one's way around (well enough for 
certain purposes) is possible without being able to draw a reliable map. 
Nor is incompetence in map-sketching a necessary qualification (Cp. PI 
sl8, Z sl21 and Augustine on the city of God and the human city; also 
Augustine on theology in Confessiones 1.4 and Wittgenstein's various 
allusions to this, for which references are given in other chapters).
5.4 LOGIC AND THE SUBLIME IN KIERKEGAARD
Wittgenstein's early slogan, "Der Logik muss fur sich selber sorgen: 
Logic must take care of/look after itself" (NB p2 TLP 5.473) gives 
notice, not that ethics, aesthetics and the mystical are to be 
reconstructed within the confines of a Fregean new-town or dormitory 
suburb, but that instead of the sublime showing itself through the world 
of Schopenhauer's Will, and instead of the sublime showing itself 
through the world of Kant’s Reason, it shows itself now through the new 
world of inclusive logic. Of course, the use of the words "sublime" and 
"sublimity" is not essential, or perhaps the words have become 
impossibly debased, and may be handed over to suspicious interpreters 
such as Nietzsche and Freud with their hermeneutics of sublimation, 
which psychologise the tradition of the sublime. (Cp PI s38, 89, 94, 97, 
192, 389). In an age of inversions, the use of "deep" and "depth",
(instead
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of, as well as, "greatness", etc.) is more than ever appropriate. 
However, the pattern of thinking and style of enthusiasm, characteristic 
of Schopenhauer on the sublime, but present in various versions among 
many others, are close to the heart of the matter.
Nevertheless, it is Kierkegaard/Climacus, a theologian of the sublime, 
with his making a theological virtue out of the "necessities" of 
tormented human tightrope^walking between the possibilities and 
actualities of existing, rather than Schopenhauer with his awareness of 
the limits of argument, who formulated the slogan, "Necessity must be 
dealt with by itself", adding that "the categories of possibility, of 
actuality and of necessity have all been compromised" (Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript 306-307) . Kierkegaard has Climacus summarise in 
this way his "Interlude" in his Philosophical Fragments, or a Fragment 
of Philosophy, where he argues, "The necessary is a category entirely by 
itself ...Nothing whatever exists because it is necessary, but the 
necessary exists because it is necessary or because the necessary is. 
The actual is no more necessary than the possible, for the necessary is 
absolutely different from both... The immutability of the necessary 
...consists in its constantly relating itself to itself... (The Absolute 
Method, Hegel's discovery... a glittering tautology, coming to the 
assistance of academic superstition with many signs and wonders...)... 
Necessity ... is wholly a matter of essence, and thus it is of the 
essence of the necessary to exclude coming into existence..." 
(Philosophical Fragments 92 - 107).
Does this mean that Wittgenstein's early slogan, regardless of actual 
influence, amounts to a misreading of Kierkegaard/Climacus, or that it 
is a mistake to hear the voice of the sublime in Wittgenstein's slogan? 
Neither suggestion has to be accepted, in view of the
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"Supplement;Application" added to the "Interlude". Here we are told 
that contradiction is the "nisus" of wonder (its "passion", its 
"impulsive power"; "nisus" applies also to the labour of giving birth). 
It is the nisus of wonder at the possible, or at the actual, or at the 
process of coming into existence, which mediates between the possible 
and actual. Compare Wittgenstein's reference to, "The labour pains at 
the birth of new concepts" (CV 62). However against Hegel, 
contradiction is not the nisus of the process of coming into existence, 
but the nisus of wonder which reproduces the coming into existence. All 
coming into existence implies contradiction, we are told. Presumably 
the idea here is that there is a contradiction between saying, "It is 
possible" and "It is actual", if we assume that "eternal" reason does 
not come into time or that the historical does not come into the 
"timelessness" of reason.
However, Kierkegaard/Climacus does not spell this out, but leaves us to 
read between the lines. In any case, he is more interested in this 
passage in pointing to the greater "contradiction" that the "eternal God 
has come into historical existence". How has this greater contradiction 
been, and how can it be, the nisus of a greater wonder? Would it be a 
greater wonder to surrender the "eternal God", or his "historical 
existence", or some hidden premise corresponding to the hidden premise 
of the timelessness of reason or of the irrationality of the historical?
In order to avoid at this point attempting to discuss the whole of the 
Philosophical Fragments (etc), and possibly their longer sequel in the 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript, recourse may be made to 
Kierkegaard’s address on "The Unchangeableness of God" which, although 
dated 1855, speaks to these problems in the pseudonymous works of the 
1840s. Here Kierkegaard makes clear, with much use of the aesthetics of
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the sublime, that the eternity of God is not a spurious "eternity" of a 
distorted "reason", but is the eternity of a love which shows constancy 
in the thick of and beyond all unreliable forms of love. Thus the 
apparent contradiction between "eternal God" and "has come into 
historical existence" is the nisus of a greater wonder at a greater love 
which transcends all loves confined merely to the actual or just to the 
possible. The sublimity of this love is shown not apart from but in and 
through the nisus and passion of its conflict with the false eternities 
or necessities which are projected upon it. Analogously, Wittgerstein’s 
logic which must take care of/look after itself does so by sublimely 
working in and through language, world and thought (with all their 
contradictions or confusions, tautologies or banalities, contingencies 
or "graces of fate" [NB 73]) which it transcends.
Could we say that for the Wittgenstein of the early Notebooks, the 
Tractatus and the Lecture on Ethics, as for Kierkegaard, logic is an 
interlude among interludes, a language-game among language-games, which 
separates and connects them, makes or breaks them? This is tempting 
when one compares the logical "interlude" in the Philosophical Fragments 
with the self-belittling in the preface to the Tractatus and the place 
which Wittgenstein gave the Tractatus in his life, including his later 
thinking on contradiction. However, something stronger has to be said 
for the earlier Wittgenstein. For him, the interlude of logic is not 
just an interlude but the interlude. For him, logic has a splendour 
such as befits the apex of Schopenhauer’s hierarchy of quasi-platonic 
ideas. The interlude of Wittgenstein’s early logic is the seventh-day 
sabbath-rest of the Will, the still centre of the Will’s spiralling 
spheres of music. This is the way of seeing the sublimity of logic
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which the Wittgenstein of the Investigations is still putting in its 
place, with his attacks on the subliming of logic and language and on 
mirages of super-concepts. For the later Wittgenstein, logic had become 
^  nisus of wonder, wondering at language in language. But an important 
part of what gives his later work its distinctiveness of ethos and style 
is that it knows the temptations of letting logic be the nisus of 
wonder, temptations which may well have presented themselves more 
commonly or more aptly through a Hegelian rather than through a 
Schopenhauerean style of thinking.
5.5 SUB SPECIE AETERNITATIS
Wittgenstein’s early sense of the sublime is more indebted to 
Schopenhauer than to Kierkegaard, even though it moves easily in the 
direction of Kierkegaard. This closeness to Schopenhauer is illustrated 
in the following passage, dated 2.9.1916, Here the "philosophical” , 
"metaphysical”, sublime "1", "the 1 of solipsism", through the "realism" 
of its engagement with the world to the point of losing itself in 
"reality", finds itself beyond the world, inheriting and judging it as a 
kingdom free from alienated "history" and free from alienation between 
human and other animate or inanimate neighbours in the world. The notes 
of 2.9.1916 are worth reproducing here in full, without the original 
paragraphing, as they express so strikingly the pattern and atmosphere 
of Schopenhauer’s sense of the sublime.
"Here we can see that solipsism coincides with pure realism, if 
it is strictly thought out. The 1 of solipsism shrinks to an 
extensionless point and what remains is the reality co-ordinate 
with it. What has history to do with me? Mine is the first and 
only world! 1 want to report how 1 found the world. What others 
in the world have told me about the world is a very small and
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incidental part of my experience of the world. ^  have to judge 
the world, to measure things. The philosophical I is not the 
human being, not the human body or the human soul with the 
psychological properties, but the metaphysical subject, the 
boundary (not a part) of the world. The human body, however, my 
body in particular, is a part of the world among others, among 
beasts, plants, stones, etc., etc. Whoever realises this will 
not want to procure a pre-eminent place for his own body or for 
the human body. He will regard humans and beasts quite naively 
as objects which are similar and which belong together". (HB 82)
This vision is "the world seen sub specie aeternitatis", which is "the 
good life" (NB 83) or the good will (NB 79,76) for which the problem of 
the meaning of life has disappeared (NB 74). Correspondingly an 
object, human or otherwise, may be seen sub specie aeternitatis, instead 
of in space and time, "outside", with "the whole world as background", 
"as my world" (NB 83). This free flight into metaphors on behalf of the 
ineffable points towards the possibility of individuals being regarded 
as symbols of the ineffably sublime, a possibility which may be held as 
metaphysically grounded in their deep identity with "the metaphysical 
I", the cosmic Solipsist. In this way, "Ethics and aesthetics are one", 
"The World and Life are one", and aesthetics and ethics are both 
conditions of the world, "like logic" (NB 77). Does it follow that the 
ethical task of the individual person is to make his life good art, 
which expresses as completely as possible the good life, which is the 
world seen sub specie aeternitatis (Cp NB 83)? Perhaps, but if so this 
is obscured by Wittgenstein’s already mentioned difficulties in making 
sense of Schopenhauerean doctrine(s) of the will, difficulties which 
become acute in relation to ethics, as will be demonstrated shortly 
below.
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5.6 KANT AND THE SUBLIME IN KNOTS
First, however, it should be noted that these difficulties concerning 
the relation between phenomenal will and noumenal will, may in turn be 
traced back into Kant. Kant responsds to "misinterpretation" in this 
area (which is, he claims, "easy to avoid") in the first of his 
footnotes to the last section (9) of his Introduction to the Critique of 
Judgement. Kant recognises here that critics claim his distinction 
between the causality of nature and the causality of freedom implies a 
contradiction within his system. They claim that if nature resists or 
assists "causality according to (moral) laws of freedom", then Kant is 
admitting, inconsistently, an influence of the former upon the latter. 
Kant replies that, "The opposition or assistance is not between nature 
and freedom, but between the former as phenomenon and the effects of the 
latter as phenomena in the world of sense". Here Kant appears to shift 
the problem (of how the phenomenal and the noumenal are related) to 
another location, rather than to solve or dissolve it. This "easy" 
avoidance, taken in isolation, suggests the artificiality of 
distinguishing between noumenal freedom and phenomenal world in an ad 
hoc way in many contexts.
However as Kant himself suggests more than once in his introduction to 
his third Critique, the relationship between "the phenomenal" and "the 
noumenal" is not ad hoc when usage of this language is brought home to 
what he describes as the experience of the sublime. This is suggested 
both when Kant presents the Critique of Judgement as the key-stone in 
the arch formed by two previous Critiques and in his delightful reply to 
those who think it "a doubtful point that my divisions in pure 
philosophy should always be threefold", when he argues that his concept 
of synthetic a priori concepts requires "(1) a condition, (2) a 
conditional, and (3) the concept which arises from the union of the
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conditioned with its condition". (The final footnote of Kant’s
introduction to the Critique of Judgement). This contrasting and
combining is the theme of his account of the sublime, where through
terror in the conditioned world there arises a fascination expressive of 
the mind’s unconditioned transcendence of conditioned terror.
Before sketching, as a necessary background for understanding
Wittgenstein, a genealogy of concepts of the sublime from Pascal and
Milton, through Kant and Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Freud, to
Wittgenstein’s embodiments, it is appropriate to pick up at this point,
the recent reference to how Kant’s (as well as Schopenhauer’s)
difficulties, in the area of phenomenal and noumenal causality (or will) 
become evident in Wittgenstein’s early struggles with the ethics of the 
sublime.
The evidence is provided by Wittgenstein’s notes for 29.7.1916.
"For it is a fact of logic that wanting does not stand in any 
logical connection with its own fulfilment. And it is also clear 
that the world of the happy is a different world from the world 
of the unhappy. Is seeing an activity? Is it possible to will 
good, to will evil, and not to will? Or is only he happy who 
does not will? ’To love one’s neighbour’ would mean to will! 
But can one want and yet not be unhappy if the want does not 
attain fulfilment? (And this possibly always exists). Is it, 
according to common conceptions, good to want nothing for one’s 
neighbour, neither good nor evil? And yet in a certain sense it 
seems that not wanting is the only good. Here I am still making 
crude mistakes! No doubt of that! ...Here everything seems to
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turn, so to speak, on how one wants... can there be a world that 
is neither happy nor unhappy?" (NB 77 - 78) .
To comment fully on this passage one would need to discuss questions 
which here can only be asked. However various lines of thought are 
intersecting. There is the problem of Schopenhauer’s consistency. How 
can he teach both the ethics of the denial of the will (including the 
paradox of the will’s denial of itself) and the ethics of compassionate 
love for all sorts and conditions of neighbours tormented in the coils 
of maya? Does this show Schopenhauer failed to search his conscience 
and, for this reason, is a shallow thinker? Another line of thinking is 
that logic opposes wishful thinking, as much as the world of facts 
opposes such fantasy. Does the world of the happy belong with the 
phenomena of fantasy? Can there be an ethics which coincides with the 
aesthetics of seeing the world of the happy through seeing the world of 
the unhappy? Which ways of wanting or willing are phenomenal and which 
are noumenal? Is the sublime to be found in the "ordinariness" of love 
for one’s neighbour, or in the will to go beyond "good and evil" in the 
sense of love for neighbours?
If the above passage of 29.7.1916 is connected with .the passage of 
13.8.1916, one can reasonably reconstruct the direction in which 
Wittgenstein might have tackled the above questions. In the latter 
passage, he wrote, "How can man be happy at all, since he cannot ward
off the misery of this world? Through the life of knowledge... The
life of knowledge is the life that is happy in spite of the misery of
the world..." (NB 81). The will’s "denial" of itself in the life of
knowledge could be understood as noumenal reality, while in the
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phenomenal world love for neighbours consists in assisting them towards 
the life of knowledge. This knowledge is not to be confused with any 
merely phenomenal detachment or impartiality. For it is the knowledge 
which belongs to the ethics and aesthetics of the sublime. This life of 
knowledge is indeed "happy in spite of the misery of the world". For 
this is what distinguishes it from any malicious pleasure in the misery 
of others (Schadenfreude). However, if it is also to be distinguished 
from a callous, small-minded detachment from the misery of others, it 
must be a happiness because of knowledge of the misery of the world, in 
one's self. Here Schopenhauer's doctrine that ethical compassion is 
grounded in the metaphysical unreality of distinctions between persons 
has one of its less paradoxical, more intelligible aspects.
It is not just that Schopenhauer has glimpsed, in a faint or confused 
way, that knowledge of others and knowledge of self are interdependent 
and necessary conditions for sympathy (ethics) and empathy 
(understanding). (Compare Hamlyn [1983] pp 286 - 300 and especially pp 
288 - 89. Hamlyn is more interested in the relationship of knowledge 
and love in the reverse direction). It is also a matter of unconscious 
self-identification by one person with another, investigated in 
aboriginal forms in the "family romances" of psychoanalysis, but evident 
in any more "advanced" relationships and even between relative 
strangers, as when a medical student, for example, faints when observing 
the administration of an injection. If at such deeper levels of feeling 
"others" may be "harmed” by "one's" anger, greed or envy, than expiation 
for such harm, or avoidance of such dangers, may be expressed by 
commitment to an ethics of compassion within the context of a monistic 
metaphysics.
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The exploration of the relevance of such themes for literary criticism, 
and for other forms of cultural critique, has been undertaken by Harold 
Bloom in The Anxiety of Influence (1973) and in his subsequent work. 
Bloom’s work points to what the previous paragraph described as the need 
for knowledge of the misery of the world in and through one’s own 
misery. The traditional Cartesian argument for knowledge of other 
minds, by analogy with the knower's solipsistically inclined minding, 
can be seen as a rationalisation of the solipsist's needs. Bloom’s 1973 
study points to this when, in the final paragraph of his aphoristic 
manifesto within that book, he writes, without explicit reference to the 
younger Wittgenstein: "Criticism is the discourse of the deep tautology 
- of the solipsist who knows that what he means is right, and yet that 
what he says is wrong". (Cp TLP 5.62 - 5,63 "...For what the solipsist
means is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself 
manifest... I am my world...". See also NB pp 49, 82, 85 etc.).
The "discourse of the deep tautology" is, in the language which 
Schopenhauer made his own, the discourse of "This is you", the discourse 
of the Vedantic family of traditions. Hence the younger Wittgenstein’s 
concern with "the general form of all propositions" or "thé essence of 
the proposition" as expressible as "This" (TLP throughout: "Yet, strange 
to say, the word "this" has been called the only genuine name; so that 
anything else we call a name was one only in an inexact, approximate 
sense. This queer conception springs from a tendency to sublime the 
logic of our language ~ as one might put it". (PI s38). Wittgenstein’s 
reference to "has been called" applies also to Russell in The Philosophy 
of Logical Atomism (1956) p201, but it was Wittgenstein who wrote, "What 
is the source of the feeling "I can correlate a name with all that I 
see, with this landscape, with the dance of the motes in the air, with
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all this; indeed, what should we call a name if not this"?!" (Sic) (NB 
53). The original title of the book, baptised by Moore as the 
Tractatus, was The Proposition which is at least as appropriate as 
Moore’s allusion to Spinoza, the sublimer of Descartes’ mind/body 
dualism into a monism as naturalistic as it is theistic. For the 
discourse of the Tractatus/Proposition is "discourse of the deep 
tautology", ie discourse that, "This is you" or rather that, "I am my 
world" (TLP 5.63, NB84). (For another attempt at assimilating "This is 
You", see H-G Gadamer’s essay on "Aesthetic and religious experience" in 
Gadaraer 1986).
5.7 THE SUBLIME IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
Distinctly 18th and 19th century European notions of the sublime have 
important prehistories in the 17th century. For Pascal, the sublime in 
the order of thought prefigures the sublime is the order of love or 
grace. Indeed Pascal’s doctrine or methodology of the three orders, 
which are three ways of knowledge because they relate to three ways of 
being, can in its developed form be regarded as a Christian doctrine of 
the sublime. For human existence, as known and lived according to the 
orders of the bodily and the mental, falls victim to a dilemma 
illustrated by Epictetus and Montaigne. The former, by stressing human 
duties and neglecting moral weaknesses or incapacity, encourages 
ungrounded pride, as if human existence were confined to the order of 
mind alone. (Epictetus tends to stand in for Descartes). The latter, 
by stressing human weaknesses and neglecting duties, legitimises 
indolence grounded in fear or complacency, as if human existence were 
confined to the order of the bodily. The two orders of body and mind 
(cp Descartes) can only be related properly, and their misrelationships 
overcome, by the presence of a third order which, by reversing what is 
wrong in and between them and preserving what is good in and between
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them, shows its transcendence of them through its transforming presence 
among and within them. Thus human greatness and wretchedness are to be 
fully understood only in the context of Christ’s crucifixion and 
resurrection, where the order of grace judges, delivers and reconciles 
the orders of mind and body. Thus what is sublime in the order of 
grace, .ie. the glory of God revealed in the cross of Christ, is at best 
prefigured and at worst caricatured by what is sublime within the orders 
of mind and body, when considered in relative abstraction.
Aspects of Pascal’s notorious "Wager" argument becomes more
understandable, if not more acceptable, if it can rightly be interpreted 
as an ad hominem argument aimed at those still confined within alienated 
versions of the orders of mind and body, within which the genuinely 
sublime is caricatured. The history of the presence of Pascal, perhaps 
unrecognised or perhaps unacknowledged, within the thinking of 
subsequent generations, including Kant, Hegel and even Kierkegaard, is a 
history apparently unwritten and perhaps unwriteable, but, for all that, 
still important. It is in Kierkegaard that Pascal’s dialectics are
brought back to their home in Christian discourse, and it is in
Wittgenstein that these dialectics are prefigured in the rules and
anomalies, commonplaces and breakdowns of logic and language, as human 
beings struggle for balance between 1’esprit de géométrie et l’esprit de 
finesse.
Pascal's best known expression of the sublime in the order of mind comes 
in his remarks associated with the image of the "thinking reed". The 
universe with its immensity of perceptible and conceivable space, or a
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mere drop of water, may kill a human body, but this mental being is 
"encore plus noble", a member of an order of transcendent greatness, in 
the knowledge that he is dying and that the universe knows nothing of 
this. "It is not from space that I must get my dignity, but from the 
control of my thought. The possession of whole worlds will give me no 
more. By space the universe embraces me and swallows me up like an 
atom, by thought I embrace the universe". (Pensées Stewart, sl60 -
161; Krailsheimer s200). Pascal here anticipates Kant on the 
mathematically sublime (space, the swallower swallowed up by mind or 
reason) and on the dynamically sublime (the crushing universe crushed by 
aphoristic esprit or Geist).
Pascal seems not to have anticipated the way in which following 
generations would interpret what he saw as the sublime according to the 
order of love or grace in terms of a projection of the sublime according 
to the order of mind. Such a projection could, for Pascal, only have a 
large element of demonic caricature in it. If it appears unrealistic, 
with respect even to Pascal, to consider the possibility of anticipating 
such re-interpretation, then it is appropriate to recall Milton’s Satan 
who, in his valedictory ode to joy, anticipates this aspect of 
transcendental idealism, with its descendants and byproducts. Milton’s 
Satan enjoys a sense of his own sublimity, which points as far back as 
some pseudo-creative demiurge of Gnostic mythology, and as far forward 
as the solipsistic ethics of minimal survivalist selves descended 
perhaps from existentialism.
" Fairwell happy fields
Where joy for ever dwells : Hail horrors, hail
Infernal world, and thou profoundest Hell
Receive thy new Possessor : One who brings
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A mind not to be changed by Place or Time,
The mind is its own place, and in it self 
Can make a Heav’n of Hell, a Hell of Heav’n,
What matter where, if I be still the same...?"
(Paradise Lost, book one, lines 249 - 256)
This Satan, almost a Cartesian in respect of his mind-body dualism, 
seems set to become the muse of that post-enlightenment or Romantic 
poetry which, seemingly obsessed with the power of mind over the 
deadness of the world, explores to what extent the mind is lord and 
master, with external sense the servant of its will.
5.8 KANT’S VARIATION ON PASCAL
Kant, in his "Analytic of the Sublime" insists that if nature is to be
called sublime this should be "merely because it raises the imagination
to a presentation of those cases in which the mind can make itself 
sensible of the appropriate sublimity of the sphere of its o\m being, 
even above nature". It is in his discussion of the mathematically 
sublime that Kant appears most open to Pascal on the nobility of the 
human according to the order of mind. Kant summarises how, "In the
immeasurableness of nature and the incompetence of our faculty for 
adopting a standard proportionate to the aesthetic estimation of the 
magnitude of its realm (Kant’s emphasis is perhaps an echo of Pascal’s 
order), we found our own limitation. But with this we also found in our 
rational faculty another non-sensuous standard, one which has that 
infinity itself under it as a unit, and in comparison with which 
everything in nature is small, and so found in our minds a pre-eminence 
over nature even in its immeasurability". Similarly, for the
dynamically sublime, Kant writes.
227
"the irresistibility of the might of nature forces upon us the 
recognition of our physical helplessness as beings of nature, but at the 
same time reveals a faculty of estimating ourselves as independent of 
nature, and discovers a pre-eminence above nature that is the foundation 
of a self-preservation of quite another kind from that which may be 
assailed and brought into danger by external nature. This saves 
humanity in our own person from humiliation, even though as mortal men 
we have to submit to external violence". (Critique of Judgement Book 
2, B, s28). Hence the sublimity residing in our own mind is what makes 
us capable of attaining to the idea of the sublimity of the Godhead, 
"which inspires deep respect in us, not by the mere display of its might 
in nature, but more by the faculty which is planted in us of estimating 
that might without fear, and of regarding our estate as exalted above 
it". (Loc. cit).
Kant's insistence that sublimity is essentially a state of mind does not 
stop him from appreciation of certain of its social aspects. Thus, "War 
itself, if it is carried on with order and with a sacred respect for the 
rights of citizens, has something sublime in it..." in so far as it 
involves facing dangers with courage. Moreover, Kant holds that delight 
in the sublime, like delight in the beautiful, is universally 
communicable, though requiring a degree of culture. Furthermore, in 
contrast to all self-interested forms of isolation from society, there 
"is something approaching the sublime" in being self-sufficient, ie. not 
standing in need of society, without being unsociable, ie. without 
shunning it. This may show itself in a type of impartial sadness, which 
Kant calls a sublime and vigorous affection, directed to the evils which 
human beings inflict on themselves or one another.
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Here Kant touches on the kind of sublimity which is evident both in 
Simone Weil's essay on "L'Iliade, poeme de la force" and in much of her 
other writing, as well as her life, "Alain" (Emile Chartier) who taught 
Weil philosophy, interpreted Kant as if the third Critique were 
functionally equivalent to Pascal's third order, an interpretation not 
without some grounds in Kant's own writing. Weil's philosophy works in 
the area marked out by Pascal and Kant, and highlighted in Alain's 
following remark, where he uses "beauty" also for Kant's "sublimity". 
"Beauty is the meeting-place of the mind with nature, where mind 
recognises its good. There the true miracles, which reconcile what is 
noble and base in humanity, take place". (Quoted in Weil 1978, p.184). 
The congruence of aspects of Weil's thinking with aspects of 
Wittgenstein's has been touched on by various essayists, including Peter 
Winch. See, for example, his introduction to Weil (1978) and Winch 
(1972).
5.9 SCHOPENHAUER ON THE SUBLIME
Schopenhauer seems to be the main source or stimulant of Wittgenstein's 
Kantian tendencies, and an important, if not the main source of what 
will be presented later as Wittgenstein's understanding of the sublime. 
Schopenhauer's response to Kant on the sublime is exceptionally 
enthusiastic,
"By far the best part of the 'Critique of Aesthetic Judgement' is the 
theory of the sublime. It is incomparably more successful than that of 
the beautiful, and does not only give, as that does, the general method 
of investigation, but also a part of the right way to it - so much so 
that even though it does not give the real solution of the problem, it 
yet touches very closely upon it". ("Criticism of the Kantian 
Philosophy" WWI vol. 2 p. 155-56).
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Schopenhauer writes of the sublime as a disposition, frame of mind, 
feeling or character. It is the opposite of "the charming or 
attractive", ie. the opposite of that which excites the will by direct 
communication of the will's fulfilment. Thus sublime character arises 
when "something entirely unfavourable to the will becomes the object of 
pure contemplation, so that such contemplation can only be maintained by 
persistent turning away from the will and transcending its interests" 
(WWI vol 1, book 3 p.268). What distinguishes the sublime from the 
beautiful is that in the latter case "pure knowledge has gained the 
upper hand without a struggle". In the case of the sublime, pure 
knowledge is gained by struggle which involves a conscious and strenuous 
deliverance, by a free and conscious transcending, beyond the relations 
of the object of contemplation to the will and to the knowledge related 
to the will. This exaltation can therefore only be retained by a 
constant remembrance of the will as universally expressive "in its 
objectivity, the human body". This disposition can arise when objects, 
with significant form inviting our pure attention, are against the will 
in general, as it expresses itself "in its objectivity, the human body". 
Thus we need to be threatened in our bodiliness either by the 
irresistible predominance of the other's power, or by a sense of 
insignificance before immeasurable greatness, and while recognising this 
hostility, nevertheless to turn away from it, forcibly detaching 
ourselves from our will as we surrender ourselves to quieting attention, 
lingering gladly over the essence or Idea of these hostile powers. In 
this way one is raised above oneself, one’s person, one's will and all 
alienated will. One enters into the state of spiritual exaltation which 
is being filled with the sense of the sublime.
Schopenhauer elucidates this account by means of a hierarchy of degrees 
of sublimity, beginning with the weakest examples and ending with the
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strongest. While strong summer sunlight falling against warm stone-work 
expresses or symbolises the beautiful, the rays of the setting winter 
sun reflected by masses of frozen stone evoke a weak sense of the 
sublime in those who faintly remember warmer days as they contemplate 
the winter scene. A desert or wilderness, still, lifeless and empty, 
is, "as it were, a call to seriousness and contemplation apart from the 
will and all cravings". This imparts to the scene a touch of the 
sublime. It is here as if Schopenhauer were familiar not just with the 
Biblical wilderness but also with Japanese Buddhist stone-gardens. 
Schopenhauer goes on to show how, the more hostile the scene which 
evokes attention, the greater the opportunity for attention which is 
impartially detached from all that is threatening and terrible to the 
will or the body, Schopenhauer, like Kant, divides his account between 
the mathematically and the dynamically sublime, but appropriately for a 
prophet of the will, he begins with the dynamically sublime. He 
dissents from Kant's psychological explanation and "hypostases from 
scholastic philosophy", and even, he claims, from "moral reflections", 
by which he can only mean Kant's moral reflections, seeing that 
Schopenhauer's own account is as saturated as Kant's with moral 
reflections, though of a somewhat different type.
Thus, "in the undismayed beholder, the two-fold nature of his 
consciousness reaches the highest degree of distinctiveness". On the 
one hand, as an individual, he perceives himself as a frail phenomenon 
of will, a helpless, dependent victim of chance, "a vanishing nothing in 
the presence of stupendous might". On the other hand, beyond himself 
qua individual, he perceives himself as "the eternal peaceful knowing 
subject, the condition of the object", "supporter of this whole world",
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with "the terrific strife of nature" being only his idea, as he rests 
free from all necessities and desires, in quiet contemplation. 
Similarly, to switch to the mathematical mode of sublimity, we may lose 
ourselves in contemplation of the infinite greatness of the universe in 
space and time, feeling ourselves to "pass away and vanish into nothing 
like drops in the ocean. But at once there rises against this ghost of
our own nothingness, against such lying impossibility, the immediate
consciousness that all these worlds exist only as our idea, only as
modifications of the eternal subject of pure knowing, which we find
ourselves to be as soon as we forget our individuality, and which is the 
necessary supporter of all worlds and all times, the condition of their 
possibility. The vastness of the world which disquieted us before, 
rests now in us; our dependence upon it annulled by its dependence upon 
us... It is the felt consciousness of this that the Upanishads of the 
Vedas repeatedly express in such a multitude of different ways..." (loc 
cit) .
After illustrating spatial and historical or temporal aspects of the 
sublime, Schopenhauer, like Kant, concludes with the sublime character, 
Schopenhauer might at this point have confirmed that it is the sublime 
character which is open to, or even embodies and expresses, many forms 
of the sublime. However, instead, like Kant he acknowledges belatedly 
in his final section the social or interpersonal character of human 
existence, stressing that a person of sublime character contemplates 
others and himself impartially or impersonally, not letting personal 
happiness greatly affect him. Here Schopenhauer might have had Kant's 
ethics in mind after all. However there is a gnostic stress that in the 
end knowing matters more than suffering or joy. If happiness does come 
into it after all, it is, as Wittgenstein saw, the happiness of the life
232
of knowledge. Schopenhauer, like Kant, remains committed to Pascal’s 
order of mind. For a fuller understanding of what sublimity of 
character might mean one has to look elsewhere, perhaps back to Pascal 
or Augustine, or perhaps to Kierkegaard and Schleiermacher among 
Schopenhauer’s contemporaries, or to the Dostoevsky of The Brothers 
Karamazov, or to the Emerson who underlies James' humanism. It is 
noteworthy that among Schopenhauer's successors and critics, it is 
Nietzsche who is unstinting in his admiration for both Dostoevsky and 
Emerson, while struggling to transform the image of the sublime 
character through his own dialectics with Apollo and Dionysus.
5.10 THE SUBLIME IN EMERSON
The limits of the present discussion must regretfully be drawn so as to 
preclude any exploration of the vicissitudes of the sublime in Nietzsche 
and Freud, even though Wittgenstein's interest in Freud was not 
negligible, as these areas are too complex and too contested to be 
manageable in this context. However, as a preliminary to returning to 
the threads of the sublime in the younger Wittgenstein, it is worth 
recalling that Wittgenstein's considerable knowledge of American 
literature extended to Nietzsche's hero, Emerson. Given the 
Wittgenstein family links with America, as well as European interest in 
Emerson, it is far from surprising. One of Wittgenstein’s remarks which 
shows his assimilation of Emerson comes from 1931. Wittgenstein had 
been ruminating over Spengler's hints that Beethoven (and perhaps 
Goethe) tackled problems to do with the limits or the ending of the 
intellectual world of "modern" Western Europe. Attempts to describe a 
culture as a whole, produced before the end of that culture and from 
within it, could "only be written in the obscure language of prophecy, 
comprehensible to very few indeed" (CV 9). Such problems, Wittgenstein
233
speculates, are perhaps lost as far as western philosophy is concerned, 
though Nietzsche perhaps "passed by them".
Wittgenstein continues, "But I do not come near these problems. When I 
"have done with the world" I shall have created an amorphous 
(transparent) mass and the world in all its variety will be left on one 
side like an uninteresting lumber-room (GerÜmpelkammer). Or perhaps 
more precisely: the whole outcome of this entire work is for the world 
to be set on one side. (A throwing into-the-lumber-room of the whole 
world). (Rumpelkammer) (CV9). Here Wittgenstein is clearly reacting 
against his earlier essentialism and reaching towards his later concern 
with Jamesian (as well as Spenglerian) family-relationships and 
varieties. Putting the world in all its variety on one side like an 
uninteresting lumber-room has affinities with gnostic world-rejection. 
However the simile or metaphor of the lumber-room is very strong and 
points to a much-quoted passage in Emerson’s 1837 Phi Beta Kappa 
address on "The American Scholar". The affinity is not merely verbal 
but one of sensibility. The heart of Emerson's passage is "...show me 
the sublime presence of the highest spiritual cause lurking, as it 
always does lurk, in these suburbs and extremities of nature... and the 
world lies no longer a dull miscellany and lumber-room..." The 
juxtaposition here of Emerson's sense of the sublime and Wittgenstein's 
imagery, including the lumber-room, and the city (suburbs and 
extremities of nature), and much else, make it worthwhile to consider a 
fuller version of the passage before continuing more directly with 
Wittgenstein. Passages of Emerson such as this, as well as "Fate", 
arguably inspired the Longfellow poem which Wittgenstein thought of as 
providing a motto for his work. Such passages James had in mind when, 
praising Emerson for seeing that the commonest person's act can lay hold
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of eternity, he was moved to quote, "So nigh is grandeur to our dust, so 
near is God to man". (White 1972 pp 113-114). Thus, even if it cannot 
be shown that Wittgenstein had read the following passage of Emerson, it 
remains a passage expressive of a sensibility for the sublime which is 
close to Wittgenstein, especially in his later work. (McGuinness (WLi), 
pp224-225) has now confirmed that Wittgenstein read Emerson at least as 
early as 1914) .
"The literature of the poor, the feelings of the child, the philosophy 
of the street, the meaning of household life, are the topics of the 
time. It is a great stride. It is a sign - is it not? - of new vigor 
when the extremities are made active, when currents of warm life run
into the hands and the feet. I ask not for the great, the remote, the
romantic; what is doing in Italy or Arabia; what is Greece art, or 
Provencal minstrelsy; I embrace the common, I explore and sit at the
feet of the familiar, the low. Give me insight into today, and you may
have the antique and future worlds. % a t  would we really know the
meaning of? The meat is in the firkin, the milk in the pan; the ballad 
in the street; the news of the boat; the glance of the eye; the form and 
the gait of the body; - show me the ultimate reason of these matters; 
show me the sublime presence of the highest spiritual cause lurking, as 
it always does lurk, in these suburbs and extremities of nature; let me 
see every trifle bristling with the polarity that ranges it instantly on 
an eternal law; and the shop, the plough, and the ledger referred to the 
like cause by which light undulates and poets sing; - and the world lies 
no longer a dull miscellany and lumber-room, but has form and order; 
there is no trifle, there is no puzzle, but one design unites and 
animates the furthest pinnacle and the lowest trench". (Emerson, "The 
American Scholar" 1983 pp68-69).
235
The polarity which ranges every bristling trifle instantly on an eternal 
law is the polarity of the sublime presence always lurking in 
extremities and in trifles; it is the one design which unites and 
animates the furthest pinnacle and the lowest trench. Emerson, 
apparently rejecting anything like Pascal's Augustinian Christology,
still seems to know more about Pascal's third order, the order of love, 
of grace or wisdom, than many more probable prophets.
5.11 THE RANGE OF ANALOGICAL THINKING; AGAINST FIDEISM
A hostile critic might object at this point that the above juxaposition 
of Emerson with Pascal, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard amounts 
to conflating an American populist version of anti-intellectualism or 
anti-rationalism with European elitist versions of the same tendencies. 
Moreover, if we can think here of a continuum rather than a dichotomy, 
Tolstoy's elitist populism, in his writings as in his life, would come 
somewhere in the middle, as might Wittgenstein’s attitudes and style of 
living.
The main point to be made in reply to such a critic is that
Wittgenstein's later work, in its central tendencies, aims to show that 
arguing or reasoning by juxtaposition and comparison of examples is not 
a poor relation of the forms of rationality developed in mathematics and 
in logic. It is not a shanty-town for squatters outwith these new 
planned suburbs of language, but is the older heart of the city.
This approach opens up the possibility of a reconciliation of argument 
and spirituality, understanding and faith, such as aimed at by Augustine
and others. If it is too soon to conclude with certainty that
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Wittgenstein succeeded in this aim, it is also too soon to conclude that 
he failed, particularly when the potentiality of his own rational 
juxtapositions of materials relating to the varieties of the sublime 
has, as yet, scarcely been recognised, let alone fully appreciated or 
evaluated. If Wittgenstein’s aim emerges as not being too wide of the 
target, then this will illuminate others who have been half-recognised 
and half-misunderstood, even perhaps by themselves at times, as if they 
were "against reason" or "anti-intellectual", when a better 
understanding of them, ie. a more just, more accurate and more loving 
attention to them, would see them as at least sometimes struggling to 
revise styles of argument in the direction taken and given by 
Wittgenstein. (See Wittgenstein's reported comments on styles of 
thinking [p27-28, s 34-41] and on undermining a kind of reasoning 
[p63-64, etc.] in LG),
Thus Emerson's polarity ranging every bristling trifle instantly on an 
eternal law, and his one design which unites and animates the furthest 
pinnacle and the lowest trench, may be read not just as his gesturing at 
the sublime, but also as his pointing towards the polarity, law, or 
design described above as Wittgenstein's direction, ie. the direction of 
the juxtaposition of examples for the sake of argument and understanding 
in the context of living, a direction or ladder which is itself a 
version of the sublime, but a ladder which is not necessarily 
indispensable in a particular version when this version has been 
personally assimilated by alert and strong readers, its better students.
Similarly Pascal, for all his interest in Montaigne and his 
contemporaries' retrievals of varieties of scepticism, is not fully or 
justly understandable or dismissible as a sophisticated fideist in
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collusion with Montaigne, who somehow strangely falls into the abyss of 
his own version of gnosticism in stressing the observer's isolation in 
the universe and "the infinite distance between body and mind" (Pensées 
s308). For given his dialectics of the sublime, with their Augustinian 
Christological formation, that infinite distance only "symbolises the 
infinitely more infinite distance between mind and love" (loc cit), the 
love which not only transcends but also reconciles body and mind, as in 
the Word become flesh. The third order has its wisdom, which transcends 
the transcendence of the first by the second order (loc.cit.). This 
wisdom (Pascal trusts) is at work in the writing and reorganising of his 
fragmentary remarks. It is in comparing differences and similarities 
between these that the heart discovers its many reasons, of which a
dogmatic and onesidedly essentialist reason knows nothing, or next to
nothing.
Thus Pascal's master-game, his language-game of language-games, shares 
light with Wittgenstein, who could also have written, "Let no one say 
that I have said nothing new; my arrangement of matter is new. In
playing tennis we both use the same ball, but one of us places it
better". (Pensées s676). Pascal insists, "We show greatness, not by 
being at one extreme, but by touching both at once and occupying all the 
space in between" (Pensées s681). Both he and Wittgenstein learn and 
teach a method of occupying "the space in between" by writing, editing
and struggling with fragmentary remarks. And if this method does not
catch on and work for others, as they work out their own salvation with 
it, they will be left in a position akin to the "Plato" of the Seventh 
Letter (341d), where "knowledge" that cannot be put into words comes
like a blaze kindled by a leaping spark, or as Pascal puts it, in
dialogue with an unidentified voice, "But perhaps it is only a sudden
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flash of the soul from one extreme to the other; perhaps greatness only 
ever lies in a single point, as in a glowing ember?" Pascal replies to 
himself, again as if for Wittgenstein, "Maybe, but at least that shows 
how agile the soul is, even if it does not show its range", (Loc cit).
It would take admiration for and understanding of a passage of such 
strength as Emerson's in "The American Scholar" to lead someone like 
Wittgenstein to write, "I think I summed up my attitude to philosophy 
when I said; philosophy ought really to be written only as a poetic 
composition. It must, as it seems to me, be possible to gather from
this how far my thinking belongs to the present, future or past. For I
was thereby revealing myself as someone who cannot quite do what he 
would like to be able to do". (CV 24). In fact, Wittgenstein does go 
on, with Pascal and Emerson, to show inarticulate platonists the "range" 
of the soul set free by the gift of parrhesia.
5.12 THE SUBLIME IN REGULATIVE PRACTICE
The earliest evidence of Wittgenstein's assimilation of a particular 
understanding of the sublime, after his first reading of Schopenhauer, 
can be dated to about 1910. Malcolm (1984 p58) reports that
Wittgenstein told him of a turning-point at this time away from his 
earlier contemptuous attitudes towards religion. It came about through 
attending a "mediocre" play. This has plausibly been identified as
Ludwig Anzengruber's Die Kreuzelschreiber. According to Malcolm's 
recollection of Wittgenstein, he said that one of the characters
expressed the thought that no matter what happened in the world, nothing
bad could happen to him - he was independent of fate and circumstances.
Wittgenstein was impressed by this thought, which in Malcolm is
described as "stoic". For the first time Wittgenstein "saw the
possibility of religion". Later (p60) Malcolm writes of Wittgenstein
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himself, "But I think that there was in him, in some sense, the 
possibility of religion".
Now the relevant part of the play in question is the beginning of the 
third act, where a character proclaims, "Whether you are lying six feet 
deep in the earth beneath the grass or whether you have to face this 
many more thousand times again ~ nothing can happen to you - you belong 
to all of it and all of it belongs to you. Nothing can happen to you. 
And this was so wonderful that I shouted to all the others around me: 
Nothing can happen to you... Now be joyful, joyful - Nothing can happen 
to you". (Anzengruber 1898, vol.7, p279). Compare Schopenhauer,
Emerson and James.
If this is "stoic” , then it is stoicism seen through lenses ground by 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. It is close to the retrieval of stoicism by 
Simone Weil, stoicism in the light of a later understanding of the 
sublime. As has already been noted, such gestures in the direction of 
the sublime recur in the earliest of Wittgenstein's surviving Notebooks, 
in the Tractatus and in the Lecture on Ethics of 1929. Nor do they 
disappear, as if drowned by the flood of changes in the 1930s. For in 
1950 Wittgenstein writes, "A theology which insists on the use of 
certain particular words and phrases, and outlaws others, does not make 
anything clearer.... It gesticulates with words, as one might say, 
because it wants to say something and does not know how to express it. 
Practice gives the words their sense". (CV 85). The type of practice 
which gives sense to talk of the sublime is described in many of 
Wittgenstein’s remarks of the period 1929 - 1951, including the passage 
leading up to the last quotation. The thought of this passage may be 
related easily to the varieties of the sublime if its paragraphs are 
considered in a different order. For the practice that gives the words
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their sense is the practice expressive of an attitude. "The attitude 
that's in question is that of taking a certain matter seriously and 
then, beyond a certain point, no longer regarding it as serious, but 
maintaining that something else is even more important" (CV 85).
This is the attitude we find in the Tractatus, at more than one level of 
its ladder. The attitude towards logic, and then towards aesthetics and 
ethics, fits this pattern. Likewise with the levels of concern in the 
Lecture on Ethics and in the Investigations, where what matters most is 
that others should appropriate and work through this method, so as to 
recognise the range which runs between the two extremes of the goal 
(already present in the way) and the way (still present in the goal).
In Wittgenstein's remark about taking a matter seriously, but then 
insisting on what matters more (loc, cit.), we have a formulation for 
the varieties of the sublime which is open to the way in which Pascal's 
order of love takes up both the order of mind and the order of body. 
For Wittgenstein gives as one of his main examples, the problem of what 
different people mean when they say they believe in God or in the 
Trinity.
Here Wittgenstein names Karl Barth, though without making it clear 
whether he is thinking of Barth's better practices or worse practices, 
or both. The deeply trinitarian character of Barth's thinking has been 
recognised and explored, in somewhat different ways, by the work of 
Moltmann, Jungel, von Balthasar and others. This tradition and 
programme of work elaborate the central theme that the glory of God is 
that he is as he does in Christ crucified. This is far from clashing 
with Irenaeus' anti-gnostic maxim that the glory of God is a living man, 
for the divine work of reconciliation in Christ involves confirmation, 
renewal and fulfilment of the whole of creation, both in bodily and
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mental dimensions. (Cp Irenaeus' key concept of "recapitulation*'). 
Barth, with or without Kierkegaard - about whom he is ambivalent, has 
deep affinities with Pascal. As God the Father and God the Son, in all 
the distancing expressed by Good Friday (and Easter Saturday), are at 
one as God the Spirit, so the order of body and the order of mind are 
reconciled in the order of love. In Pascal's three orders we have a 
vestige of the Trinity which is no less important for being risky and 
which looks forward to the trinitarianism of Barth and his successors.
There are two remarks of Wittgenstein which give further support to this 
interpretation of CV 85 on Barth and God as Trinity. The more important 
of them is Wittgenstein's reply to Waismann's question, "Is the 
existence of the world connected with what is ethical?" According to 
Waismann, Wittgenstein replied, "Men have felt that here there is a 
connection and they have expressed it thus; God the Father created the 
world, the Son of God (or the Word that comes from God) is that which is 
ethical. That the Godhead is thought of as divided and, again, as one 
being indicates that there is a connection here". (WVC p 118).
In much popular piety, as in the "Apostles' Creed" (the baptismal creed 
of the Roman Church, using the baptismal trinitarian formula of Matthew 
28:19 for its structure), God the Father is connected especially with 
the work of creation, while the Son of God is connected with the work of 
salvation. Under the influence of Kant much popular piety, within and 
beyond Protestantism, came to assimilate the saving with the ethical and 
the Word with practical reason or mind/will. If Pascal's three orders 
(like Joachim of Fiore's three ages, which meant so much for the 
secularised eschatology of Lessing and others) can be intelligibly 
regarded as vestiges of trinitarian thinking, then to insist on
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differences between the bodily and the mental, or between the 
non-ethical and the ethical, is to think of the Godhead as divided, 
while to transcend this gnostic abyss with the mediatorial work of the 
third order is to think of the Godhead as one. The connection 
Wittgenstein is after seems to involve not just the difference(s) and 
similarity(ies) between the ethical and the non-ethical, the type of 
answer Waismann was probably looking for, but also the connection 
between such apparently secular discourse and religious discourse.
This answer to Waismann was not an isolated occurence, for as well as 
the reference to varieties of trinitarianism in connexion with Barth 
(CV85) from 1950, there is also from the 1930s or 1940s a report of 
Wittgenstein answering in Trinity College, Cambridge, a question
concerning his apparent contrast between ordinary grammar and deep 
grammar. His reply consisted of a question to the effect: should one
say in trinitarian discourse that the Father and the Son are one God, or 
is one God? To suppose this answer was intended to show the apparent 
logical nonsense of such discourse, or even its immunity from other 
rules of discourse, as if within a religious ghetto, would be a mistake, 
in view of Wittgenstein's trinitarian remarks of 1930 and 1950. These 
passages will be discussed further in chapter eight.
In the 1950 passage, Wittgenstein’s formula for the sublime is
exemplified in two further ways. It can be said, "it's a very grave 
matter that such and such a man should have died before he could 
complete a certain piece of work"; yet in another ("deeper") sense, this 
is not what matters. Similarly a religious person's apparent craving 
for a causal explanation of "everything" gets its point from a craving
for a yet more important matter, a particular attitude to all (causal)
explanation which, however, stops short of his God. Explanations of the
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causal variety come to an end, as do justifications, in our practical 
acceptances. "My life consists in my being content to accept many 
things" (OC s344). But there remains the possibility of a kind of 
explanation, justification and understanding which shows or sees the 
sublime pattern of these life-acceptances in small steps of piecemeal 
comparison, with the reasoned discussion these make possible. Analogies 
of the sublime may be found in many places, including each small 
investigation of difference and similarity.
Chapter Six:
Tolstoy, James and Pascal
244
CHAPTER SIX
TOLSTOY, JAMES AND PASCAL
The structure of chapter six
6.1 Opening summary for chapter six
6.2 Tolstoy and Schopenhauer
6.3 Tolstoy, James and the Tractatus
6.4 Introducing James on Tolstoy
6.5 The sense of an ending
6.6 James’ dialectic of the happy and unhappy
6.7 James on the last judgement
6.8 The world in contradiction?
6.9 Pascal’s presence
6.10 Dialectical grammar as the way of the sublime
6.11 Investigating Tolstoy
6.12 Tolstoy’s "moral" death and resurrection
6.13 Tolstoy’s theological grammar
6.14 Wittgenstein’s grammatical knots
6.15 James and Tolstoy on love for enemies
6.16 Pascal's dialectics of truth and love
6.17 Kierkegaard and Pascal
6.18 Pascal and Tolstoy's struggle
6.19 Wittgenstein, Tolstoy and Pascal
6.20 Wittgenstein’s ethics foreshadowed
6.21 Tolstoy, the Gospels and the Tractatus
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6.1 OPENING SUMMARY FOR CHAPTER SIX
Wittgenstein was profoundly affected by Tolstoy’s paraphrase of the 
Gospels. Wittgenstein’s response makes better sense when understood as 
in part an outcome of his earlier response to William James’ Varieties. 
The latter work included extensive consideration of Tolstoy’s ^  
Confession, which illustrates James’ sense of the sublime way in which 
religion may make a happy virtue out of necessity.
James and Tolstoy also come together in Wittgenstein's written response 
to his father’s death as, "worth a whole life". A genuinely happy life 
is one that leads to a good death. Similarly, in Pascal’s dialectical 
grammar, truth (or honesty) and love enrich each other in a sublime 
wholeness of life. For Pascal, as for Augustine and Kierkegaard, 
sharing truth truthfully and sharing love lovingly mean/s bringing 
together truthfulness and love in a dialectical grammar which shows the 
sublime in action. Augustine’s "nonsense" about talkative ones who say 
nothing (Confessiones 1.4) illuminates those who suppose they can 
communicate truth without love and love without truth. James, Tolstoy 
and Pascal on love for strangers and enemies, as expressed in the 
Gospels, point to implications for belief, knowledge, understanding and 
truth, as well as for less overtly epistemological forms of ethics. 
Whether this is shown more clearly in the stories of James and of 
Tolstoy, or in Pascal’s fragmented remarks, or in Kierkegaard’s 
effusions, depends perhaps on where one is standing.
The sense of the importance of an ending, through which only "the 
impossible" can save us from the impossible, evident in the Tractatus 
and the Lecture on Ethics, memorialises, as well as Wittgenstein's
246
conversion, Tolstoy’s "moral" death and resurrection, and Karl 
Wittgenstein’s life and death transfigured.
6.2 TOLSTOY AND SCHOPENHAUER
The ways in which Wittgenstein moved against or beyond Schopenhauer are 
marked not only by what Wittgenstein did with Frege and Russell, James 
and Kierkegaard, Kraus and Sraffa, but also with Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, 
Judaism and Christianity. While all of these can be read through 
Schopenhauer’s spectacles, it is clear that Wittgenstein was moved by 
their differences from Schopenhauer even more than by their
similarities, as he eagerly assimilated key aspects for his work of
"clarification with COURAGE" (CV 19).
Tolstoy was early among the many distinguished writers and other artists 
influenced by Schopenhauer. He immersed himself in Schopenhauer, and 
consequently Kant, in the summer of 1869, as soon as War and Peace was 
completed. He then planned and began the first Russian translation of 
Schopenhauer’s masterpiece but soon dropped out in order to write Anna 
Karenina. Schopenhauer seems to have remained for him, however, the 
embodiment of the scope and limits of philosophy. As such Schopenhauer 
helped to set the scene for, and perhaps even to precipitate, the deep 
crisis which began to overwhelm Tolstoy while writing the second half of 
Anna Karenina and which led to the writing of My Confession during 
1879-82.
6.3 TOLSTOY, JAMES AND THE TRACTATUS
If Wittgenstein did not know the whole of Tolstoy’s Confession at first
hand, he certainly knew of it in parts by 1912, thanks to James’ 
far-reaching discussions of Tolstoy’s crisis and conversion in the
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Varieties. See Lectures 6 and 7, pp 156-163; Lecture 8 pp 182-83, 
note 1 and pp 189-191; Lecture 10 p246 note 1; and Lectures 14 and
15 pp 346-350. In this last section, the reference to Tolstoy links 
with a discussion of the prophetic character and (Emersonian) sublimity 
of Tolstoyan love of enemies; Emerson is not named here, but is present 
- masked as a "St Paul" who teaches "the essential sacredness of 
everyone". So far as I am aware, it has not been previously remarked 
that the contents and structure of the Tractatus in effect reproduce 
Tolstoy's conversion-crisis as portrayed in James’ Varieties. Through 
his conversion-crisis, Tolstoy’s life was turned in the direction given 
by a vision of the sublime present in love for enemies. This came to 
Tolstoy through the Gospels and especially through the "Sermon on the 
Mount" of Matthew chapters 5,6 and 7. Wittgenstein’s retrieval of these 
things in 1914-1915 is memorialised in the way his book points to the 
sublime in Tolstoy’s transcendence of his crisis. However the Tractatus 
points to this quietly, anonymously, as it were "indirectly", in the 
hope that it may become for its reader a repetition of that crisis and 
so a repetition of opportunity, a recurrence of the right time, for a 
crisis-transcending conversion. The trouble with the Tractatus is not 
as if it were a heap of useless mechanical bits and pieces, but rather
as if it were a clock which is not adjusted to tell the right time, as
Wittgenstein is reported to have said. However, sometimes it is still 
possible to tell the right time from it, if one knows how to make
allowances for it.
James' style of thinking in the Varieties may be called psychosomatic, 
in view of the interpenetration of his psychological and medical
interests. In order to begin substantiating the claims of the above
paragraph, James’ style of thinking needs to be transposed into 
Wittgenstein’s Fregean style, or rather into that more platonic (or
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neo-platonic) version of it which was developed by the younger 
Wittgenstein. For, as Wittgenstein wrote at an unknown date, possibly 
in the late 1930s or 1940s (since most of his related remarks on his own 
style of thinking came from this period, eg. CV 53, 60, 71, 76), "The 
style of my sentences in extraordinarily strongly influenced by Frege. 
And if I wanted to, I could establish this influence where at first 
sight no one would see it". (Z s712).
This hiding place could well be Wittgenstein's later style of thinking, 
which - with its stress on what is shared and shareable between thinkers 
- radiates a sublimity which may be seen, at least in this respect, as 
related to the sublime in platonism and neo-platonism. The following 
remark, at the end of CV in 1951, may be taken as partial confirmation 
of this, bearing in mind that "great" like "deep", belongs to the heart 
of Wittgenstein's vocabulary for the sublime. "You cannot assess 
yourself properly if you are not well versed in the categories. 
(Frege's style of writing is sometimes great ; Freud writes excellently 
and it is a pleasure to read him, but his writing is never great)". (CV 
87). For it is character which gives greatness to stylistic talent. 
(CV65). Here Wittgenstein is thinking, not of "mere intellectual 
skeleton", which is how Frege is often read, as well as Kraus before the 
publication of his private letters in 1974 (Canetti 1987 "The Hew Karl 
Kraus"; cp Wittgenstein CV 65), but of "a complete human being. That 
too is why the greatness of what a man writes depends on everything else 
he writes and does". (Loc cit). Here the category which Wittgenstein 
is touching on is that of sublimity of character. Compare Kant and 
Schopenhauer on sublimity of character.
6.4 INTRODUCING JAMES OH TOLSTOY
Before examining the part of Varieties chapter 6 which discusses
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Tolstoy, it will be helpful to set the scene for this by considering 
selected aspects of earlier parts of that chapter. James' strength of 
interest in Tolstoy's crisis cannot be unrelated to his own crisis 
between his 26th and 28th years, itself involving worries concerning 
necessity and freedom, determinism and the will, and so within the 
tradition of Kant and Schopenhauer. The title of Lecture 6 of the 
Varieties, where James introduces Tolstoy, is "The Sick Soul". James 
begins with reminders of the phenomena of vitality and mortality, 
including references to healthy-mindedness in Spinoza, Luther and 
Molinos. James' samples of the ideal type of healthy-mindedness and its 
opposite are close neighbours of what Wittgenstein writes about in his 
earliest surviving Notebooks (NB) as the unhappy and happy man, each 
with his respective life-world. James frequently relates the phenomena 
of healthy or sick souls to happiness or unhappiness, or to obviously 
related language. However the affirmity is much closer that merely 
verbal.
For just as, in James' understanding, healthy-minded humanity must 
undergo baptism in the depths of sick-minded humanity, without which it 
cannot rise again to reach its goal, so in Wittgenstein's earliest 
Notebooks happy humanity must be reconciled with the unhappy humanity 
from which it is estranged in the world of spatio-temporal facts. The 
author of The Brothers Karamazov prefaced his "divine comedia" with the 
words, "Truly, truly, I say to you, unless a grain of wheat falls into 
the earth and dies, it remains alone? but if it dies, it bears much 
fruit" (John 12:24). About him Wittgenstein writes, "And Dostoievsky is 
right when he says that the man who is happy is fulfilling the purpose 
of his existence" (NB 73 for 6.7.1916).
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6.5 THE SENSE OF AN ENDING
At this point we need to note that Wittgenstein's reading of Dostoevsky 
and James seems to have influenced, and - later - been influenced by, 
his own experience at the time of the death of his father, Karl 
Wittgenstein. The day after his father's death Wittgenstein wrote to 
Russell, ".... He had the most beautiful death that I can imagine.... I 
did not feel sad for a moment during all the last hours, but most joyful 
and I think that this death was worth a whole life". (21 January 1913;
McGuinness (WLi) pl66). McGuinness comments, "... A good life should 
issue in a death one could welcome: perhaps, even, a good life was one 
that led to a good death...." (Op. cit. pl67). Without this sense of an 
ending, in which one can see a pattern for a whole life, all that was 
lived through before it could seemed uniformly devalued - relatively 
valueless. However, with this sense of an ending, all that was lived 
through before such a death could appear altogether wonderful, 
expressive of an experience of absolute wonder. (Compare Wittgenstein's 
last words to his friends, "Tell them I've had a wonderful life" 
(Malcolm 1984, M 81) and his reference to a widely shareable experience 
of absolute wonder in his Lecture on Ethics).
This is the wonder of a life seen "sub specie aeternitatis", as a 
parable or sacrament of the world as a limited whole, embraced by and 
expressive of the infinite logical space which "doesn't rival" or 
"exclude" anything finite and relative, a life transfigured in the light 
of the all-inclusive grammar of logic, ethics and aesthetics. (Compare 
PR s 138 and CV 27; "The way to solve the problem you see in life.... a 
bright halo round his life, not a dubious background.") This sense of 
an ending, as an occasion for transformation in our reading of all that 
leads towards it, influences the way in which Wittgenstein structures
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his Tractatus and Lecture on Ethics. In the Investigations, these 
dialectics of the sublime are embodied in the words and work of 
Augustine himself, already at the beginning of the Investigations. For 
Augustine, sharing with his readers his own alienation from language, 
and all that belongs together in language, opens the way for overcoming 
that alienation, as his own developing responsibility suggests.
It was in June 1912 that Wittgenstein had written to Russell in praise 
of Varieties for helping him to get rid of "Sorge", ie the sense of 
futility which Goethe had identified in Faust, part two. (McGuinness 
1988, (WLi) 129). James in chapter six of Varieties stresses that, 
"Just as we saw that in healthy-mindedness there are shallower and 
profounder levels, happiness like that of the mere animal, and more 
regenerate sorts of happiness, so also are there different levels of the 
morbid mind, and the one is much more formidable than the other." 
(Chapter 6, p 143). Compare Wittgenstein's comment that, "The problems 
of life are insoluble on the surface and can only be solved in depth. 
They are insoluble in surface dimensions" (CV 74, 1948). Thus, for
Wittgenstein "Religion is, as it were the calm bottom of the sea at its 
deepest point, which remains calm however high the waves on the surface 
may be, - " (CV 53, 1946).
6.6 JAMES' DIALECTIC OF THE HAPPY AND UNHAPPY
For James, the superficially happy person is one who takes his 
happiness, in its estrangement from life's humiliating failures, as 
being the essence of things, the key to the meaning of life. Similarly 
the superficially unhappy person is one who takes his unhappiness, in 
its resentful estrangement from life's joy, as being the essence of the 
meaning of things. Both the superficially happy and the superficially
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unhappy have what James calls, "the secrets of their prison-house", to 
which James, with his audience, needs to listen.
Here is a deep use and meaning of the anti-essentialism suggested by 
James and used by the later Wittgenstein: to enable those apparently
merely happy or unhappy, each with their own secret key to the essential 
meaning of things, to listen to each other more seriously, so as to open 
their mutual prison-houses and find deliverance from their secret, 
superficial frames of mind. However, for the younger Wittgenstein, a 
revised Fregean-platonic style of thinking seemed a better candidate for 
fulfilling this function with clarity and power, rather than the style 
of James and other varieties of American pragmatist, whose stories about 
use, meaning, truth and essence, as heard and attacked by Russell and 
Moore, seemed unusable.
James begins his listening to the prison-secrets of the unhappy with 
Goethe, projecting a Schopenhauerian frame of mind, within which human 
existence "is but the perpetual rolling of a rock that must be raised up 
again for ever" (Varieties pl46). This is the sense of "Sorge" against 
which, Wittgenstein told Russell, James' book was so helpful (Op. cit. 
See also LRKM plO).
6.7 JAMES ON THE LAST JUDGEMENT
After listening to Goethe wearing a Schopenhauerian mask, James also 
listens briefly to Luther. Luther's prayer that the Lord may come with 
his last judgement seems at first expressive of world-weariness or 
life-weariness. However, listening to Luther on the last judgement, and 
then to Robert Louis Stevenson's healthy-minded (sublime) 
acknowledgement that "failure is the fate allotted.... Our business is
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to continue to fail in good spirits", evokes from James a remarkable 
footnote on belief in a final, divine judgement. This footnote, 
together with James' notions of the importance of listening to one 
another, and of the importance of a right-minded practice of confession, 
as within the Church, can be regarded as contributing to the depth of 
significance in Wittgenstein's phrase, "until we meet again at the last 
judgement". James writes as follows:
"The God of many men is little more than their court of appeal against 
the damnatory judgement passed on their failures by the opinion of this 
world. To our own consciousness there is usually a residuum of worth 
left over after our sins and errors have been told off - our capacity of 
acknowledging and regretting them is the germ of a bitter self in posse 
at least. But the world deals with us in actu and not in posse : and of 
this hidden germ, not to be guessed at from without, it never takes 
account. Then we turn to the All-Knower, who knows our bad, but knows 
this good in us also, and who is just. We cast ourselves with our 
repentance on his mercy : only by an All-Knower can we finally be
judged. So the need of a God very definitely emerges from this sort of 
experience of life". (Varieties Ch.6, pl47, note 2)
In certain contexts when the judgement of failure which others deliver 
seems relatively justified, it may become tempting to say that James is 
here a just judge of religious trickery or cheating. However, in other 
contexts, when others deliver a judgement of failure which seems 
overwhelmingly unjust, a divine court of appeal becomes a different 
matter, in spite of prior uneasiness at notions of the divine as a 
compensation for human weakness. The importance of secret sins may be a 
price that some religious people pay for the importance of secret 
righteousness in secret recognition of sins. That secrecy here seems to
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be of the essence may also create uneasiness, in the context of a 
critique of Cartesian insistence on the essential privacy of the mental. 
It is in this latter context that Wittgenstein writes, "There is indeed 
the case where someone later reveals his inmost heart to me by a 
confession ; but that this is so cannot offer me any explanation of 
outer and inner, for I have to give credence to the confession. For 
confession is of course something exterior. Look at people who doubt 
even in these circumstances, and at ones who do not doubt. Only God 
sees the most secret thoughts. But why should these be all that 
important? Some are important, not all. And need all human beings 
count them as important?" (Z s558-560, paragraphing suppressed).
The sense of this quotation is, I suggest, more evident if we add 
internal quotation-marks to "confession is of course something exterior" 
and to, "only God sees the most secret thoughts". For confession can 
sensibly be called both an inner matter and an outer one? and, among 
those who insist that it must be called "outer", some prominence is 
achieved by prisoners of Cartesianism as well as by certain types of 
anti-Catholic religious protesters.
The point of appealing, as the younger Wittgenstein did regularly, to 
"until we meet again at the last judgement", could well be to move the 
phenomena identified by James to a higher order. Here and now, we meet, 
or try to meet, one another subject to the uncertainties and 
difficulties just discussed, but we may do so in the hope expressed by 
appealing to a judgement which will set us free from all attempts to use 
"divine judgement" as an ideological weapon, either against others or 
against ourselves. This may set us free to meet again, in a way which 
confirms, renews and fulfils earlier meetings and attempts at meeting.
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(Compare CV33 on not being able to believe that the Lord "will come to 
judge me").
The same point is expressed by Wittgenstein's remark, "We might say that 
in Christianity God says to men : Don't act a tragedy, don't act out 
heaven and hell on earth. Heaven and hell are my province" (CV 14, 
1931, translation by Rhees (1981) pl85). On one level, that of dogmatic 
self-confidence, we enact, or try to enact, heaven on earth when we act 
as if we were final judges against others, and so encourage them to act 
in the same way against us. This may be done in the name of God, or 
against the name of God, or in apparent ignorance of God. In all these 
ways we may unintentionally create hell on earth for others and so for 
ourselves, as in religious or ideological or anti-religious wars or 
crusades.
At another level, that of despair, interpretation of Wittgenstein's 
saying needs to be informed by a particular, though perhaps distorted, 
sense of the sublime, as James suggests both in his reference to R L 
Stevenson and in his pointing to the possibility of a sense of the 
sublime being at work in confession. The second level of interpretation 
is anticipated by Milton's Satan, in his valediction to joy, proclaiming 
that "the mind is its own place" and that, if he can enact hell on 
earth, he can in this way enact the heaven of his own inward, mental 
identity, in proud self-transcendence. To try to enact heaven on earth 
by means of enacting hell on earth is a formula for Pascal's order of 
mind trying in despair to make itself self-sufficient, or for a gnostic 
conflation of creation with fall or sin, as in Marcion or Schopenhauer, 
or for a morbid Romanticism or existentialism which glorifies suicide.
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The radical alternative, both to such perhaps "unintentional" tragedies 
of pride and to such perhaps "intentional" tragedies of despair, lies in 
the direction pointed out by Wittgenstein, when he speaks of meeting 
"again at the last judgement" or writes implying that God enacts heaven 
and hell as his business, in this respect not unlike Wittgenstein's 
early view of "logic" which "must look after itself". The radical 
alternative, to which James points with his descent and ascent of 
healthy-minded happiness, is a distinctive account of the sublime in 
which victory over hell is won, neither just in heaven, nor just on 
earth, as if these were always fated to envious opposition, but also in 
a hell in which the poisons of such envy and resentment were, in being 
fully suffered, fully overcome. The "we" who meet "again", given the 
finality of such a judgement, may be regarded as inclusive, not just of 
human beings, as it were nakedly estranged between one another and 
within themselves, but also inclusive of human beings clothed in truths 
previously buried within their estranged stories of their worlds and 
other worlds.
James then has his audience listen to the teacher of dialectical wisdom 
in Ecclesiastes ("Solomon") on vanity and the need to remember "the days 
of darkness" while still living in the light of the sun. (Compare CV19 
on the Jewish sense of having nothing, yet possessing all things). 
However, James' response is to sum up his chapter, as far as this stage, 
in the following sentences: ".... life and its negation are beaten up
inextricably together. But if the life be good, the negation of it must 
be bad. Yet the two are equally essential facts of existence; and all 
natural happiness thus seems infected with a contradiction. The breath 
of the sepulchre surrounds it". (Loc. cit. 148). For "The lustre of 
the present hour is always borrowed from the background of possibilities 
it goes with". Accordingly, if such "permanent meaning" is removed, as
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it is in "pure naturalism and the popular science evolutionism of our 
time", then the lustre becomes "curdling cold and gloom", "the breath of 
the sepulchre" as opposed to "the atmosphere (of faith and hope) which 
man breathes in". (Loc cit 148-49. Compare CV 42, "Put a man in the
wrong atmosphere .....  Put him back into his proper element .....",
from 1942).
6.8 THE WORLD IN CONTRADICTION?
After a survey of ancient Greek culture, Epicureanism and Stoicism, 
James again emphasises, "They leave the world in the shape of an 
unreconciled contradiction, and seek no higher unity". (Loc cit). 
Compare the Tractatus and the Lecture on Ethics. James' insistence that 
a life-world or a life can contradict itself needs some discussion. 
Firstly it should be recalled that James here anticipates a 
characteristic of the younger Wittgenstein, which was identified in 
Chapter Two above, ie a tendency to run together logic and life, or 
rather logic and (his) sins.
Secondly, it is important to confront a suspicion that James is lapsing 
into a bad habit of some Hegelians and Marxists, ie confusing logical 
contradiction with historical, social or other kinds of conflict. James 
might reply that there is a logical contradiction between, "This life is 
good" and "This (same) life is bad", and that the goodness of this life 
can be negated not just by the above proposition, but also, in a 
perfectly respectable metaphorical extension of negation, by events, 
experiences, etc, and our linguistic expressions of these, all of which 
may give grounds for claiming, "This life is bad". However, James seems 
vulnerable to a reply that, even allowing such a metaphor, he still does 
not start from a contradiction, in that the two contrasted claims are
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"really" about two different aspects of "this life". He might reply 
that the two aspects are two aspects of one life, and that the unity of 
a life is a matter of deep concern to the person whose life it allegedly 
is. Here the prior disagreement may reshape itself into one about 
whether a life is or should be understood as a dispersed series of 
"lives", like beads strung out along a thread ("What thread, which 
beads?"), or as a configuration gathering together all its apparently 
dispersed aspects ("Where, when and how?"). In fact we seem to be 
pulled in both these directions at once, even though some of us are more 
vulnerable to being pulled in the direction developed religiously and 
metaphysically as "reincarnation" and others of us in the direction 
developed as "eternity for this soul". (See Chapter Eight on the 
regulative action of God the Trinity).
The use of "we" and "us" here may be called at least as much an ethical, 
religious or normative use as an empirical or introspective use, in that 
it expresses a refusal merely to distance, devalue, or dismiss (in 
reductive empiricist, or sociological or psychological fashions), either 
of two families of stories by which or within which many human beings 
struggle to live and die. Thus, the use of "we" etc is not grounded in 
any restrictive, exclusive or fideistic notion of religious 
language-games or forms of life. However, just as Wittgenstein’s 
descriptive method is guided by broad, inclusive "philosophical" 
purposes, eg. to illuminate conceptual and ethical problems, so the 
above description seeks to illuminate shadowy areas.
The notion of being pulled in both directions at once may be compared 
with Wittgenstein's discussions of distinguishing between the simple and 
the complex. Such distinguishing is relative to contexts and purposes, 
hence his error in the Tractatus in attempting to build absolutely or
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metaphysically simple elements, ie. "context-free and purpose-free" 
(except for the author's purposes), into the system of the Tractatus. 
In respect of the apparent "manyness" and "oneness" of life/lives (as of 
mind/minds) we find ourselves in one of those "in-between" positions or 
dialectics, stretching between two infinities, the logical and spiritual 
geography of which was mapped by Pascal, with his teaching of orders or 
levels, across which such dialectics prefigure or recall an always 
greater dialectic, which Pascal claims to know as Christ (as head and 
body with many members) and as God (as Trinity) .
Here we need to reconsider the possible point in James' use of 
"contradiction". For us this is primarily a logical term, and indelibly 
so in the aftermath Frege and Wittgenstein. For James, it was not used 
in a "secondary" way or with a "secondary" sense, when applied to 
conflicts of life or lives which, for James as for Wittgenstein, could 
be summed up as "the problem of (the meaning of) life", or - we might 
say - as the life-problem of lif e-problems. The point of such an 
analogical extension may be better seen if this analogy is understood in 
the context of a larger series of analogies with a sublime purpose.
1. As from a lower level we see only the difference between "the 
contingent" and "the necessary", but from a higher level see that 
"the contingent" is necessary in relation to "the necessary", and 
vice versa, so we may see at least two other transitions between 
lower and higher levels.
2. Similarly, from a lower level, typical of a pre-evolutionary 
biological understanding, we see only difference or opposition 
between wanting to live and having to die, but from a higher level 
of biological understanding we see that life is necessarily in
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relation to death as death is necessarily in relation to life, if 
there is to be evolutionary selection and space for evolutionary 
variation between generations. This has been grasped partially, as 
in a darkened mirror, by many (before or without benefit of 
evolutionary theory, as we may see in various stories and rituals), 
including those who have told or enacted stories of the 
"contingency” of death and the "necessity" of life, as well as 
stories of the "contingency" of life and the "necessity" of death.
Somewhere amongst or between these categories of storytellers are 
located Platonic/Socratic and Schopenhauerian teachers of 
philosophy as preparation for death, and Christian teachers of the 
sense in Christ of the first and the second death, as well as James 
on religion as making a felicitous virtue of (the) "necessity" (of 
death), and Freud on "the death instinct" in reality-testing ; "If 
we are to die ourselves, and first to lose in death those who are 
dear to us, it is easier to submit to a remorseless law of nature, 
to the sublime necessity, than to a chance which might perhaps have 
been escaped...." (Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 1920, quoted in 
Bloom (1973) p87).
3. Similarly, from a lower level we see only opposition or difference 
between the happy and the unhappy (people, attitudes, ways of 
being, experiences, etc.), while we are in the grip of anxiety lest 
the sickness of the unhappy infect the health of the happy, or 
while we are subject to anxiety which seeks to minimise unhappiness 
by minimising happiness. However, from a higher level, we 
understand (with James, Tolstoy and Wittgenstein) that the way of 
higher levels of happiness passes through lower levels of 
unhappiness, "A solemn state of mind is never crude or simple - it
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seems to contain a certain measure of its own opposite in solution. 
A solemn joy preserves a sort of bitter in its sweetness..." 
(James Varieties ch2 p65) . "A philosopher is a man who has to 
cure many intellectual diseases is himself before he can arrive at 
the notions of common sense. If in life we are surrounded by 
death, so too in the health of our intellect we are surrounded by 
madness". (CV44, RFM pl57) . "I ought to be no more than a 
mirror, in which my reader can see his own thinking with all its 
deformities, so that, helped in this way, he can put it right". 
(CV18).
6.9 PASCAL'S PRESENCE
Of course, the above three levels of analogy in effect make James more 
like Pascal than is conventionally plausible, given James' ambivalence 
towards Pascal's "Wager argument", as James understood it is the Will to 
Believe, and given the overt response to Pascal's prayers for the sick 
in the Varieties. However, this surface ambivalence towards Pascal 
should not be allowed to obscure the possibilities of deeper influence, 
both directly, as shown by James' notes written in his copy of the 
Pensees, and indirectly through James' French education and continuing 
involvement in French culture, evident in his many French references and 
his acknowledged deep debt to Charles Renouvier, as well as in his 
friendship with Bergson. Certainly James' dialectic of the happy and 
the unhappy fits well into the pattern of Pascal's thinking, as does 
James' stress on equilibrium, on the heart's reasons versus rationalism, 
and on a (non-Hegelian, non-Marxist) analogy between logic and 
existence. For further discussion of the complexities of James' 
relationship with Pascal, see William James on The Courage to Believe by 
the distinguished Augustinian scholar R J O'Connell (1984).
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It is not clear to what extent, or even whether, Wittgenstein was 
directly acquainted with Pascal's work, though the two references in CV 
(pp 41 and 79) suggest some direct acquaintance. Both references are 
concerned with the "beauty" of mathematical work as experienced in a 
projected, alienated way, as though the mathematician, for whom Pascal 
is taken as typical ( ! ) , were admiring regularities in a kind of 
crystal. Here Pascal seems not to be understood at any great depth. 
Pascal's understanding of mathematics is, prima facie, closer to 
Platonism than is Wittgenstein's, unless one pays attention to Pascal's 
dialectic of 1'esprit de geometrie et l'esprit de finesse. For Pascal 
himself, the beauty or beauties of 1 'esprit de géométrie are not 
self-contained, but parabolic relative to the beauties or beauty of an 
always greater work. The later Wittgenstein's apparent (selective) 
animus against essentialism, both with regard to mathematics and the use 
of "beauty", leaves some uncertainty about how far he saw the wider 
pattern of Pascal's thinking, including its openness to, or 
anticipations of, Wittgensteinian revisions concerning mathematics and 
aesthetics.
However, in Wittgenstein's transitional period, we find him using, in a 
Pascalian way, an image of the centre of world, which the spirit of his 
work tries to grasp, in contrast to the restless spirit of alien forms 
of civilisation. (Foreword for PR November 1930). The foreword moves 
on to the problem of wanting to say, "This book is written to the glory 
of God", which is connected by Wittgenstein with a notion of writing in 
good will rather than out of vanity. These thoughts and "this book" are 
close to Pascal, but also to Kierkegaard in certain respects. 
Kierkegaard could reasonably be described as the main secondary source 
of Pascalian influence on Wittgenstein.
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Stanley Cavell, who in The Claim of Reason, as in Must we mean what we 
say?, shows himself to be both a deep reader of Wittgenstein and 
familiar with Pascal, might have been expected to follow up the pointer 
given by von Wright (Malcolm 1984 P 19) to "a trenchant parallelism" 
between Wittgenstein and Pascal "which deserves deeper study". However, 
as far as I can judge from any of his published work, Cavell seems not 
to have seen the possibilities, both of actual influence between Pascal 
and Wittgenstein, and of potential relationship, at the various levels 
indicated in the present chapter.
There seems to be a tendency, not just in Cavell, first to note the
salience of von Wright's pointer, and then to swerve away from it. This 
can be seen in Drury's distancing of Wittgenstein from Pascal’s alleged 
"fideism" (RW pp 93-94, Rhees 1984) which, according to Drury, 
essentially "dodges all difficulties by adopting a too familiar
acquaintance with holy things", as well as from Pascal's alleged
exclusiveness, which has something to do with his loyalty to the Roman 
Catholic church and his links (not simple identification, in spite of 
Drury) with Port Royal. Thus the potential fruitfulness of von Wright’s 
pointer is in danger of being missed, as Pascal is trapped (perhaps with
a measure of poetic justice) between contrary suspicions. He seems to
be a would-be champion of a later wave of the counter-Reformation, who 
is strangely open to voices of the Reformation. He seems to be a
would-be defender of both Catholic orthodoxy and human understanding, 
who is suspect for his apparent closeness to anti-scholasticism, 
anti-clericalism, anti-Thomism, fideism, existentialism and 
anti-rationalism. It can be dangerous to (be seen to) approach too
closely to someone who apparently aspires to such wild feats of
tightrope-walking interpretation. For how could such opposites be held 
together by any honest, healthy thinker? However, there are risks also
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(however inadvertently taken) in falling in with using against Pascal a 
feature of Pascal’s own method.
One of the better commentaries on von Wright's pointer to a "trenchant 
parallelism" between Pascal and Wittgenstein comes, even if 
unintentionally, from von Wright himself, three paragraphs later, at the 
end of his Biographical Sketch. "....In Wittgenstein many contrasts 
meet. It has been said that he was at once a logician and mystic. 
Neither term is appropriate, but each hints at something true. Those 
who approach Wittgenstein’s work will sometimes look for its essence in 
a rational matter-of-fact dimension, and sometimes more in a 
supra-empirical, metaphysical one.... Such 'interpretations’ have little 
significance. They must appear as falsifications to anyone who tries to 
understand Wittgent stein in all his rich complexity. They are 
interesting only as showing in how many directions his influence 
extends. I have sometimes thought that what makes a man's work classic 
is often just this multiplicity, which invites and at the same time 
resists our craving for clear understanding". (Loc. cit.) Here Pascal's 
presence shows through, though also a swerve away from him. One of the 
many contrasts which meet in Wittgenstein, in a manner well adapted to a 
Pascalian reading, is that between essentialism and anti-essentialism 
with respect to meaning. For even Wittgenstein’s later teaching and 
practice of anti-essentialism are in the context of a selective practice 
of essentialism, and this is less a weakness that a strength. This 
selective practice of essentialism can be seen, for example, in his 
understanding of religion. But it is here, too, that his 
anti-essentialism and essentialism can be better understood in their 
belonging together, as is intimated in James' Varieties.
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6.10 DIALECTICAL GRAMMAR AS THE WAY OF THE SUBLIME
James, at first reading, appears to present an odd juxtaposition of 
essentialism and anti-essentialism with respect to religion. There is, 
for example, the classic passage against essentialism at the start of 
his second lecture, on "Circumscription of the Topic". John Wisdom 
appears to be the first known recorder of a relationship between this 
passage and Wittgenstein's later anti-essentialism (Wisdom 1965 PP 90 
-91). But there is on the other hand, for example, the heuristic and 
sublimely Kantian definition of religion as making felicitous virtue out 
of necessity. However the word "necessity" itself is notoriously 
elusive, if one assumes the correctness of a naive essentialist 
approach.
As has been shown above, in the paragraphs on the three levels of 
understanding of "logic and life" (three levels which with their 
analogical relationships form a ladder-section for Pascalian 
descent/ascent) there is a way to interpret James’ use of "necessity" 
(in the context first of Varieties and then elsewhere) which begins from 
its primary biological sense ("the necessity of mortality") in this 
context, and relates this sense to secondary senses (secondary also 
being relative to context) in logic, ethics and religion, not to mention 
Christology or Trinitarian theology.
Some aspiration towards a catholicity of understanding, such as is 
gestured towards here, is in many Jewish and Christian contexts 
essential to inclusive religion or spirituality. Indeed, one source of 
Pascal's three orders (as well as Aristotelian equilibration) may have 
been the Deuteronomic direction concerning the one Lord of Israel who is 
to be loved "with all your heart, and with all you soul (Luke 10:27 adds 
on "mind") and with all your might", words to be inwardly appropriated, 
again according to Deuteronomy 6:4-9, through talking both when sitting
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at borne and when walking by the way, both when lying down and when 
risen; also appropriated through both the involvement of handling and
the detachment of looking; also memorialised between the young and the
old, and (using classic symbols of sublime exclusion/inclusion) by way 
of door-posts and gates. The last analogies do not depend just on the 
etymological connection between "sublime" and "below the lintel" or 
"below the threshold", but also on upon ancient and modern religious
usage of imagery involving closed/open doors, expressive of
acceptances/transcendences of oppositions in various concepts of the 
sublime. Wittgenstein’s use of door imagery needs to be discussed in 
relation to his ruminations on the grammar of doctrines of determinism, 
necessity, freedom, predestination and election by divine grace. (See 
Chapter Eight).
The dialectical features of Deuteronomy 6:4-9, as partially identified 
in the previous paragraph, (see also "the Lord our God", etc), provide a
way of articulating what Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus and in the
Lecture on Ethics, held to be the propositionally inexpressible
experience of the sublime, present in the ordinary, but also
transcending and unifying it.
6.11 INVESTIGATING TOLSTOY
James presents the case of Tolstoy as the first of his three major 
case-histories in this chapter. The other two are Bunyan and an 
anonymous sufferer who is James himself, according to standard 
interpretations in scholarship on the Varieties. While Bunyan is the 
exemplary case-history for a sense of sin, the unnamed sufferer (James) 
is described as a case of fear of the universe. He is overwhelmed not 
just by its contingency, but by what is in effect a demonic parody of 
the classic Hindu "This is you" in terms of "That shape am I". (Compare
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Hindu traditions, Schopenhauer and the Tractatus and Notebooks on the 
"this" character of the general form or essence of the proposition). 
James’ nightmare experience was in response to an inmate of an asylum 
who filled him with metaphysical horror.
Tolstoy is presented as the exemplary case-history for "the vanity of 
mortal things". Tolstoy is seen as close both to Ecclesiastes and to 
the evangelical-stoic understanding of religion in the Varieties♦ 
"Religion thus makes easy and felicitous what in any case is necessary" 
(Lecture 2, p 68). This is the state of mind in which, "what we most 
dreaded has become the habitation of our safety and the hour of our 
moral (sic, not "mortal") death has turned into our spiritual birthday. 
("Moral death" is an allusion to Tolstoy’s Confession, as in Varieties p 
190). The time for tension in our soul is over (Cp CV 9 "....This 
dissolution eliminates all tensions"), and that of happy relaxation, of 
calm deep breathing, of an eternal present, with no discordant future to 
be anxious about, has arrived. Fear is not held in abeyance as it is by 
mere morality, it is positively expunged and washed away..... A solemn 
state of mind....never crude or simple - it seems to contain a certain 
measure of its own opposite in solution" (Lecture 2, pp 64-65. Cp 
concepts of the sublime, and the grammar of dialectical interpretation 
introduced in chapter one of this thesis). This is the state of being
in which Ivan is portrayed at the end of Tolstoy’s The Death of Ivan
Ilych, one of Tolstoy’s stories which the younger Wittgenstein regarded 
as, together, expressing the essence of Christianity.
James is now ready to present Tolstoy’s own "wonderful account” of his 
conversion crisis in My Confession. James classifies the precipitating
crisis as a clear case of "anhedonia", a term proposed by Ribot
(Psychologie des sentiments) to designate "loss of appetite for all
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life’s values" or an incapacity for anything other than "passive 
joylessness" or "disgust" with "every good". (Chapter 6, pp 153-157). 
Another feature of Tolstoy’s case-history which interests James is "how 
the altered and estranged aspect which the world assumed" ("in 
consequence of" anhedonia, according to James) provoked Tolstoy 
intellectually into "a gnawing, carking questioning and effort for 
philosophical relief", (p 157).
Wittgenstein’s transposition of "anhedonia" from James’ psychosomatic 
style into his own earlier, Fregean style of thinking is most evident in 
Tractatus 6.4 - 6.52. "....If there is any value that does have value,
it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the 
case...." In other words, as expressed in the Lecture on Ethics, we 
must distinguish between what is or must be absolutely valuable for its 
own sake and those values which are relative and more akin to contingent 
matters of fact within the world pictured by propositions. This 
distinction is made in a way which seems to require us, not just to 
appreciate how, "The world of the happy is a different world from that 
of the unhappy" (NB 78, TLP 6.43), but to attempt the 
thought-experiment of answering the question, "Then can there be a world 
that is neither happy nor unhappy?" (NB 78) . If the answer must be 
"No", this shows how, "The world and life are one" (NB 77), or how the 
good or bad will changes the limits of the world, which it constitutes 
as a limited whole (TLP 6.43, 6.45).
James’ version of this is, "Conceive yourself, if possible, suddenly 
stripped of all the emotion with which your world now inspires you, and 
try to imagine it as it exists, purely by itself, without your 
favourable or unfavourable, hopeful or apprehensive comment. It will be 
almost impossible for you to realise such a condition of negativity and
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deadness. No one portion of the universe would then have importance
beyond another; and the whole collection of its things and series of its 
events would be without significance, character, expression, or 
perspective. Whatever of value, interest or meaning our respective
worlds may appear endued with are thus pure gifts of the spectator's 
mind. The passion of love is the most familiar and extreme example of
this fact....  So with fear, with indignation, jealousy, ambition,
worship. If they are there, life changes. And whether they shall be 
there or not depends almost always upon non-logical, often on organic 
conditions. And as the excited interest which these passions put into 
the world is our gift to the world, just so are the passions themselves
gifts - gifts to us, from sources sometimes low and sometimes high; but
almost always non-logical and beyond our control....Meanwhile the 
practically real world for each one of us, the effective world of the 
individual, is the compound world, the physical facts and emotional 
values in indistinguishable combination. Withdraw or pervert either 
factor of this complex resultant, and the kind of experience we call 
pathological ensues". (Ch 6, pp 158 -59).
James, in spite of his Cartesian epistemological individualism 
(powerfully exposed and criticised by Lash 1988) , so nearly gets it 
right. At first he sounds, in the above passage, almost an idealist, 
then almost a materialist, and then a religious pragmatist. It could 
be, one might think, only a small step from grasping the centrality of 
practice and of the passions (hopefully in a Pascalian or 
Christian-Aristotelian equilibration of the passions with one another, 
of practices with one another, and of passions with practices), 
transcending and reconciling the dualism of mind and matter, to grasping 
the centrality of linguistic practices and passions in all their 
differences and similarities.
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Cavell (1979 p.483) comes close to this point in attempting a reading of 
Cartesian dualism through the lenses of Pascal, Wittgenstein, Feuerbach 
and Shakespeare: "I might express his (Descartes) difficulty as
follows. His sense of himself as composed of his contrary natures (of 
what he means by mind and body, the one characterized in opposition to 
the other, each essentially what the other is not) is the idea of a 
double nature, symbolised centrally in the culture we share with him 
(but perhaps now only in literature) as the figure of Christ. So the 
thing of incarnation, the mysterious meeting of heaven and earth, occurs 
in Descartes's thought not alone in the inspirer of Christianity but in 
each individual human being. From here you may conclude that the human 
problem in recognizing other human beings is the problem of recognizing 
another to be Christ for oneself. (What is the significance of the 
charge that Descartes proves the existence at best of a philosopher's 
God?" This comes from Cavell's thirteenth chapter, entitled, "Between 
Acknowledgement and Avoidance", in which he extends certain themes of 
his earlier essays (1969), including "The Avoidance of Love: A Reading of 
King Lear"♦ Cavell's passage unfortunately takes Soth Feuerbach and 
dualism the wrong way, not seriously enough, rather than too seriously.
6.12 TOLSTOY'S "MORAL" DEATH AND RESURRECTION
"In Tolstoy's case", writes James, "the sense that life had any meaning 
whatever was for a time wholly withdrawn". James describes this as 
conversion in the reverse direction. He notes that there are some 
people who in this way become a prey to the profoundest astonishment, so 
that an urgent wondering and questioning is set up, which may lead 
either to a metaphysical or religious solution. At first Lfc seemed to 
Tolstoy as if his new questioning must be answerable. Tolstoy felt that 
such questioning must be answerable, if only he took enough time.
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However, as the self-questioning and world-questioning became 
increasingly intense, he realised that it was like the first faint 
symptoms of a sick person, to which he scarcely attends, until they run 
together into continuous suffering. Then he realises that what had 
seemed a temporary disorder means his death. Tolstoy writes, "I
felt..... I had nothing left to hold on to, and that morally my life had
stopped It cannot be said exactly that I wished to kill myself, for
the force which drew me away from life was fuller, more powerful, more 
general than any mere desire. It was a force like my old aspiration to 
live, only it impelled me in the opposite direction...." (Op. cit. p 
160) . This is one of at least two passages James was alluding to when, 
in chapter two of Varieties, he had written of the religious state of 
mind as one in which, "the hour of our moral death has turned into our 
spiritual birthday" (p.64).
At this point Tolstoy, as reported by James, retells an oriental fable,
which Tolstoy calls, "the literal incontestable truth", of a traveller
!
who hangs halfway down a well, between a wild beast seeking his life at I
the top of the well and a monster waiting to devour him at the bottom, 
with a pair of mice, one white, one black, gnawing through the roots of 
the bush from which the traveller hangs at mid-point in the well. 
Tolstoy in his despair rejected the version of the story in which the 
traveller licks drops of honey from the bush.
This is a nightmare which would lend itself to interesting analysis by 
Pascal, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Freud as well as James. Tolstoy in 
his despair at first sought with his colossal energies for "an 
explanation" of his predicament in all branches of knowledge to which he 
had access. Finding no explanation or solution he became convinced that 
all who had sought for an answer in the sciences had also found nothing.
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except "the meaningless absurdity of life the only incontestable
knowledge accessible to man". (Op. cit. p.162). Here Tolstoy cites as 
witnesses the Buddha, "Solomon" ie. Ecclesiastes, and Schopenhauer.
Sucking the honey, Tolstoy thinks, would mean mere animal blindness, not 
seeing either the dragon or the mice. And yet, in the midst of this 
despair there was already growing in him what he later recognised as "a 
thirst for God" which had nothing to do with the movement of his 
thoughts, except that it was the contrary of that movement. "It was 
like a feeling of dread that made me seem like an orphan and isolated in 
the midst of all these things that were so foreign. And this feeling of 
dread was mitigated by the hope of finding the assistance of someone". 
(Op. cit. pp 162-163. Compare Wittgenstein on feeling orphaned and 
alone, in the context of metaphysical speculation versus religious 
passion, in CV 33. See also CV 13). James comments that when 
disenchantment with life or world has become so absolute there is seldom 
a "restitutio ad integrum" to reverse such a fall. If happiness 
returns, it is a process of redemption, not of mere reversion to natural 
health. A more complex, deeper and higher form of wholeness in 
necessary, if natural evils and unnatural terrors are to be overcome, 
so that the sufferer is saved by what seems to him "a second birth, a 
deeper kind of conscious being than he could enjoy before". (hoc cit).
James warns of the dangers of antagonism between the "healthy-minded" 
way, which appears shallow and blind to the other side, and the 
"sick-minded way", which may appear so obscene to the other side as to 
move that party of healthy-minded humanity to desire the return of 
hanging and burning, to wipe out such heresy. James is clear that 
"healthy-mindedness is inadequate as a philosophical doctrine, because 
the evil facts which it refuses positively to account for are a genuine
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portion of reality; and they may after all be the best key to life's 
significance, and possibly the only openers of our eyes to the deepest 
levels of truth. The normal process of life contains moments as bad as 
any of those which insane melancholy is filled with, moments in which 
radical evil gets its innings and takes its solid turn. The lunatic's 
visions of horror are all drawn from the material of daily fact.... If
you protest, my friend, wait till you arrive there yourself man must
die to an unreal life before he can be born into the real life". (Op. 
cit. 169-171). Compare Wittgenstein: "I once said, perhaps rightly: The 
earlier culture will become a heap of rubble and finally a heap of 
ashes, but spirits will hover over the ashes" (CV 3, from 1929). "The 
Jew is a desert region, but underneath its thin layer of rock lies the 
molten lava of spirit and intellect" (CV 13, from 1931). The 
Tractatus, we may say, is a desert region of volcanic ash and rubble, 
but, beneath it and above it, there is movement. If the surface 
pictures a reverse conversion, akin to Tolstoy's "anhedonia", then the 
movement below and above that surface will be akin to Tolstoy's rebirth.
Tolstoy's recovery was relatively gradual and slow, compared with some 
dramatic and perhaps over-publicised conversions. While this slow 
process had various stages, one of the most striking characteristics of 
the whole process is that Tolstoy writes, "Just how or when the change 
took place I cannot tell". Wittgenstein, perhaps responding here to 
James' understanding of religion as making a felicitous virtue out of 
necessity, makes more of Tolstoy's incomprehension than does James: 
"The solution of the problem of life is to be seen in the disappearance 
of this problem". (NB 74, TLP 6.521). "Isn't this the reason why men 
to whom the meaning of life had become clear after long doubting could 
not say what this meaning consisted in?" (NB 74, TLP 6.521). "There 
are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves
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manifest. They are what is mystical" (TLP 6.522). "We feel that even 
when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems 
of life remain completely untouched. Of course there are then no 
questions left, and this itself is the answer" (TLP 6.52).
However, Wittgenstein, despite the above, tried, like Tolstoy and James, 
to say more and to show something not just in this way but also by 
changes in his life which, in the years immediately following the 
completion of the Tractatus, were sometimes strikingly similar to 
Tolstoy's new life. This is especially evident in Wittgenstein’s 
attempt to liberate himself from his share of his father's fortune and 
in his career as a village school-teacher in Southern Austria.
6.13 TOLSTOY'S THEOLOGICAL GRAMMAR
For Tolstoy there was, as James also saw it, "almost no theology in his 
conversion. His faith-state was the sense come back that life was 
infinite in its moral significance". (Lecture 10, p.246, note 1) . 
Tolstoy saw his new sense of the meaning of life as mediating, not just 
between life and death, purposefulness and despair, but also between 
divine infinity and human infinity; "Since mankind has existed, 
wherever life has been, there has also been the faith that gave the 
possibility of living. Faith is the sense of life, that sense by 
virtue of which man does not destroy himself, but continues to live on. 
It is the force whereby we live. If man did not believe that he must 
live for something, he would not live at all. The idea of an infinite 
God, of the divinity of the soul, of the union of men's actions with God 
- these are ideas elaborated in the infinite secret depths of human 
thought" (Tolstoy Confession, as quoted by James. Varieties, Lecture 8, 
p 189). A notion of the sublime, influenced perhaps, by Pascal,
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provides a key to unlock the continuity and coherence of Tolstoy's 
passage in a way which James misses. Three levels of appreciation of 
the sense of life are suggested:
(1) - that level at which human living and dying can be seen as natural 
in a way which might be called perhaps animal or childlike, recalling 
the fragrance of Eden;
(2) - that level at which human purposefulness and despair develop in 
many knotted ways; and
(3) - a level transcending and embracing these levels, at which divine 
infinity is at one with human infinities in the "secret depths" as well 
as heights of humanity. If Tolstoy were not consciously influenced 
here, or elsewhere, by Pascal's style of thinking, that should not be 
allowed the last word on this matter. Yet James is right to point to 
Tolstoy's independence of tradition, in the sense that an ability to 
draw a useful map for oneself is not an infallible mark of an ability to 
find one's way around or between such levels in thinking of the sublime.
Wittgenstein makes closely related points in another way in 1930. "If 
anyone should think he has solved the problem of life and feel like 
telling himself that everything is quite easy now, he can see that he 
is wrong just by recalling that there was a time when this "solution" 
had not been discovered; but it must have been possible to live then too 
and the solution which has now been discovered seems fortuitous in 
relation to how things were then. And it is the same in the study of 
logic. If there were a "solution" to the problems of logic (philosophy) 
we should only need to caution ourselves that there was a time when they 
had not been solved (and even at that time people must have known how to 
live and think)". (CV 4). Here it would be relevant to compare the 
ways in which Jewish and Christian theologians, for example, have 
wrestled with problems concerning (opportunity for) salvation for those
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who apparently do not know the gospel of the Torah or the creative and 
saving Word and Spirit of God.
6.14 WITTGENSTEIN'S GRAMMATICAL KNOTS
This, too, is an appropriate context for an initial consideration of 
certain aspects of Waismann's record of Wittgenstein on "religion", 
while in conversation in Vienna on 17.12.1930. "Is talking essential to 
religion? I can well imagine a religion in which there are no doctrinal 
propositions, in which there is thus no talking. Obviously the essence 
of religion cannot have anything to do with the fact that there is
talking, or rather: when people talk, then this itself is part of a 
religious act and not a theory. Thus it also does not matter at all if 
the words used are true or false or nonsense. In religion talking is not 
metaphorical either; for otherwise it would have to be possible to say 
the same things in prose. Running against the limits of language?
Language is, after all, not a cage " (WVC p 117).
Much could be said of this extract, which continues to speak of how "the 
Godhead is thought of as divided and, again, as one being" in the 
context of the relation of ethics and the world, and of Trinitarian 
language. It is not difficult to point out various aspects of the main 
extract, in the previous paragraph, which seem simply wrong. Does not 
Wittgenstein here dogmatise about the essence of religion while
disregarding the varieties? Ifhat religion would contain doctrinal 
propositions which were both "doctrinal" in Wittgenstein's sense of
being religious acts and "propositions" in the sense of the Tractatus, 
apart - that is - from the Tractatus itself? If a major family of 
religions involves renewal, development and fulfilment for the sake of 
whole human beings, how can talking, theorizing and doctrinal teaching
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not have their places? Does abuse of such activities destroy the 
possibilities of their proper use? Why should "true or false or
nonsense" be used in and of religion merely in the sense of the 
Tractatus? After all, "Language is....not a cage". Yet this is just 
what the notion of the essence of language seems to be in the Tractatus 
and in the Lecture on Ethics.
We need to recall here that Wittgenstein is being quoted from a 
conversation at a time when he was in the thick of the transition 
between his earlier and later ways of thinking. This is not a reason 
for dismissing the passage on account of its apparent confusion(s). For 
such confusion could be extremely illuminating. This passage seems to
show, amongst other things, that both the earlier "cage" view of
prepositional language and its overcoming fitted into certain of
Wittgenstein's considerations concerning religion as well as into 
philosophical programmes. Even when the cage (cave?) picture of language 
was dominant, it was there for the purpose of being overcome. Hence, 
"....I do not scoff at this (religious) tendency in man; I hold it in
reverence I am speaking about myself what men mean when they say
that "the world is there" is something I have at heart". (Loc. cit.). 
In the Lecture on Ethics Wittgenstein speaks very similarly. How he has 
this "at heart" can be seen from his appropriation of William James and 
Tolstoy. The heart in question is not just a descendant of Jonathan 
Edwards or Pascal via James or of Rousseau via Tolstoy, but is also 
related, like Augustine's "cor", to the Biblical heart which is the 
centre of a struggling, suffering human being, the centre of both 
restlessness and rest, made and remade in the image and likeness of God, 
according to the vision of Augustine's Gonfessiones.
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The paradoxes of Wittgenstein's conversation with Waismann on religious 
speech-acts, especially the apparently outrageous words, "Thus it also 
does not matter at all if the words used are true or false or nonsense", 
are not adequately understood unless they are related to Wittgenstein's 
prolonged meditations on Augustine's paradoxical maxim, "Et vae 
tacentibus de te, quoniam loquaces muti sunt." (Confessiones 1.4) "How 
terrible for those silent about you, just because those who chatter on 
are dumb".
Wittgenstein's frequent allusions to this maxim include one other in the 
1929-1930 conversations in Vienna. A conversation on 30.12.1929 begins
- according to Waismann - with Wittgenstein saying, "To be sure, I can 
imagine what Heidegger means by being (Being?) and anxiety", continues 
with a reference to what Kierkegaard means by running up against
paradox, and ends with an allusion, in colloquial Viennese, to 
Confessiones 1.4. "....But the inclination, the running up against
something, indicates something. (Earlier:" This running up against
the limits of language is ethics....") St Augustine knew that already 
when he said, (and here the editor, Brian McGuinness, tells us that 
Waismann seems to have added the quotation later, no doubt having had 
difficulty in following Wittgenstein's thought the first time around, 
and perhaps having hoped to replace Wittgenstein's over-colloquial 
paraphrase with the correct quotation, perhaps after an over-hasty 
repetition by Wittgenstein), "What, you swine, you want not to talk 
nonsense! Go ahead and talk nonsense, it does not matter!" (WVC pp 68
- 69 and note 30) . Compare RW pp 89-90 where Wittgenstein shows his 
familiarity with the relevant Latin text and claims the Loeb translation
misses the point by not recognising that "loquaces" is a term of
contempt. According to Drury, Wittgenstein's preferred translation is 
now, "And woe to those who say nothing concerning thee just because the
2Z9.
chatterboxes talk a lot of nonsense". Just as Augustine’s essentialism 
about language fits in with a version of divine ineffability which 
evokes from him many words in the context of prayerful response, so 
Wittgenstein's earlier Fregean essentialism concerning language fits in 
with a version of divine ineffability (and ethical and aesthetic 
ineffability, again akin to Augustine) which evokes from him many words 
of "virtuous nonsense" expressive of the paradoxes of the sublime. 
Wittgenstein is, clearly enough, struggling to articulate his own 
regulative dialectics, to be compared with Augustine's dialectics in 
Confessiones, Book 1, etc. Wittgenstein may first have come across this 
theme of speech and silence in Kierkegaard's variations on Augustine in 
his Two Ages. See Janik (1979) and (1984).
6.15 JAMES AND TOLSTOY ON LOVE FOR ENEMIES
For the Tolstoy of My Confession the paradoxical aspect of his reborn 
awareness of the sublime is that his new sense of the meaning of life 
mediates between the infinite God and the secret depths of humanity, as 
could be known in the thoughts, sorrows and joys of his Russian 
peasants, but also in the Gospels and especially in the "Sermon on the 
Mount", where the sublime character of the teaching of love for one's 
enemies became most evident to him and to many readers of his subsequent 
work. James expresses his awareness of this in a passage beginning 
explicitly with Tolstoy and non-retaliation and continuing with an 
Emersonian sense of the sublime, introduced in the guise of St Paul's 
reverence for "the essential sacredness of everyone". (Varieties, 
Lectures 14 and 15 on "The Value of Saintliness", pp 346-350). James is 
here in the midst of discussing religious extravagance as shown in 
"excesses of Tenderness and Charity", which may be expressed in terms of 
"Resist not evil" and "Love your enemies". "Here, if anywhere", he
280
writes, "one feels the complexity of moral life, and the mysteriousness 
of the way in which facts and ideals are interwoven." James' strategy 
is first to let advocates of "hard-headed, hard-hearted, and hard-fisted 
methods" of dealing with "the unfit," "parasites and beggars", "human 
crocodiles and boa-constrictors", have their say. In this way James 
lets it be said that, "The world is there". He then takes to heart what 
men mean by these methods, but in a way that is different. If such 
methods were to be universalised, "the world would be an infinitely 
worse place than it is now to live in. The tender grace, not of a day 
that is dead, but of a day yet to be born somehow, with the golden rule 
grown natural, would be cut out from the perspective of our 
imaginations. The saints, existing in this way, may, with their 
extravagances of human tenderness, be prophetic. Nay, innumerable times 
they have proved themselves prophetic. Treating those whom they met, in 
spite of the past, in spite of all appearances, as worthy, they have 
stimulated them to worthy, miraculously transformed them by their
radiant expectation and by the challenge of their expectation One
fire kindles another; and without that overtrust in human worth which 
they show, the rest of us would lie in spiritual stagnancy. Momentarily 
considered, then, the saint may waste his tenderness and be the dupe and 
victim of his charitable fever, but the general function of his charity 
in social evolution is vital and essential". (Op. cit. 347 - 348).
6.16 PASCAL'S DIALECTICS OF TRUTH AND LOVE
James' dehumanisers "explain" that "because of" the past that is still 
present, "because of" the unpromising appearances, there shall be (will 
be) yet more retaliation and resentment, opposition and estrangement. 
"The causality of these truths" is conflated with "the truth of 
causality", so that extensional truth (truth estranged from love) is
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made an idol. As Pascal anticipates prophetically on behalf of all 
Tolstoys, out of his own deep engagement with Descartes, "We make an 
idol of truth itself, for truth apart from love is not God, but his 
image and an idol that we must not love or worship. Still less must we 
love or worship its opposite, which is falsehood" (Pensées s 926 p
318-319). Question: is this opposite, which we must not "love or
worship", and "which is falsehood" (i.e., perhaps, falsehood to love or 
worship), understood here by Pascal as the opposite of "truth" (i.e.
falsehood - a non-dialectical reading) or the opposite of "truth without
love", ie. love without truth?
Thus the rehumanisers , those who like James say with their lives, "Let 
us be human" (CV 30), do not "explain", but "show" that, despite the 
unpromising appearances, there can be - for there already is - an
overcoming (through acknowledgement and confession) of retaliation and 
resentment, opposition and estrangement. The strength of a love which 
expresses itself through forgiveness, compassion and intervention on 
behalf of others may be assessed by the depth of its openness to the 
world of facts apparently estranged from it. We make an idol of love 
itself, for love apart from truth of this kind is not God, but, seen in 
one direction, his image and, seen in the opposite direction, an idol 
that we must no more love or worship than we must its opposite, ie. 
truth without love. Compare CV 45 - 46 on the infinite torment of "one" 
"single", isolated human being in need of infinite help, help which
comes in "the gift of opening his heart, rather than contracting it", in 
relation to God and to other people, through confession which is "the 
means of salvation", in so far as this is the work of "A love which 
acknowledges, as it were, that we are all wicked children", ie. not just 
wicked children, but wicked children, a love which acknowledges that it 
cannot overcome by itself its isolated torment, in which it cannot/will
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not/does not love (CV 77). Here truth without love (tormented 
isolation) and love without truth (in a contracted closure which avoids 
acknowledgement and confession) are both overcome, (Compare CV 17, on 
Tolstoy and not wanting to see, with Pascal on the will’s selection 
of aspects for belief, in Pensées s539, p218).
The distorted or dead versions of theology which are attacked, ridiculed 
or discarded by Tolstoy, James and Wittgenstein should not be allowed to 
obscure the pointers which these writers give in the direction of better 
theological activities, including descriptive, explanatory and teaching 
activities. Careless or prejudiced readers of all three have seized on 
the aspects of rejection and overlooked the other side of this 
rejection, which is implicitly or even explicitly present in all three. 
Thus, while Wittgenstein writes, with, application to Tolstoy and perhaps 
to James, "Isn't this (ie the disappearance of the problem of life) the 
reason why men to whom the meaning of life had become clear after long 
doubting could not say what this meaning consisted in?" (NB 74 and TLP 
6.521), he is not willing, to interpret this as meaning the 
disappearance of attempts to talk of God, however hopeless such attempts 
seem to be. For he also writes, in the same context, "To believe in a 
God means to understand the question about the meaning of life. To 
believe in a God means to see that the facts of the world are not the 
end of the matter. To believe in a God means to see that life has a 
meaning" (NB 74), While this theological language doesn't play an 
overt part in the Tractatus, it does enter into both his work as a 
village school-teacher, where Wittgenstein teaches the Lord's Prayer 
every day and speaks accordingly to children in a frightening situation 
(Bartley 1986, p.100. "To pray is to think about the meaning of life" 
NB 73) and his work as a Cambridge teacher, where the Lecture on Ethics, 
like remarks and conversations from later in his development, uses the
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"nonsense" of "God", "the supernatural", "absolute goodness", "absolute 
wonder", etc. Even in his earlier period, the silence required by TLP 
s7 was clearly impossible for Wittgenstein: "Et vae tacentibus de te, 
quoniam loquaces muti sunt".
The difficulties and promise of theology are, as Pascal intimates, 
deeply connected with the difficulties and promise of trying to speak 
both truth with love (cp Ephesians 4:15) and love with truth (cp 2^ 
Corinthians 13:8; also the whole of the Johannine Gospel and Letters). 
Pascal's formulation of these difficulties and this promise in terms of 
his own doctrine of levels of order is illuminating in the following 
three ways: with regard to
(1) certain long and wide influences within Cartesian tradition;
(2) Tolstoy’s crisis and conversion, and
(3) Wittgenstein’s life-work, with its own regulative dialectics.
(1) Pascal’s formulation of idolatry as truth without love, and by 
implication as also love without truth (Pensées s926 pp 318-319) may be 
seen as prophetic of influences within Cartesian tradition in the two 
following respects.
(la) The original Cartesian dualism of mind and matter is repeated in 
the later (Cartesian) dualism of values and facts. For facts in 
abstraction from concepts (ie. capacities or skills for recognizing 
relevant similarities and differences, and capacities for using 
language) and concepts in abstraction from values (which guide 
inevitably selective perception of relevance among possible similarities 
and differences) are "image and idol". In other words, they are, seen 
in one direction, only images or shadows of truth with love and love 
with truth, which Pascal sees transcending and reconciling all other 
orders, as that Anselmian transcendence beyond which nothing more
284
sublime can be conceived. Seen in the other direction, we have a 
triangle of estrangement between "facts", "concepts" and "values". Here 
rising and falling fashions struggle together for dominance. Consider, 
for example, what may be seen as the collusive war of all against all in 
the relations between scientism, conceptualism and emotivism; or 
materialism, idealism and existentialism; or naturalism, relativism and 
prescriptivism. On such battlefields any concern for the centrality of 
integral values is almost certain to be dismissed as a "romantic ethics 
of the ineffable" (Hacker 1987, p.107, about Wittgenstein’s central 
vision) or as the eccentric project of some peripheral cult. In this 
area the shadows or images of truth with love are taken for idols, seen 
as if they are truths without love, which are to be set against loves 
without truth, or vice versa,
(lb) Gnostic and Cartesian dualisms are also repeated in later dualisms 
between objectivity and subjectivity, or objectivism and relativism. 
(Compare Richard Bernstein 1983). Here we find deep uncertainty whether 
objectivity is, or should be, a normative or a descriptive concept. Is 
objectivity a property, attribute or state of being which inheres in the 
facts and in those who are more on their side? Or is objectivity an 
ideal requirement in embarrassingly intimate relations with ideal 
attitudes, normative states of mind or rational passions, which are of 
course notorious for being seduced by, or even selling themselves to, 
the sources of error and enemies of truth?
6.17 KIERKEGAARD AND PASCAL
Kierkegaard works in this area, with his dialectical use of 
"objectivity" and "subjectivity". His abstract or lower level versions 
of subjectivity correspond at best to Pascal's images of love with truth 
and at worst to Pascal's idols of love without truth. Correspondingly
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Kierkegaard's abstract or lower level versions of objectivity correspond
at worst to Pascal’s idols of truth without love and at best to his
images of truth with love.
Kierkegaard claimed or believed that he found inspiration for his stages 
of existence in Augustine. This is not so far from recognising Pascal 
as a deep influence, perhaps deeper than Augustine. Kierkegaard's own 
understanding of subjectivity as truth is certainly anticipated in 
various ways by Pascal: "....Since the way a thing is done matters as
much as doing it, and perhaps more so,...... " (Pensées s928, pp
319-320). "....Few speak humbly of humility, chastely of chastity,
sceptically of scepticism we hide and disguise ourselves from
ourselves". (Op. cit. s655, p240) . " .... Tyranny is wanting to have by
one means what can only be had by another......Tyranny consists in the
desire to dominate everything regardless of order " (Op. cit. s58,
p45 with sequence of sentences reversed).
Kierkegaard, as well as approaching this side of Pascal in his use of 
the Kantian and Hegelian terminology of subjectivity and objectivity, 
also uses the terminology of the ’’What" and the "How" of a topic or 
activity. The latter pair of terms is used regularly by Wittgenstein at 
least from his Philosophical Remarks of 1929 - 30. There is a pleasant 
irony in the reflection that the verificationism fashionable in the
1930s may have owed something not just to a particular reading of the
American pragmatists but also to particular readings of Kierkegaard and 
(via Kierkegaard) of Pascal on "the Way and the Truth" as belonging 
together in "the Life" which is expressed in John 14:6.
Alternatively, one may read "the Life" and "the Truth" as belonging 
together in "the Way" of the divine order, this Way having the sublime
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character which is evident in the Fourth Gospel's presentation, for 
example, of the heavenly Son of Man as Jacob’s ladder between heaven and 
earth, and of the coincidence of opposites in Christ's coming 
from/returning to the Father, humiliation/exaltation, servanthood/ 
lordship, and crucifixion/glorification. In the context of a hierarchy 
of levels of order or language, such as that of Pascal or Kierkegaard, 
we show what we mean by the extent to which we fail or succeed in 
communicating truth truthfully and love lovingly, which implies 
communicating truth lovingly and love truthfully. This Pascalian - 
Kierkegaardian formulation expresses an understanding, in terms of a 
dialectic both Jewish and Christian, of that inclusive transcendence 
beyond which nothing can be more sublime. For here the sublime 
expresses itself even in that which runs counter to truth with love.
6.18 PASCAL AND TOLSTOY'S STRUGGLE
The dynamic equilibration, which characterises Pascal's precocious 
understanding of the sublime, contrasts with the relatively static 
dualism which may be said (if we read Kant's first and second Critiques 
in the light of his third) to have overtaken Kant's gestures in the 
direction of the sublime. For example, in the first Critique, Kant's 
island of truth, despite its "enchanting name", is "enclosed by nature 
itself within unalterable limits", "surrounded by a wide and stormy 
ocean, the native home of illusion, where many a foggy bank and many a 
swiftly melting iceberg give the deceptive appearance of farther shores, 
deluding the adventurous seafarer ever anew with empty hopes, and 
engaging him in enterprises which he can never abandon and yet is unable 
to carry to completion". (Kant Critique of Pure Reason (1929) B295, 
A236). Compare Coleridge's voyage in The Rime of the Ancient Mariner, a 
poem which he came to think of as a dream of his own life. (Compare
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Stanley Cavell (1983), Genteel Responses to Kant?, on Coleridge, Emerson 
and Kant).
In the Romantic tradition of poetry, which comes to such singular 
expression in Coleridge, Cartesianism appears as the arch-enemy of 
poetic vision, for Cartesian dualism opens up an abyss between the 
solitary poet and his world which threatens to strike him dumb. 
(Compare Bloom (1975) chapter 1, especially pp 38-41). In spite of 
themselves, many Romantic poets and their successors, for example 
Wordsworth, Yeats and Stevens, appear to be still compromised with
Cartesian dualism, in which truth and love are essentially estranged or 
in conflict.
Like those poets with their readers, Freud struggled to help his 
patients to work out better life-stories in which they could more
coherently and comprehensively come to terms with themselves, not as 
isolated spectators of their life-worlds, but as actors embodied in one 
social, natural, historical world. However, again like many Romantic 
poets, Freud never fought sufficiently free of Cartesian dualism, as may 
be seen from his entanglements with the mechanistic scientism generate# 
and protected within Cartesian tradition.
These entanglements prevented him from achieving fuller realisation and 
recognition of the therapeutic power of listening to, telling, and 
interpreting stories of torments and dangers related to the Cartesian 
family tradition, stories as it were from the cellars and attics of
humanity, which had been reached by rumours of the sublime, but also by
rumours of its impossibility. (Hence the apparent necessity of onesided 
"sublimation of lower energy"). Thus Freud’s own story-telling, which 
starts with something like a mental-hydraulics model of humanity.
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ends with a mythology which could have its model in some variety of 
Jewish gnosticism. "You cannot assess yourself properly if you are not 
well versed in the categories... Freud writes excellently and it is a 
pleasure to read him but his writing is never great.)" (CV 87). 
Freud's late opposition of death-wish and pleasure-principle, which are 
reconciled only in the reality-testing which belongs to the life of 
knowledge within the prison of Cartesianism, seems a poor version of the 
sublime, an opaque image of Pascal's truth with love, and love with 
truth, following in the way of the sublime.
(2) This is not to claim that acute depression, such as Tolstoy’s 
"anhedonia", arises principally from experience of the bankruptcy of 
later Cartesian tradition, but that this tradition has been one 
significant factor in certain types of "depression" or "accidie". 
Again, it need not be claimed, against Freud, that other contributory 
factors do not include perhaps an element of mourning for the loss of 
the infant's earliest and most intimate relations with his or her 
mother. Perhaps there is also an element of self-punishment, either to 
compensate for infantile resentment against a parent or to turn the 
infant's desire for revenge (against one or more parents) against the 
safer target of self, or to mask the humiliation of being vulnerable and 
weak in such ways with the glory of the strength to be bad. The ascetic 
discipline of holding oneself open to such possibilities, as well as to 
the possible dangers of narcissistic fantasies, is beyond being captured 
in any easy algorithm for truth-testing. However, it fits felicitously 
into the dialectics which Pascal teaches under the guidance of the 
direction that we make no idol, either in the realm of "truth" without 
love or of "love" without truth.
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Rather than learn to live in a semi-darkness between opposing 
uncertainties (a semi-darkness which is not to be confused with a 
necessarily static state of semi-darkness, or with a single perpetual 
dawning) we may in despair prefer to embrace the "certainty" of a total 
darkness. For Pascal the twilight state is constituted by truths 
without love and by loves without truth. Pascal already knew that there 
may be forms of depression or despair which consist in turning against 
both these uncertainties. Turning against them in one direction, Pascal 
hints, we may find God in the dark night of the soul; turning against 
them in the other direction, we may find the dark night in God. This 
direction may however be taken out of a lust for darkness, just as the 
other direction may be taken out of a love for God's order of truth with 
love. Pascal writes, in continuation of his remark that truth without 
love is not God, "....I may well love total darkness, but if God plunges 
me into a state of semi-darkness I am displeased by such darkness as is 
there, and because I fail to see in it the same merits as in total 
darkness, such a state does not please me. This is a fault, and a sign 
that I am making an idol of darkness, separated from God's order. Now, 
we should worship only in his order." (Pensées s926, pp 318-319).
Tolstoy's crisis of depression consists of being plunged into a 
half-dark condition in which he belongs to a world of truths without 
love, and is tempted by a desire for the merits of total darkness. The 
half-dark appears to render life an intolerable problem so long as he 
does not see how it relates to God's order, in which the problem 
dissolves. He still has to learn that the half-dark is also a 
half-light of loves without truth and that the sun which goes down into 
darkness through these onesided twilight conditions is the same sun 
which comes up through them in light-giving reconciliation.
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6.19 WITTGENSTEIN, TOLSTOY AND PASCAL
Here Wittgenstein's 1931 comment on Tolstoy comes close to Pascal in 
several ways. Tolstoy, in his Confession, describes how in his search 
for help he has studied Pascal. Thus it will be seen that 
Wittgenstein's comment amounts to a hint that Tolstoy had not understood 
Pascal sufficiently well, Wittgenstein's comment is, "Tolstoy: a
thing's significance (importance) lies in its being something everyone 
can understand. - That is both true and false. What makes a subject 
hard to understand ~ if it's something significant and important ~ is 
not that before you can understand it you need to be specially trained 
in abstruse matters, but the contrast between understanding the subject 
and what most people want to see. Because of this the very things which 
are most obvious may become the hardest of all to understand. What has 
to be overcome is a difficulty having to do with the will, rather that 
with the intellect". (CV 17).
Here Tolstoy was writing about the essence and importance of art, but 
the passage applies also to his account of his crisis and conversion. 
Tolstoy had been Imprisoned in a tradition of wanting to see truths 
without love, a victim of Cartesianism. He needed to want truth with 
love and love with truth. He did not see that his problem with the 
meaning of living and dying would dissolve into the order of the 
sublime. He did not want to see this and he could not see it. Willing 
and understanding go together as love and truth go together. The 
twilight conditions of truths without love and of loves without truth 
belong together under the judgement of truth with love in the order of 
the sublime. This is the first way in which Wittgenstein’s comment 
comes close to Pascal. It is not as if Tolstoy's conversion were 
unreal, but incomplete, and less incomplete when he wrote his better
291
short stories of Russian life and death than when he wrote of the 
significance of art, or of how he read the Gospels as if they were an 
abstract ethics, merely disguised as folk-stories, to sugar the abstract 
moral pill for the peasants, in a Russian anticipation of Richard 
Braithwaite’s religion of "agapeistic stories". (Braithwaite 
1966/1955). Neither Tolstoy nor Braithwaite was entirely wrong. They 
were not radical enough in their transformation of understanding and in 
developing wider and deeper responsibility for the conversation that we 
are.
Another way in which Wittgenstein’s comment on Tolstoy comes close to 
Pascal can best be shown by a further seminal remark from Pascal. 
"....The will is one of the chief organs of belief, not because it 
creates belief, but because things are true or false according to the 
aspect by which we judge them. When the will likes one aspect more than 
another, it deflects the mind from considering the qualities of the one 
it does not care to see. Thus the mind, keeping in step with the will, 
remains looking at the aspect preferred by the will and so judges by 
what it sees there". (Pensées s539, p 218),
This is why the will needs to be guided by and transformed into the love 
which extends to strangers and enemies. Only so can the understanding 
be opened to participate also in those aspects of truth which have been 
treated as, and have become, alien and hostile. Truth without love is 
narrow and love without truth is shallow. As such ontological 
shallowness falsifies love, so such ethical narrowness denies truth. 
Thus we may read Wittgenstein’s already-considered remark in CV 30 
through Pascal’s Pensées as follows; we might say that in Christianity 
God says to human beings; Don’t act a tragedy, that’s to say, don’t act 
out "heaven" on earth in the form of "love" without truth, and don’t act
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out "hell" on earth as "truth" without love. For these belong to my 
order of truth with love.
Pascal also has a more concise formulation with a related theme which 
comes close to Freud as well as to Wittgenstein: "Man is neither angel 
nor beast, and it is unfortunately the case that anyone trying to act 
the angel acts the beast". (Pensées s678, p 242). Wittgenstein’s later 
investigations of seeing x as y may be regarded as belonging to a 
discussion in which Pascal, with his remarks on the will and belief, 
love and truth, makes a seminal contribution. The point is not just 
that there is an analogy between inter-personal love for strangers and 
enemies and, on the other hand, intellectual openness to the alien and 
the hostile for the sake of better understanding and testing, if not 
conclusive falsification or verification. The point is also that love 
for strangers and enemies is itself creative, sustaining, liberating and 
fulfilling with respect to social and personal, outward and inward, 
conditions in which the corresponding intellectual practices and 
attitudes can flourish. This is why "truth" without love is not God, 
and why the same is to be said of "love" without truth. Saying (what) 
and showing (how) belong together.
(3) It has already been indicated, in preliminary ways, throughout the 
two previous sections of this chapter, concerning more general 
influences within Cartesian tradition, and concerning the specific 
case-study of Tolstoy by James, how Pascal’s understanding of truth with 
love illuminates Wittgenstein’s life-work. There is both external and 
internal evidence confirming how Wittgenstein was influenced by both 
James and Tolstoy. There is also a wide consensus that Wittgenstein’s 
whole work, increasingly so in its later developments, takes the form of
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a struggle with pervasive and deep features of Cartesianism, For these 
reasons, this third section can be relatively concise.
The Tractatus can be read in this context as an investigation of truths 
without love, which is undertaken, not for the sake of a "romantic 
ethics of the ineffable" (Hacker, op. cit.) in the pejorative sense of 
loves without truth, but for the sake of an ethics of truth with love, 
such as shows itself more clearly through Wittgenstein’s later work. In 
this work truths about "meaning", "explanation", "understanding", etc 
are reconnected with their social, historical and biological home, in 
sustained attempts to overcome alienating and antagonistic features of 
Cartesian and other gnostic dualist traditions. "No one can speak the 
truth; if he has still not mastered himself. He cannot speak it; - but 
not because he is not clever enough yet. The truth can be spoken only 
by someone who is already at home in it, not by someone who still lives 
in falsehood and reaches out from falsehood towards truth on just one 
occasion". (CV 35, 1939-1940, paragraphs conflated).
Truth with love and love with truth is also a theme of an early remark 
on Frazer’s Golden Bough. "We must begin with the mistake and transform 
it into what is true. That is, we must uncover the source of the error; 
otherwise hearing what is true won’t help us. It cannot penetrate when 
something is taking its place. To convince someone of what is true, it 
is not enough to state it; we must find the road from error to truth. I 
must plunge again and again in the water of doubt" (RFGB 1). The notes 
continue with a juxtaposition of Frazer with the Augustine of the 
Confessiones. What take the place of truth (with love) are the images 
or idols of truth. These are truths without love, but also varieties of 
love without truth. It is not necessarily a love of darkness which 
shows itself in plunging repeatedly into the water of doubt. Such a
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baptismal prolongation may be, instead, expressive of longing for truth 
with love, a longing which learns to be at home with others in the 
half“dark conditions of dusk for the sake of becoming at home with them
in the conditions of dawn and beyond.
In the following trio of remarks, placed together in CV 76 - 77, from
1948, Wittgenstein is thinking of himself as well as Tolstoy, and
arguably of Cartesian dualism between truth and love as well as perhaps 
about a patient known to Drury, and about the grammar of "free-will". 
"Are you a bad philosopher then, if what you write is hard to 
understand? If you were better you would make what is difficult easy to 
understand, - But who says that’s possible?! (Tolstoy). Man's greatest 
happiness is love. Suppose you say of the schizophrenic: he does not 
love, he cannot love, he refuses to love - what is the difference?! ’He 
refuses to ....’ means: it is in his power. And who wants to say
that?!..." (CV 76-77). Notice Wittgenstein’s unusual triple use of ’’?!’’ 
It is Tolstoy, but not just Tolstoy, who fails to take sufficiently to 
heart Pascal on will and belief, on the half-dark/half-light conditions 
of "truth" without love and "love" without truth, or on the problem of 
the meaning of a cave-life which wanders between images and idols. 
Could it be said that Wittgenstein fails to take these things 
sufficiently seriously? Is that not a question as much for 
Wittgenstein's readers as for Wittgenstein himself? Wittgenstein’s 
prolonged concern with what is right and what is wrong in both solipsism 
and uncritical realism is not just a discussion with Russell and 
Schopenhauer. It is a discussion which involves both Pascal and much 
later readers, or perhaps non-readers - for whom Russell and 
Schopenhauer are not related and for whom Pascal is only a name honoured 
by a computer language.
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The view that Tolstoy’s conversion-crisis was a model for the structure 
of the Tractatus, with the apparent clash between its ethical or 
mystical point and its logical methods, its sublime dialectics of saying 
(what) and showing (how), is supported by one of James’ final comments 
on Tolstoy. "As I interpret his melancholy, then, it was not merely an 
accidental vitiation of his humours, though it was doubtless that also. 
It was logically called for by the clash between his inner character and 
his outer activities and aims.... His crisis was the getting of his soul 
in order, the discovery of its genuine habitat and vocation, the escape 
from falsehoods into what for him were ways of truth. It was a case of 
heterogeneous personality tardily and slowly finding its unity and 
level". (Varieties Lecture 8, p 191), Once again, through James’ 
Cartesian, psychologising style of thinking, aspects of both Pascal and 
Wittgenstein are evident.
James seems close to transcending this typical style at times, and one 
such time is in the sentence omitted from the middle of the above 
quotation. Here James prefigures Wittgenstein’s Tolstoyan ethics and 
virtually relates such matters to an incarnational view of truth with 
life, and hence truth with varieties of love. "Although a literary 
artist, Tolstoy was one of those primitive oaks of men, (a favourite 
image with Wittgenstein, who applies it to Luther (RW 143), withholds it 
from Mendelssohn (CV 2) and relates such trees to the sublime in RFGB 
11; compare his appreciation of Uhland’s poem, "Graf Eberhard’s 
Hawthorne"; Engelmann (LLW) 6f and 82-85) to whom the superfluities and 
insincerities, the cupidities, complications, and cruelties of our 
polite civilization are profoundly unsatisfying, and for whom the 
eternal veracities lie with more natural and animal things". (Loc. 
cit.) Compare Wittgenstein, for example, in 1946: "It is very
remarkable that we should be inclined to think of civilization - houses,
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streets, cars, etc - as distancing man from his source, from what is 
sublime (Hohen), infinite and so on. Our civilized environment, along 
with the trees and plants in it, then seems as though it were cheaply 
wrapped in cellophane and isolated from everything great, from God, as 
it were. That is a remarkable picture that forces itself on us." (CV 
50, as translated by Fergus Kerr 1986, 3).
This is not just a picture of romantic alienation from immoral society  ^
but also, and more deeply, a Pascalian picture of human self-distraction |
by truths without love in bondage together with loves without truth, in 'iI
the face of the gravity of the human predicament. What makes it so '4 
remarkable is the double estrangement it pictures. There is the 
estrangement of humanity from human works, and this is either projected 
into, or itself an expression of, an apparent estrangement between 
humanity with its works and its sublime source or goal. Arguably, the 
tendency to regard the sublime as nothing but a projected picture of our 
alienation from our own works is itself a symptom of the underlying 
illness rather than a therapeutic diagnosis. Such a symptom appears to 
fit in with the pathological syndrome of naive solipsism and uncritical 
realism which can only be a caricature of the sublime as understood by 
Pascal for example.
6.20 WITTGENSTEIN’S ETHICS FORESHADOWED
There is a further way in which the James-Tolstoy connection can 
illuminate Wittgenstein’s ethics of the sublime, James, from his 
Bostonian security, was drawn sufficiently to a Tolstoyian ethic to 
write in terms such as the following, "Poverty indeed in the strenuous 
life - without brass bands or uniforms or hysteric popular applause or 
lies or circumlocutions; and when one sees the way in which
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wealth-getting enters as an ideal into the very bone and marrow of our 
generation, one wonders whether a revival of the belief that poverty is 
a worthy religious vocation may not be "the transformation of military 
courage", and the spiritual reform which our time stands most in need 
of". (Varieties, Lectures XIV - XV, "The Value of Saintliness" p 356). 
Wittgenstein's sister Hermine wrote of his voluntary military enlistment 
in 1914, in spite of being exempted, that she knew for certain "that he 
was not motivated simply by the wish to defend his fatherland. He also 
had an intense desire to take something difficult upon himself and to do 
something other than purely intellectual work". (R Rhees, RW 3).
Wittgenstein shows concern with facing and overcoming fear of poverty 
and fear of death. These are forms of what the age of Kant and 
Schopenhauer recognises as a sublime character. "A man who is happy 
must have no fear. Not even in the face of death.... Fear in face of 
death is the best sign of a false, ie. a bad, life". (NB pp 75 - 76 for 
8th July 1916).
It was in June 1915 that Wittgenstein "went on duty to the town of
Turnov in Galicia, and happened to come upon a bookshop it contained
just one book: Tolstoy on the Gospels. He bought it merely because
there was no other. He read it and re-read it, and thenceforth had it
always with him, under fire and at all times " (Russell’s letter to
Lady Ottoline on 20th December 1919 from the Hague where he had talked 
with Wittgenstein. LRKM p 82).
The earliest evidence concerning what Tolstoy’s The Gospel in Brief 
meant to Wittgenstein comes from his letter to Ficker, written on 
24.7.1915, from the hospital of the Krakow Fortress, after a workshop
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explosion that left his hearing partially damaged: "You are living, as 
it were, in the dark and have not found the saving word. And if I, who 
am essentially so different from you, should offer some advice, it might 
seem asinine. However, I am going to venture it anyway. Are you 
acquainted with Tolstoy’s The Gospel in Brief? At its time, this book 
virtually kept me alive. Would you buy this book and read it?! If you 
are not acquainted with it, then you cannot imagine what an effect it 
can have upon a person...." (Janik 1979).
The qualifying clause, "At its time", may be understood, not - or not 
just - as indicating that the passage of time had given a more balanced 
perspective, nor as a gesture of distancing - out of respect for, or a 
wish to avoid embarrassing, his reader, but as recalling that the time 
when the book first spoke to him so powerfully was a time when he was 
oppressed by the thought of the affinity between military courage and 
suicide. Compare the remarks, "If suicide is allowed then everything is 
allowed. If anything is not allowed then suicide is not allowed. This 
throws a light on the nature of ethics, for suicide is, so to speak, the 
elementary sin. And when one investigates it it is like investigating 
mercury vapour in order to comprehend the nature of vapours. Or is even 
suicide in itself neither good nor evil? (NB 91, 10.1.1917). This
connects with the Notebooks theme, in July 1916, that "To believe in God 
means to see that life has a meaning" (NB 74, etc.). Suicide can be 
seen as "the elementary (or basic) sin", in so far as it is a refusal to 
let there be a life-world.
6.21 TOLSTOY, THE GOSPELS AND THE TRACTATUS
Tolstoy’s harmonisation/interpretation/editing of the Gospels is in some 
respects close to Matthew’s stress on Christ as the fulfilment of the
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Torah, the divine guidance for the whole of life, life now seen between 
this age and the age to come. In other respects Tolstoy’s Gospel is
close to the Gospel and Letters of John, as they connect "life" with
"love” and "fear" or "hate" with being "dead", stressing in this way 
possible realisations in the present of features which more traditional 
eschatology had regarded as belonging to the age to come. These 
tendencies having a family resemblance to Matthew and John are evident 
in Tolstoy’s own summary of his twelve chapters on the "sense of the 
teaching of Jesus".
"1. Man is the son of an infinite source: a son of that Father not by
the flesh but by the spirit.
2. Therefore man should serve that source in spirit,
3. The life of all men has a divine origin. It alone is holy.
4. Therefore man should serve that source in the life of all men. 
Such is the will of the Father.
5. The service of the will of the Father of life gives life.
6. Therefore the gratification of one’s will is not necessary for 
life.
7. Temporal life is food for the true life.
8. Therefore the true life, is independent of time: it is in the
present.
9. Time is an illusion of life; life in the past and in the future 
conceals from men the true life of the present.
10. Therefore man should strive to destroy the illusion of the 
temporal life of the past and future.
11. True life is in the present, common to all men and manifesting 
itself in love.
12. Therefore he who lives by love in the present, through the common 
life of all men, unites with the Father, the source and
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foundation of life." (Preface to The Gospel in Brief. Tolstoy 
1940)
These twelve theses should be compared especially with Tractatus 6.431 
- 6.432, for example: "Death is not an event of life. Death is not 
lived through. If by eternity is understood not endless temporal 
duration but timelessness, then he lives eternally who lives in the 
present. Our life is endless in the way that our visual field is 
without limit". (6,4311).
Additional material from Wittgenstein's diaries during the war of 
1914-18 casts some further light on "the saving word". For example, 
"Perhaps the nearness of death will bring light into life. God 
enlighten me". ( R Rhees RW 194, May 1916, written the day before 
going on duty, at his own request, as an artillery spotter during the 
heavier night shelling. See now also the more extensive material in 
McGuinness (1988) IfLi) . This should be connected with the June 1916 
remark that, "To pray is to think about the meaning of life" (NB 73). 
After the first night of such duty he wrote, "In constant danger of my 
life. By the grace of God the night went well. From time to time I
despair. This is the fault of a wrong view of life " (RW 195).
Here is one interesting context for, "Even if everything that we want 
were to happen, this could still only be, so to speak, a grace of 
fate, for what would guarantee it is not any logical connection 
between will and world, and we could not in turn will the supposed 
physical connection (NB 73, 5.7.1916 and TLP 6.374); also one may
recall, "Fear in face of death is the best sign of a false, i.e. a 
bad, life". (NB 75, 8.7.1916), In May 1916 what Wittgenstein
contrasts with "a wrong view of life" (einer falschen 
Lebensauffassung) is to "understand people. Whenever you feel like
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hating them, try instead to understand them. Be at peace within 
yourself. But how do you find this peace in yourself? Only if I live 
in a way pleasing to God. Only so can one bear life" (RW 198). (Cp. 
NB 74 - 75, 8.7. 1916). Already in March 1915, when Wittgenstein was 
for a long time unable to write philosophical notes, possibly 
Tolstoyan notes are sounded: "Am in mind so to speak unwound
(Abgespannt, run down or worn out)....I am nourished and kept alive by 
repulsive surroundings (cp Tolstoy on temporal life as food for the 
true life). My entire external life breaks in on me with all its 
meanness. And within myself I am full of hatred and cannot let the 
spirit come to me. God is love.” (RW 197).
Later Wittgenstein appears to have become highly critical of projects 
such as Tolstoy's The Gospel in Brief. Drury relates how, probably in 
1930, Wittgenstein saw a book entitled The Bible Designed to be read 
as Literature. He commented to the effect that now he would not want 
to look at that. He didn't want some literary gent to make selections 
from the Bible for him. (RW 118-19). Similarly in 1951, in a 
conversation about the Bible, Wittgenstein insisted to Drury that one 
must not pick and choose on moral grounds just what one wants, or does 
not want, in the Bible. (RW 169-70).
This criticism relates to other remarks of Wittgentstein about the 
Bible, wonder and tragedy, and to James' understanding of religion. 
Wittgenstein's appreciation of Tolstoy, while including Tolstoy's 
Hadj i Murad, on account of its freedom from the master’s late 
didacticism, shifted its focus to some of the very short and late 
stories collected in Twenty-Three Tales (English Edition title). In 
the early 1930s Wittgenstein urged Cambridge students to read 
especially What Men Live By, The Two Old Men, The Three Hermits and
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How Much Land Does a Man Need? John King recalls his saying that 
these present the essence of Christianity. (RW 72),
Wittgenstein's favourite was the story of the three hermits who in 
their eccentric simplicity make a joke out of the well-meaning 
orthodoxy of the bishop’s attempts to teach them to pray the Lord’s 
Prayer. The precarious life of the hermits, embodying their prayer 
for divine mercy, is itself a miracle of "sobornost" (roughly 
"togetherness") with the triune God on whom they call. (Gibson 1973). 
For Wittgenstein it remained the case that Tolstoy and Dostoevsky were 
two of the greatest religious writers in more recent European history. 
He once linked this judgement with the comment that people in the West 
were inclined to forget the existence of the Eastern Orthodox Church 
with its millions of members. (RW 102). Fania Pascal judges that his 
feeling for Russia and Russian language, connected with the plan to 
emigrate, had at all times more to do with this inclusive religious 
dimension than with any exclusively political or social matters. (RW 
44-45. The most suggestive work for understanding Dostoevsky and 
Wittgenstein together is, in my view, Gibson 1973).
The point about Tolstoy's, as Dostoevsky's, best work is that it shows 
a Christian sense of the sublime at work, as it portrays human 
happiness and unhappiness, living and dying, shame and glory. 
Moreover these portrayals do not depend, in any obvious way, on 
strengths of discourse about the sublime on the part of these artists. 
Nor are these portrayals spoilt by weaknesses of such discourse. The 
struggle to purify and strengthen such discourse may be shared by 
artists and philosophers, working together towards perceptive 
equilibration. (Nussbaum 1987) . This struggle is a distinctive burden 
and glory of the style of philosophy and humanity which Wittgenstein 
s eeks.
Chapter Seven:
The Lecture on Ethics
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THE LECTURE ON ETHICS
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7.1 OPENING SUMMARY FOR CHAPTER SEVEN
Wittgenstein’s Lecture on Ethics, and especially his parable of the way 
and the goal, is an important key to understanding the inclusive grammar 
which Wittgenstein found in Augustine and Kierkegaard and as well as in 
Judaism. In this grammar, the ethical does not necessarily exclude the 
aesthetic, the religious and the logical. The lecture begins by
stressing that the way and the goal must be seen together and ends by 
urging that what we experience as logically impossible (in an exclusive 
sense) can save us from what we may come, in more inclusive 
understanding, to see as absolutely impossible.
The lecture’s setting-in-life relates to Wittgenstein's sense that human 
beings need to wake up to wonder, but cannot do so, apart from the 
grammar of the logical space which neither rivals nor excludes the
finite. Scientism, as misdirection and deformation of the absolute, 
inclusive sense of wonder, is guilty of confusing what matters
absolutely and what relatively. Wittgenstein’s new sense of wonder, 
centred on language, appears to be influenced by the rediscovered 
inclusive linguistic mysticism of J G Hamann.
One can begin learning how way and goal belong together in a lecture, or 
in mathematics, logic, language and philosophy - but also in aesthetics, 
ethics and spirituality. Such learning finds and gives signs of the 
self-interpretation of inclusive grammar. This may be properly spoken 
of dialectically as the glory of the Holy One, sublimely filling the 
ordinary with significance, raising it up into wider glory. For
inclusive grammar, Wittgenstein's phrase "theology as grammar" is 
reversible.
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Confused, abstracted, exclusive language-worlds, in which this 
dialectical method is impossible, can be found impossible and broken up, 
if they are to be transformed into the inclusive grammar which enables 
the good and the true, the sublime and the holy to be present and active 
in and through language. Interpretation within inclusive grammar 
requires patient development of critical realism and critical idealism, 
going beyond certain limited or mistaken aspects of Augustine's and 
Wittgenstein's early accounts. Such interpretation cannot consistently 
or fairly be accused of reductionism, arbitrariness, exclusiveness or 
fideism, if it is developed consistently and fairly. When due account 
is paid to Wittgenstein's development and later self-criticism, it is 
possible to describe more fully the kinds of experience he describes as 
being of absolute value.
This involves what may be called perceptive discrimination for the sake 
of perceptive equilibration, centred openness for the sake of open 
centredness. Without this background, Wittgenstein's imminent j
development of his family-resemblances method serves mainly to make 
explicit a confusion in which one does not know how to find one's way 
around. With this background, the new method means that one knows how 
to go on. The neo-Augustinian vision of the Lecture on Ethics renews 
this sense of what it means to be lost and found. |
i
I
i
7.2 THE LECTURE'S SETTING-IN-LIFE
On 17 November 1929, Wittgenstein read a lecture to a Cambridge j
undergraduate society known as "The Heretics". (King and Lee (1980) |
pXV, supported by Shanker (1986) pl2). This is an earlier date than j
previously often conjectured. McGuinness (1979 in WVC p77, note 41) |
gave "November 1930”, which even in 1979 did not cohere well either with ;|
evidence earlier in WVC (eg., pp68-69) or with CV 3, 1929. The date is i|
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important partly because of the speed with which Wittgenstein was 
transforming his thinking in the period of 1929 - 1931. See, on this 
speed, Hilmy (1987) who argues that major developments were begun 
earlier than was previously apparent. Other reasons for the importance 
of the date will be given below.
Wittgenstein’s manuscript for his lecture has no title. On first 
publication in 1965, it was editorially entitled, "A Lecture on Ethics",
(Philosophical Review, January 1965, pp3-12). It has since become
widely known as (The) Lecture on Ethics (LE). The title is both 
appropriate and inappropriate.
The title may be considered appropriate for the following reasons. 
Wittgenstein chose what he calls his ’’subject" for the lecture. Within 
his lecture he calls this subject "Ethics" (p4). It is something he is 
"keen on communicating" and which seems to him to be of general 
importance. The point of the lecture could be described as the giving 
of guidance on how to think, speak and express oneself. To this extent 
the title is appropriate.
However, the title may also be considered inappropriate. Wittgenstein’s 
introductory remarks (p3) acknowledge pre-emptively, as the second of 
his expected "great difficulties in communicating" with his hearers, the 
difficulty that probably many of them have come "with slightly (sic) 
wrong expectations." This tactful understatement is already in
interesting tension with the previously mentioned "great difficulties". 
It may reasonably be doubted whether Wittgenstein’s introductory 
remarks, intended to set his hearers right on this point, are
sufficient.
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For one of the most striking features of the main part of the lecture is 
the way he connects ethics with aesthetics and especially with religious 
experience. The usual exclusion barriers between the good, the true, 
the sublime and the holy are absent. The lecturer is paradoxically 
eloquent about ineffable experiences of the absolute. This is a paradox 
which Augustine turned and turned again throughout his Confessiones and 
beyond. It is not, however, a contradiction if one sees the point of 
Augustine's and Wittgenstein's dialectical practice. If we are to turn 
from living within one language (syntax, logical space or grammar) to 
living within another, if we are to turn from an exclusive to an 
inclusive way of using language, then the sense of an ending - of an 
ethical, logical, aesthetic death - may be unavoidable, if a new 
beginning is to be available and experienced. Only what we first 
experience as impossible in encountering a new and better language may 
be able to save us from what we come to see as impossible in our older 
language. Wittgenstein wants to share this ethical experience with his 
hearers.
In Cambridge where fashionable ethical discourse was dominated by 
interpretations of G E Moore’s Principia Ethica, communication between 
Wittgenstein and his hearers was likely to go more than "slightly wrong" 
- as he well knew. His understanding of ethics is too heretical for his 
audience of "Cambridge Heretics". This is confirmed by Julian Bell’s 
verse satire, "An Epistle on the Subject of the Ethical and Aesthetic 
Beliefs of Herr Ludwig Wittgenstein (Doctor of Philosophy) to Richard 
Braithwaite, Esq., MA (Fellow of King's College)."
The second reason why it is important to be able to date Wittgenstein’s 
lecture precisely, as given on 17.11.1929, is that Bell's satire was 
first published in February 1930, and seems likely to have been written
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as a way of occupying a Christmas vacation after hearing and discussing 
Wittgenstein's lecture, along with other evidence or gossip, no doubt. 
The extensive satire, using Dryden's couplet form to considerable good 
effect, was originally published in a university medium. The Venture. 
(Now available in Copi and Beard (1966) pp67-73.)
Bell writes tellingly of Wittgenstein, that
"... He smuggles knowledge from a secret source:
A Mystic in the end, confessed and plain,
The ancient enemy returned again;
Who knows by his direct experience
What is beyond all knowledge and all sense.
Religion once again shall raise its head - 
A general resurrection of the dead:- 
A battered harlot, who, though old, has found 
A silly priest, whose lechry thinks her sound.
We, like good rationalists, have never been 
Tempted by Jesus, or by Magdalene ..."
"Magdalene" was also the college of the Ramsey brothers, Frank and 
Michael. Frank's very premature death on 18 January 1930 was a widely 
experienced shock. (This is one reason for conjecturing that the satire 
was written in the Christmas vacation.) Frank had helped to translate 
the Tractatus and, aged 20, had written an acute review of it for Mind. 
He visited Wittgenstein in 1923 and 1924 when the latter was teaching 
children at Puchberg. His own thinking was moving in the direction of 
pragmatism. Wittgenstein acknowledges the important influence of this
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friend and critic, especially during 1928-30, on the development of his 
own thinking (PI, preface. However, compare the more critical remarks 
about Frank Ramsey in CV 17, 1931). While Magdalene College was ultra 
Anglican, and Michael Ramsey a Magdalene "convert" from 
Congregationalism, Jesus College had strong non-conformist connections.
The senses in which Wittgenstein may be said, in his lecture, to smuggle 
"knowledge from a secret source", and the senses in which the tradition 
with which Wittgenstein is increasingly at odds also smuggles "knowledge 
from a secret source" will be developed later in this chapter. It is 
interesting how the theme of secrecy and openness recurs in 
Wittgenstein's notes for 1930-31. For example, 'h-îben you bump against 
the limits of your own honesty (NB - not the limits of language as such 
- I McP) it is as though your thoughts get in a whirlpool, an infinite 
regress: You can say what you like, it takes you no further" (CV 8, 
1930), Wittgenstein's already discussed passage on the allegedly 
secretive nature of Jews, or of a Jewish style of thinking, comes from 
1931 (CV 22). There is no hint in Bell’s heroic couplets of anything 
that deserves to be called anti-semitism or anti-German animus, unless 
Bell is deliberately rejecting anti-semitism in two passages - a risky 
hypothesis as Wittgenstein's family background was apparently not known. 
The author, however, is in places extraordinarily acute. Bell, 
admitting he lacks the philosophical learning he supposes may be held 
necessary to engage in controversy with "wild philosophers in all their 
rage" continues:
"Well knowing that, a puny Jonah, I 
The great Behemoth of the seas defy;
Whose learning, logic, casuistry's so vast,
He overflows the metaphysic waste."
The 1932 printing of the poem carries a final prose disclaimer that, 
"... this satire is not intended as a personal attack ... but solely as 
a criticism of certain views on art and morals (which Bell considers his
own territory) advocated by (Dr Wittgenstein) three years ago." (Ie.,
in 1929).
The setting-in-life of Wittgenstein's lecture, the atmosphere of which 
is expressed by Bell's "Epistle", is confirmed by J M Keynes’ account of 
how such circles affected both D H Lawrence and Wittgenstein: "We were
not aware that civilisation was a thin and precarious crust erected by 
the personality and will of a very few, and only maintained by rules and 
conventions skillfully put across and guilefully preserved. We had no 
respect for traditional wisdom or the restraints of custom. We lacked 
reverence, as Lawrence observed and as Ludwig with justice also used to 
say - for everything and everyone." (Keynes 1949, p99).
Wittgenstein’s way of expressing and responding to Keynes' 
(retrospective) concern will be explored in the following discussion of 
his lecture. His general approach is indicated by his response to 
Renan's scientism, written only months later: "... Man has to awaken to 
wonder - and so perhaps do peoples. Science (ie., as abused by Renan et 
al. - I. McP.) is a way of sending him to sleep again ..." (CV 5, 1930).
7.3 WITTGENSTEIN'S INTRODUCTION
The first of Wittgenstein's three "great difficulties", which jointly 
constitute the introductory section of his lecture, is that English is
not his first language. He says his expression will often lack the
subtlety and precision which are desirable for his subject. He is at 
least right that there are in the lecture small errors of syntax and 
grammar. The importance of his drawing attention to this is only partly
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that he asks for his audience’s tolerance and co-operation. More 
importantly, he begins by putting himself into his audience’s situation 
and by drawing attention to this. It is, in the light of what follows, 
not just a matter of good manners, diplomacy or good teaching technique, 
but the front door into what Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer meant by 
"indirect communication". Wittgenstein seeks to approach his self-set 
task from the direction in which his hearers are likely to approach it.
In fact, his powers of expression in English were remarkably strong. He 
had grown up at home with English. Nevertheless, he says, "All I can do 
is to ask you to make my task easier by trying to get at my meaning in 
spite of the faults which I will constantly be committing ..." (p3) .
However, differences between English and German are not the only 
occasions of error concerning Wittgenstein’s subject.
His introduction of his second "great difficulty" goes some way towards 
diagnosing his audience’s difficulties at deeper levels: "... probably 
many of you come up to this lecture of mine with slightly wrong 
expectations." He would have misused his opportunity if he had decided 
to give a lecture on logic. For logic, as "a scientific matter", would 
need a course of lectures. Even worse than attempting the impossibility 
of trying to contract a year’s work into an hour would be to give 
"what’s called a popular-scientific lecture". That would be not 
impossible but wrong. For it would be intended to make his audience 
believe that they understood something when they didn’t. "Popular" 
science, according to Wittgenstein, aims to gratify one of the lowest 
desires of modern people, a desire expressed in their superficial 
curiosity about the latest discoveries of science. Wittgenstein rejects 
the possibility of using his lecture to feed this base craving for 
superficial knowledge or superficial understanding of science. This is
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not a rejection of science as such, but of an abuse of science. Such 
abuses of science we may conveniently label as "scientism".
7.4 DEMYSTIFYING SCIENTISM
Wittgenstein’s anti-scientism is closely connected with his hostility to 
certain notions or accounts of progress, of modernity and of the spirit 
"which informs the vast stream of European and American civilisation in 
which all of us stand". (Foreward to PR, November 1930. Compare the 
draft for this in CV6).
At this point it is perhaps sufficient to note how Wittgenstein’s 
targets include what he sees as a displacement or misdirection, but also 
a deformation, of reverence which, being aesthetic, ethical and 
religious, is properly directed towards the sublime, the good and the 
holy. When this reverence is directed towards science or invested in 
it, idolatry and superstition appear in the high-priestly robes of 
science itself. (Cp CV 8 and 5 (1930) with PI s426, CV 1 (1929)
onwards. Compare the high-priestly aspect of the "Grand Inquisitor" in 
Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov).
Wittgenstein’s disgust with the scientism in certain attempts to 
popularise natural sciences is strongly expressed in his reaction to 
James Jean’s book, The Mysterious Universe. "... I loathe it and call 
it misleading. Take the title, this alone I would call misleading. 
(But in what way is it misleading? Isn’t it mysterious, or is it?) ... 
I might say the title The Mysterious Universe includes a kind of idol 
worship, the idol being Science and the Scientist. ... I am honestly 
disgusted ... how much I ’m doing is persuading people to change their 
style of thinking." (Students' notes in LC pp27-28, s36-41.) On the 
other hand, Wittgenstein once remarked that perhaps someone trained in
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philosophy could most usefully write a clear and decent popular account 
of some science, like Michael Faraday's lecture The Chemical History of 
a Candle. (Malcolm in Fann (1967) p73. However, cp PI p46, note 1 with 
Baker and Hacker (1983) pp221-223).
Wittgenstein's struggle against religious or quasi-religious (also 
ethical and aesthetic) aspects of scientism as a style of thinking is 
anticipated in the Tractatus. There we find his early criticism of 
misplaced faith in scientific explanation, together with his own faith 
in the new logic: "There is no compulsion making one thing happen
because another has happened. The only necessity that exists is logical 
necessity. The whole modern conception of the world is founded on the 
illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the explanations of 
natural phenomena. Thus people today stop at the laws of nature, 
treating them as something inviolable (Unantastbarem: unimpeachable,
unassailable), just as God and Fate were treated in past ages. And in 
fact both are right and both wrong: though the view of the ancients is 
clearer in so far as they have a clear and acknowledged terminus, while 
the modern system tries to make it look as if everything were 
explained." (TLP 6.37-6.372). "We feel that even when all possible 
scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain 
completely untouched ..." (TLP 6.52).
Scientism, as a distinctive style of metaphysical thinking, confuses 
contingent or empirical questions and answers with conceptual issues, 
including issues in ethics, aesthetics and religion, as well as in logic 
and philosophy. Wittgenstein's struggle against scientism is thus a 
struggle within ethics and aesthetics as well as within religion. "So 
if you want to stay within the religious sphere you must struggle". (CV 
86, 1950. Here Winch’s translation of "im Religiosen" by "in the
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religious sphere" may appear to be a case of reading "Wittgensteinian 
fideism" into the text, unless one reflects that a sphere may be an 
inclusive and complex totality, rather than an exclusive part of a 
disintegrated Venn diagram.)
7.5 HAMANN
Wittgenstein's struggle against scientism places him within a family of 
traditions where he sought and found certain ancestors. Amongst these 
is Kierkegaard as a scourge of Hegelian scientism, with his criticism of 
a superficial objectivity, abstracted from subjectivity. Here too 
belongs the great precursor of Kierkegaard, acknowledged by the Danish 
writer as an "emperor", ie. , Johann Georg Hamann, student of Pascal and 
Hume, friend and critic of Herder and Kant, interpreter of Luther on 
theology as grammar, and studied by Wittgenstein at least as early as 
1930 (Rhees (1984) RW pl07).
The rediscovery of Hamann in German-speaking Europe went together with 
the discovery of Kierkegaard, beginning before the war of 1914-18 and 
developing after it. Wittgenstein, as a not uncritical reader (as well 
as subsidiser) of Picker's Brenner journal, may have first encountered 
Hamann there. Certainly the Brenner published extracts from Ferdinand 
Ebner's Das Wort und die geistigen Realitaten (Innsbruck 1921). This 
work, which makes use of Hamann in developing new thinking about 
language, thought and spirituality, had some influence on both Martin 
Buber and Franz Rosenzweig. Of Ebner's work, which Buber discovered 
through the Brenner, Buber wrote, "... following the trail of Hamann, 
but binding the insights more strongly to one another, he penetrates 
more deeply into the mystery of speech as the ever-new establishment of 
the relation between the I and the You (Du)". (Quoted by Maurice 
Friedman 1982, pSOl; date of original not given).
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When Hamann and, after him, the new Jewish thinkers of the 1920s and 
1930s write of theology as grammar, Luther's understanding of this is 
being developed and transformed away from Luther's somewhat nominalist 
and/or platonic renaissance background. However, carried forward from 
Luther, as an interpreter of Biblical sources and traditions, are the 
senses that language is a matter of interaction between people and that 
language has important regulative and interpretative functions which are 
not originally or ultimately dependent on any mysterious goings-on 
within the isolated individual consciousness. Luther's stress on 
theology as a grammatical study includes the renaissance displacement of 
medieval scholastic dialectics by linguistic, ie., grammatical, study of 
the "sources" of tradition.
Hamann, inheriting this tradition, develops an inclusive mysticism of 
language which makes central to its openness Pascal's vision of Christ 
as the mediator and interpreter, sublimely reconciling, in the order or 
language of love, the languages or orders of the mental and physical, 
and so overcoming recurrent threats of gnostic dualism or anarchic 
chaos. Thus the development of human responsibility for language, with 
its expressive, regulative, interpretative and interactive as well as 
representational resources, is - far from having to be regarded with
religious (ie., Christian and Jewish) suspicion - central to the
mastery, freedom, lordship and glory which humanity may share in the
glory of God through Christ the Word, who is exalted in his very 
humiliation in this world of sick and poisonously exclusive language 
parodies. It is this vision of language (cp. Hamann's "Speak, that I 
may see you") which is in large measure responsible for Kierkegaard's 
extraordinary explosion of writing and provocation in the 1840s and
early 1850s. Kierkegaard is not the only singular individual in the 
tradition influenced by Hamann's parrhesia to have expressed himself so
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energetically. There are, for example, Karl Barth, Hans von Balthasar 
and " in his own more Jewish-Christian way - Ludwig Wittgenstein.
The best available interpretation of Hamann known to me is that of 
Balthasar in his Herrlichkeit; Eine Theologische Esthetic 1961 - 1969; 
ET; The Glory of the Lord. See especially ET vol 3 (1986), but also ET 
vol 1 (1982) . Balthasar, for all his learning, shows no sign of any
deep acquaintance with Wittgenstein, to whom he does not refer in any 
work currently available. The above account of Hamann relates him more 
explicitly to Pascal than does Balthasar or any other interpreter known 
to me. The way of relating Hamann to Wittgenstein in this thesis has 
not been attempted elsewhere so far as I am aware. One of the best 
accounts of Hamann from an English-language scholar is W M Alexander 
(1966). The work of Ronald Gregor Smith (1960), James C O'Flaherty 
(1979) and Terence J German (1981) should also be recalled, even though 
they do not develop their accounts in terms of Wittgenstein's grammar 
and sense of linguistic responsibility - a limitation not to be wondered 
at, in view of the slow and tortuous processes involved in making 
Wittgenstein available for understanding. Wittgenstein's epigraph for 
his work now in PR, rightly set at the front of that work by its 
translators (confirmed by a personal communication from Roger White), 
should not be forgotten, as it expresses the shadow-side of his Jewish 
grammatical dialectic: "And many, leading this life before us, made
tortuous ways, which we were forced to traverse, with multiplied travail 
and anguish imposed on Adam's offspring: et multi ante nos vitam istam 
agentes, praestruxerant aerumnosas vias, per quas transire cogebamur 
multiplicato labore et dolore filiis Adam." (Augustine Confessiones 
1:9. Translation I.McP.).
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Wittgenstein bad certainly read Hamann for himself before he spoke in a 
1932 lecture of theology as grammar, attributing this insight to Luther. 
(Alice Ambrose's lecture notes (1979) WLAA s28, p32). According to
Alice Ambrose, Wittgenstein said, "Luther said that theology is the 
grammar of the word "God". I interpret this to mean that an 
investigation of the word would be a grammatical one. For example,
people might dispute about how many arms God had, and someone might 
enter the dispute by denying that one could talk about arms of God, 
This would throw light on the use of the word. What is ridiculous or 
blasphemous also shows the grammar of the word." (G.E. Moore (1959)
gives a very compressed account of the same material, omitting the 
reference to Luther). Here Wittgenstein may be directly or indirectly 
dependent on Hamann for his knowledge of Luther.
Drury reports that in 1930 Wittgenstein spoke of having read Hamann on
Genesis (RW 107). This was probably his Biblische Betrachtung of 1758. 
These Biblical Reflections (Gregor Smith's translation) begin with the 
maxim that, "All Biblical history is a prophecy which is fulfilled in 
every century and in the soul of man."
However, even Wittgenstein's first remark in CV (pi, 191 A) is in the
spirit of Hamann. It was written in the early days of his war service 
and McGuinness (1988, WLi, p215) has now given the written context for 
this remark. The parts not in CV (pi) will be shown in brackets. 
Writing about a lieutenant, and about his own difficulties in getting on 
with his fellow soldiers on his gunboat, Wittgenstein notes: "(A very 
nice man. He can have to do with the biggest scoundrels and be friendly 
without losing any of his dignity.) When we hear a Chinaman talk, we 
are inclined to think his speech nothing but inarticulate gurgling.
Someone who understands Chinese will recognise it as language.
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Similarly I often cannot recognise the human being in a man." (Diary 
21.8.14; translation McGuinness, loc.cit.)
Drury, doubtless influenced by Wittgenstein's example, quotes Hamann in 
order to develop his own interpretation of Wittgenstein, though he does 
not take this in the direction of the present thesis: "But this anxiety 
in the world is the only proof of our being different from it." (Hamann 
as quoted by Drury RW 84). This is adapted from Hamann's letter to
Herder on 3 June 1781: "This Angst in the world (like Noah in his ark)
is the sole proof of our being different (Gregor Smith: heterogeneity). 
For'if we lacked nothing we would not be any better than the heathen and 
the transcendental philosophers, who know nothing of God, and become 
enamoured of dear Nature like fools; no homesickness would assail us. 
This awkward (not "irrelevant", as Gregor Smith) unrest, this holy 
hypochondria, is perhaps the fire with which we beasts of sacrifice must 
be salted and preserved from the corruption of the present age." 
(Translation revised from Gregor Smith (1960) p49). In this
Augustinian, Pascalian passage, Hamann provides a powerful key both to 
Kierkegaard's Concept of Dread and to Heidegger on Angst as revelation 
of human being in the world. "To be sure, 1 can imagine what Heidegger 
means by being and anxiety. Man feels the urge to run up against the 
limits of language ... Kierkegaard too saw that there is this running up
against something and he referred to it in a fairly similar way (as
running up against paradox) ... the inclination, the running up against 
something, indicates something. St Augustine knew that already..." 
(Wittgenstein to Waismann, 30 December 1929; WVC pp68-69). Heidegger in 
Being and Time (1927) acknowledges Augustine and Kierkegaard as sources, 
but does not mention Hamann. The resemblances between Heidegger and 
Wittgenstein's Lecture on Ethics are more extensive that this, as will 
be indicated below. (Wittgenstein's "running against the limits"
metaphor is common in Dostoevsky and used identically by Kraus (1976)
p67, Kraus and Goethe both studied Hamann).
In 1930, Drury recalls, Wittgenstein said to him, "... where (Hamann) 
says, commenting on the story of the Fall in Genesis : "How like God to 
wait until the cool of the evening before confronting Adam with his 
transgression." Now I wouldn’t for the life of me dare to say "how like 
God". I wouldn't claim to know how God should act. Do you understand 
Hamann's remark? ..." (RW107). Wittgenstein here is worrying in case
Hamann should be a fideist who claims a complacent or presumptuous
intimacy with the Holy One to which he is not entitled. Compare Drury 
on Wittgenstein's criticism of fideism elsewhere, eg., RW 93-94.
Properly understood, neither Pascal, nor Hamann, nor Wittgenstein
himself are fideists in any possible unacceptable sense of the term. 
For a start, their commitment to the inclusiveness of the grammar of 
Christianity and Judaism points in the contrary direction. Their 
attacks on "reason" are always attacks on deformations of reason as 
abstracted from living, fully human language and order.
Wittgenstein, as reported by Drury, seems in danger of misunderstanding
Hamann. Wittgenstein can be answered out of his own mouth. The fact
that in Judaism and Christianity one can say (as a matter of grammar) 
that God says to human beings: "don't enact heaven and hell on earth. 
Heaven and hell are my business" (cp. CV14, 1931), shows that the
holiness of the Holy One is expressed in - and not contradicted by - his 
liberating concern for human beings on earth and in their earthliness. 
In 1929, Wittgenstein had noted, "My ideal is a certain coolness. A
temple providing a setting for the passions without meddling with them" 
(CV 2). In 1949, he noted, "The Sabbath is not simply a time for rest.
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for relaxation. We ought to contemplate our labours from without and 
not just from within." (CV 80).
The last remark shows excellently the dialectical operations of 
Wittgenstein's inclusive Jewish grammar. To contemplate our labours 
from without, and not just from within, means to contemplate them 
inclusively, thus following the paradigmatic divine contemplation, on 
the seventh day, after the labours of world-creation. Here is 
Wittgenstein's grammatical doctrine of humanity as being in the image 
and likeness of God, anticipated by the wordless vision and Augustinian 
eschatological rest of the seventh and final section of the Tractatus.
Hamann's idea seems to be that the cool of the evening, which is the 
daily sabbath rest from human struggle and conflict, is the right time 
for us to be made aware of our responsibility and guilt. Moreover, 
confession is not (just) a mechanism in human attempts at privatised 
self-regulation through self-accusation. For, as Wittgenstein 
recognised, "A confession has to be a part of your new life" (CV 18, 
1931; cp. RW 172 - 209). In confession before others and before God one 
opens one's excluding heart towards contemplating one's labours from 
without, more inclusively. In confession one includes more of the 
excluded and so becomes more inclusive. (See CV 46 on "the gift of 
opening"; cp. CV80 on contemplating our labours from without.) 
Wittgenstein, in his own way, came to share with Hamann the vision they 
both share with Henry Vaughan's "Son-days":
"... Transplanted Paradise; God's walking hour;
The cool o' the day;
The creatures' Jubilee; God's parle with dust;
Heaven here; Man on those hills of myrrh, and flowers;
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Angels descending; the returns of trust;
A gleam of glory, after six-days-showers ..."
(Vaughan 1983, p205).
Compare George Herbert's sonnet Prayer I . Like Herbert, Wittgenstein 
was not unacquainted with "Heaven in ordinarie, man well drest". 
(Herbert (1981), p70.)
A quiet, but crucial, emphasis of Wittgenstein's lecture, as of his 
life's work, is that while scientism greedily and impatiently dreams of 
"progress", genuine philosophical existence, as genuine humanity, 
requires and enjoys an awakened patience. This theme is already played 
by Hamann before Kierkegaard. Kant eulogised the heart's desire of the 
eighteenth century enlightenment in terms of "Sapere aude": have the 
courage to use your intelligence. Compare Wittgenstein on his 
interpretative vocation of "clarification with COURAGE" (CV 19). Hamann 
brings out the difference here between Kant and Wittgenstein. For 
Hamann diagnosed the desire for enlightenment among his contemporaries 
as including a considerable element of that complacent and superficial 
curiosity which Wittgenstein also loathed in scientism. Hamann's 
criticism is an application of Augustine and Pascal on the restlessness 
and distractedness of human hearts in abstraction from the open centre 
of all things. Hamann links the sickness of curiosity with a spirit of 
impatience. Both patience and impatience are regarded by him, followed 
here by Kierkegaard, as pregnant with Jewish and Christian implications. 
Scientism, which Hamann sees as having its own version of eschatology 
and apocalyptic, has its own ways of trying to force the coming of the 
Kingdom, or to take the new Jerusalem, by a violence that is logically 
and aesthetically, as well as ethically and religiously deforming. By 
contrast, for him: "Reason is language, logos. This is the bone I gnaw
at and shall gnaw myself to death over. Yet these depths are still 
obscure to me; I still await an apocalyptic angel with a key to this 
abyss" (Hamann to Herder, 6 August 1784).
"What is sought in oriental cisterns lies in the sensu communi of the 
usages of language and this key transforms our best intellectuals into 
senseless mystics, and the simplest Galileans and fishermen into the 
profoundest students and heralds of a wisdom which is not of earth, or 
of man, or of the devil ... and this philosophy leaves no proper man, 
who has been driven by fear into desert places and wilderness, without 
help and comfort." "... Our whole philosophy consists more of language 
than of reason, and the misunderstandings of countless words, the posing 
as real of the most arbitrary abstractions, the antitheses of 
pseudo-gnosis, and even the commonest figures of speech of the sensus 
communis, have produced a whole world of questions which have as little 
reason to be raised as to be answered. We are still needing a grammar 
of reason, as of writing and its common elements ..." "The adiutorium, 
the help, language, is the seducer of our understanding and will always 
be so, until we turn back, turn home to the beginning ..." (Hamann to 
Jacobi, 2 November 1783, 1 December 1784 and 29 April 1787. Cp the
Tractatus, the Lecture on Ethics, and the Investigations, throughout, 
especially, "... is the word ever actually used in this way in the 
language-game which is its original home? - What we^  do is to bring words 
back from their metaphysical to their everyday use". (PI sll6.)
In the whole of Wittgenstein's work, perhaps with a little help from 
Hamann, we can see how our impatient, superficial curiosity - with its 
restless misunderstandings of language, its posing and projecting, its 
dialectics and its metaphors - has produced "a whole world of questions 
which have as little reason to be raised as to be answered." (Ibid),
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Such, when seen in an abstractive or exclusive way, is the world of the 
Tractatus and the Lecture on Ethics. Such is the world opened up, 
renewed and transfigured by the Investigations.
Hamann’s apocalyptic vision of the togetherness of ordinary languages, 
philosophies and theology is the outcome of his Jewish-Christian style 
of interpretative dialectical thinking. Consequently it is arguable 
that if Hamann has not found his "apocalyptic angel" in either 
Kierkegaard or in Wittgenstein, then - at least if read in each other’s 
light - they deliver a not unenlightening message.
This is the context in which Wittgenstein could write in 1931, "I ought 
to be no more than a mirror, in which my reader can see his own thinking 
with all its deformities, so that, helped in this way, he can put it 
right" (CV 18). In the Lecture on Ethics he lets us see, not only our 
exclusive ways of seeing and living, with all their deformities, which 
culminate in a negative final judgement that we are the prisoners of our 
own contradictoriness, but also, as the reverse side of this, a positive 
judgement involving his inclusive grammar of "The infinite (which) 
doesn't rival the finite ... (which) exclude(s) nothing finite" (PR 
sl38). The effect is like one of the various Gestalt-psychology shifts 
of configuration, whereby we can in this case see the figure either 
ambiguously or else see it unambiguously as an ambiguous figure. WTiat 
was background switches to foreground, and the converse, and does so 
uncapriciously once one knows how to respond to it. It is no accident 
that in the Investigations Wittgenstein explores "philosophy of 
psychology" by means of such allegorical figures. The true vision sees 
inclusively the aspects which, seen exclusively, are ambiguous. This 
becomes perspicuous in Wittgenstein's third "great difficulty" in the
introductory section of his lecture. Here also we are dealing with the 
dialectics of the sublime.
Before, at last, reaching that part of the text, one more example of 
Wittgenstein’s appropriation of Hamann should be noted. As mentioned, 
Hamann prefaced his Biblical Reflections, which Wittgenstein read, with 
the remark, "All biblical history is a prophecy which is fulfilled in 
every century and in the soul of man." Wittgenstein writes, 
"Christianity is not a doctrine, not, I mean, a theory about what has 
happened and will happen to the human soul, but a description of 
something that actually takes place in human life. For "consciousness 
of sin" is a real event and so are despair and salvation through faith. 
Those who speak of such things (Bunyan for instance) are simply 
describing what has happened to them, whatever gloss anyone may want to 
put on it". (CV 28, 1937).
This is no longer readable as a sample of psychologistic privatisation, 
as if by a follower of Schleiermacher or of William James, \*Jhat 
"actually takes place in human life" is interaction, guidance and 
interpretation, as well as expression and description. The dialectical 
grammar of Judaism and Christianity becomes "real event". After Hamann, 
notions of religious experience have to be interpreted inclusively and 
so more richly than anything which William James anatomises. Hamann is 
aware of his affinity to Kabbalah hermeneutics and jokes playfully about 
this. (Aesthetics in Nuce Gregor Smith (1960) pl99f, etc. It is 
striking that Gadamer’s Truth and Method, for all its range and its 
interest in "sensus communis" (etc), has nothing on J G Hamann or on 
Jewish hermeneutics.)
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7.6 THE THIRD "GREAT DIFFICULTY"
Wittgenstein’s presentation of this third and final part of his 
introduction is of such importance for the present argument that it 
needs to be given in full, and perhaps read more than once, in view of 
its carefully constructed reverberations.
"... the hearer is incapable of seeing both the road he is led and the 
goal which it leads to. That is to say; he either thinks; ’I understand 
all he says, but what on earth is he driving at’ or else he thinks ’I 
see what he’s driving at, but how on earth is he going to get there’. 
All I can do is again to ask you to be patient and to hope that in the 
end you may see both the way and where it leads to". (p4).
The many implications and associations of this passage need to be 
unfolded patiently. The true goal of the lecture is, perhaps, more 
readily recognised in the beginning of the lecture than in its actual 
ending. For the true goal is to see the goal in the way and the way in 
the goal, ie., not to see the way and the goal in contradiction of each 
other. If we look for the goal of the lecture just at its end, then we 
shall see in it just the confusion which is ours, reflected back in its 
mirror. The true goal of the lecture is to learn how to hear, interpret 
and respond inclusively, instead of excluding the way and the goal from 
each other. If we read this mirror exclusively, we shall be reading our 
own reflected exclusiveness.
This applies to the whole of Wittgenstein’s philosophical development, 
right from his initial concern with mathematics and logic, in the 
context of Boltzmann’s and Hertz’s insights into the importance of 
conceptual transformations. (CV 19)
In mathematics, it is a matter of learning to see the way and the goal 
together. Neither 1’esprit de geometrie nor 1’esprit de finesse is 
right or rightly comprehensible in exclusive isolation. Pascal, as a 
deep Augustinian, presumably saw this in relation to Augustine’s grammar 
of the way and the goal, and in relation to Augustine’s interpretation 
of using the law lawfully. (I Timothy 1:8 and Confessiones chapter 12 
and throughout). Mathematics is, in its essence, the right way of using 
numbers - and numbers, of course, turn out to be an expanding family. 
Less tersely, mathematics is the right way of using right ways of using 
numbers of different kinds. We need to be trained as apprentices in 
this way of ways before we can understand it as a dynamic discipline in 
the service of which we may become, if not perfectly free, at least 
adventurously and enjoy ably free. We may even find ourselves in the 
company of Pythagoras, Plato, Augustine, Pascal, Weil and Wittgenstein, 
using and enjoying these activities as sacraments of the all-embracing 
way and goal, the perfectly open centre (which has its centre everywhere 
and circumference nowhere - Cusanus and Pascal, etc), the Holy One whose 
glory fills heaven and earth.
In logic, it is a matter of learning to see the way and the goal 
together. Neither contingent truth nor necessary truth, and neither 
truth nor method, are rightly asserted, used or accepted in exclusive 
isolation. Truth without the love of logic and logic without the love 
of truth are idols and not God, as Pascal’s Augustinian interpretation 
almost says. Logic is, in essence, the right way of using language - 
with propositions, of course, along with other well-formed ways of using 
language, turning out to be a widely ramifying family network. Less 
compactly, logic is the right way of using right ways of using language. 
Here again we need apprenticeship in this way of ways before we can 
understand it as a dynamic discipline, with its own alternative, expert.
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strict systems, with their actual applications and with many compromises 
between practices and norms. We may even find ourselves in the company 
of Aristotle, Plotinus, Cusanus, Hegel, Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein, 
using and enjoying these activities as signs which remember and 
anticipate the omnipresent way and goal, the holy mystery which is the 
life and light of those who follow its dialectical way, and even of
those who make of this way their own "tortuous ways, which we were
forced to traverse, with multiplied travail and anguish imposed on 
Adam’s offspring" (Augustine Confessiones 1.9 and Wittgenstein PR, 
epigraph),
The similarity or sameness of structure in the above accounts of
mathematics and logic shows why it may appear as if mathematics could be 
founded in logic, or even logic in mathematics; also why it may appear 
as if philosophy could be transformed into logic or into some new 
synthesis of logic and mathematics. However, it also shows how 
mathematics and logic open up into philosophy; as well as showing how 
philosophy itself may open up into aesthetics, ethics and spirituality, 
when these are understood inclusively, ie., not with the exclusiveness 
of scientism, or dualistic gnosticism, or suspicious and one-sidedly 
specialised professional or curricular divisions of labour.
Continuing the pattern of thinking sampled with reference to mathematics 
and logic, philosophy in the classical sense of the love of wisdom, as 
sought and found in spirituality, ethics and aesthetics, may be seen 
more perspicuously as the right way of relating right ways of relating 
with others, and so with ourselves. "Others" here is to be taken 
widely, as meaning human and non-human; aniÊÊte and inanimate beings; 
processes, substances and events; skills, rules, concepts and
activities, etc. However, the reference to human others is primary. It
is also in order to express this as; the better way of relating better 
ways of relating with others. Alternatively and more explicitly in the 
language of Wittgenstein’s lecture; the absolute way of relating
absolute ways of relating with others. It is significant that
Wittgenstein introduces his concept of absoluteness in terms reminiscent 
of Kant, but also of Augustine. Absoluteness in relations with others 
means relating to another (or others) as end rather than just as means. 
(For some of the complexities of Augustine’s fluid thinking on these 
matters, using terminology adapted from both Stoic and Biblical sources, 
see Oliver O ’Donovan’s discussions in 1982 and 1986 of "usus et 
fruitio".)
The contrast between the languages of "the right way" and of "the 
better", "best" or "absolute" way expresses the perennial tension 
between deontic ethical theory and teleological ethical theory, or 
between types of ethics influenced by voluntarist or rationalist
interpretations, or between a morality of duties and a morality of
happiness, blessedness or fulfilment. The right - or felicitous - way 
to regard these polarities, so that they cohere with the general 
approach and arguments of this thesis, is to recognise "that the tension 
between the two moral languages reflects a necessary dialectic in the 
perceptions of moral agents for whom moral insight is still a task and 
not yet an achieved fact. In moments of grace we may be given the 
perception that our duty and our fulfilment are one and the same, and we 
may speak of that unity in hope and faith; but we cannot ask that we 
should never be challenged to further thought and conscientious struggle 
by an awareness of the divergence of inclination and duty". (O’Donovan 
(1986) pl39; see 137-139 and throughout), Wittgenstein’s lecture begins 
with such a perception of unity and ends in struggle with such a 
divergence.
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This quotation provides an admirable sample of perceptive equilibration. 
It also relates to Augustine’s prayer for "continentia" - not just 
"continence” but collectedness, wholeness, single-mindedness, 
equilibration. (Compare Heidegger's "Gelassenheit") - when Augustine 
asks, "Give what you command, and command what you will." (Confessiones 
book 10, s29 and s37). It should also be said that this perceptive
equilibration relates to the ethics of interpretation, belief, 
perception and experience (ie., to epistemology and aesthetics) and not 
just to ethics in a narrower sense. (Compare Nussbaum (1987) on 
"Perceptive Equilibrium" - sic. - emphasis added).
Wittgenstein’s right, or better, or absolute ways of relating 
aesthetically involve the ethics and logic of perception and experience 
as well as of skilled performances. Paradigms of such relationships are 
those in which the individual, the particular or the "merely" factual 
becomes a sign mediating wonder or awe, In virtue of reminding us about, 
or promising us, fuller ethical and spiritual relationships. Thus, as 
the extreme, limiting cases, even language (or the world in language, or 
our language-world) and world become parables or messengers of the 
sublime dialectic in which we see the finite within the infinite, the 
relatively good within the absolutely good, so that the finite and 
relative point beyond themselves, beyond the limits of the 
language-world in question, and so that the absolute or infinite may be 
said, in this sense, to be present and active in the finite and 
relative. As in varieties of Platonism, aesthetic reality is related to 
ethical-spiritual reality as the way is related to the goal in 
Wittgenstein’s introduction to his lecture. Thus the accounts already 
given of mathematics and logic are also aesthetic accounts.
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The far-reaching implications of Wittgenstein's aesthetics have as yet 
barely been glimpsed by most of his readers, even though the ways of
seeing and expressing things shared by many poets (and others) often
come close. There is still little recognition that Wittgenstein’s 
dialectic of rule-understanding and rule-following points to a family or 
families of hermeneutic studies which will bring closer together ethics 
and literature, ethics and history, ethics and film (cp. S Cavell), 
ethical theory and literary or historical theory.
Such developments have been partially envisaged and exemplified by 
Martha Nussbaum in her paper which brings together Aristotle ("The 
discrimination lies in perception" Nicomachean Ethics 1109b: 18-23 and 
1126b; 2-4) and Henry James' novel The Ambassadors, to give an account 
of what she calls Perceptive Equilibrium: Literary Theory and Ethical 
Theory (1987). While Nussbaum does not refer to Wittgenstein, let alone 
to his dialectical grammar, her discussion of Henry James strongly
suggests that his thinking as a novelist was closer to that of
Wittgenstein than his brother William's psychologising tendency.
Another area which would cohere with Nussbaum's argument is the 
relationship between Haggadah (narrative interpretation and application 
in Judaism) and Halakhah (legal interpretation and application in 
Judaism) in Jewish tradition and hermeneutics. Developing understanding 
and practice of all such relationships would help to elucidate the 
significance of Wittgenstein's insight into the interdependence of 
ethics and aesthetics as the interdependence of goal and way. Without 
the relative particularity valued in aesthetics, the relative generality 
valued in ethics drifts towards empty formalism. In the other 
direction, aesthetics drifts towards sentimental or violent or 
dissipated cultivation of sectarian aestheticism.
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7.7 THE GOOD AND THE HOLY IN LANGUAGE?
The relationships between the ethical, the religious, and the divine, 
according to Wittgenstein's thinking at this time, can be considered by 
starting with notes he made just before the lecture was delivered on 17 
November 1929. Two days previously (15.11.29) he wrote: "You cannot 
lead people to the good; you can only lead them to some place or other. 
The good is outside the space of facts" (CV 3; translation revised in 
part according to McGuinness and Schulte (1979: W\?C pll7, note 82). 
Just before writing that, according to the CV sequence for 1929, 
Wittgenstein noted: "What is good is also divine. Queer as it sounds, 
that sums up my ethics. Only something supernatural can express the 
supernatural," (CV 3. Winch retains the German text's upper-case "S" 
for the last word, though it is not obviously required).
If these remarks were read out of context, they would sound more like 
Platonic negative theology than anything else. The remark given first 
above (dated 15.11.29) is, however, more subtle than that. On the same 
page (CV 3) we see two earlier remarks which may serve as warnings to 
us: "I think good Austrian work ... is particularly hard to understand. 
There is a sense in which it is subtler than anything else and the truth 
it expresses never leans towards plausibility." ” ... it does not occur 
to us that (the world's) path is not a straight line but a curve, 
constantly changing direction." (CV 3, cp Confessiones 1.9, PR epigraph 
and PI preface). Wittgenstein's remark of 15 November on the same page 
of CV is more subtle than we expect, because it is written, like the 
Lecture on Ethics, to confront us with a question about a change of 
direction.
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The questions it puts to us are: does the good exclude or include the 
space of facts? Is the good itself the space of facts, and more? Or is 
the good its own space, beyond the space of facts? Is ethical space 
inclusive of logical and aesthetic space and, in this way, inclusive of 
the world of facts? The decision called for by these forms of 
questioning is at once a religious, ethical, aesthetic and logical 
decision. Deciding in one direction, we accept that it is possible to 
love the Holy One with all our heart and soul (mind) and strength. It 
is our decision, but in our decision it is decided for us how we relate 
to the all-inclusive grammar of Judaism and Christianity. Cp 
Wittgenstein’s meditations on the grammar of election by grace, and his 
use of door imagery.
Consequently, a decision for this grammar cannot reasonably be called 
arbitrary, fideistic or irrational. For, on the contrary view, with 
what would one be making comparison? The burden of proof would appear 
to be on the rejecter of this grammar to show that he is not being 
irrational or arbitrary. Moreover, imaginable disputes between 
different groups claiming exclusive allegiance to the same or similar 
inclusive grammar appear in principle to be capable of resolution by 
appropriate rational methods, which would include becoming learners of 
Wittgenstein’s (and others’) way and goal. A rationality of centred 
openness is called for and made possible by the inclusive infinite which 
neither rivals nor excludes anything finite. Such developmental 
rationality, appropriate to the mutually inclusive way and goal, might 
also be described as developing responsibility for the conversation that 
we are. For it is a way of being called to account for ourselves and 
others.
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Wittgenstein's own answer to the inclusive/exclusive issue is clear, 
provided two qualifications are made. He seems to be steadily committed 
to the inclusive reading, as a matter of intention. About his personal 
relations, politics, general attitudes and practices, no comprehensive 
discussion is possible in this thesis, except to point out that, when he 
believed an attitude, action or episode of his life had fallen short of 
the inclusive grammar of Judaism and Christianity, he practised a form 
of confession.
The second qualification begins with the intellectual implications of
his' loyalty. For he came to see his earlier account of the essence of 
language as objectionably and correctably exclusive, even though he had 
been using this account in order to overcome exclusiveness at another 
level of understanding. Part of the fascination of the Lecture on
Ethics, and its fourth, unmentioned but shown, difficulty is that while 
part three of his introduction shows us in a microcosmic nutshell the 
continuity of his vision and programme, and may justifiably be read as a 
sign of imminent break-through towards his later philosophy, the main 
section of the lecture lapses or relapses into that mistaken, exclusive 
theory of language which by 1930-32 (PG sl9 - s20, pp56-57) he was
criticizing in Augustine's account of learning language in Confessiones 
1.4.
Wittgenstein's earlier account of his language-world is a microcosm
which, on its own, does not yet fit properly into the macrocosmic
language-world implied and shown by his ethics, aesthetics and 
spirituality - his regulative dialectics of the sublime, ie., his 
Jewish-Christian grammar. Give his emergent understanding of theology 
as grammar, and given his inclusive understanding of theology, he had 
(in November 1929) still some way to travel in learning the extent to
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which - for better or for worse - all grammar is implicitly if not 
explicitly theological. The grammar of his earlier account of language 
is in 1929 still in part tied up with Deistic or Gnostic dualist 
attitudes towards language and all that belongs to language, or to which 
language belongs.
Regardless of his own better practice, language is still accounted for 
as essentially representational, ie., as essentially a matter of 
"naming", "picturing" or "describing" a separate reality, as if from the 
outside position of a Deistic or Gnostic god's-eye-view, and as if 
describing and conceptualising could be "purified" or made exclusive of 
our ways of working and living with, in, for or through them. The 
interactive, regulative, interpretative and even expressive workings of 
language are still being demoted to the point of exclusion from the 
essence of language.
Wittgenstein's struggle against this inadequate account of language is 
complex and hard, partly because it is a struggle in language, against 
language, by means of language. (Compare CV 11 (1931) and CV 86-87
(1950) with Augustine De Magistro s5.14. There are other remarks in 
Wittgenstein which suggest he knew this passage. See Wittgenstein's 
scattered images of itching and scratching, and the impossible 
"thumb-catching" game by one hand) . It is also hard because it is a 
deep struggle between better and worse forms of theology: "It is often 
said that a new religion brands the gods of the old one as devils. But 
in reality they have probably already become devils by that time" (CV 
15, 1931).
335
7.8 BREAKING THE TEACUPS
Perhaps the most revealing place in Wittgenstein's lecture to consider 
his going astray from the perspicuity of his "introductory" parable of 
the way and the goal is not in pages 4-5, where he explains how he is 
"going to use the term Ethics in a slightly wider sense", inclusive of 
aesthetics, by giving multiple definitions, in effect like Galton's use 
of multiple exposures of one photographic plate to different human 
faces, to develop a composite picture of a typical face. Rather, in 
view of what has been discovered in the introduction, we should look 
closely at page 7 of the lecture, where much becomes significantly 
tangled. "Our words used as we use them in science are vessels, capable 
only of containing and conveying meaning and sense, natural meaning and 
sense. Ethics, if it is anything, is supernatural and our words will 
only express facts; as a teacup will only hold a teacup full of water 
(even) if I were to pour out a gallon over it." (Loc.cit).
The teacup image is an adaptation of Augustine to commonplace English 
culture: "For the things which you fill by containing them do not 
sustain and support you as a water-vessel supports the liquid which 
fills it. Even if they were broken to pieces, you would not flow out of 
them and away. And when you pour yourself out over us, you are not 
drawn down to us but draw us up to yourself: you are not scattered away, 
but you gather us together." (Confessiones 1.3; the theme is continued 
throughout, by the language of springs, and the water and river of 
life.)
The hypothesis that Augustine is being used and invoked here by 
Wittgenstein is confirmed by the way Augustine's (ur-kabbalistic, 
Pauline and Gospels *) thought of the shattering of the linguistic 
containers of meaning is also taken up by Wittgenstein, when he writes, 
immediately prior to the above quotation from page 7, of his feeling
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that "if a man could write a book on Ethics which really was a book on 
Ethics, this book would, with an explosion, destroy all the other books 
in the world."
Here it is as if Augustine is and is not the man. Wittgenstein once 
told Drury that he considered the Confessiones possibly "the most 
serious book ever written" (RW 90). The depth of Wittgenstein's 
engagement with this book makes his tentative remark intellegible. 
Augustine's paradoxes throughout the book make sense as dialectical 
guides to, and provocations of, the experience of struggling between 
exclusive grammar and inclusive grammar. Through his regulative 
dialectics, Augustine shows and shares the sublime glory of the Lord who 
is at once both way and goal. Augustine's use of language is better 
than parts of his theory on language. His mistakes in his Confessiones' 
account of language-development are arguably cancelled and transcended 
by the rest of what he is seeking to do in and with language. Written 
books of ethics and lived books of ethics, in so far as they are
exclusive books, expressions of exclusive ethics, are shattered, as well 
as drawn together, by the ethical and linguistic explosiveness of 
inclusive ethics and inclusive grammar. "The Jew is a desert region, 
but underneath its thin layer of rock lies the molten lava of spirit and 
intellect" (CV 13, 1931). The experience of the shattering of the
containers of language (including the shattering of container or conduit 
metaphors and theories of language) may be necessary for recovery,
renewal and development of better interpretations of the conversation
which we are. (Cp. Reddy (1979) and Lakoff and Johnson (1980). At
least as early as 1933-34, Wittgenstein rejected the picture of words as 
external conveyers of pure thoughts: Ambrose (1979) WT^AA, p54) .
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Wittgenstein, significantly right after the above passage, finds it 
harder to keep to the higher level of understanding claimed for him in 
this chapter: "The right road is the road which leads to an arbitrarily 
pre-determined end and it is quite clear to us all that there is no 
sense in talking about the right road apart from such a pre-determined 
goal. Now let us see what we could possibly mean by the expression,
' the absolutely right road’ . I think it would be the road which 
everybody on seeing it would, with logical necessity, have to go, or be 
ashamed for not going ... And I want to say that such a state of 
affairs is a chimera." (p7).
The notion of the "arbitrarily pre-determined end" does not fit, for the 
reasons already given. This looks like a narrowly logical expression of 
the arbitrary voluntarism of eternal double-predestination, which 
disfigures Augustine's theology. Notice how the one-sided emphasis on 
the goal leads into the road or way which everyone is compelled to 
enter. (Cp Augustine’s exegesis of 'compel them to come in', in the
parable of the rejected feast). Notice, too, how Wittgenstein also 
wavers between an exclusively logical, reductive interpretation of his 
(and Augustine's) central grammar and a moral interpretation ("or be 
ashamed ... or feel guilty”) which is implicitly also reductive and 
exclusive, as it follows the reductive and exclusive interpretation of 
the logical. (If this notion of the moral were not intended to be thus 
reductive and exclusive, then arguably more should have been done to 
make this clear, including the necessary transformation of the notion of 
the logical).
However, Wittgenstein is, as it were, wobbling from side to side, rather 
than going simply astray. For he still wants and tries to keep together
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the way and the goal, and realises that this involves bringing together 
the logical and the ethical.
These wobbles are not just salutory warnings for those who can 
appreciate from them the difficulties of learning to think with 
Wittgenstein. They are also suggestive, as already indicated, of how 
Wittgenstein's way of thinking the grammar of Judaism and Christianity 
can, when he is true to himself at his best, point us to errors of 
grammar which may well be part and parcel of Augustine's disfiguring 
doctrines of the predestination of some to eternal damnation and of the 
(exceptional) legitimacy of the use of compulsion when dealing with 
sectarians.
Certainly Wittgenstein tells us that he wants to say: "No state of
affairs has, in itself, what I would like to call the coercive power of 
an absolute judge". The suggestion is that Augustinian (and so 
Calvinistic) teaching of predestination, when it deviates from the 
grammar of Gnadenwahl (the election of grace: CV 30, 32, 77; but not CV 
72, 81, 86 - which refer to deterministic predestination, but are lumped 
under "Gnadenwahl" by the German index of CV) is a form of scientism or 
superstition or grammatical confusion. Cp: "Religious faith and
superstition are quite different. One of them results from fear and is 
a sort of false science. The other is a trusting." (CV 72, 1948).
Expressions such as, "It is God's will" may rightly do the work of 
expressions such as, "Don't be resentful" (CV 61, 1947). For overcoming 
resentment is a true response to the infinite or absolute which neither 
rivals nor excludes anything finite (PR sl38). When Wittgenstein said 
to Drury that he would have liked to dedicate his work, like Bach, to 
the glory of God and the benefit of his neighbour (an echo by
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Wittgenstein of his 1930 Foreward for PR) , this confession was in the 
context of receipt of a letter from an Austrian priest and old friend 
(probably Ludwig H&nsel), saying he hoped "my work will go well, if it 
should be God's will." Wittgenstein's response is, first: "Now that is 
all I want: if it should be God's will", and then the confession about 
dedicating his work like Bach. (RW, 168 (1949) according to Drury) .
The link with the 1930 Foreword for PR (which contrasts good will, which 
is concerned with the glory of God, against 'vanity' etc.) strongly 
suggests that Wittgenstein's grammar of 1947 and 1949 was already 
developing in 1930. This tends to support the above reading of the way 
and the goal as inclusively related in the introduction to the Lecture 
on Ethics.
7.9 THE GRAMMAR OF AUGUSTINE AND KIERKEGAARD
Augustine's inclusive grammar is also the context in which 
Wittgenstein's persistent concern with the grammar of "seeking", 
"expecting", "hoping", "asking" (etc) should be read: "Tell me how you 
are searching, and I will tell you what you are searching for" (PR s27, 
p67) . The terminology of "how" and "what" is Kierkegaard's as well as 
Augustine's, but also Wittgenstein's, in the introduction to his 
lecture. To interpret this reductively, as if it were nothing but an 
early and unrefined groping towards a verificationist theory of meaning, 
is to put the linguistic-positivist cart before the theological horse.
Wittgenstein's brief period of speaking or writing as a 
proto-verificationist seems to have been more a matter of heuristic 
thinking than of a rudimentary theory of meaning implying an 
anti-realist or idealist way of seeing the world. Most important of 
all, the contextual evidence is that this was a matter of (theological) 
grammar for Wittgenstein. His later analyses of "seeking" (etc) are all
refinements of this concern. The way we seek (etc) already shows for 
whom or what, or for whom and what, we are seeking (etc). Seeking (etc) 
is already a shareable interpretation, which may indeed need to be
revised, of finding (etc). As in mathematics, logic and philosophy, so 
in aesthetics, ethics and spirituality, the way and the goal belong
together inclusively. (It has already been noted, in chapter 2, how 
Wittgenstein’s parable of the way and the goal amounts to a development 
of Confessiones 7:20 (on the way and the goal) by means of the master 
text of the Confessiones : Matthew 7:7-8 = Luke 11:9-10).
In becoming an heir of what is central and right in Augustine, 
Wittgenstein also became an heir of Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard certainly 
looks like the clearest nineteenth century interpreter of Augustine’s 
inclusive grammar and - in this sense - Wittgenstein’s claim that 
Kierkegaard was both “the most profound thinker" of the nineteenth 
century and "a saint" becomes more intelligible as an objective 
judgement and (thereby) also more intelligible as a self-revealing 
confession (RW 87), (Kierkegaard rejected Augustine’s doctrine of
predestination as well as rejecting Pelagianism). Wittgenstein’s 
similar, apparently extreme, veneration for the Confessiones has already 
been noted. Kierkegaard's version of the theme is touched on in
Concluding Unscientific Postscript but is sounded out most strongly, 
clearly and simply in Purity of Heart is to Will One Thing. The 
following extract ends with a typical, but appropriate, contrast with
I
Hegel’s philosophical "owl of Minerva/Athena" - a bird which begins its i
i
flight too late, when the action is over: "Eternally speaking, there is j
only one means and there is only one end: the means and the end are one 
and the same thing. There is only one end: the genuine good; and only 
one means: this, to be willing only to use those means which are
genuinely good - but the genuine good is precisely the end. In time and
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on earth one distinguishes between the two and considers that the end is 
more important than the means... In the judgement of eternity, the 
relation between the end and the means is rather the reverse of this... 
He, whose means are invariably just as important as the end, never comes 
too late." (Purity of Heart sl4, pp202-203. Compare Karl Kraus' poem. 
Two Runners (given later in this chapter) ; also the motto of the
Investigations).
For Kierkegaard, to speak eternally of eternity is to speak
grammatically of the grammar of Christianity as inclusive of both means 
and' end. Kierkegaard regularly signals clarifications of grammar in
this language, as D Z Phillips has recognised. "In time and on earth", 
writes Kierkegaard, "one distinguishes between" the end and the means, 
ie., the way and the goal, seeking and finding. For Kierkegaard this 
exclusive way of thinking is the double-mindedness at odds with the
single-mindedness or purity of heart which lives with the promise of 
seeing God. Consequently the double-mindedness of exclusive thinking 
constitutes a form of darkness, blindness or forgetfulness. 
Wittgenstein's double-minded hearers, "in the darkness of this time" (PI 
Preface) are those who ask either, "What on earth is he driving at?" or 
"How on earth is he going to get there?" (p4).
Just as end and means belong together in inclusive grammar, so "what" 
and "how" belong together. These equivalences are central to 
Kierkegaard. They support the hypothesis that he should be understood 
as at least on the way, with Kant, to the kind of critical realism and 
critical idealism which Wittgenstein develops. Uncritical realism and 
uncritical idealism share the same basic error of complacency or 
dogmatism about our general ability to differentiate across the board 
between human and non-human, and between mental and non-mental.
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contributions to our epistemological and other interactions with the 
world. Wittgenstein’s early insistence on the identity of realism and 
solipsism points in the direction of his later, more critical approach. 
Like Augustine, even while Wittgenstein is still struggling with the 
effects of traditional uncritical realism in his understanding of 
language, this is already within the context of inclusive grammar which 
makes significant space for the interactive nature of language and of 
epistemological relationships between us, and between us and the world 
which is ours, as well as with the world which is not ours.
The truth in realism is that our learning depends on contributions 
transcending what we can call ours. The truth in idealism is that our 
learning also depends on our own contributing activities. Further 
consideration will be given to realism, idealism (or "anti-realism") and 
epistemology in the following, final chapter. Here it must suffice to 
note that both uncritical idealism and uncritical realism, as forms of 
exclusive thinking, are related to the gnostic or deistic grammar of a 
withdrawn spectator deity, and to notions of knowledge and rationality 
which are guided by a doctrine that being human means being an image of 
the perfection of that mind or Mind. (Cp. E Craig 1987). Much 
traditional scepticism in both philosophy and theology only makes sense 
as belonging to that tradition of theological grammar. When 
Wittgenstein discusses certainty and scepticism, it is a mistake to read 
him as if he still belongs to that tradition. It would be nearer the 
truth to say that he recognises the world of that tradition as an 
ongoing temptation which belongs to him. (Wittgenstein On Certainty: 
throughout).
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7.10 PATIENCE
For the inclusive thinking which can be described both as critical 
realism and critical idealism, patience and courage are epistemological 
as well as moral virtues. Patience without courage becomes fatalistic 
naturalism. Courage without patience becomes foolhardy
anthropocentrism. For Hamann it is patience, especially trained in the 
school of the prophets and apostles, which can transform the "Aude 
sapere" of the enlightenment into genuine wisdom. Wittgenstein’s style 
of thinking combines the courage of his aphorisms and images with the 
patience of his analytical unknotting. In the introduction to his 
Lecture on Ethics he asks his hearers to be "patient" as well as to 
"hope".
The patience Wittgenstein asks for is, on one level, an entirely obvious 
virtue. For his hearers (and readers) need patience to understand his 
lecture. Most of all, they need patience to understand both the way and 
the goal together. They need patience to endure with hope in the face 
of temptations to grasp prematurely and clumsily at its way or at its 
goal in abstraction from one another. Patience is a virtue needed to 
transform dissipated or wilful scientistic curiosity into the wholeness 
and health of inclusive understanding. Moreover, the passage from the 
beginning to the end of the lecture is a metaphor (or, rather, a
I
metonymic parable) for the passage of life between beginning and end. |
Here, also, patience is a virtue needed to transform anxious or rash 1
curiosity into the wholeness of wisdom, if one is to resist temptations j
to grasp prematurely at ways without an integral goal or at goals I
without an integral way. Patience may be described as the virtue which iI
enables us to develop through a centred openness to an open centredness; !
"The virtues are those qualities which enable the evil to be overcome, j
the tasks to be accomplished, the journey to be completed” (Alasdair I
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MacIntyre (1985) pl75 on "Medieval Aspects and Occasions" of the 
virtues. Compare Lorraine Code's Epistemic Responsibility 1987).
The connection between inclusive thinking, regulated by the dialectical 
grammar of the sublime (a concept of sublimity is used or alluded to 
non-pejoratively in LE pp6-7, and is arguably in the background of the 
ineffable expressibility of the absolute experiences of wonder, guilt 
and safety, throughout LE) , which neither rivals nor excludes anything 
finite or relative, and the virtue of patience with courage (or faith or 
hope), is one which has long been recognised: "... let patience have its 
perfect work (ergon teleion) , so that you may be perfect and whole 
(teleioi kai holoklairoi), lacking in nothing. But if any of you lacks 
wisdom, let him ask God, who gives to all generously and without 
disgrace, and it will be given to him... For that person must not go on 
as if someone who is double-minded, unstable in all his ways, will 
receive anything from the Lord..." (James 1:4-8. Translation revised). 
The letter of James is a key text for Kierkegaard's thinking as a whole, 
and especially for Purity of Heart is to Will One Thing. Moreover, 
James 1:5 is a clear echo of the key text for the Confessiones and so 
for the whole of Augustine's Christian grammar: "Ask, and it will be
given to you; seek, and you will find; knock, and it will be opened to 
you. For everyone who ask$ receives, and he who seeks finds, and to him 
who knocks it will be opened." (Matthew 7:7-8 and Luke 11:9-10; cp. 
James 4:2-3: "You do not have, because you do not ask. You ask and do 
not receive, because you ask wrongly...". Cp "Non es requies, ubi 
quaeritis eam. Quaerite quod quaeritis sed ibi non est ubi quaeritis: 
there is no rest, where you seek it. Seek what you are seeking, but it 
is not there, where you are seeking it." Confessiones 4:12.
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In CV possible or probable allusions to, or adaptations of, the 
Augustine of the Confessiones include the following: pp3, 11, 22,
42(x2), 43, 49, 56, 67, 76, 80(x2), 81 and 87 (x2), Asking, seeking, 
knocking (against walls or limits of language-worlds, as well as against 
doors) are typical of being en route. Receiving, finding, and entering 
in to a resting-place are typical of being at a goal. "... I have 
reached a real resting place. I know that my method is right..." Drury 
describes how Wittgenstein, after saying this, "suddenly stood still and 
look at me intently." (RW 110, 1930).
7.11 LESSING, KRAUS, SCHUBERT AND BACH
This incident reported by Drury was not an isolated one. This can be 
seen from putting together various remarks which express Wittgenstein's 
concern with relating to Augustine's grammar of seeking and finding 
Lessing's famous passage on God's left and right hands. In Z s457 
Wittgenstein jots down, and then cuts out for later use "... quia plus 
loquitur inquisitio quam inventio...: because more is said in/by
searching than finding" (loc.cit. If the editorial work on Zettel can be 
relied on here, the previous three passages (Z s454-456), as well as 
those that follow, take on clearer significance in the light of 
Wittgenstein's difference from Lessing, to be pin-pointed shortly). 
Wittgenstein's quotation from Confessiones 12.1 in Z s457 could be read 
as the source of Lessing's preference for the search for truth (the gift 
of God's left hand) rather than the possession of truth (the gift of the 
right hand) - but only if we ignore the context of Augustine's remark 
within the inclusive grammar of Confessiones. It is clear that 
Wittgenstein, far from taking Lessing's side against Augustine, wants to 
choose both God's hands together. For when Drury reminded Wittgenstein, 
in Phoenix Park (Dublin) in 1949, of Lessing's choice of God's left hand
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to the exclusion of his right hand, Wittgenstein replied, "That might be 
all right for Lessing to say. But I can see that there is a much deeper 
state of mind than Lessing expressed here" (RW 166 - a passage easily 
overlooked, as it is not indexed in the widely available RW, though it 
is in the first edition, entitled Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal
Recollections - Rhees, 1981).
This remark is precisely in the spirit of Wittgenstein's 1930 
identification of "a real resting place" and "my method" (RW 110: the 
restlessness of the human heart and the rest or sabbath of the eternal 
One are themes central to Confessiones). The present interpretation is 
confirmed when Wittgenstein writes, "Suppose someone said 'I wish - but 
I don’t want my wish to be fulfilled’ - (Lessing: If God in his right 
hand ...). Can one then ask God to give the wish, and not to fulfil 
it?" (RPP(l) s492). The fact that this remark relates to Wittgenstein's 
discussions of grammatical differences between description of wishing, 
searching, etc., and expression of wishing, searching, etc. (and to the 
fact that how we wish or search is already an interpretation of what 
would count as fulfilment or finding) neither excludes nor is excluded 
by Wittgenstein's inclusive Augustinian (theological) grammar.
i
Wittgenstein's stress on patience as an intellectual, moral and j
ispiritual virtue reflects his own evaluation of his recurrent impatience i
with others. Here again we find that his style is meant to express both |
the man and the message: "Sometimes a sentence can be understood only if î
it is read at the right tempo. My sentences are all supposed to be read •{
slowly" (CV57, 1947). "I really want my copious punctuation marks to i
slow down the speed of reading. Because I should like to be read 1
slowly. (As I myself read.)" (CV68, 1948). "In philosophy the winner :i
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of the race is the one who can run most slowly. Or: the one who gets
there last" (CV 34, 1938), Cp Karl Kraus' poem. Two Runners:
"Two runners run the track of time.
Reckless the one, the other strides in awe.
The one, from nowhere, wins his goal; the other -
The origin his start - dies on the way.
And he from nowhere, he that won, yields place 
To him who ever strides in awe and e'er 
Has reached his terminus: the origin."
(Werke Vol 3, p293). Quoted in Engelmann (1967) px).
The patience which Wittgenstein calls for, and expresses, in his lecture 
is a patience which both endures and points beyond typically Cartesian 
notions of meaning, knowledge, rationality and value. This 
transcendence in endurance is itself an expression of the concept of the 
sublime which has been examined in previous parts of this thesis. The 
main part of the lecture points to various discussable yet paradoxical 
experiences of the sublime. Wittgenstein also says that there are 
others he could have mentioned, and some of these are arguably present 
in the lecture itself.
What has to be identified here is similar to points Wittgenstein makes 
about his favourite composer, Schubert: "One can say of Schubert's
melodies that they are full of turns of thought ... One can indicate 
certain places in a Schubert melody and say 'You see, that is the point 
of his melody, that is where the idea reaches its apex.' One of these 
turns of thought is executed in the last two bars of the theme of "Death 
and the Maiden": "One is liable to think at first that this figure is 
conventional, commonplace - until one understands what it more 
profoundly expresses; ie., until one understands that here the
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commonplace is filled with significance." (CV 47 and 52, translated by 
McGuinness (1988) pl24). McGuinness comments, "The commonplace filled 
with significance - it might alone express Wittgenstein's ideal". 
However, McGuinness seems not to see how this is connected with what he 
adds, for he continues, "but (sic) Schubert attracted him also for 
another reason, in which the ethical and the aesthetic were intertwined: 
the contrast of the misery of his life and the absence of trace of it in 
his music, (by which McGuinness means) the absence of all bitterness". 
(Loc.cit.) However, all these features belong to what has been
developed in this thesis as the Jewish-Christian concept of the sublime, 
which shows itself in regulative dialectical grammar.
Wittgenstein’s introduction to his lecture already anticipates those 
experiences of the sublime which he later mentions. There is his 
expression of concern for his hearers as strangers to him, as he is to 
them, - concern for them perhaps even as "enemies": compare Julian
Bell's satire of 1929/1930, already discussed. Such putting of oneself 
in one’s audience’s or public’s place is an essential feature of what 
Kierkegaard means by indirect communication, which he sees as both 
fulfilled and regulated by the sublime, archetypal paradox of the 
incarnation of God in Christ. Such is the significance with which the 
commonplace courtesy of Wittgenstein's "first difficulty" may be filled.
I
Wittgenstein's enthusiasm for his subject in spite of - or just because |
j
of - the dominance of scientism, with its confusions between the î
absolute and the relative, and between inclusive and exclusive grammar, Ï
is the positive side of his "second difficulty". The third "great I
difficulty" too, is not just difficult and therefore great, but is first |
great and then difficult, when we lack patience to take time to see the 
way and the goal together.
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All three of these introductory "great difficulties" show how the 
commonplace may be filled with the sublimely significant, and prepare us 
for what is to come. It was the J S Bach who saw no rivalry or 
exclusiveness between benefit for his neighbour and glory to God in the 
highest of whom Wittgenstein wrote: "Bach said that all his achievements 
were simply the fruit of industry. But industry like that requires 
humility and an enormous capacity for suffering, hence strength. And 
someone who, with all this, can also express himself perfectly, simply 
speaks to us in the language of a great man." (CV 71, 1948). This is 
the language of humanity which Wittgenstein was struggling to hear with 
his fellow soldiers in 1914 (CV 1). This is the language of greatness 
which Wittgenstein came to hear in Augustine: "Rex ipsius civitatis se 
fecit viam ut ad civitatem perveniremus: the king of the city made
himself a way for us to reach it". (Commentary on Psalm 87(EVs) =
86(Latin) Migne, PL, vol 36, col 1101). Wittgenstein's city of language 
is open to echoes, rumours and messengers of that greatness.
7.12 KEYS FOR EASTERING LOCKED DOORS
"You cannot lead people to the good; you can only lead them to some 
place or other. The good is outside the space of facts" (CV 3, 15
November 1929). It is now clear that, despite the exclusiveness still 
lingering in Wittgenstein's account or view of language at that time, 
"the good" is to be interpreted inclusively. The good includes the 
space of facts as precisely nameable, picturable structures, but also 
the space of facts in other, wider language-worlds, and the space of 
aesthetics, ethics, logic and spirituality. One cannot lead people to 
the inclusive good if this is understood "only" by contrast with other 
forms of goodness. One can lead people to the inclusive good if the 
inclusive good is always already present as that which lets all other
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forms of goodness be what they are, if one glimpses them from time to 
time as transfigured, eastered in their ordinariness, raised up into the 
glory of the absolute goal by the descending embrace of the absolute 
way. (Gerald Manley Hopkins uses "easter" as a verb in the culminating 
stanza of The Wreck of the Deutschland and this usage is appropriated by 
Nicholas Lash in the culminating section and in the title of Easter in 
Ordinary (1988), which should presumably be read as an invitation or a 
summons).
"What is good is also divine. Queer as it sounds, that sums up my
ethics. Only something supernatural can express the supernatural" (CV 
3, 1929). It only sounds queer given the dominance of exclusive
grammar, which would have us grasp ethics and religion, aesthetics and 
logic, fact and value, more by reference to their differences and what 
they exclude than by reference to their inclusive similarities.
These remarks, and others like them, can be read two ways, but it is 
clear how Wittgenstein intended them to be read, in spite of 
complications arising from his approach to language. Such remarks are 
in one passage described as locks. The key is the ability to use the 
distinction between inclusive and exclusive grammar as Wittgenstein and 
Augustine intend: "If you have a room which you do not want certain
people to get into, put a lock on it for which they do not have the key.
But there is no point in talking to them about it, unless of course you
want them to admire the room from the outside! The honourable thing to 
do is to put a lock on the door which will be noticed only by those who 
can open it, not by the rest". (CV 7-8, 1930; written in the context of 
discussion of problems in writing a foreword or an introduction).
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Inclusive grammar can sound exclusive to those dominated by exclusive 
grammar. Even though inclusive grammar excludes nothing but dominant 
exclusiveness, it can still be experienced as if exclusive by those who 
are confused. Wittgenstein's room which is not for certain people 
sounds like the worse aspects of Augustine, unless the people in 
question are any or all of us when we do not realise that it is the 
collusive slave of exclusiveness in all of us who is excluded. 
Wittgenstein goes some way to clarifying his position, which includes 
distinguishing it from the 'elite scientism of the Vienna Circle, in the 
following passage; "If I say that my book is meant for only a small 
circle of people (if it can be called a circle) , I do not mean that I 
believe this circle to be the elite of mankind; but it does comprise 
those to whom I turn (not because they are better or worse than others 
but) because they form my cultural milieu, my fellow citizens as it were 
(die Menschen meines Vaterlandes) , in contrast with the rest who are 
foreign to me" (CV 10, 1931).
Other, apparently more successful, door parables came later; "A man will 
be imprisoned in a room with a door that's unlocked and opens inwards; 
as long as it does not occur to him to pull rather than push it." (CV 
42, 1942.) Compare; ""You can't hear God speak to someone else, (you 
can hear him) only if you are being addressed." - That is a grammatical 
remark". (Z s717. The brackets have been added to the standard English 
translation. Compare the original: ""Gott kannst du nicht mit einem
Andern reden hô'ren, sondern nur, wenn du der Angeredete bist." - Das ist 
eine grammatische Bemerkung." To read this as expressing an arbitrary 
"existentialist" individualism is to credit Wittgenstein with an 
insensitivity towards the grammar of Judaism and Christianity which does 
not afflict him elsewhere. That individualistic reading would be in 
open conflict with the grammatical connection between openness to God
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and openness to each other which is stated so powerfully in CV 45-46, 
1944). Consequently, rather than assume Wittgenstein is inconsistent at 
this point, it seems more plausible to interpret Z s717 as follows: God 
uses personal pronouns - both singular and plural pronouns - 
inclusively. Therefore, you can't hear God speak to someone else, but 
only if (- unless?) you yourself (du) are being addressed, together with 
some other(s). Thus one is imprisoned in exclusive grammar with a door 
that's unlocked and opens inwards; as long as it does not occur to one 
to turn the grammar the other way, inclusively (cp. CV 42). Compare the 
inclusiveness of Wittgenstein's use of "we" in the Investigations.
"A person caught in a philosophical confusion is like a man in a room 
who wants to get out but does not know how. He tries the window but it 
is too high. He tries the chimney but it is too narrow. And if he 
would only turn around, he would see that the door has been open all the 
time." This is Norman Malcolm’s report of Wittgenstein's words in 
Malcolm 1984 (M), p44. Malcolm rightly relates the parable to PI sl08, 
si23 and s309. He does not recognise that it also relates to the Jewish 
and Christian concept of turning to God (Hebrew: teshuvah; Greek:
metanoia; English: conversion) which involves the turning of the whole 
person in all relationships, because it is a turning to inclusive 
grammar.
The inclusive grammar, which in one sense is, and in another sense is 
not, Augustine's, Pascal’s, Kierkegaard's and Wittgenstein’s, and is 
hidden by Wittgenstein in his lecture's introductory parable like yeast 
or reburied treasure, can also be described as follows: "Yes, a key can 
lie forever in the place where the locksmith left it, and never be used 
to open the lock the master forged it for" (CV 54, 1948). The extract 
from Augustine's Confessiones, left lying right in front of the door of
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the Investigations, is a key Wittgenstein forged for that lock, a key 
which can only be used when we realise that what locks up that book also 
locks us up, ie., our own inability and unwillingness to use inclusive 
grammar inclusively.
If one does not develop this linguistic responsibility, then 
Wittgenstein's life-work appears as "a fairy-tale", or as "the magic
castle" in such a story, and then the following parable is, after all,
appropriate: "The solution of philosophical problems can be compared
with a gift in a fairy tale; in the magic castle it appears enchanted 
and if you look at it outside in daylight it is nothing but an ordinary 
bit of iron (or something of the sort). (CV 11, 1931) - Such as a rusty 
key? - Such as the analysis of Augustine's mistaken account of language 
development, pursued with strange single-mindedness throughout all the 
"criss-cross" "zigzags" of the Investigations?
For "tortuous or zigzagging paths which don’t lead out into the open at 
all” , see CV 80. This refers to the extract from Confessiones 1.9 used 
as the epigraph for PR. The reference is also there in the "criss-cross 
(Kreuz und quer: kreuz = cross) in every direction" of the preface to 
the Investigations. Again on p80 of CV, the three remarks following the 
above one ("The Sabbath.,.") deepen the Augustinian meditation. All 
four paragraphs are about being imprisoned in exclusive grammar and 
waking up to this in the Sabbath freedom of inclusive grammar. For 
Wittgenstein on philosophical clarification as the opening of a safe 
with a combination lock, see RW 81.
Brief mention should also be made of the two door parables reported by
D.A.T. Gasking and A.C. Jackson in Fann (1967) pp52-53. The first
parable is a matter of turning around, away from dummy doors, to open
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the real door which is at first hidden behind one. The authors' whole 
presentation of this is worth reading. Their second reported parable 
concerns a student (one of the authors?) who, becoming deeply depressed, 
held Wittgenstein's philosophy in some way responsible for his
condition. Wittgenstein's reply, in the authors' account, is: "Suppose 
you were sitting in a room, facing a door which was completely black. 
You sit and stare fixedly at it, impressing on your mind its total 
blackness, and saying to yourself somberly over and over again, 'That 
door is black! That door is black!' After a bit you could easily begin 
to feel miserable about it, and to feel that it was the blackness of the 
door that was the melancholy fact which had produced your gloom".
(Loc.cit). The point, which one must make one's own as best one can, is 
that a door is not for staring at but for going through. Wittgenstein 
with his philosophical work is a door. Only those who do not know what 
a door is or how to use it will confuse a door with a picture. If we 
learn how to open a door, not just Wittgenstein's door, but our own
door, and not just our o\<n door - then the blackness of the door may
become light and freedom. We need to learn how to open black doors, in 
order to go out and in freely, to become citizens and heirs of the city 
of inclusive grammar. Wittgenstein's philosophy offers to contribute to 
the training which is needed by people who can only see his life-work as 
a black picture.
7.13 HOW TO GIVE UP STARING AT BLACK DOORS
The experience of being in an impossible situation, which we must endure 
with patience and courage, is powerfully presented by Wittgenstein as 
the actual ending, rather than the goal, of his lecture. He gives his 
hearers a logical or linguistic radicalisation of the sense of moral 
death which Tolstoy experienced as the black door of his conversion. 
Tolstoy's black door connects with something as universally human as
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experiencing the death of a father, as has been considered in the case 
of Wittgenstein. However, Tolstoy's black door also connects with the 
moral death of (sick) metaphysics: "Human reason has this peculiar fate 
that in one species of its knowledge it is burdened by questions which, 
as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to 
ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not able
to answer ... human reason precipitates itself into darkness and
contradictions; and while it may indeed conjecture that these must be in 
some way due to concealed errors, it is not in a position to be able to 
detect them." (Immanuel Kant Critique of Pure Reason, Preface to the 
first edition, Avii - Aviii.)
Compare Wittgenstein: "My whole tendency and I believe the tendency of 
all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run 
against the boundaries of language. This running against the walls of 
our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics so far as it springs 
from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the 
absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no science. But it is a 
document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help 
respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it." (LE 11-12: 
the end of the lecture),
In view of the previous argument of this chapter and this thesis it 
appears as neither accidental nor trivial that Wittgenstein, who on pplO 
and 11 (as previously) was talking of "ethical and religious language",
now at the end talks of ethics or religion. Even if this were not
intentional, it points to the pressures he is acknowledging at this 
point. Normally ethical and religious language go together for him. 
For further examples one may recall various incidents from McGuinness 
(1988) showing how Wittgenstein thinks both of life as a task and of
356
work as a gift or grace - McGuinness prefers "boon". Such inclusive 
language reverberates with the inclusive grammar of Judaism and 
Christianity, for which God’s glory and interpersonal benefit neither 
rival nor exclude each other, and for which the divine guidance of the 
Torah is already grace or gift through which the Holy One gives himself 
as the way and the goal together.
The pressures which Wittgenstein is acknowledging here are various, 
whether or not he is fully aware of their variety at this time. For our 
"ethical and religious expressions" (sic, pll) must appear as
essentially not making sense (their "nonsensicality") given an absolute 
commitment to the following:
1. Logic as a single, strictly deductive system, rather than either a 
family of expert systems or a wider family of ways of using language to 
which strict systems belong,
2. Logic, understood as in (1), as definitive of the essence of
language.
3. Science and/or knowledge defined in light of (I) and (2) as
"strictly contingent" ie., "strictly empirical". (Compare David Hume.)
4. Knowledge, as in (3), as being either strictly value-free or
hypothetically and extrinsically valuable, relative to other knowledge 
(cp. LE p6).
5. Absolute or intrinsic value as essentially beyond language and 
knowledge.
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6. Absolute value as ineffably shown in logic, ie., in the absolute 
ethics of language, knowledge, experience and perception as well as of 
attitudes, actions, etc., ie., the absolute value of logical (aesthetic, 
ethical, religious) space for letting contingencies and relativities be 
themselves.
7. A traditional regard for platonic negative theology and axiology, 
ie., absolute goodness, truth, beauty, holiness and unity as being 
together beyond language (which is seen as essentially representative of 
finite beings), and so as a numinous "Nothing". (Rudolf Otto’s (1917) 
notion of the numinous, as the mystery which in its overwhelming 
otherness is experienced as at once both threatening and fascinating, is 
a relative of concepts of the sublime, a point noticed but psychologised 
by Francis Sparshott (1963) pp80-81). Even William James, for all his 
battles against "vicious intellectualism", was still in the grip of the 
notion of experience essentially beyond language. (See Lash (1988) and 
Wittgenstein's later work, throughout).
8. A recurrent Gnostic or Deistic dualism which read the tradition of 
(7) dualistically, rather than in terms of its approximations to a 
dialectical inclusive grammar; implying a god's-eye-view of language and 
world as essentially external to each other.
9. Hamann's perception that when the language of metaphysics is 
divorced from our other ways of using language, there is "produced a 
whole world of questions which have as little reason to be raised as to 
be answered" (Letter to Jacobi, 1 December 1784, in Gregor Smith (1960) 
pp250-251). Hamann's criticism here of Hume's and Kant's fact/value 
dualism is in effect taken over by Wittgenstein. For in the 
language-world where there can only be either value-free facts or facts
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of "relative" value (relative only to value-free facts, or also to 
absolute value?) what reason can there be to produce "a whole world of 
questions", not just "countless irrelevant questions" (CV 67), but, more 
importantly, all the questions on which we, like Kant and Wittgenstein, 
insist even with our life, even though we do not know how they should be 
answered?
10. Hamann's and Paul's experience of reversal or rather transformation 
in their understanding of wisdom and power: "... For the foolishness of 
God is wiser than men and the weakness of God is stronger than men" (j[ 
Corinthians 1:25 RSV; part of the text which Princess Gallitzin had 
inscribed on Hamann's tombstone). This is not a matter of fideistic 
irrationalism or of the spiritual masochism which Nietzsche attacked, 
but of giving logic and love their rightful places in a more fully human 
life.
11. An understanding that for inclusive ethics (the ethics of language, 
belief, perception and worship as well as of attitude, practice and 
desire) ie., for inclusive grammar, more is shown or "said" 
"non-propositionally" by the whole human being than by words alone, 
(Cp. Z sl44.)
With reference to (4) above, the lecture raises significant questions 
concerning relations between facts and relative values, and between 
relative and absolute values. It is left undecided whether value-free 
facts or relative values are more basic, or whether there is and should 
be some sort of equilibrium between these two interpretations. It is 
also left undecided whether relative values are relative to value-free 
facts or relative to absolute values, or whether, here also, there 
should be or is some sort of balance. Even if Wittgenstein did not plan
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these ambiguities, or even if he did not care about or notice them, they 
remain significant for what they show about the dialectical tendencies 
of his thinking. Furthermore, they point to Wittgenstein's approaching 
realisation that the language-world of his early logic is not purely a 
matter of value-free facts, but a matter of a world tailor-made for, as 
well as by, that logic. Concepts and descriptions are never matters of 
"immaculate perception" (Nietzsche Zarathustra, part two, chapter 15) 
but are always selective and instrumental (Investigations throughout). 
Hence concepts and/or descriptions, abstracted from the ethics of 
inclusive grammar, cannot rightly or successfully be used as foundations 
of the tower of "pure" knowledge or reason.
7.14 EXPERIENCES OF ABSOLUTE VALUE
Wittgenstein's first-described experience of absolute value is first 
called "wonder at the existence of the world", and "my experience par 
excellence". Any member of the Vienna Circle who chanced to overhear 
this might notice the similarity with Heidegger's 1928 Freiburg 
inaugural lecture, entitled What is Metaphysics?, and wonder how he and 
his Viennese friends could have seen in Wittgenstein one of their 
allies. (Compare WVC p68 (30 December 1929) for Wittgenstein on
Heidegger. Gilbert Ryle, who reviewed Heidegger's Being and Time (1927) 
with considerable enthusiasm in Mind (1929) , would certainly have been 
intrigued. The convergences between Heidegger and Wittgenstein in 1929 
have been discussed by Michael Murray (1978) pp80-83. Heidegger's
inaugural lecture was published in 1929).
For Heidegger, the Nothing which reveals itself in human anxiety 
concerning the finitude of human being in the world, against the 
background presence of the infinite, is the reverse side of the numinous
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mystery of Being which reveals itself in human wonder and awe. This
experience, which Wittgenstein refers to as "what Heidegger means by
being (?Being) and anxiety" and as feeling "the urge to run up against 
the limits of language" (WVC p68, as noted by Waismann. Compare
McGuinness's note 25, loc.cit), gives rise to what Heidegger considers
the most basic question of thought, "Why is there something and not 
rather Nothing/nothing?" Wittgenstein says that when "I wonder at the 
existence of the world ... I am inclined to say 'how extraordinary that 
anything should exist' or 'how extraordinary that the world should 
exist'". For Wittgenstein, such expressions of wonder cannot properly 
be made into questions, for - at least according to his early doctrine - 
where there can be no answer, there can be no question. (Cp. CV 85.)
Wittgenstein, in effect, further differentiates himself from Heidegger 
when, later in LE, he says, not just that his experience of wonder is, 
he believes, "exactly what people were referring to when they said that 
God created the world" (LE 10) , but also that the existence of language 
itself expresses (the experience of seeing) the world as a miracle or as 
the absolute miracle. Hence, language does not have to be strained or 
forced against the limits of the world, at least in Heidegger's more 
extreme "archaic" style, in order to experience the absolute mystery and 
wonder of the world.
In fact, Wittgenstein's awe (cp. "awe" in Kraus's Two Runner's, op.cit) 
is a descendant of the awe of many Romantic poets and of the Goethe who 
writes, "So, waiting, I have won from you the end:
God's presence in all elements."
Heidegger's later concern with interpreting the poetry of Holderlin 
should not be forgotten, nor should the Wordsworth who wrote of:
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"A presence that disturbs me with the joy 
Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime 
Of something far more deeply interfused.
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,..."
(Tintern Abbey 1:88)
The dialectical character of Heidegger's thinking of Being/Nothing is 
most clear in the following passage: "Being is both utterly void and
most abundant, most universal and most unique, most intelligible and
most resistant to every concept, most in use and yet to come, most 
reliable and most abyssal, most forgotten and most recalling, most said 
and most reticent . .. Perhaps Being itself does not trouble itself 
about the contradictions of our thought". (Heidegger Nietzsche vol 4, 
p201). This belongs in the tradition of dialectical concepts of the
sublime. Wittgenstein’s own sense of wonder develops in the direction
already discussed in this chapter. It is less backward-looking, more
worldly and more simple than Heidegger’s wonder.
Wittgenstein’s two other types of experience of absolute value are again 
as much religious as they are ethical. The "experience of feeling 
absolutely safe" is one that he also knows (LE 8) and which "has been j
described by saying that we feel safe in the hands of God" (LE 10) . 1
IWittgenstein does not enlarge on this here. However, it can be read as |
a deep expression of the inclusive grammar of the way and the goal, as ]
can both the experience of absolute wonder and the third type of j
experience Wittgenstein mentions, that of absolute guilt.
The experience of absolute wonder is experience of the world, or of |
particulars in the world, within the inclusive grammar of Jewish and ,i
Christian theological tradition. In this sense it is permissible to j
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speak of experience of the world in God, but also of God in the world. 
The world and God are related as way and goal.
The experience of absolute safety is what Wittgenstein believes people 
have described by saying, "We feel safe in God’s hands". Wittgenstein's 
earliest known attempt to interpret the grammar of salvation has already 
been mentioned. Through the vivid representation of an experience in an 
otherwise apparently undistinguished play, seen years before his wartime 
encounter with Tolstoy and the Gospels, Wittgenstein first tried reading 
the grammar of salvation in the manner of an uncritical idealism, for 
which the threatening world, to which I or we belong, becomes (when 
regarded in the right way) the world which belongs to us or to me, in 
such a way that all menace is safely transcended: "Nothing can happen to 
me" - ie., nothing that matters can happen to me apart from "my" will or 
"our" will. However, as has been argued throughout this thesis, 
Wittgenstein’s understanding of salvation developed beyond Schopenhauer 
in many respects. In November 1929, his understanding was on the way 
towards the later developments which are expressed in notes (now sampled 
in CV) from the later 1930s and 1940s. Some of these passages will be 
considered in the final chapter.
For November 1929, a highly specific interpretation can be given of "We 
feel safe in God’s hands". It is not possible to prove that 
Wittgenstein intended this interpretation. However, it is not just as 
if it cannot be shown that he did not intend it, but rather that it 
coheres well with his later thinking, as he anticipates it in this 
lecture. (Compare chapter 8).
This interpretation begins from the introductory parable of the way and 
the goal. It is therefore, consistent with what has been argued
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throughout this chapter in general, and thus consistent with what has 
been argued about the experience of absolute wonder. We have already 
considered Wittgenstein’s concern with Lessing’s story of God’s two 
hands. In response to Lessing, Wittgenstein in effect points to 
Augustine and Kierkegaard, as well as to his own thinking, on the 
belonging together of the way and the goal. To accept and trust this 
inclusive grammar means to feel safe in God’s hands - both his left and 
his right hand together. Kierkegaard recognised this in his insistence 
that the means and the end are equally important in and for eternity, 
and in his equivalent insistence that the true "How" (genuine 
subjectivity) belongs together with the true "What" (genuine 
objectivity). Kierkegaard of course took Lessing seriously as a 
conversation partner.
Now, both Kierkegaard and Lessing are virtually certain to have known, 
as Wittgenstein may not have known, the early Christian history of the 
metaphor of being safe in God’s two hands. For Irenaeus, with his 
passionate and deep anti-gnosticism, the Word of God and the Spirit of 
God are God's two hands. Moreover, it is already clear from the New 
Testament that the living Word of God made human flesh and the Holy 
Spirit, as Lord and Giver of life (as of intercession, advocacy, 
interpretation and personal appropriation of - or participation in - the 
living Word and so of written words) belong together in the work and 
mysterious reality of God, as Irenaeus, Augustine, Pascal (truth and 
love) and Kierkegaard - as well as Wittgenstein - were to recognise.
These hands of God are hands in which it would be appropriate to feel 
safe, true hands as opposed to the crushing or feeble means of handling, 
holding, helping and handing-on (the concept of tradition) by which 
others so often caricature his hands. There is, for example, one
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"Augustinian" tradition for which the left hand of God is the sinister 
hand of violence and wrath as manipulated by political powers against 
the allegedly reprobate. (Compare the above paragraph with Roger 
White’s Notes on analogical predication and speaking about God in 
Hebblethwaite and Sutherland 1982).
It should be noted that there is no difficulty of principle involved in 
differentiating between experiences of absolute wonder and experiences 
of absolute safety, even though they are both to be understood as 
experiences guided and given by inclusive grammar. In traditional 
terms, there is the wonder characteristic of creation and providence, 
and the wonder characteristic both of already experienced reconciliation 
and of still hoped-for fulfilment of salvation. A sense of salvation 
may be understood in terms of restoration, but also renewal, development 
and future fruition of that sense of wonder already evoked or prepared 
in terms of creation and preservation.
Wittgenstein’s third type of experience of absolute value is that of 
absolute guilt. This is to be understood precisely in line with the 
first two types of experience. It is only as one wakes up to inclusive 
grammar that one can become more aware of the significance of betrayals 
of inclusive grammar. "A confession has to be a part of your new life" 
(CV 18, 1931, and CV 45-46, 1944). Engelmann reports how Wittgenstein 
often quoted, full of enthusiasm, the words spoken by Dimitri Karamazov, 
in awareness of his guilt. In a standard English translation of 
Dostoevsky’s magnum opus, the words Wittgenstein often quoted are: 
"Glory to the All-Highest in excelsis. Glory to the All-Highest in me". 
(David Magarshack’s Penguin translation, p.118). Engelmann’s version of 
Wittgenstein’s quotation has "- also within me". The notion of the 
glorification of God "also" in the confession of sin is central to
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Judaism. Compare "... all have sinned and fallen short of the glory of 
God ..." (Romans 3:23 RSV). Absolute guilt is the guilt of betrayal of 
the glory known in the absolute wonder of the first two types of 
experience to which Wittgenstein refers. For Wittgenstein to surrender 
to the temptations of scientism would be for him to incur absolute 
guilt. See his references to trickery and cheating.
The absolute or inclusive sense of guilt, as the betrayal of absolute 
wonder, has, all too often, been confused with quite different senses of 
guilt. See, for example, William James’ already considered discussion 
of notions of the last judgement, and Harry Guntrip’s 
Nietzschean-Christian awareness that human beings often prefer to feel 
guilty but strong (through false, unjust or unreasonable 
self-accusation) rather than innocent but weak. Experiences of the 
abused, the violated and the bereaved provide examples. (Guntrip 1964). 
Wittgenstein’s grammatical interpretation of three types of absolute 
experience is both profoundly humane and profoundly coherent.
It cannot justly be argued that such grammatical interpretation amounts 
"only" to a reduction of theology and metaphysics to "mere" human 
grammar, if it is fair to argue that such interpretation not only raises 
grammar up to the level of (well-formed, well-forming) metaphysics and 
theology, but also applies - and must be applied - comprehensively and 
coherently. Such is, in part, the task of the final chapter.
The present consideration of Wittgenstein’s Lecture on Ethics may 
fittingly be given a provisional end in terms of two remarks from 
Augustine. The first, mistakenly attributed by Henry Chadwick (1986) to 
Confessiones 1.10, becomes intelligible in the light of the distinction 
between inclusive and exclusive grammar. While the correct source in
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Augustine has not been located, the remark expresses Wittgenstein's 
attitude at the end of his lecture; "It is better to find God by "not 
finding" him, than, by "finding", not to find him". (Inner 
quotation-marks added) . The other remark is one of many in Augustine 
which confirm the general correctness of Wittgenstein’s reading of "Et 
vae tacentibus de te, quoniam loquaces muti sunt" (Confessiones 1.4). 
It also fits the end of the Lecture on Ethics, as well as the spirit in 
which Wittgenstein spoke in 1930 and in 1949 (loc.cit) of how he would 
have liked to dedicate his life-work to the glory of God: "... let us 
sing the song of a longing heart: for one who truly longs, sings within, 
even if silent; one without such longing, however resounding for human 
hearers, for God is voiceless". (Commentary on Psalm 87 (EVs) - the 
same psalm concerning which Augustine writes: "Rex ipsius civitatis se 
fecit viam").
Chapter Eight:
Truth and love transposed
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CHAPTER EIGHT
TRUTH AND LOVE TRANSPOSED
The Structure of Chapter Eight
8.1 Opening summary for chapter eight
8.2 Going beyond the limits of exclusive logic and language
8.3 Euthyphro revisited
8.4 Wittgenstein’s trinitarian thinking
8.5 Prayer and shared responsibility
8.6 The grammar of Jesus as crucified and risen Lord
8.7 Among and beyond the shadows of exclusive grammar
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8.1 OPENING SUMMARY FOR CHAPTER EIGHT
In the period immediately following the Lecture on Ethics, Wittgenstein 
increasingly goes beyond the exclusive interpretation of language he had 
used in the Tractates and in the Lecture. The contrast between the 
beginning and the end of the Lecture can be understood in terms of the 
need for equilibration between teleological and deontic types of ethics 
and ethical theory. Later in the chapter, it also emerges that the 
Lecture's dialectics amount to a close though qualified encounter with 
Barth's lecture on ethics of 1922 (1924/28) as well as with Heidegger.
Wittgenstein's use of the Euthyphro dilemma makes better sense 
understood in relation to his involvement with Augustine. 
Wittgenstein's ethics develop as perceptive equilibration at work in 
descriptive ethics, and in inclusive dialectical interpretation which is 
both grammatical and theological. His grammar, which is at once 
descriptive, interpretative and evaluative, has a trinitarian character 
which relates to Pascal, Emerson and Barth as hermeneutical thinkers. 
What Wittgenstein means by prayer as well as ethics cannot be understood 
in abstraction from his Augustinian and Jewish grammar.
Wittgenstein's apparent reading of Barth's Church Dogmatics on language 
as action and acknowledgement, on Luther’s dialectics, the Holy Spirit 
and Christian experience, etc., is used as a key to interpret 
Wittgenstein on the grammar of Jesus as crucified and risen Lord. 
Wittgenstein's criticism of the exclusiveness of Augustinian theories of 
language-development and of predestination amounts to a convergence with 
Barth’s inclusive grammar.
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Hacker's position that metaphysics (and hence theological metaphysics) 
at its best can be nothing more than shadows cast by (exclusive) grammar 
is criticised as interpretation of Wittgenstein which is at once 
indiscriminately general and reductive, as well as incoherent avoidance 
of acknowledging the need for better equilibration in interpreting 
interpretations, descriptions, and evaluations, or in developing 
critical realism and critical idealism.
Finally, it is argued that Wittgenstein's theological reticence, 
especially in his later work, is not in the end problematic, in so far 
as it expresses, as it may well do, his attempt to work out the 
implications of Matthew 5;23-24 for what he tried to do and how he tried 
to do it. His attempted transformation of himself, his friends and 
philosophy into a new Augustinian movement is neither irresponsible nor 
pointless. It invites sharing of responsibility by those who are 
learning how to "Go on ..." This is responsibility for the language 
which we use and have, share and are, for the sake of active 
interpretation of inclusive grammar, within and beyond our shadowy 
partial interpretations.
Explicit reference to Barth's lecture on ethics is made in this chapter, 
and not in chapter 7 on Wittgenstein's lecture, as developing an 
understanding of their relationship is internally related to the method 
and content of justification, in keeping with the content and style of 
the whole thesis. To learn, with Wittgenstein, how to see the goal in 
the way and the way in the goal, is to learn how to see together gospel 
and law, resurrection and crucifixion, God and humanity, Creator and 
creation. Father and Son. It was a deeper understanding of the 
applicability of Matthew 5:23-24 which made it clear how Wittgenstein 
and Barth belong together, to a degree which made it impossible to 
continue avoiding explicit reference to Barth's lecture on ethics. The
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"great arrogance" which Wittgenstein had heard in Barth, and which many 
have heard in Wittgenstein, is indeed "great arrogance". Their/His 
"third (last, greatest) difficulty" (LE) is in truth the greatest, last 
difficulty.
8.2 GOING BEYOND THE LIMITS OF EXCLUSIVE LOGIC AND LANGUAGE
In both assimilating and moving on from the end of Wittgenstein's 
Lecture on Ethics it is helpful to recall a passage cited in the 
previous chapter as an important sample of perceptive equilibration in 
ethical thinking. At the end of a discussion of the perennial tension 
between voluntarist (deontic) and rationalist (teleological) approaches 
in ethics, Oliver O'Donovan concludes, "that the tension between the two 
moral languages reflects a necessary dialectic in the perceptions of 
moral agents for whom moral insight is still a task and not yet an 
achieved fact. In moments of grace we may be given the perception that 
our duty and our fulfilment are one and the same, and we may speak of 
that unity in hope and faith; but we cannot ask that we should never be 
challenged to further thought and conscientious struggle by an awareness 
of the divergence of inclination and duty" (O'Donovan (1986), pl39).
We have seen that Wittgenstein's lecture begins, in his introduction and 
especially in his parable of the way and the goal, with his graceful 
perception that duty and inclination came together for him as a lecturer 
on this theme, as a philosopher of mathematics, logic and language, as a 
Jewish thinker aiming to understand Augustine better than Augustine 
understood himself, and as a fellow human being struggling alongside 
Augustine and Kierkegaard for a richer, more coherent life together in 
response to, and in shared responsibility for, inclusive grammar. We 
have also seen Wittgenstein's lecture ending in a struggle with 
divergence between duties and inclinations belonging to that unity for
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which he hoped and in which he already trusted. At the beginning of the 
lecture we see that the door out of his false prison is already open. 
By the end of the lecture he seems at least in danger of trying to turn 
the door outwards instead of inwards, with the right kind of inwardness,
or even in danger of turning his back upon the door.
However, the end of the lecture is to be understood in the light of what 
follows it, as well as what precedes it, in Wittgenstein's development. 
"My whole tendency, and I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried
to write or talk Ethics or Religion, was to run against the boundaries
of language. This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, 
absolutely hopeless ... But it is a document of a tendency in the human 
mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not 
for my life ridicule it" (LE 11-12).
This is not to be read merely as if it were the autobiographical report
of an individual who wishes to limit the Comptean triumphalism of the 
coming-of-age of science by becoming a "concluding unscientific 
postscript" to that third kingdom of the spirit. Rather, it needs to be 
read more fully as documenting Wittgenstein's life-long inclination, 
tendency or rather passion for letting logic have its rightful place 
("... take care of itself" - NB, p2, 22 August 1914) within a more fully
human life, a life of practices in which showing and saying cohere, so
that we say what we show, and show what we say. If Wittgenstein was 
thinking, at least from his time with Russell, of both logic and sins, 
he was presumably thinking of what it meant for logic and/or language to 
be fallen and what it would mean for that fallenness to be reversed or 
overcome. At any point we may fall linguistically into exclusiveness or 
rise linguistically into inclusiveness. Consider, for example, the use 
of "we", as in the last sentence. At first this thinking may well 
appear, and perhaps for many cannot help but appear, as a displacement 
which reduces and devalues logic and philosophy. However, if this
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disorientation is worked through, it can be seen that this displacement 
amounts to transposition into other keys which enable better 
development.
The Tractatus already understood logic as the ethical and aesthetic
space which lets there be the world and all that it good to behold 
within it. However, logic and language were still interpreted with a 
degree of unjustified and unjustifiable exclusiveness which was not 
recognised as such: "The basic evil of Russell's logic, as also of mine 
in the Tractatus, is that what a proposition is is illustrated by a few 
commonplace examples, and then presupposed as understood in full 
generality" (RPP (1) s38). "A main cause of philosophical disease - a
one-sided diet: one nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of
example" (PI s593) . Note that the notions of one-sidedness and of 
exclusiveness belong together. It is "... as if one were to say: 'You
may indeed leave a person enclosed by four walls a certain liberty of 
movement, but the walls must be perfectly rigid* - and that is not 
true... The avowal of adherence to a form of expression, if it is 
formulated in the guise of a proposition dealing with objects (instead 
of signs) must be 'a priori'. For its opposite will really be
unthinkable, in as much as there corresponds to it a form of thought, a 
form of expression, that we have excluded... 'If one proposition is a 
picture, then any proposition must be a picture, for they must all be of 
the same nature.' For we are under the illusion that what is sublime, 
what is essential, about our investigation consists in its grasping one 
comprehensive essence." (Z s441 - 444. Cp. CV 33, considered below).
On 17 December 1930, exactly thirteen months after delivering the
Lecture on Ethics, we find Wittgenstein explicitly contradicting the end 
of his lecture. In the lecture, he spoke of language with its
boundaries as "the walls of our cage" (LE 12) . At the end of 1930, he
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says, "Running against the limits of language? Language is, after all, 
not a cage." (WVC 117). His point is not the banal one that in, 
"Language is a cage", "cage" is used metaphorically.
Indeed, Wittgenstein’s point is, I will argue, the very opposite. For 
apparently he still (inconsistently) adheres to the general position, 
partially stated in the lecture, that it only makes sense to call 
something a simile or metaphor if we can "simply . .. state the facts 
which stand behind it", ie., without using simile or metaphor. 
Immediately before denying that language is a cage, Wittgenstein makes 
the same point about metaphor that he had made about simile in the 
lecture (LE 9 - 10).
Now, following this view, someone who says, "Language is a cage" is not 
speaking metaphorically, if he (and those who share his language) cannot 
restate, ' "Language is a cage" except by giving substitute or 
near-equivalent expressions such as, "Language has limits", "Language is 
bounded", "Language excludes some combinations of words", "Language can 
be analysed only so far", etc - if all such expressions retain some 
degree of figurative elements or if all language is held to be 
irreducibly figurative.
If language is held to be irreducibly figurative, Wittgenstein’s 
approach to these figures of speech does not work, unless it is revised 
in terms of what is relatively figurative (secondary) with reference to 
a given (primary) context. This is almost what we find in PI p216. 
However, even in PI, Wittgenstein continues to use "metaphorical" to 
mean in effect: essentially paraphrasable. "If I say 'For me the vowel 
e is yellow’ I do not mean: ’yellow' in a metaphorical sense, - for I
could not express what I want to say in any other way than by means of
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the idea 'yellow'" (PI, p216) . This has the interesting result that, 
the more we appreciate the extent to which a literary work is 
unparaphrasable, the more it becomes non-metaphorical.
Perhaps against Wittgenstein, it can be argued that it is not a question 
of whether Individual words (eg. , yellow) have or do not have a
metaphorical sense, but a question of whether sentences are
metaphorical. (The contrary view may be regarded as treating 'yellow' 
etc., as a metonym) . More importantly, "The sound e is yellow", in a 
given context, may not be fully paraphrasable as "We associate (some) e 
vowel sounds with the colour yellow", but is still intelligibly called a 
metaphorical sentence relative to, "That illuminated letter e is
yellow," and relative to many other such sentences. Moreover, this
sense of "metaphorical" is intelligible regardless of individual ability 
to paraphrase, or to judge the acceptability of a paraphrase. What 
counts as an acceptable paraphrase is context-dependent in any case, and 
is often a matter of degree rather than of all or nothing. Moreover, 
paraphrasability is at least as much to do with the abilities of those 
who interpret as it is to do with what is interpreted and the intention 
of its producer or performer.
When Wittgenstein says, "Language is, after all, not a cage" he is not 
implying that "Language is a cage" is a metaphorical expression, given 
his questionable or incomplete concept of metaphor. (His concept 
appears to be a hangover from the view of language he is struggling to 
overcome, in so far as the concept implies an attempt to maintain an 
exclusive cage wall between figurative and non-figurative language). If 
he intends either to assert or deny the metaphorical character of 
"Language is a cage" or of "Language is not a cage", then his concept of 
metaphor (if it is not idling but being seriously used) requires him to 
show that at least one of these expressions can or cannot be paraphrased
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in some acceptable style of language - call it "prose", or
"literalistic", or "belonging to some other, better related (primary) 
context or situation", if you wish. However, Wittgenstein attempts 
nothing of this kind and it is difficult to see how he could. This 
strongly suggests he is using the words, "Language is, after all, not a 
cage", not as part of what he calls "a theory" , ie., a general
explanatory picture of how many things are, but as part of an action -
or, rather, as part of a different kind of action.
Both the immediate context of his denial and its wider context in his 
discussions on 17 December 1930 show that he probably understood his 
denial as part of a new religious action, both correcting and developing 
or fulfilling his earlier religious action: "Is talking essential to
religion? I can well imagine a religion in which there are no doctrinal 
propositions, in which there is thus no talking. Obviously the essence 
of religion cannot have anything to do with the fact that there is
talking, or rather: when people talk, then this itself is part of a
religious act and not a theory. Thus is also does not matter at all if 
the words used are true or false or nonsense. In religion talking is 
not metaphorical either; for otherwise it would have to be possible to 
say the same things in prose. Running against the limits of language? 
Language is, after all, not a cage. All I can say is this: I do not
scoff at this tendency in man; I hold it in reverence. And here it is
essential that this is not a description of sociology but that I am 
speaking about myself. The facts of the matter are of no importance for 
me. But what men mean when they say that 'the world is there* is 
something I have at heart" (WVC 117-118, Cp LE pp6-12).
Here Wittgenstein, while seeing that he must now reject the cage of the j
i
language-game of the Tractatus, is clearly still struggling with the |
i
cage. For his earlier religious speech-act, his Tractarian religion I
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without "doctrinal propositions" and without "talking" as interpreted 
within that cage, is still regulating him so that he says, "All I can 
say", ie., I can only say I do not scoff at, but reverence this
tendency. What he is seeking for is, not just not a sociological
description, and not just not a description of himself and his 
(universally human) tendency, but essentially not a description in the 
exclusive Tractarian sense at all.
This is why it now "does not matter at all" if the words used are true 
or false, or neither true nor false, when all these terms are being used 
within the language-world or cage of the Tractatus. It is not in 
"religion" in some exclusive, non-Jewish, non-Christian sense, and not 
in "religion" interpreted as some alien phenomenon deformed by a 
philosophical Procrustean bed, that Wittgenstein claims this "does not 
matter at all". It is in Wittgenstein's own developing inclusive 
religious grammar that it "does not matter at all if the words used are 
true or false or nonsense." Within the cage we can now see in the 
Tractatus, that remark would be heretical. It is Wittgenstein himself
rejecting the cage of the Tractatus and inheriting his more mature
voice. Here he anticipates his late parable of the river and its bed 
and banks (OC ss 94-99).
I
Both these cage-rejecting remarks of 1930 and the river parable of |
I
1949-51 relate to David Pears' insight into the continuous line of !
descent from the Tractatus position, that a proposition as a linguistic |
picture cannot picture its own method of projection, to the I
Investigations position, that a rule or a set of rules cannot alone I
decide its own application. (Pears 1987, pp 115-152, etc). i
Compare the classical Jewish critique of (the misuse of Images as) idols i
and the related freedom (parrhesia) in the use of linguistic imagery in
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the Jewish scriptures. This freedom belongs to the meaning of the 
prohibition against misuse of the name of God. Compare the related 
Christian freedom in reading the Jewish scriptures in general and Torah 
in particular in terms of using the law lawfully, according to its 
becoming fulfilled in the law of love. (This is a major theme of the 
Confessiones. This freedom belongs to the meaning of the prayer, 
"Hallowed be thy name").
Compare Wittgenstein, thinking of the Gospels: "Christianity ... says 
Here you have a narrative, don't take the same attitude to it as 
you take to other historical narratives! Make a quite different place 
in your life for it. - There is nothing paradoxical about that!” : Ie.,
"... believe, through thick and thin, which you can do only as the 
result of a life” (CV 32, 1937; sequence revised). See also: "... a 
picture which is at the root of all our thinking is to be respected and 
not treated as a superstition" (CV 83, 1949). If a picture, or a story, 
or a name plays a genuine part in the language-game of developing more 
inclusive thinking, if it lends itself in active service to the way and 
goal of inclusive grammar, it is to be regarded not with scorn but with 
reverence.
Propositions cannot capture exclusively the essence of inclusive 
religion or inclusive grammar; they can show it by being used less 
one-sidedly, more dialectically, ie., in moving towards better 
equilibration. Religion, theology, metaphysics and spirituality which 
forget this, or even fail to learn it, are what Wittgenstein diagnoses 
as "talking", "doctrinal propositions", "chattering" (cp., his 
translation of "loquaces" in Confessiones 1.4 as "chatterboxes"), which 
has nothing to do with the essence of inclusive religion and grammar. 
In this sense, too, it "does not matter at all if the words used are
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true or false or nonsense", as none of them succeed in hitting the nail 
right on the head.
Thus, Wittgenstein can read Augustine's warning as a two-edged sword, 
cutting against idle theology, in which language is idling, as well as 
against the silence of idle theologians, in which the silence of idle 
language-users is audible: et vae tacentibus de te, quoniam loquaces
muti sunt" (loc.cit). For Wittgenstein, too, language and 
language-users are idle if they are neither explicitly nor implicitly 
theological, given the equation of inclusive theology and inclusive 
grammar. (Compare PI s373, sl32, s38, CV 35 ("idle" and "Resting"; cp 
Confessiones 7.6 and Ephesians 4:14 ff) WVC 68-69).
In 1929 Wittgenstein could allude to these insights in the vividly 
colloquial Austrian village idiom of, "What, you swine, you want not to 
talk nonsense! Go ahead and talk nonsense, it does not matter" (WVC 
69). In 1947 he could again allude to the warning of Confessiones 1.4, 
in language less prejudiced against pigs but no less vigorous or rich in 
its reverberations for German speakers: "Don't for heaven's sake, be
afraid of talking nonsense ! But you must pay attention to your
nonsense: Scheue Dich ^  nicht davor, Unsinn zu reden! Nur musst Du 
auf Deinen Unsinn lauschen" (CV 56), Winch's perceptive translation of 
this Augustinian aphorism may be heard as recognising the German 
language's echoes of Luther and Nietzsche in the underlined "ja". 
"Unter und hber dem Nein das tiefe, heimliche Ja: deeper than the No, 
and above it, the deep, mysterious Yes". (Luther, EA 11, 120. Here
Luther expresses the Christian perception of the sublime, as in Paul's 
acknowledgement of Christ as God's "Amen", in 2 Corinthians 1: 17-20
ff.) Compare what Nietzsche call his "Yes and Amen Song" (Zarathustra 
3.16) or his "Drunken Song" (Zarathustra 4.19).
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See also Karl Kraus:
"Nicht Gott, nur allés leugn’ich, was ihn leugnet,
Und wenn er will, 1st allés wunderbar:
Not God, I deny, but whatever denies him.
If he wills it, it is altogether wonderful."
(Quoted by Erich Heller (1961) p223). Kraus' "altogether wonderful" 
relates, not just to the intentionally unambiguous ambiguity of his 
lines but to what Wittgenstein calls his own experience par excellence, 
the experience of absolute wonder at the world in language, in which 
prepositional exclusiveness in the world is overcome by inclusive 
grammar.
It is worth recalling here, not only the Lecture on Ethics and all of 
Wittgenstein's other "wonder" sayings - including his final words - but 
also his sayings about how he would have liked to dedicate his work to 
the glory of God. Both of these sayings (PR Foreword and RW 168) are 
readable as Augustinian riddles. (Riddle is a related meaning of the 
New Testament word translated as parable). Both use the grammatical 
form: I would (have) like(d) and both refer to the will which is
good/God's. Both, by referring to the "glory of God", recall what 
Wittgenstein called his experience par excellence (LE 8). In virtue of 
Wittgenstein's acknowledgement of Kraus' influence on his own Jewish 
interpretative work of "clarification with COURAGE" (sic: CV 19, 1931), 
it seems reasonable enough to conjecture that Kraus' just-quoted lines 
on what is "altogether wonderful" belong to the background of both the 
Foreword to PR of November 1930 (cp. CV pp5-10) and the letter, probably 
from Fr Ludwig Hansel, in 1949 (RW 168).
Hansel was well-placed to understand Kraus' influence on Wittgenstein, 
and so to write hoping Wittgenstein's work will go well, "if it should 
be God's will". Moreover, this would not be a pious platitude, and
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would justify Wittgenstein’s response, "Now that is all I want", as well 
as his reference to Bach’s dedication. It is easy to see why 
Wittgenstein would refer here to Bach rather than to Kraus. While being 
deeply influenced by Kraus, he had long felt that Kraus was vain. See 
the Foreword to PR, against vanity. Compare McGuinness (1988) p281 and 
note 53 for Wittgenstein’s attack on Kraus and Krausians' vanity. See 
Kraus (1986) p33 for what looks like a splendidly perceptive reply from 
Kraus: "If someone calls me vain and mean, I know that he trusts me and 
has something to confess to me." Compare also the terms of 
Wittgenstein’s praise for Bach ("humility", "enormous capacity for 
suffering", "strength" and "industry") with the terms of his criticism 
of Kraus and of himself (CV 12, 19 (- lacking courage?) 23, 65, 66 and 
perhaps the Krausian self-epitaph of CV 87).
Wittgenstein could have mentioned Kraus, as well as Heidegger, 
Kierkegaard and Augustine, as someone sharing the urge to run up against 
the limits of language. Kraus too shares the sense of wonder at the 
world in language; also the use of paradox in his aphorisms and 
dialectical use of half-truths and one-and-a-half-truths in the movement 
of equilibration which is altogether, inclusively, both way and goal. 
See Kraus' Two Runners, already quoted.
We have just seen at least some of the reasons why Wittgenstein was also 
disappointed with Kraus, as well as trusting him and having something to 
confess to him (Cp Kraus 1986, loc.cit). These considerations, taken 
together, help to explain how Kraus can stand in for Heidegger, James, 
Kierkegaard, Pascal, Augustine, Paul, and other interpretative ’’Jewish" 
thinkers, all of whom practice dialectical equilibration or criss-cross 
(transformative) description, in Wittgenstein's 1931 list of influences 
(CV 19). These considerations also help to explain why Kraus, as a 
disappointing speaker of "the word of deliverance" (what Wittgenstein
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heard in Tolstoy, as he told Ficker, and what he tried to speak, or 
serve, as a preparer of the way, in all his philosophical work) is not 
included with Heidegger, Kierkegaard and Augustine in the discussion of 
30 December 1929 (WVC pp68-69).
Heidegger is acknowledged there for reasons already mentioned (see 
chapter seven). Kierkegaard and Augustine may be acknowledged as more 
passionate practitioners of the way, while Augustine may be acknowledged 
as the strongest, most lasting and deepest of the influences named on 30 
December 1929. For all three (Heidegger, Kierkegaard and Augustine), 
the urge to run up against, or to go beyond, the limits of language is, 
of course, not precisely the urge to break out of the language-cage of 
the Tractatus itself - unless one recognises the Tractatus as a 
culmination (perhaps the culmination, in view of the Tractatus' 
relationship to the Investigations and to Wittgenstein's whole 
life-longing and subsequent influence) of the tendencies towards 
exclusive interpretations of language which became prominent in 
Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, flowed through Augustine (with their 
antidote), and went on to achieve dominance through David Hume, Immanuel 
Kant and others.
The aspiration to a revisionary account of the history of thinking and 
language on this scale is shared by Heidegger. Compare Wittgenstein's 
references to Plato, in CV ppl4-15, etc. Plato as the theologian of 
eros and philia, as interpreted by the neoplatonic family (with its 
Christian (Eastern and Augustinian), Jewish and Islamic branches, and 
its relations with other families of ancient spirituality and of modern 
hermeneutic dialectics) is another - but not totally other - matter, 
Heidegger also shares with Wittgenstein a commitment to the significance 
of what William James called "ontological wonder" - close to what 
Heidegger means by Being - (Varieties, Lectures 11-13, p276. On
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Nietzsche and James, as well as Bergson and Husserl, as sources for 
Heidegger, cp. Craig 1987 chapters 5-6). Finally, Heidegger and 
Wittgenstein have in common, for all their conspicuous differences, the 
facts that - while they have considerably influenced or intrigued 
theologians - not only has their own religious thinking been found 
elusive in the extreme, but also they found it difficult to articulate 
because of the institutionalised legitimation given, especially in the 
first half of the century, to accounts of religion in terms of what 
Heidegger called onto-theology, what Wittgenstein called theory and/or 
idle metaphysics (or worse) and what this thesis has called neognostic, 
deistic theology and metaphysics. This helps to explain Wittgenstein's 
angry scorn for scientistic apologetics for religion. (See also 
Nicholas Lash (1988) on "deism" and "theism"),
For Heidegger the effably ineffable experience of Being/Nothing within |
ontological anxiety/ontological wonder is the new and yet old language |
in which he runs up against, and perhaps breaks through, the barriers of I
a linguistic exclusiveness which may also be diagnosed as i
foundationalism or fundamentalism with reference to belief, language,
knowledge and meaning. Such fundamentalism decrees that this sample of 
language, knowledge, belief or meaning, and no other, is capable of 
regulating our efforts to communicate, know, understand and explain.
For Wittgenstein, as for Kierkegaard, Pascal and Augustine, such 
fundamentalism (and the scepticism which colludes with it) is best put 
in its place - all things considered - by the way and the goal of
equilibration which is regulated by the central dialectic of Judaism and 
Christianity.
This is the dialectic of which Judaism and Christianity stammer, but 
also the dialectic which they embody in their relations, first of all 
with each other, and then with all others. Each, excluding the other.
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finds it has excluded itself. Each, Including the other, finds it has 
included itself. Each needs to become both interpreter and interpreted 
for the other, and in this mutual interpreting to find themselves 
together in the image of the Holy One, the way and goal, judged judge, 
servant lord, victim and victor of inclusive grammar.
For Augustine and for Kierkegaard, the paradigmatic self-interpreting of 
the Holy One, ie., his regulative centred-openness and open-centredness, 
is actively present in and shared through the sorrow and joy, torment 
and glory of a single human being, who is in himself the togetherness of 
Jews and Christians. For Kierkegaard, this is the central paradox which 
Hegelian systematisers do not take seriously enough, in taking 
themselves too seriously. For Augustine, this is the central paradox 
upon which Platonists and Manichaeans also come to grief or joy. For 
both Augustine and Kierkegaard, as for Wittgenstein, the paradox is only 
a vicious paradox, just as a picture or a rule is only arbitrary or 
superstitious, if we abstract from its proper use (RPP vol 1, s65; PI 
sl82, PR(2) sl4, p59, CV p61 and p83). The Christian paradoxes of God 
as Trinity, of death/resurrection and incarnation/reconciliation are 
paradoxes of inclusive grammar.
Thus John Calvin can write, not that the world’s good-standing is 
grounded in God’s arbitrary decree or in his inscrutable wisdom, or in 
his indefeasible power, but that "The world’s good-standing is grounded 
in the joy of God: status mundi in laetitia Dei fundatus est."
Consequently, it is also possible for Calvin to write that there is no 
element or particle of the world which in its affirmation of present 
misery is not "oriented to the hope of its resurrection; in spem 
resurrectionis intenta sit." (Both passages are quoted by Karl Barth in 
his Thoughts on the 400th Anniversary of Calvin’s Death in Barth (1971) 
pl09.) When the whole creation can fall into the misery of exclusive
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grammar and rise into the joy of inclusive grammar, and is oriented away 
from the former and towards the latter goal, fundamentalism which tries 
to make everything depend just on belief, or reason, or will, or 
experience, or on some anxious alliance between these, means relapsing 
into exclusiveness. (Compare D Z Phillips (1988) Faith After
Foundationalism).
If the preceding paragraphs of this chapter appear to go too far beyond 
what Wittgenstein wrote - and that is a possible judgement to be 
considered also with regard to the following sections of this chapter - 
it should also be considered whether they go beyond the written words in 
the spirit in which he wrote. For the preceding paragraphs are an 
attempt to take seriously remarks of his which do not fit easily into 
existing, established interpretation. In the first instance, the
remarks being interpreted above are those of 30 December 1929: "To be 
sure, I can imagine what Heidegger means by being (? Being?) and 
anxiety. Man feels the urge to run up against the limits of language. 
Think, for example, of the astonishment that anything at all exists 
Kierkegaard too saw that there is this running up against something and 
he referred to it in a fairly similar way (as running up against 
paradox). This running up against the limits of language is ethics. I 
think it is definitely important to put an end to all the claptrap about 
ethics ... But the inclination, the running up against something, 
indicates something. St Augustine knew that already ..." (WVC
pp68-69).
8.3 EUTHYPHRO REVISITED
It is now time to turn to other features of the context of
Wittgenstein’s inclusive ethical-religious speech-act of 17 December 
1930, rejecting the exclusiveness of language as a cage or prison (WVC 
117), At the beginning of the day’s dictation to Waismann, Wittgenstein
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takes issue with Moritz Schlick, whom he held in relatively high regard 
amongst the members of the Vienna Circle, concerning how to interpret a 
version of the Euthyphro dilemma.
Wittgenstein read Schlick's Fragen der Ethic (1930, ET Problems of 
Ethics 1939) shortly after publication. Using Wittgenstein's words, as 
reported by Waismann, but also partly preserved in Wittgenstein's 
annotated copy of Schlick's book, "Schlick says ... the shallower 
interpretation", ie., of the essence of the good, according to the 
dilemma, is that, "the good is good because it is what God wants." The 
profounder interpretation of the essence of good is that "God wants the 
good because it is good". Wittgenstein's rejoinder is: "I think that
the first interpretation is the profounder one: what God commands, that 
is good. For it cuts off the way to any explanation 'why' it is good, 
while the second interpretation is the shallow, rationalist one, which 
proceeds 'as i f  you could give reasons for what is good. The first 
conception says clearly that the essence of the good has nothing to do 
with facts and hence cannot be explained by any proposition. If there 
is any proposition expressing precisely what I mean, it is the 
proposition 'VJhat God commands, that is good'" (WVC pll5) .
In the last but one sentence, the phrase "any proposition" uses 
"proposition" in the sense of the Tractatus and the Lecture. However, 
the final sentence does not. Consequently the final sentence is already 
going beyond the limits of exclusive language and logic, just as the 
bringing together of the religious and the ethical is already moving in 
this direction. Wittgenstein's point is that, even when put in 
Schlick's way (with a "because", which Wittgenstein omits in order to 
show - in the terms of LE - that this is an absolute use of language to 
express absolute value), the proposition "What God commands, that is
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good" looks even less plausible as an attempted explanation or 
justification than does, "God wants the good because it is good".
In PR II, slO and s 15 (pp 57 and 59) we also find a new freedom in 
thinking of "propositions as Instructions for making models", and in 
relating words in propositions with use or application, so that "Every 
instruction can be construed as a description, every description as an 
instruction". (Loc.cit). In 1947, Wittgenstein tells us that, "It is 
God’s will" is a sentence which can do the work of a command, including 
a command "which you give yourself. And conversely the utterance of a 
command, such as "Don’t be resentful", may be like the affirmation of a 
truth" (CV 61). Compare Augustine’s prayer, "Give what you command and 
command what you will". (Confessiones 10.29 (twice) and 10.37). The 
good that God commands as God, such as "Don’t be resentful", or "Don’t 
act a tragedy ... don’t enact heaven as hell on earth" (CV 14) is the 
good that he gives as God, in giving himself as the inclusive good - the 
infinite neither rivalling nor excluding anything finite (PR sl38). 
Confessiones chapter 10 links divine self-giving and divine direction 
with inclusive grammar by the concept of continentia.
If Wittgenstein’s response to Schlick, "What God commands, that is good" 
were read out of its context in Wittgenstein’s wider Augustinian 
thinking, then it would sound like nothing but a voluntarist half-truth 
(or one-and-a-half-truths) intended at best to counter-balance Schlick’s 
rationalism and at worst to replace it with a form of irrationality. 
Compare the perceptive equilibration of Oliver O ’Donovan’s Augustinian 
passage quoted at the beginning of this chapter. However, Wittgenstein 
does not just want to differentiate himself from the Vienna Circle, as 
represented here by Schlick, but also to interpret Augustine’s inclusive 
grammar by using it in his own work.
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Another passage of the Confessiones which shows the Augustinian 
background of Wittgenstein’s disagreement with Schlick is 7.4, one of 
the sources of Anselm’s ontological argument(s): "... For no one has 
ever been, or ever will be, able to conceive of anything better than 
you, who are the supreme, the perfect good ... For there is no means 
whatsoever by which corruption can injure our God, whether by an act of 
will, by necessity, or by chance. This is because he is God and what he 
wills is good and he is himself that same good: whereas to be corrupted 
is not good." (Confessiones 7.4). Compare Wittgenstein in CV 3 and in 
LE on the identity of the good and the divine. For Wittgenstein’s 
response to the usual complaints about the apparent or real Platonic and 
Anselmian confusion between Idea and existence, norm and application, 
rule and sample, see CV82 (1949) . There Wittgenstein responds in the 
way indicated throughout this thesis, which is fundamental to his 
inclusive grammar and its spirituality. Wittgenstein’s intimate 
acquaintance with the relevant part of Confessiones is further confirmed 
by his transposition of one of Augustine’s closely following points 
about evil. Wittgenstein: "Man can regard all the evil within himself 
as delusion" (CV 67, 1948). Augustine: "Where then is evil? What is 
its origin? ... Can it be that there simply is no evil? ... If our 
fear is unfounded, it is itself an evil ... In fact the evil is all the 
greater if we are afraid when there is nothing to fear. Therefore, 
either there is evil and we fear it, or the fear itself is evil". 
(Confessiones 7,5).
Comparison between Schlick’s version (or other versions) of the 
Euthyphro dilemma and Augustine’s inclusive grammar, which is at once 
both axiological and theological, ethical and religious, in loyalty to 
its Jewish descent, shows that the dilemma fits very awkwardly with this 
grammar. Wittgenstein was getting at this when he dropped one of 
Schlick’s uses of "because". If inclusive grammar is really inclusive, 
then it must include all types of "because" within the vision which it
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at once both orders and gives. In other words, the "dilemma" is 
ill-formed. Far from presenting the only two alternatives, it reduces 
and deforms the possibilities.
Our understanding of good and of God is both partial and capable of 
indefinite development. It is not a matter of all or nothing, but a 
matter of "sometimes" here, "often" there, "almost never" here, "nearly 
always" there. (Cp CV 82 on the selective sampling by which inclusive 
grammar is acknowledged and followed). It is no coincidence that the 
late William James uses "some" to explain his developing understanding 
of family resemblances (while appropriating Bergson's own struggle 
against "vicious intellectualism") in his Oxford lectures on A 
Pluralistic Universe. (James (1977) chapter 6 and especially chapter 
7) . James explicitly connects the family resemblances method with 
inclusive thinking and with Kierkegaard; see especially ppl09~117. It 
is striking that this late Jamesian vision was seminal for the 
development of Alfred N Whitehead’s later thinking. To this extent, 
Whitehead can be read as transposing into his metaphysical key what 
Wittgenstein transposed into his grammatical key. Cp. the introduction 
to James (1977) by Richard J Bernstein. James' "radical empiricism" is 
analogous to Wittgenstein's phenomenological or descriptive 
hermeneutics. They both zigzag elusively for naive realists, naive 
idealists, scientistic empiricists, etc.
Compare with James and Wittgenstein; "Philosophy destroys itself when it 
indulges in brilliant feats of explaining away. It is then trespassing 
with the wrong equipment upon the field of particular sciences. Its 
ultimate appeal is to the general consciousness of what in practice we 
experience." "In the study of ideas, it is necessary to remember that 
insistence on hardheaded clarity issues from sentimental feeling, as it 
were a mist, cloaking the perplexities of fact. Insistence on clarity
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at all costs Is based on sheer superstition as to the mode in which 
human intelligence functions.” "Fundamental progress has to do with the 
reinterpretation of basic ideas," "It is a false dichotomy to think of 
man and nature. Mankind is that factor nature which exhibits in its 
most intense form the plasticity of nature." "The art of literature, 
vocal or written, is to adjust the language so that it embodies what it 
indicates." "We ask of theology to express that element in perishing 
lives which is undying by reason of its expression of perfection proper 
to our finite natures. In this way we shall understand how life
includes a mode of satisfaction deeper than joy or sorrow." (Whitehead
in W H Auden et al, pp.343, 346, 105, 278, 77).
The alternative which lets us out of the cage of the Euthyphro dilemma 
is the appreciation of how understanding of the good and of God, as well 
as of our own individual becoming in relationship, may grow - and does 
grow - in piecemeal and patchwork fashion. This is the character of 
human and natural reality for which Wittgenstein's method(s) of 
philosophical investigation and description is/are rationally
well-adapted. This approach to the Euthyphro dilemma has been
developed, though without reference to Wittgenstein, by Basil Mitchell 
(1980).
Wittgenstein’s approach suggests that Mitchell’s development may be 
enriched by including the equilibration of rule-understanding with 
rule-following and by relating Mitchell's development to studies in 
developmental psychology and in the procedural character of knowledge. 
How we seek already shows for whom and for what we are seeking, even 
though our seeking, in its provisionality, still needs reliable revision 
and guidance. The human infant's innate procedural knowledge or 
recognitional capacity is shown, for example, in the reflex response - 
in early days - to patterns like a human face. The infant, with this
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inheritance, can and must learn much more of how to read faces, in the 
hope of finding the face being searched for in the faces that are given 
or withheld.
Such skills or skill belong(s) to the same family as the interpretative 
skill or wisdom into which Wittgenstein sought to transpose the 
one-sidedness of much in both traditional ethics and traditional 
epistemology. "The canons of art are merely the expression in 
specialised forms of the requirements for depth of experience." 
"Civilisation advances by extending the number of important operations 
which we can perform without thinking about them". (Whitehead, op.cit. 
pp268 and 345).
The later Whitehead, like the later James and Wittgenstein, was 
developing a variety of interpretative thinking. This is perhaps a 
surprising sequel to the event McGuinness (1988, pl80) reports, of how 
the young Wittgenstein received the blessing of Whitehead, as well as 
Russell, as the one who was going to revise and develop their shared 
work published in Principia Mathematica. Wittgenstein’s later 
grammatical investigations of mathematics, which left Russell so cold, 
should be compared with the later Whitehead’s remark, from his Jamesian 
America, that: "’One and one makes two’ assumes that the changes in the 
shift of circumstance are unimportant. But it is impossible for us to 
analyse this notion of unimportant change." (Op.cit, p261). This 
remark should also be recalled with reference to Wittgenstein on the 
relativity or contextual dependence of our usage of "simple" and 
"complex" (PI s46-49, etc) and on the related grammar of God as Trinity, 
discussed below. Commonplace uncertainties of writers about whether to 
use singular or plural forms of words may also be read as reminders of 
the central interpretative grammar of God as Trinity. Whitehead, too,
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can write Augustinian aphorisms: "Seek simplicity and distrust it."
(Op.cit, p354).
8.4 WITTGENSTEIN’S TRINITARIAN THINKING
The following pieces of evidence, already touched on, must now be drawn 
together. The older Wittgenstein was once asked, by fellow members of 
Trinity College, to explain how he understood what they took to be his 
theory about the relationship between "surface grammar" (eg,, the 
grammar of ordinary text-books used for elementary teaching) and "Deep 
grammar", ie., the logical or conceptual grammar which may appear to be 
the territory of a professional philosopher. (For arguments about 
Wittgenstein’s rejection of any hard distinction between two such 
different senses of "grammar", see G E Moore, 1959, chapter 11). 
Wittgenstein obliged, as if it was a matter of course and ready to hand, 
with an explanatory question to this effect: should we say that the
Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit one God, or are one God? Whether 
this was "just a clever game" or "carrying out the work of clarification 
with COURAGE" (CV 19) can be seen, at least in principle, from how it 
relates to the rest of his work and life.
Wittgenstein’s concern with God as Trinity is also expressed in a 
passage written in Oxford in 1950 among his remarks published as Remarks 
on Colour and later published separately in CV85 (Manuscript 173, page
93 = RC 3 s317): "... the words you utter or what you think as you utter
them are not what matters, so much as the difference they make at 
various points in your life. How do I know that two people mean the 
same when each says he believes in God? And just the same goes for
belief in the Trinity. A theology which insists on the use of certain
particular words and phrases, and outlaws others, does not make anything 
clearer (Karl Bartb), It gesticulates (fuchtelt: "fumbles about" (RC
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s317)) with words, as one might say, because it wants to say something 
and does not know how to express it. Practice gives the words their 
sense" (CV 85).
The whole passage, of which only the final part is given above, is 
discussed by Fergus Kerr (1985, ppl51-152). Kerr takes the reference to 
Karl Barth as a reminder of good theological practice, which it might 
be, though this is not as clear as one might conclude from Kerr. Kerr 
rightly takes account, in his first chapter, of Barth’s 
anti-Cartesianism, as expressed in Church Dogmatics volume 3, parts 1 
and 2 (op.cit, pp8-9) . It should be noted that even in 1927 (in the 
Christian Dogmatics which he later retracted, p92 f) Barth, the great 
critic and interpreter of Schleiermacher, expressly stated, and did not 
later withdraw his claim, that "it would be an injustice" to 
Schleiermacher and his followers "to foist upon them the intention, 
which of course was Feuerbach's, of making the human subject the creator 
of his determination by God, to claim their theology therefore as direct 
Cartesianism". (Church Dogmatics volume 1, part 1, first published in 
1932, ET 1st edition 1936, p241).
Barth is relevant for Wittgenstein to name in CV 85 for several reasons. 
Firstly, Barth's Church Dogmatics are regulated, from the outset in 1932 
(after the false start in 1927, which still suggested dependence on 
Kierkegaard and Heidegger) by his doctrine of the Trinity. This 
doctrine structures the whole huge (and unfinished) work, not as an 
afterthought but as the starting point. The doctrine has a grammatical 
articulation, though not explicitly in Wittgenstein's more radical 
sense, for Barth develops it in terms of God as the paradigmatic subject 
and object and action of revelation; God is known through God alone.
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Barth’s regulative use of the doctrine of God as Trinity and his move in 
the direction of a grammatical interpretation of it, intended to clarify 
the logical space of church ’’dogmatics’’ (ie., regulative teachings) as 
not reducible to Cartesian, Idealist or existentialist subjectivism, or 
to Aristotelian metaphysical realism or an objectifying Thomism, makes 
him an appropriate candidate for exemplifying better forms of 
theological practice.
This is in contrast with certain influentual strands in medieval 
scholasticism and with post-renaissance natural theology, for which the 
meaning of the unity of God is understandable quite independently from, 
and in latent if not explicit opposition to, all that is distinctive in 
the grammar of Christianity, not to mention Judaism. Barth’s 
theological practice was accordingly against the stream of what he saw 
as the disastrous ecclesiastical, political, ethical and doctrinal 
consequences of such confusion of grammar, come home to roost in the 
twentieth century.
While Kerr (pl52) believes that Wittgenstein is unlikely to have read 
much of Barth, it is clear that he did read some. Kerr thinks this is 
likely to be the first half-volume of Church Dogmatics, already quoted 
above on Schleiermacher and Cartesianism. Kerr supports this hypothesis 
with a quotation from chapter 1, s3.2 (ET p86) linking meaning with use.
Further support for Kerr’s hypothesis is offered by the five following 
points.
1. Barth’s same volume contains his radical doctrine of God as 
Trinity.
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2, Chapter one, section 5.3 on "God’s language as God’s act" relates 
directly to Wittgenstein’s stress on practice in CV 85, where Barth is 
named.
3. The same section 5, in part 4 on "God’s language as God’s mystery" 
contains material which casts significant light on Wittgenstein’s 
exegesis of I Corinthians chapters 12-13 and of the resurrection of 
Christ (CV 33, 1937, a passage to be discussed later in this chapter).
4. Chapter one, section 6, formulates in explicit contrast with 
Cartesian theologies the theme that human knowledge of God’s human 
self-communication consists essentially in acknowledgement of him, 
acknowledgement which is only realised and possible through the
divine-human communication of the Word-made-flesh. (Op.cit. p213-283). 
Compare Wittgenstein: "Knowledge is in the end based on acknowledgement" 
(OC s378, Cp OC sl96, s344, CV 16: "Nothing we do can be defended
absolutely and finally ... has to be an aim you accept"; and CV 14
"Within Christianity..." Cp K Barth’s commentary on Romans, sixth 
edition, ET 1933, pp374-385 on Paul’s Romans 10:4-21).
5, Wittgenstein, in 1940, wrote to Drury that Barth’s work, "must have 
come from a remarkable religious experience". In view of my following 
argument, it may be significant that Wittgenstein had apparently 
forgotten their discussion of Barth in 1930, when Wittgenstein said that 
the Swiss theologian sounded very arrogant. Wittgenstein did not take 
up Drury’s reminder of this (RW 146 and 119). Now, a younger Barth had 
a tendency, if not to "outlaw" (CV 85) the expressions "religion",
"experience" and "religious experience" at least to treat them with 
great suspicion, in view of their use for (and effecting of) 
psychologising, privatising and individualising the language of the 
inclusive Christian community.
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However, Wittgenstein’s reference to "remarkable religious experience" 
as a source of Barth’s writing is neither inept nor perverse if he had 
read the same first volume of Church Dogmatics. For there Barth allows 
that these expressions may also be used inclusively, in an unCartesian 
way, in relation to the dialectic of God’s self-revelation. Moreover, 
in chapter one, section 6.3 on ’'The Word of God and experience", Barth 
analyses human knowledge of God as "acknowledgement" of the prior 
divine-human acknowledgement in Christ. Barth points to the 
paradigmatic "religious experience" of Golgotha in the light of the 
Easter experiences of the disciples, but also to exemplars in the 
remarkable religious experience of Eduard BShl and H F Kohlbrügge. Bühl 
sees the truth of inclusive theological grammar in the sign of a 
rainbow, not standing on the confused "earth" of human foundationalism 
but guiding from above. (See CV 33, to be discussed. Cp Wittgenstein 
on the grammar of colours and light). Kohlbrügge’s even more remarkable 
Christian experience is expressed in a famous passage belonging to one 
of his Passion sermons: "... someone finds my skull, let this skull
still preach to him, saying, I have no eyes, yet I behold him ... I have 
no lips, yet I kiss him; I have no tongue, yet I praise him with you all 
... I am a hard skull, yet am I quite softened and melted in his love; 
I lie outside here in the churchyard, yet I am in paradise ... That 
hath his great love done for us, since for us he bore his cross and went 
forth unto Golgotha." Barth’s comment is, "Thus speaks true Christian 
experience" (Op.cit p225). Compare CV 33 and 45-46. (To be discussed).
At the centre of Barth's regulative dialectical grammar is God’s way to 
humanity which is the way into the far country of the depths glimpsed 
through Golgotha. This way is humanity's way of homecoming with God to 
God. Moreover, God’s way to humanity, and with humanity to God, is 
God’s way of being true to himself eternally, for it shares and 
expresses his eternal ways of being as Father to Son, as Son to Father,
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and as Spirit from Father to Son and so from Son to Father - as their 
inclusive unity. God the Trinity is eternally his own interpreter, 
self-interpreting and self-interpreted. He is known through human 
acknowledgement finding itself in the depths and heights of his 
self-acknowledgement. This is the dialectical grammar of all-inclusive 
complexity and simplicity, to which all relativities of complexity and 
simplicity bear tacit or open witness. What Barth does in and says 
about theology, Wittgenstein does in and says about philosophy: "Why is 
philosophy so complicated? It ought, after all, to be 
completely simple. - Philosophy unties the knots in our thinking, which 
we have tangled up in an absurd way; but to do that, it must make 
movements which are just as complicated as the knots. Although the 
result of philosophy is simple, its methods for arriving there cannot be 
so. The complexity of philosophy is not in its matter, but in our 
tangled understanding." (PR s2, p52, with variations elsewhere later). 
Note that there may be an inter-linguistic pun on "knots". German "Not" 
is necessity, wretchedness, torment, etc. The pun is there in German 
also: "der Knoten" is not "Not". Wittgenstein’s student and friend, the 
witty American-Dutch Calvinist 0 K Bouwsma, insists on the pun in his 
own variation on Wittgenstein’s style and message somewhere in his 
posthumously published works. (See the Bibliography).
Before further consideration of Wittgenstein’s most explicit passage of 
trinitarian thinking, it is appropriate to consider more carefully the 
remarkable and as yet barely noticed convergence between Karl Barth and 
Ludwig Wittgenstein. (The philosopher and theologian and logician 
Heinrich Scholz was both a "dear friend" and valued colleague of Barth, 
influencing his methodological Anselm (1931), and a student, friend, 
editor and (I believe) executor of Gottlob Frege. In the 1930s, Scholz 
and Wittgenstein communicated about Frege’s letters. (McGuinness (1988) 
WLi, p287, note 77. See also Pannenberg (1976) on Scholz). Anselm and
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so Augustine help Barth to disengage himself from Kierkegaard's 
"Augustinian" Cartesianism) .
In 1930, Wittgenstein told Drury that he had been put off by the tone of
"great arrogance" he had heard, or thought he heard, in the younger
Barth. Wittgenstein commented to this effect when the young Drury read 
(at his own request) to Wittgenstein (something Wittgenstein often 
requested, probably to develop appreciation of tone and style through 
performance) from Barth's Das Wort Gottes und die Theologie (1924,
republished in 1928 as The Word of God and the Word of Man). (RW 119).
It gives food for thought that Drury does not mention which address he 
had selected to draw to Wittgenstein's attention. The obvious one to 
discuss with Wittgenstein is "The Problem of Ethics Today" (1922,
op.cit). Drury's report of the occasion may well be a tactful 
recollection of an experience which was at least potentially 
embarrassing for himself. For the convergences (and differences) 
between Barth's and Wittgenstein's lectures on ethics are, in spite of 
any "great arrogance", striking and in need of exploration. Drury 
nowhere says he attended or did not attend Wittgenstein's delivery of 
his lecture on ethics in 1929.
In summary, both lectures are radicalisations within Kantian, Jewish and 
Christian contexts. Both are dialectical. For both, the truth about 
truth and logic is at issue in ethics. For both, the happy man is the 
man who sees his "impossibility" and accepts responsibility for this, 
instead of rejecting his hope or his goal as "impossible". For both, 
the way and the goal belong together. For Barth, this is thinkable only 
in the reality of forgiveness by God alone. For both, the first demand 
of the moral law is that we face up fully to the negative insight, the 
narrow way and the straight gate, without illusions. "We are to bend
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before the doom revealed in the problem of ethics" (Op.cit pl68. It is 
Barth who underlines "bend") . "You get tragedy where the tree, instead 
of bending, breaks. Tragedy is something unJewish ..." (CV 1, 1929).
Human "goals from the least to the highest will be of a different kind 
from the final goal" (Op.cit, pl70). "You cannot lead people to the 
good; you can only lead them to some place or other. The good is 
outside the space of facts" (CV 3, 1929). If forgiveness is "found only 
in God", God is "found only in" the sense of need, which is "found only 
in the midst of real struggle". (Op.cit, pl72. Cp CV 11, 60 and 86 on 
struggle). This means that human goals and struggles on earth have 
their relative dignity and authority (loc.cit). "Within Christianity, 
it’s as though God says to men: Don't act a tragedy, that's to say, 
don't enact heaven and hell on earth. Heaven and hell are my^  affair" 
(CV 14, 1931. Cp Romans 10:6 ff).
"We certainly cannot defend ourselves against the reproach that our 
thought is a "mere play of words" ("... only playing a great 
intellectual game which was played much better by Hegel and his school 
...") by referring to the divinity of the Logos, for what we say 
breaks apart constantly into a multiplicity of logoi, first into two, 
and finally into a limitless system, producing paradoxes which are held
together in seeming unity only, as we know, by agile and arduous running
to and fro on our part." (Op.cit. 176. Cp CV 19, 80, etc). "My third 
and last difficulty ... All I can do is again to ask you to be patient 
and to hope that in the end you may see both the way and where it leads
to" (LE 4). "There is no way from us to God .. . the god who stood at
the end of some human way - even of this (... via paradoxa ...) way - 
would not be God" (op.cit, pl77). "You cannot lead people to the good; 
you can only lead them to some place or other. The good is outside the 
space of facts" (CV 3, 1929).
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Wittgenstein’s Lecture on Ethics, as well as anticipating his own later 
development, may be seen as anticipating Barth's also. For the later 
Barth develops by learning how to take more seriously his grammar of the 
Word made flesh as God's way to humanity. This true and living way is 
always God's way to humanity before being humanity’s way to (or into) 
God, but it is humanity's inclusive way to God understood always in this 
sequence. This is a key grammatical relationship within the inclusive 
grammar which Barth enacts and expounds, following the guidance of 
Ephesians, for example, with some assistance from Hegel as well as 
Augustine et al.
It is no accident that when the elderly Barth was asked on television 
what he would have liked to have been, "if not a theologian", he 
contested the grammar of the question by replying "A traffic policeman" 
- one who helps people, who don't know how to find their way around the 
city of language, which is the city of God and humanity. Wittgenstein's 
Augustinian investigations map this city as the open city, with many 
resting-places in its inclusive logical space. It is in this dimension 
of grammar that Barth, the traffic policeman with his regulative Church 
Dogmatics, sometimes seems to "fumble about" or "gesticulate" 
extravagantly or ambiguously with language. (CV 85, read as a whole 
passage, is not just a eulogy of Barth).
While Barth always intends to speak and act on behalf of inclusive 
grammar, his parrhesia is sometimes too loquacious and prematurely ready 
for that naming of names which belongs to eschatology. But then, 
Wittgenstein fumbles with words in what are often the opposite ways. In 
his terseness, slow rumination of rewritten notes, love of silence and 
secrecy, and reluctance to name names, he complements Barth's style of 
thinking.
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The strange relationship between Wittgenstein’s and Barth's lectures on 
ethics, suggesting that Wittgenstein may have read Barth before Drury 
tried to read Barth to him, suggests a further reason why Wittgenstein 
may have wished to identify as "Jewish" his passion for interpreting 
others better than they interpret themselves (CV 19). For how else 
could a philosopher of theology as grammar and of grammar as theology, a 
philosopher of Trinitarian interpretation, avoid appearing in those 
days, before the "loquaces", labelled with a "Barthian" in-group party 
membership card? The development of Paul van Buren's career in 
theology, philosophy and interpretation of Jewish grammar, by way of 
both Barth and Wittgenstein, illustrates the point. (See Paul van 
Buren's four volume "Theology of Jewish-Christian Reality", which begins 
with his Discerning the Way 1980). Wittgenstein's anti-Augustinian 
thinking of "the election of grace" is Barth transposed into another key 
(CV throughout). The echo of Anselm in CV 45-46 is a related 
transposition of Barth.
Wittgenstein's explicit Trinitarian thinking is recorded on the same day 
in 1930 as, "Language is, after all, not a cage" and "What God commands, 
that is good": 17 December 1930 (WVC ppll5-121). Wittgenstein says,
"... But what men mean when they say that 'the world is there' is 
something I have at heart". (Cp LE). Friedrich Waismann responds: "Is 
the existence of the world connected with what is ethical?" 
Wittgenstein replies: "Men have felt that here there is a connection and 
they have expressed it thus: God the Father created the world, the Son 
of God (or the Word that comes from God) is that which is ethical. That 
the Godhead is thought of as divided and, again, as one being indicates 
that there is a connection here." (WVC 118).
Previously, in 1916, when writing of God as the meaning of life, the 
meaning of the world, as the unity which "we can call God" (NB 73),
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Wittgenstein went on to write a few days later, "There are two godheads: 
the world and my independent I" (NB 74). The thinking is closely 
related, not just to Kant, Schopenhauer, Tolstoy, Dostoevsky and James, 
but also to Emerson. The lapsed Unitarian of the township of Concord is 
the one who develops this thinking most clairvoyantly, and who was read 
by Wittgenstein at this time of war: "The bulk of mankind believe in two 
gods" "... seeing these two things, fate and power (- necessity and 
freedom: Kant’s sublime antinomy - I McP) (the question is whether) we 
are permitted to believe in unity? ("Fate" in The Conduct of Life, 
Emerson (1983) p958). "Once we were stepping a little this way, and a 
little that way; now, we are as men in a balloon, and do not think so 
much of the point we have left (ie., "necessity"), or the point we would 
make (ie., "freedom" - I McP), as of the liberty and glory of the way"
(op.cit., p955-56). "To say it less sublimely, - in the history of the
individual is always an account of his condition, and he knows himself 
to be a party to his present estate" (op.cit., 948). Hence Wittgenstein 
can write, "To pray is to think about the meaning of life" (NB 73) .
In 1930 Wittgenstein has developed this way of thinking as indicated in 
chapter 7 (The Lecture on Ethics). People have thought of the unity of 
the non-ethical and the ethical as divided and as not divided, as 
disconnected and connected. This is a retrieval of Pascal’s dialectics 
of truth and love, considered in previous chapters. Truth without love 
is not God: a creator disconnected from a saviour is not God: the Father 
without the Son is not God, The same holds for the converse series, 
starting: love without truth. Moreover, the ethical with the
non-ethical, the absolute with the relative, love with truth, are 
formulations which express the Christian dialectic of the sublimely 
beautiful: the glory of the Lord in the flesh of the Servant, the
majesty of the Father in the humiliation of the Son. The inclusive 
reality of God as Holy Spirit is shown in the way the inclusive grammar
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of God regulates the use which is the life and spirit of human words. 
As parables and active signs they may shine with a beauty not their own,
"Wittgenstein’s" regulative trinitarian grammar means, amongst other
things, that the traditional dualism or binitarianism of much popular 
and academic culture and spirituality need no longer be allowed to make 
a "Cinderella" of the doctrine of God as Holy Spirit. For
Wittgenstein's descriptive dialectics are in the service of 
interpretation, for which the Holy Spirit, ie., God as Spirit and
Advocate, is paradigmatic. The point may be explained in many ways, as 
complex knots of living and understanding are unknotted into the 
simplicity which is ordered and given by the Spirit as "Lord and Giver 
of life". (The Nicene Creed, as rule of faithful conversation).
Following Wittgenstein and Pascal together, we learn with them to see 
our need of and our opportunities for the ethics of truth and the
epistemology of love as bridges to the unified grammar or hermeneutics 
of truth and love together. This bringing together and holding together 
of truth and love, ethics and epistemology, logic and aesthetics - as 
indicated in the previous chapter - is what can be called "truth and 
love transposed" into a new key, a master key of interpretative grammar, 
which works descriptively to open up and develop the prisoners of 
deformed, underdeveloped and irresponsible languages, "To say it less 
sublimely" with Emerson, and differently with Wittgenstein, " - in the 
history of the individual", as of the groups to which he more or less 
belongs, and as of the shared concepts which more or less belong to him, 
"is always an account of his condition, and he knows himself to be a 
party to his present estate" (loc.cit). "Accounting" is ambiguous 
between "story-telling" (itself ambiguous) and "responsibility".
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For philosophical work as accountancy see Wittgenstein in Zettel s273: 
"Hardy (ie., G M Hardy 1877 - 1947, author of A Mathematician’s
Apology); "That ’the finite cannot understand the infinite' should 
surely be a theological and not a mathematical war-cry". (The slogan is 
discussed in Earth, op.cit). True, the expression is inept. But what 
people are using it to try and say ( - in theology as well as in
mathematics - I McP) is: "We mustn't have any juggling! How comes this 
leap from the finite to the infinite?" Nor is the expression all that 
nonsensical - only the ’finite’ that can't conceive the infinite is not 
’man' or 'our understanding’, but the calculus (ie., the version of the 
rules or grammar with which we try to work - I McP). And HOW this 
conceives the infinite is well worth an investigation. This may be 
compared to the way a chartered accountant precisely investigates and 
clarifies the conduct of a business undertaking. The aim is a synoptic 
comparative account of all the applications, illustrations, conceptions 
of the calculus... And this survey must extend over a wide domain, for 
the roots of our ideas reach a long way. - "The finite cannot 
understand the infinite" means here: It cannot work in the way you,
which characteristic superficiality, are presenting it. Thought can as 
it were fly, it doesn’t have to walk. You do not understand your own 
transactions, that is to say you do not have a synoptic view of them, 
and you as it were project your lack of understanding into the idea of a 
medium in which the most astounding things are possible. (Z s274:-) The 
’actual infinite' is a 'mere word'. It would be better to say: for the 
moment this expression merely produces a picture - which still hangs in 
the air: you owe us an account of its application" (Z s273 - 274).
This exemplifies what the young Wittgenstein told Russell he was 
tormented by in his thinking - what it means to be thinking of both 
logic and one’s sins: "There is no religious denomination in which the 
misuse of metaphysical expressions has been responsible for so much sin
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as it has in mathematics" (CV 1, 1929). Ie., by separating what and
how, method and meaning, the way and the goal. For a very full 
accounting for how the grammar of God the Trinity works in practice and 
attitudes, though not explicitly related to Wittgenstein for the most 
part, see Lash (1988).
8.5 PRAYER AND SHARED RESPONSIBILITY
This topic has already been touched on in previous chapters, and in the 
previous section of this chapter, with reference to Wittgenstein’s 
earliest Notebooks, to Emerson and the regulative work of the Holy 
Spirit as the one true intercessor, advocate and interpreter. The 
related terminology of accounting responsibility, response and 
conversation is also relevant. Augustine’s Confessiones is, 
overwhelmingly though not exclusively, in the form of prayer.
After the earliest Notebooks and the Lecture on Ethics with its intimate 
relationship to Augustine in his Confessiones, it is not surprising to 
find that Wittgenstein continues to stress the connections between 
prayer and theology and inclusive grammar: "A man says ’0 God’ and
looks up to heaven. Now, it is this which can teach us the sense of the 
proposition that ’God lives on high’. We might say, very roughly, of 
people whose nature it is to kneel down on certain occasions and fold 
their hands, that in their language they have a personal God ... Keller 
writes (in Der grune Heinrich) about a man who said indeed that he did 
not believe in God, yet used the usual expressions which contain the 
word ’God’ (’Thanks be to God’, ’God willing’, etc.). And Keller thinks 
that he thereby contradicts himself. But there need not be any 
contradiction in that, and we could say: what you mean by the word ’God’ 
I shall learn from what sentences you use this word in and which ones 
are meaningless for you. For I too use the expressions 'sense of a 
sentence' and 'meaning of . a word’ in certain
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contexts, yet am acquainted with no object 'the meaning of a word' and 
no shadow of an event (called) 'the sense of a sentence'" 
(Wittgenstein, manuscript 219, 6: probably 1932 or 1933. This extract 
has been translated and published by Garth Hallett (1977) p427).
Prayer in this sense is not excluded by, but includes and transcends, 
longing which is turned towards one, exclusive, supposedly more powerful 
being among beings. For Augustine and the Wittgenstein of the Lecture 
on Ethics, prayer is the longing of the whole person for the inclusive 
good which is, beyond the space of facts, unifying and developing the 
world. For, although "You cannot lead people to the good; you can only 
lead them to some place or other", nevertheless "the good ... outside 
the space of facts", gives itself as the way which may guide our ways in 
relation to the facts. (Cp CV 3). To pray, in this sense, then, is not
just "to think about the meaning of life" (NB 73) but to enact the
meaning of human life, life as representative of creation, both visible 
and invisible, life which enjoys the freedom of not having to enact some 
exclusive "heaven" or "hell" on earth (Cp CV 14).
Prayer in this sense is shared responsibility for the meaning of the
world and life, together, which seeks and asks for, finds and receives,
celebrates and enjoys the vision of the way and the goal together. It 
is acknowledgement in rest and in struggle of the infinite which neither 
rivals nor excludes the finite (LE and PR sl38). The longing for the 
inclusive good, which is learned the tortuous way, amidst the 
frustrations of exclusive goods, is both the gift and the requirement of 
the Holy Spirit (CV 42: "If you already have a person's love ..."). 
This longing shows itself, for example, in someone who would like to be 
able to, but cannot, dedicate his work to the glory of God in the 
highest and in the depths, in such a way that his neighbour may be 
benefitted. (PR Foreword and RW 168).
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The longing which is the heart of prayer according to Augustine shows 
itself in the sense of responsibility which insists on saying, against 
itself first and foremost, "et vae tacentibus de te, quoniam loquaces 
muti sunt" (Confessiones 1.4 and RW 89-90 etc). Augustine, on Psalm 38: 
8-9 (EVs) makes the point even more explicitly, and Wittgenstein 
develops it in his own way. The psalm (NEB) reads:
"All battered and benumbed 
I groan aloud in my heart's longing.
0 Lord, all my lament lies open before thee 
And my sighing is no secret from thee."
Augustine comments: "... it is your heart's desire that is your prayer 
... Are we to be 'without ceasing’ bending the knee, prostrating the 
body, or lifting up our hands ...?... Whatever else you are doing, if
you do but long for that Sabbath, you do not cease to pray... You will
be ceasing to speak, if you cease to long for it... Love grown cold is 
the heart's silence: love on fire is the heart's cry... And it is
important you should understand, too, before whom the 'clamour of your 
heart' is open" (loc.cit).
Wittgenstein makes this his own in CV 45-46, together with what Karl 
Barth describes as "true Christian experience" (loc.cit), and together 
with what Kierkegaard describes as the task of becoming a single 
individual in discipleship of the one genuinely, inclusively, individual 
human being. "No cry of torment can be greater than the cry of one
man... A man is capable of infinite torment, therefore, and so too he
can stand in need of infinite help... Anyone in such torment who has
the gift of opening his heart, rather than contracting it, accepts the
means of salvation in his heart. Someone who in this way penitently
opens his heart to God in confession lays it open for other men too...
A love which acknowledges, as it were, that we are all wicked 
children..." (loc.cit. Here Wittgenstein transposes Barth's book.
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Anselm ^ into his own key. Notice, also, the dialectic of the sublime, 
akin to that of the Lecturer on Ethics, with its greatest difficulty 
which is the greatest difficulty).
Augustine's commentary on Psalm 38 takes care also of someone whose 
torment, sense of responsibility and longing for the openness, shared 
with others, of inclusive grammar, leads him to express himself in such 
terms as: "I cannot kneel and pray because it's as though my knees were 
stiff. I am afraid of dissolution (of my own dissolution), should I 
become soft" (CV 56, 1946). It is striking that the first quotation 
from Wittgenstein on prayer in this section contrasts one who prays as 
he "looks up" with those who pray kneeling feudal-style; also that 
Augustine, as quoted above on the body-language of prayer, mentions as 
well as prostration and kneeling, the upright, upward-looking, 
upward-reaching stance of prayer which is traditionally Jewish, the 
body-language both of the expectant, confident child - holding out both 
hands - and of the adult responsibly standing on his own two feet. (See 
also George Herbert’s Prayer I on the place of both "masculine" 
militancy and "feminine" softness in the heaven-and-earth embracing 
dialectics of prayer).
8.6 THE GRAMMAR OF JESUS AS CRUCIFIED AND RISEN LORD
Wittgenstein’s exegesis of "No one can say that ’Jesus is Lord' except 
by the Holy Spirit" (I Corinthians 12:3c) is available in CV 33, 1937. 
This passage alone is an intensely rich symphonic work, weaving together 
themes from the New Testament, which are also present in the Psalms, 
Augustine, Luther, Pascal, Kierkegaard, Tolstoy, Barth and others. It 
is not possible here to trace many of these rich variations in any 
detail. However, one of the probable sources outside the New Testament 
has been promised as part of the argument for Wittgenstein being a 
reader of Karl Barth's Church Dogmatics, volume one, part one.
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The single most illuminating source, beyond the Biblical sources for 
Wittgenstein's meditation, is in Barth's Dogmatics volume one, part one, 
chapter one, section 5.4 on "God's Language as God's Mystery". The 
whole of this part-section is relevant, but the key passages centre on 
pages 207-208, which quote Luther, the theologian who retrieves 
Augustine’s hints on theology as honest grammar (Confessiones 7.5 on the 
regulative work of doctrine; cp 1.9 and 1.18-19; "O Lord my God, be 
patient, as you always are, with the people of this world as you watch 
them and see how strictly they obey the rules of grammar which have been 
handed down to them, and yet ignore the eternal rules of everlasting 
salvation they have received from you...").
Barth writes, "More than once Luther described the situation of the 
believing man as a pendere (being suspended) or haerere (hanging or 
holding fast) between heaven and earth ... (On Psalm 102:7 Luther 
writes) "But to wake is to hold fast and to look to, and long for, the 
eternal good. But in this he (ie., the Psalmist/the true believer/the
faithful lover of the good) is alone, and no one is with him; for all
the others are sleeping. And he says 'on the housetop' as if he meant; 
The world is a house in which all men are enclosed and are sleeping. I 
alone am outside the house, on the roof, not yet in heaven and still not 
in the world. The world is below me, and heaven is above me. I swing 
between the life of the world and eternal life, lonely in the faith" 
(Seven Penitential Psalms, Luther (1517) Weimar 1, pl99. I have revised 
the ET (first edition) of Barth's quotation of the psalm in line with 
Pelikan (1958) vol 14, pl81, as well as adding the "ie" note in
brackets).
One the following page (208), Barth quotes Luther again; "Luther's 
familiar but insufficiently valued exposition of Article 3 comes in
here. 'I believe that of no reason or power of my own can I believe in
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Jesus Christ my Lord or come to him; but the Holy Spirit has called me 
through the gospel..,’ (Luther’s Smaller Catechism 1531, Weimar 30(1), 
p367)." Then in section 6.3 on "The Word of God and Experience", Barth 
includes the already-mentioned experiences of Bbhl and Kohlbrügge.
The same themes, mentioned in Luther by Barth, are also at work in 
Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, in the "Preliminary Expectoration", 
for example, with its contrasting of the knight of faith and the knight 
of the infinite. It is the knight of faith who is able, from his 
higher, non-foundational grammar, to express "the sublime in the 
pedestrian". All of these themes, and more, are woven together and 
expressed for himself by Wittgenstein.
One pedestrian paraphrase and interpretation of CV 33 goes like this: 
Only the loving faith and faithful love, which is the gift and 
requirement of God the Spirit, enables us to hear and understand the 
mystery of the Word of God made flesh, to see and experience the Lord in 
the Servant - the risen, living, present and coming judge in the one who 
died, the liberating helper in the teacher and moral "paragon", the 
gospel in the law. The love which in him acknowledges us and holds us 
fast in its inclusiveness is that to which we must hold fast with all 
our powers and passions. As Hamann and Kohlbrügge knew, in their 
attempts at starting to live completely differently (which are the 
applications of the rule of faith, of the grammar of Christ crucified 
and risen) the victim of Golgotha (the place of the skull) is held 
within the hands of God the Father who says, "Sit at my right hand" to 
this Son and his brothers and sisters.
The purity of heart, or single-mindedness, or wholeness and directedness 
of life which begins to learn, and can go on learning as a beginner, to 
glimpse the glory of the eschatological judge and Lord in Golgotha, and
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Golgotha in that glory, means deliverance from the prisons of
double-mindedness. For "even me", it is possible to play with 
Kohlbrügge’s vision and turn towards finding, in and through it, the key 
to the grammar of the gospel in the Gospels.
No torment can be greater than the torment of that solitary human being
(CV 45-46). To hold on to the greatness in that torment, which takes 
"us" in its hands, is to hold on to help beyond which there can be no 
greater. Anselm’s ontological arguments are not (mere) "roofed in"
"speculation", in so far as they analyse the grammar of the faith and 
love which has eaten and drunk deeply at the same table with Augustine.
Apart from this inclusive grammar, at its heart inclusive of Good Friday 
and Easter Sunday together, "we are orphaned and alone", like Luther's
solitary sparrow, or rather as sleepers within the false prison of our
own making, "roofed in" and walled into "a sort of hell" by truth 
without love and love without truth, by the abstractions of rules 
without application and lives without direction.
"Doubt" wants to go on with its "dream" of holding the roof tightly on 
to this tomb from within. But the two hands of God’s inclusiveness, the
Word and the Spirit together, hold us and raise us. We can hold fast to
I
these genuine hands. This means no longer dreaming of the Word made 
flesh as if it were an abstract word for an estranged reality as in i
exclusive grammar. One need no longer dream of the Spirit who is Lord |
and Life-giver as if it (sic) were a ghost in (or beyond) the machine of j
the lonely, passive dreamer or in (or beyond) the machine-model which he !
!
tries to use to master his dehumanised world and language. j
In other words, "The way you use the word ’God’" no longer shows only |
what you mean, to the exclusion of whom you mean, and no longer shows }
whom you mean, to the exclusion of what you mean, but can now begin to
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show together both whom and what you mean. (Cp "The way (how) you use 
the word "God" does not show whom you mean - but, rather, what you mean" 
CV 50, 1946 - a remark against his own practice, before being a remark 
against others?).
What Jesus, Paul, Augustine, Luther, Barth and others have seen is that 
one does not have to try to stand on the "foundation" of one’s own, or 
one's community’s or tradition’s, good works - whether these be what 
pass for moral, Intellectual, linguistic, emotional or physical good 
works. Their essential feature is that they all aim at guaranteeing the 
ground on which one would like to stand (and if this cannot be done,
perhaps putting oneself to sleep). Thus individuals and cultures set
out on programmes for building towers of Babel, or for digging pits of 
Babel, in the name perhaps of scientific progress, or in the name of 
philosophical analysis.
However, given some good samples of grammatical guidance, the lover or 
believer who at first can only feel and look as if he is hanging and
swinging alone, in mid-air, as a miracle of the absurd, a (vicious?)
paradox to others and to himself, can learn to interpret himself, and 
his family-relations with others, to others, and others to himself. 
Such help via the method of family resemblances means that he is no 
longer as if orphaned and alone, but able with Kierkegaard to perceive 
and express for himself the sublime in the pedestrian, - able to stand 
upright upon the earth, even though it shakes, in responsibility to God 
the Trinity, but also able to hang, run, leap, dance, fly, swing and 
even to lie down in restful sleep.
In the freedom of the Spirit, who is at one with the Word, and who, 
together with the Word (see above re Irenaeus, Lessing, Augustine and 
Wittgenstein on the two hands of God: chapter 7) , shares fully in the 
lordship, the freedom and the richness - the kingdom, the power and the
412
glory - of the Father, we are enabled both to descend down Into lower 
levels of exclusiveness and to ascend up into higher levels of 
inclusivenes, instead of falling further into lower levels the more we 
fight against them, as prisoners within them.
It is no accident that the above sentence/paragraph has the liturgical 
fullness of the style and message of (Pauls?) letter to the Ephesians. 
(N.B. The sense of "liturgy" in Greek as "public, shared, service or 
work"). For in the paragraph above, there is a pointer to better 
interpretation of the mystical geography or cosmology of Heraclitus (on 
the way and on opposites, etc), of Plato (Timaeus on the sphere), of 
Ephesians (on the richness of the dimensions of truth in love and love 
in truth) , of Augustine (on love as the river of life and 
Interpretation), of Anselm (on the perfection beyond which there can be 
no greater) , of Nicholas of Cusa (on the unity of opposites and the 
infinite sphere with circumference everywhere and centre nowhere) , of 
Pascal (on all of the above, eg., Pensees, sl99, pp89, 91, etc), of 
Simone Weil (on Intimations of Christianity Among the Ancient Greeks), 
of Balthasar (on The Heart of the World and on Pascal) etc.
The point may be put like this. The hermeneutic circle is not a vicious 
circle because it is not (at its best), and should not be, an exclusive 
circle. It is not even just a (perhaps random or "merely aesthetic")
circular chaining together of overlapping circles, as in a Verm diagram.
Compare the circular rose windows of medieval cathedrals, Eastern
mandalas, and lotus and other flower patterns. See George Herbert’s The 
Flower. The genuine hermeneutic circle is the infinite, inclusive 
sphere.
As Emerson sees, this is the kinship between the circles of the eye (and 
I) , of atoms and sea-shells, of the movements and forms of the
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astronomical heavens, of the earth and the rainbow. For we learn how to 
approach and walk with the all-inclusive, infinitely perfectible, and in 
this sense infinitely perfect, interpretation of all things in our own 
small steps. As Kierkegaard saw, it is a matter of the sublime in the 
pedestrian.
By learning how to move freely downwards and upwards, or outwards and 
inwards, between more exclusive and more inclusive interpretations (and 
so between interpreters, interpreteds and interpretings), we are 
apprentices to, and disciples of, the infinite sphere, the supreme 
regulative principle and constitutive power, God the Trinity.
For the way outwards, which true children may freely take into the far 
country of more exclusive interpretations, and which for prodigal or 
self-righteous sons and daughters (those who are determined to be 
exclusively a "younger" brother, or exclusively an "elder" brother, 
rather than inclusively children together of the inclusive father), is 
itself the way inwards, the way of more inclusive interpretation, which 
children may take together as the way of homecoming into their father's 
open house and heart.
The way down is the way up, the way out is the way in. This is true on 
the surface of our finite spheres of interpretation which (as Emerson 
saw, as well as Pascal, Michael Walzer (1983 and 1988) and Alasdair 
MacIntyre (1988)) are also "spheres of justice". They are all finite 
spheres which may and must aspire towards, and in this longing for 
receive guidance from, the infinite, inclusive sphere.
The ancient riddle of the circle (or sphere) with its circumference 
everywhere and centre nowhere is another riddle to do with interpreting 
interpretation, a reflexive riddle. For each finite interpreter
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(interacting with and guiding others, as well as, or as badly as,
himself) is on the way of becoming at once both a centred-openness and
open-centredness of interpretation. In this way interpreters are 
gravitationally inclined towards the archetypal, eschatological,
infinite centred-openness and open-centredness. Karl Barth points out, 
in the volume we have reasons to believe Wittgenstein read, at least in 
parts, that - whatever may be the case with philosophers - for 
theologians of the inclusive community of the church, the concept of 
dogma, ie., of regulative self-critical interpretation of the faith, is 
an eschatological concept, which all believers - as theologians,
professional or otherwise - may seek and enjoy proleptically. (Barth
Church Dogmatics volume one, part one, chapter one, 7.1 on "The Problem
of Dogmatics", p309, etc. Compare Wittgenstein's analogous continuing 
concern with (the concept of) meeting again at the last judgement: 
op.cit).
This geography, cosmology or topology of inclusive grammar and 
spirituality is also a physiology, in so far as the circulating systems 
of living hearts are also, not just parables but sacraments of
interpretation. Compare "Prayer ... the souls bloud" (George Herbert
Prayer I , op.cit). Similar patterns of circulation, exchange, 
interaction, pulsation, contraction and expansion, restlessness and 
equilibration, are supplied macrocosmically by astronomy, 
microcosmically by physics, and - on the human part of the scale - where 
we are stretched, contracted and tuned, also by such pedestrian 
phenomena as breathing, walking, talking, dancing and enjoying music.
These reminders may assist in appreciating how Wittgenstein's inclusive 
grammar and spirituality express(es) both a critical realism and a 
critical idealism, in equilibration. More of what this means, with due 
regard to epistemology, will be noted shortly. In the meantime, it may
415
be noted that Pascal’s sense of the Importance of how opposite extremes 
meet again is his sense of the importance of equilibration in 
perception, aesthetics, epistemology, ethics, Christology and theology. 
Wittgenstein was moving in this direction from at least as early as his 
sense that realism and solipsism (or idealism), strictly developed, 
would meet again or converge in some future judgement which we may 
already anticipate,
"'No one can say that "Jesus is Lord", except by the Holy Spirit’ - And 
it is true". Because of the way it is true, it may take a life-time of 
struggle to let it be true, or a brief moment when one sees and accepts 
that this is how things really are and would be for an unending life, or 
a combination of this lightning and this patient clarification with 
courage.
" ’No one can say "Jesus is Lord", except by the Holy Spirit' - And it is 
true" - For, "How words are understood is not told by words alone. 
(Theology)." (Z sl44) : "You can’t hear God speak to someone else, you
can hear him only if you are being addressed." - That is a grammatical 
remark" (Z s717).
To develop responsible understanding and acknowledgement that "Jesus is 
Lord" means to perceive, and to act on the perception of, not just 
"(Theology as grammar.)" - as if this were true only in some exclusive 
sense - but also; grammar as theology (PI s373 - 375 ff) . Inclusive 
grammar and inclusive theology cannot fail to be at one.
8.7 AMONG AND BEYOND THE SHADOWS OF EXCLUSIVE GRAMMAR
One outstanding promise, made earlier in this thesis, must now be kept. 
It is time to recall many commitments, both those made explicitly to 
critical realism and those made in the manner of critical realism.
416
(Semantic equilibration applies here too). These must now be drawn 
together, and related more explicitly to Wittgenstein’s later thinking 
and to later debates about how he should be read. The cumulative 
argument of this thesis appears to come up against at least one 
influential way of reading Wittgenstein as if in a head-on crash. It 
will be argued that this crash is survivable if Wittgenstein is 
understood and thought~with radically and coherently.
Our approach converges with the following guidance: "’We use what we are 
and have, to know; and what we know, to be and have still more’ . Thus 
do philosophy and reality, theory and action, work in the same circle 
indefinitely." (William James (1977) ppl48-L49 quoting Maurice Blondel 
in Annales de philosophie chrétienne 1906). Here James reveals himself 
as becoming a philosopher of that "hermeneutic circle" which, because it 
is the circle of inclusive grammar, is not a vicious, excluding circle, 
but the expanding sphere of spheres, the Lord of lords and hosts.
What is meant by Wittgenstein’s critical realism in this thesis is close 
to Pears (1987) chapters 2, 5, 7, etc. Pears’ main point is that, while 
we can ask generally about how much is contributed to a thinker’s 
picture of the world by his own mind, and how much is the independent 
contribution of the objects about which he thinks, the two contributions 
- of mind and world - cannot be separated from each other in any general 
or systematic way. This is all the clearer when we remind ourselves 
that each individual acts and thinks in and with language and so with 
indefinitely many others; also that thinking in language or in other 
modes is itself reality interacting with reality. I agree with Pears 
that Wittgenstein gradually worked his way towards a more sophisticated 
understanding of these matters. However, the position of this thesis is 
that even in the first Notebooks and the Tractates there is an 
incipient, even though still crude, understanding of the interdependence
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of mind and world. Pears, I think, does not bring this out 
sufficiently. (See, for example, op.cit. 189). My interpretation of 
Wittgenstein's developing critical realism is also close to Fergus Kerr 
(1986, chapters 5-6, etc), Joseph Margolis (1987) and Nicholas Lash 
(1988), who explains his position as anticipated by von Hugel in his 
inclusive mysticism.
Apparently against all this, Peter Hacker, with his intensive reading 
and exegesis of Wittgenstein, concludes even in the second edition of 
Insight and Illusion that "Wittgenstein thought that metaphysics was at 
best disguised grammatical trivialities, and more commonly simply 
nonsense. Any suggestion that Wittgenstein’s philosophical 
clarifications have metaphysical consequences is a sure sign that they 
have been misconstrued." Hacker then quotes PI si18 f. (Hacker (1986) 
p335, as throughout).
Against Hacker’s approach, the following points have already been, or 
can be, offered for consideration.
1. Hacker’s apparently dismissive attitude towards Wittgenstein’s 
affinities for Romanticism means that Hacker overlooks the possibility 
that Wittgenstein's "experience par excellence" (LE), his sense of 
wonder at the world in language, and at language in the world, is a 
development of the Kierkegaardian, Romantic, Pascalian, Augustinian, 
Jewish sense of the expression of the sublime in the pedestrian. 
Wittgenstein's closeness to Schopenhauer and to Kant is at its best in 
the area of the grammar of inclusive aesthetics. This shows itself in 
Wittgenstein’s method of juxtaposition of intermediate samples in terms 
of family-resemblances in pedestrian language-games.
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2. Hacker seems to make little or nothing - so far as I can see from 
his published work - of Wittgenstein's concern with developing bis 
Jewish style of thinking.
3. Hacker appears not to see any special significance in 
Wittgenstein’s concern with sampling "theology as grammar", and does not 
consider the possibility that Wittgenstein is concerned coherently and 
single-mindedly with inclusive grammar as inclusive theology. 
Consequently, Hacker’s reading of Wittgenstein’s life-work is ostensibly 
less comprehensive and less coherent than the type of account being
offered in this thesis.
4. Hacker comes uncomfortably close to "fumbling about with words" 
(CV 85) at certain points where his interpretation appears not to fit 
well. In writing about "Grammar and Metaphysics" (ppl93-206) in chapter 
7 on "Metaphysics as the shadow of grammar", he has to rely to a
surprising degree on what is for him the ad hoc hypothesis that 
Wittgenstein is using heavy irony in certain remarks. While irony there 
is not impossible, such an interpretation can be a high-risk tactic, 
especially when part of an arguably less comprehensive and less coherent 
(and non-Kierkegaardian) reading of Wittgenstein. Certainly 
Wittgenstein was not always fully consistent, etc., but it is a rightly 
accepted maxim of interpretation that one does one's best to read
"charitably". See, for an example of Hacker’s reliance on irony, his
comments on, "Grammar tells us what kind of object a thing is" (PI s373, 
Hacker (1986) pl93 ff).
Baker's and Hacker’s (1985) careful account of different senses of 
"conventionalism" (in Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity pp338 - 
347) is not conspicuously influential in the second edition of Insight 
and Illusion (1986). Moreover, this (1985) second volume of their great
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commentary on the Investigations, dealing with rules, etc, rightly does 
not treat rules and nature, or language and reality, or grammar and the 
world, as internally exclusive pairs. Many surprising things and
people, events and processes, may be followed and understood as 
regulative. However, Hacker’s approach appears not very interested in 
developing a better ethics of belief and understanding. To this extent 
there is implicit in his approach something looking like an unquestioned 
assumption of an exclusive, deistic type of theology or an exclusive, 
dualistic type of metaphysics, both of which are classic aetiologies of 
theological "fumbling about with words" (CV 85) ,
Certainly Wittgenstein struggles to exorcise such tendencies, and
certainly he is not a horse-trader (Kraus 1986, p60) for a naive
monistic or a naive pluralistic metaphysics of language, any more than 
he is a horse-trader for the Weltanschauung of any exclusive group. 
Kraus wrote: "A Weltanschauung is a good horse. But there is a
difference between a fine rider and a horse dealer". Hacker’s approach 
ostensibly would like to throw out all fine riders, and even the
possibility of fine riding, on suspicion of dishonest horse-dealing. 
Ways of seeing the world, like horses and language, are results of, and 
opportunities for, interaction between us and the rest of the world. We 
ourselves are results of, and opportunities for, rich and teleological 
interaction between human and non-human reality.
It is not obviously wrong to read Wittgenstein as a critical realist 
when readers of him like Pears (1987), Kerr (1986), Cavell (1979, etc), 
Lovibond (1983), Newell (1986), Margolis (1987) and Bambrough (1979, 
etc) read him this way. Of course, such matters are not supposed to be 
settled by the counting of heads, even heads such as these. (However, 
compare Rom Harre (1987) on actual practices in scientific communities). 
Philosophical feeling for where the burden of proof lies should be
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responsive to attempted readings of intellectual virtues, in the light 
of the ethics of understanding, which gives equilibrating guidance to 
those in peril of being tossed to and fro, and whirled around by every 
gust of intellectual or other fashion. (Cp. Lorraine Code (1987) and 
Martha Nussbaura (1987)).
Naturally Hacker, too, could in principle, and should for the sake of 
developing the discussion, also invoke virtuous names on this deep
issue. I have to confess that I am not aware who has been or might be
so named, apart from Wittgenstein, who is at issue. This may be a 
matter of culpable inattention on my part, though at present I am not so 
aware. Naturally, too, great honour is due to Hacker, as one who is 
outstanding for his efforts and success is helping others to read 
Wittgenstein more accurately, sympathetically and fairly, in many 
respects.
For the sake of this cause of Hacker’s, the first strategy (in this 
thesis) against his position (that for the later Wittgenstein all 
possible metaphysics can at best be nothing more than the shadows of
human grammar) is that he is mistakenly overgeneralising from 
Wittgenstein’s criticism of sick, corrupt and false metaphysics. If 
this strategy fails, then the alternative is to argue that Wittgenstein 
himself, at least sometimes, mistakenly overgeneralised in that way. I 
think the first strategy is (or could be) successful, and that the 
alternative is not needed.
The second is to show that Hacker’s position reduces the scope,
subtlety, power, elegance and fruitful potential of Wittgenstein’s 
approach. It is hoped that the previous parts of this thesis have 
already gone some way towards showing this.
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The third strategy is to show that Hacker’s position is incoherent, in 
so far as it makes an exception, in its own favour, of a privileged 
foundational position, apparently value-free and non-metaphysical, but 
really an under-examined ethical, aesthetic, metaphysical and 
theological position, or exclusive family of positions. In this way, 
Hacker's position on Wittgenstein and metaphysics seems to be a 
postponing of that endless mutual responsibility for our linguistic, 
ethical and metaphysical development which is philosophy and theology in 
the light of inclusive grammar.
Pascal can be read as arguing that Montaigne did not take his own 
insights seriously enough. Kierkegaard can be read the same way in 
relation to Hegel; Wittgenstein likewise in relation to Augustine and 
Kierkegaard. In Hacker's case, it can be argued that he has not taken 
his insights into Wittgenstein far enough.
Cavell (1976) has written of the sense of vertigo which Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical work may induce. Pears (1987) has written similarly. 
Wittgenstein's insistence that the "meanings of our words are kept 
constant not by Platonic universels but by the stability of our o\m 
practices", raises the question, "But what now counts as stability?" 
This produces the intellectual giddiness characteristic of withdrawal 
from platonic or naive realism - but also - we may add - from naive 
idealism or relativism. Perhaps a more charitable reading of Hacker's 
apparent unwillingness or inability to read Wittgenstein as himself a 
(better, more inclusive) metaphysician and theologian is that such 
unwillingness or inability expresses prolonged after-effects of such 
vertigo, which are not just personal but cultural. Compare the work of 
D Z Phillips and his reception. (Pears, op.cit. ppll-12) .
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This is, perhaps, a point as appropriate as any at which to recall just 
how far critical realists can go, and should be free to go, in the 
direction of fruitful agnosticism without ceasing to be realists. From 
the area of recent professional philosophy a striking example is given 
by Thomas Nagel in The View from Nowhere (1986), a work which takes 
Kant’s antinomy of freedom and necessity so seriously as to look like a 
New England secularisation or demythologising of Kierkegaard’s 
dialectics of objectivity and subjectivity. For an example of the 
patience of Nagel’s realism, consider: "Philosophy is also infected by a 
broader tendency of contemporary intellectual life: scientism.
Scientism is actually a specific form of idealism, for it puts one type 
of human understanding in charge of the universe and what can be said 
about it. At its most myopic it assumes that everything there is must 
be understandable by the employment of scientific theories like those we 
have developed to date - physics and evolutionary biology are the 
current paradigms - as if the present age were not just another in the 
series" (op.cit. 9).
From the area of theology, both ancient and modern, many examples of 
fruitfully reconciling agnostic realism are available. This is 
practicable and coherent within critical realism which understands our 
endless mutual responsibility for developing linguistically, 
aesthetically and ethically. Good examples are Thomas Aquinas, Karl 
Barth, Hans von Balthasar (1986, etc), Eberhard Jungel (1983) and 
Nicholas Lash (1988). The space for fruitful agnosticism, or reverently 
perceptive equilibration between mysteries, within such varieties of 
critical realism, makes these varieties highly developmental. Compare 
John Keats on "negative capability".
Likewise: "... Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard take seriously the fact that I
we begin our lives as children; what we need is to be shown a path, and |
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helped to take steps; and as we grow, something is gained and something 
lost ... In grown-up philosophy, the problems we have remain answerable 
only through growth . .. What has happened is that the fact that 
something is an ’outstanding philosophical problem’ has itself become 
problematic ... And the task remains to discover what we need ..."
(Cavell 1964/1984 p232. Compare I Corinthians 13:8-13).
The first of the above-mentioned strategies is appropriately pursued by 
careful reading of Hacker on Wittgenstein. Such reading cannot 
appropriately be written up at this point. All of the previous chapters 
come from, and point towards, the fulfilment of this task. It is a task 
relatively easily pursued, to the point at which it ceases to be 
profitable for each reader. Each reader’s conclusions are likely to 
develop in mutual critical correlation with understanding of the 
alternative(s) to Hacker’s apparent curse on all metaphysics and 
theologies. (Curses invoke and enact exclusion: blessing enacts and
evokes inclusion. Compare PI s23: "... Asking, thanking, cursing,
greeting, praying ..." (See also PI s680-681). For Augustine, praying 
is the language-game which excludes nothing but exclusiveness. Compare 
George Herbert’s Prayer I , where prayer is - "... the six daies world 
transposing in an houre" ("our" - ?), Herbert (1941) p51).
The third of the above-mentioned strategies (the incoherence attack) may 
be sufficiently pursued in being stated. If not, then appeal must be 
made to the other parts of this chapter, including what follows, as well 
as to previous chapters.
Concerning the second and third strategies, in addition to any !
recapitulation that may be helpful, there is much more which could be 
said. However, at this stage of the thesis only a few brief indications 
are practicable.
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Chapter 7 (on The Lecture on Ethics) argued that for Wittgenstein’s 
neo-Augustinianism it is important to learn to understand both the 
differences and the similarities between mathematics, logic, philosophy, 
aesthetics, ethics and spirituality, with respect to the way and the
goal to which they belong, and can be seen to belong when approached 
inclusively. In other words, it is important to learn to perceive both 
the differences and the similarities between the ways in which, in these 
areas, there is, can be and should be equilibration between critical 
realism and critical idealism.
If not Hacker himself, then certainly others who take a roughly similar 
approach to his, though with far less distinction in the study of 
Wittgenstein, fail to see how their philosophical strategy calls itself 
into question. They claim for philosophy itself the possible coherence, 
cogency, salience and critical realism which they do not recognise as 
possible, even in analogous forms, in ethics or in other areas. One of 
the virtues shared by the very different work of Stanley Cavell and
Renford Bambrough is that they regularly suggest or ask questions like 
these:- Can philosophers themselves, in their philosophical work, 
survive the judgement, or pass the test(s) for truth, which they
enforce, sanction or permit for others who are practitioners in ethics, 
mathematics, aesthetics, theology, etc? Why should the alleged 
contrast(s) (- or similarities) between "science" and ethics, or
"science" and theologies apparently matter more that those between 
ethics and mathematics or between theology and logic? How does faith in 
the unity of "science" differ from faith in the unity of mathematics, 
logic, philosophy, ethics and spirituality?
Hacker certainly sounds as if he is tired with, or impatient of, recent 1
■i
debates on objectivity and subjectivity, realism and anti-realism, I
absolutism and relativism. (See Hacker (1986) chapter 11). However |
i
i
J
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understandable such frustration may be, it is still important to 
consider how philosophers, like theologians, natural scientists and 
human scientists, are tempted to require of morality, aesthetics or 
theology, a standard with which philosophy, mathematics and logic would 
not expect, or be expected, to work.
In short, the approach of this thesis in chapters 7 and 8 allows for
better balanced acknowledgement of both significant similarities and
differences between mathematics, logic, philosophy, aesthetics, ethics 
and spirituality - with regard to objectivity, rationality, realism, 
coherence, etc., ie., with regard to intellectual or epistemic 
evaluation, virtue and accountability. Those who cannot or will not see 
how Wittgenstien - in attacking and destroying corrupt metaphysics, 
theology, realism and idealism - is developing as a better kind of 
metaphysician or theologian, also seem to be insensitive to how all 
these related issues call for better equilibration. It is arguable that 
these varieties of insensitivity are internally related. It is hoped 
that the thesis has already shown how this is so. (In the above 
passages I am indebted to what I have derived, I hope without
distortion, from work by Cavell and Bambrough, including Bambrough 1988. 
Later work by Nelson Goodman (eg., 1978) and by Joseph Margolis (eg., 
1987) is also relevant).
In 1987 Rom Harre had published a paper entitled "The Displacement of 
Truth". (In Abraham and Holtzer (1987) - essays in honour of Basil
Mitchell). From the position of this thesis, his argument does not take 
sufficient account of what has been presented as Wittgenstein’s 
neo-Augustinian equilibration. His title, which it would be
unreasonable to expect to have been "The Transposition of Truth", raises 
questions such as the following: Who has "displaced truth?" "Where and
when?" It is far from obvious that the answer should be: "Harre and
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those like-minded, in this and related work". Harre in effect seeks 
equilibration between what he calls the "strict system" or the "moral 
order" of science and actual scientific practices. He does not use the 
explicit language of "equilibration" or relate his argument to 
Wittgenstein on rule-understanding and rule-following. However, he 
writes, "Between the stringency of the moral order and the laxness of 
real life lies an idealisation of the latter, made with an eye on the 
former, and it is this third via media that is usually the guiding 
system for the decisions of everyday life", ie., in science (op.cit.,
p99).
Like Cavell and Bambrough, in relation to philosophers, so Harre, in 
relation to scientists, takes seriously the phenomena of one-sidedness. 
What is sauce for the goose of "our" research programme is in practice 
not necessarily sauce for the gander of "theirs". The "truth" that is 
"displaced" turns out to be the "truth" of naive realists (and naive 
idealists), ie., of adherents to, or of those on the rebound from, a 
naive correspondence or naive coherence theory of truth. In other 
words, those who displace truth (without scare-quotes) are those who 
assume the availability of a deistic or gnostic god's-eye-view of how 
exclusive language and exclusive world, or different segments of 
idealised language, correlate or fail to correlate.
Harre writes, in his concluding section (op.cit., pl03-4); "... what you 
say is true if I, now occupying your standpoint, and sharing with you 
the bulk of a conceptual scheme relevant to the matter in question, were 
to give a similar account of what can be experienced from that 
standpoint, then (sic) what you said was true, otherwise not. The 
comparison is between your discourse and mine, apropos of a common
referent. It cannot be between the relation my discourse has to the
comment referent and the relation that yours does, since those relations
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could not become objects of comparison within a single field of 
knowledge. The comparison of discourses has the flavour of the old 
coherence theory of truth, while the mention of a common referent 
reminds one of the correspondence theory."
However, "Perhaps 1 can know we are noticing the same things only if our 
discourses are similar". How do "I" know this? Perhaps, "we can do no 
better than to notice that as members of the same community we manage to 
co-exist and co-ordinate our practical activities in a common form of 
life, including common rights and duties and a morality in which 
sincerity of reporting is a common good". (Loc.cit).
If the arguments of the present thesis are well-formed, then Harre could 
do rather better than this relativity to "a common form of life". In 
Wittgenstein's transformation of Augustine, all our relativities and 
relative absolutes are relative to the constant light and constant time 
of inclusive grammar. Certainly we cannot at one and the same time both 
use someone or something for measuring or judging and measure our 
measure. However, in spite of that, we can work towards better 
judgements of judges who, with their inclusive grammar, have been - and 
still are - judged by us exclusively. (Compare Basil Mitchell (1980) on 
dissolving the Euthyphro dilemma).
Much remains to be done, which could help to test further the cumulative 
argument of this thesis, but which is not practicable at present. For 
example, Wittgenstein's fascination with Goethe's History of the Theory 
of Colours and his own patient investigations of the grammar of colours 
and light should be fruitful for further evaluative work. Again, 
Wittgenstein's explicit and implicit criticisms of Augustine on time, 
and the revisions of Augustine on time in Barth's Church Dogmatics, and 
elsewhere, need intensive work. Furthermore, Wittgenstein's involvement
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with anthropological criticism could be a rewarding area for 
reconsideration. These, however, are relatively specialised concerns, 
compared with the wider implications of the argument, if it is found 
sustainably cogent. Happily, responsibility in and for such matters can 
be shared.
During the argument of this thesis Augustine has emerged as a doorkeeper 
at the entrance to the Investigations. If Wittgenstein's book appears 
like raisins without a cake (CV 66, 1948), or like lively ants without a 
central reference (cp. CV 62 and James (1977) pll7-118: the ant not
suspecting the centre exists, and Goethe on the deed in the beginning), 
it is only until we find the goal of the book, like the goal of the 
Lecture on Ethics, in its beginning. The book, like language itself, is 
development of the background activity. The Investigations teach(es) us 
how to re-read the Confessiones♦ Because Augustine, for all his 
mistaken theories (including "his" theory of exclusive 
language-development) is nevertheless, in this context, the guide for 
Wittgenstein's investigations of inclusive grammar, Augustine's 
Christianity cannot rightly be exclusive. The way and the goal of the 
infinite, which neither rivals nor excludes any finite being, are there 
together for him as they are there and here for others, including those 
of other exclusive religions, and those of "non-religious" or 
"anti-religious" forms of exclusiveness.
Therefore, any view of Augustine, and any view of the Investigations, 
which makes Augustine appear merely in error cannot be right. "Was 
Augustine in error, then, when he called upon God on every page of the 
Confessions? But - one might say - if he was not in error, surely the 
Buddhist holy man was - or anyone else - whose religion gives expression 
to completely different views. But neither of them was in error, except 
when he set forth a theory." (Wittgenstein, Remarks on Frazer's "Golden
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Bough" in Luckhardt (1980) p61). N.B. Arguably, "completely different 
views" should be put in warning quotation marks. For examples of 
failure to see Wittgenstein’s reference to Augustine's grammar of 
seeking and finding, see a book by one translator of these Remarks on 
Frazer, ie., J Beversluis' (1985) critique of C S Lewis, and A J Ayer’s 
(1985) Ludwig Wittgenstein, chapter 7. That chapter would also be 
improved by use of G E Moore's (1959) notes on Wittgenstein on Frazer, 
as well as those of Rush Rhees in McGuinness (1982).
Given the way in which Augustine is important for Wittgenstein, it is 
all the more important to understand Wittgenstein’s theological 
reticence. In this thesis, and elsewhere, various possible explanations 
have been suggested or mentioned. These are not necessarily excluded 
by, but are certainly put in their place by, what appears to be the most 
plausible explanation. It is an explanation which is deeply consistent 
with the grammar of Judaism and Christianity. For both, love for God 
includes love for one’s neighbour as oneself. The inclusiveness of this 
interhuman love is the criterion of, and test for, the inclusiveness of 
love for God.
In the early 1930s, when Wittgenstein was discussing with Drury "a sense 
in which you and I are both Christians", he reminded Drury that 
Christianity is not a matter of how much one says in praying: "... in 
fact we are told not to do that", (Ie. , "In your prayers do not go 
babbling on (cp. "loquaces") like the heathen, who imagine that the more 
they say the more likely they are to be heard" - Matthew 6:7-8; NEB; cp 
Matthew 7:7-8). He continues, "If you and I are to live religious 
lives, it mustn’t be that we talk a lot about religion, but that our 
manner of life is different. It is my belief that only if you try to be 
helpful to other people will you in the end find your way to God" 
(RW 114).
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Given this background, which goes back to Wittgenstein's rediscovery of 
the Gospels through Tolstoy during the first world war, a very strong 
argument would be needed for rejecting the theory that the over-riding 
reason for Wittgenstein's theological reticence is given in Matthew 
(5:23-24), the Gospel to which he most often turned. "If, when you are 
bringing your gift to the altar, you suddenly remember that your brother 
has a grievance against you, leave your gift where it is before the 
altar. First go and make your peace with your brother, and only then 
come back and offer your gift." (NEB).
Wittgenstein's otherwise puzzling theological reticence, especially in 
his later work (when his gift of parrhesia (chapter one) is now so 
evident through his notes, his friends and the implications of his whole 
life-work) is his way of leaving his gift before the place where the 
sacrifice of prayer is offered, as he acts on his remembering of what 
unreconciled others have against him. This explanation is also 
consistent with the hostile and non-understanding reaction to his 
Lecture on Ethics, sampled early in chapter seven, and his distinctive 
practice of confession to, or with, others (CV 45-46 and RW throughout).
The problem of how best to respond to the guidance of Matthew 5:23-24 is 
one with which each individual must struggle as best he can. Here, one 
must speak for oneself. Compare the end of the Lecture on Ethics and 
related remarks in WVC. The Investigations is a book unfinished and, in 
a sense, unfinishable. It is an invitation to others to continue it, as 
best they can, by learning how to read it, and to read with it; and so 
to read, and to read with, Augustine - and then to answer for oneself, 
as best one can, within the endless shared responsibility which 
Augustine and Wittgenstein assist in developing. The Confessiones and 
the Investigations are both books of receiving
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through asking, finding in seeking, and entering through banging against 
the closed door.
Wittgenstein, like Hamann's apocalyptic angel of language, reveals (and, 
in revealing, reorders, revises and raises from out of our sleep of 
wonder) the ending of Augustine's Confessiones. Within Wittgenstein's 
legacy we are given a commentary on the ending of the Confessiones, and 
so an ending for the Investigations, which may let us see the way and 
the goal together, which can let us see his and Augustine's true goal 
and true ending together:
"What is eternal and important is often hidden from a man by an 
impenetrable veil. He knows: there's something under there, but he
cannot see it. The veil reflects the daylight."
"The sabbath is not simply a time for rest, for relaxation. We ought to
contemplate our labours from without and not just from within."
"This is how philosophers should salute each other:
"Lass Dir Zeitl Take your time! (Winch) : Allow yourself time: Make 
time for yourself!" (CV 80, 1949, order of paragraphs revised).
"The kingdom of heaven is like treasure hidden in a field, which a man
found and covered up; then in his joy he goes and sells all that he has
and buys that field". (Matthew 13:44 RSV).
"- until we meet again at the last judgement", (Op.cit).
For the time being, the summary at the start of this thesis offers one 
way of trying to say it all. The summary at the start of this chapter
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offers another way. See in particular the last paragraph of that 
summary.
"Go on, believe! It does no harm". (CV 45. Compare CV 56 and the 
above discussions of: et vae tacentibus de te, quoniara loquaces muti
sunt", Confessiones 1.4. Compare how Peter Geach (1977, pp.98-99) takes 
his anonymous friend to task. Compare also the report that Wittgenstein 
said about his later work: "Its advantage is that if you believe, say, 
Spinoza or Kant, this interferes with what you can believe in religion; 
but if you believe me, nothing of the sort." Anscombe (1954) commented 
she did not know if Wittgenstein was right about this).
Thinking of Geach’s and Anscombe's doubts, and of the scope for 
misunderstanding Wittgenstein's riddles, is there not a case for
concluding that, "Go on, believe! It does no harm" (loc.cit) is an 
irresponsible transformation of Augustine's message and style, both in 
Confessiones 1.4 and in, "Love, and do as you like"? (In Epistulam 
Johannis 7.8). This riddle of Wittgenstein's is arguably no less 
responsible than Augustine's riddles. Given understanding of the
situation, it is arguably not irresponsible at all. For, in the end, 
what one believes does no more harm (and no less harm) than how one 
believes it. What one likes does no more, and no less, harm than how 
one likes it. How one believes and likes is no better and no worse than
one’s way of longing, trusting, praying.
There is an ancient formula in Christian tradition which equates the law 
of praying with the law of believing. Wittgenstein in effect interprets 
and applies this formula inclusively, as a neo-Augustinian: the law of 
responsible longing and the ethics of understanding are one. "An honest 
religious thinker is like a tightrope walker. He almost looks as though 
he were walking on nothing but air. His support is the slenderest
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imaginable. And yet it really is possible to walk on it" (CV 73, 1948. 
Cp. PI s87). Therefore, the equilibration of restless (Augustinian) 
hearts must - and may - "Go on ..."
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